Naval rivalry was not the only manifestation of Anglo-German antagonism. At the same time, the struggle against advantage in the Middle East also developed. After receiving the concession on the Baghdad railway, Germany worked hard to enslave Turkey and turn it into its colony. For his part, Sultan Abdul Hamid thought to strengthen his throne, which was shaken with the help of the German government and German capital.
1908 a crisis arose in international relations in the Middle East. German imperialism was all the more willing to support the despotic regime of the “bloody sultan” because in the ruling circles of the ally of the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, hatred of the Slavs grew more and more. At the beginning of the 20th century. Austrian financial capital demanded a transition to a policy of direct annexation to what they wanted, trying to seize the route to Thessaloniki - access to the Aegean Sea.
At the same time, the movement for liberation from economic dependence on Austria intensified in Serbia. Since the Berlin Congress, Serbia has been oriented toward Austria. 1903 A coup d'etat took place in Belgrade, and the Obrenovich dynasty gave way to Karageorgievic. After that, she began to focus on Russia. This event was followed by an extraordinary intensification of national propaganda directed not only against Turkey, but also against Austria-Hungary. At the beginning of 1906, a customs war began between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
In Austria, the influence of circles increased, striving, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia, to give a radical solution to the South Slavic issue. This meant seizing the Serbian regions of the Balkans and incorporating them into the Habsburg monarchy, rebuilding it on the basis of either trialism or federalism. Such an old program of the Austrian feudal-clerical and military circles. These plans were also supported by influential groups of the Viennese financial oligarchy, interested in economic chny exploitation of the Balkans.
This movement was led by the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal Konrad von Götzendorf, and partly by Foreign Minister Erenthal. It was they who primarily plotted the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied by Austria in 1878 on the basis of Article Twenty-five of the Berlin Treaty, which still remained under the nominal sovereignty of Turkey. With such an act they hoped to put an end to the hopes of the Serbian people for the reunification of these regions with Serbia. As the next stage, a preventive war against Italy and Serbia and the “annexation of Serbia” and, finally, the seizure of the route to Thessaloniki were planned.
If Germany had managed to finally enslave Turkey, and its Austro-Hungarian ally had succeeded in implementing its plans in the Balkans, then the entire Middle East with all its human and material resources would have found itself under the heel of German imperialism.
England could not come to terms with this; it always viewed the countries of the Middle East as a bridge from Europe to India. Russia could not allow this either. The subordination of Turkey and the Balkans to the influence of Germany and Austria would mean a threat to the security of the entire Russian south from the Black Sea coast to the Transcaucasian border. Russia did not want to give up its role as a deputy to the Slavs. She could not contemplate with indifference either the dominance of the Germans on the Bosphorus, or the construction of a steel track along which weapons and troops could be transported from Constantinople and even directly from Berlin almost to the Armenian Highlands. It is not surprising that, despite the contradictions that separated them, England and Russia were interested in repelling German penetration in the east.
The British government actively opposed German expansion "in Turkey. It used different ways. First of all, it turned to purely financial action. In April 1903, English bankers refused to participate in the financing of the Baghdad Railway. Meanwhile, the Society of this railway received little from the Turkish government in full guarantee of the profitability of this enterprise. This required significant funds from Turkey, but it did not have the money. It could get it only by increasing some taxes and, above all, customs duties. But due to the regime of capitulations that existed in Turkey, it did not have customs independence Import duties were set at 8% of the value of goods, which Turkey could only raise with the consent of the great powers.
However, England resolutely refused to agree to increase duties. France and Russia, despite all the tension in Anglo-Russian relations, completely shared the English point of view on the issue of customs surcharges. Thus, the financing of the Baghdad Railway, which was already not a particularly easy matter for the Berlin money market, was slowed down. Finally, England took advantage of the unrest that occurred in 1902-1903 pp. arose in Macedonia to exert strong political pressure on the Sultan.
In 1903, in Mürzstegu, Russia and Austria agreed on a reform program in Macedonia. At that time, although for different reasons, both governments were interested in at least temporarily extinguishing the Macedonian movement and preventing the Balkan cauldron from boiling again.
English diplomacy, represented by Lord Lansdowne, put forward a program of radical reforms. Her plan was designed to deprive the Sultan of almost any real power in Macedonia. Now England renewed its pressure on the Sultan, who sold himself to Germany. She again raised the Macedonian issue. At the same time, British diplomacy sought to achieve Russian support in order to force the Sultan through common pressure to change his foreign policy orientation. In June 1908, a meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas P. took place in Reval. The King was accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for the Foreign Office Harding, Admiral Fisher, and General French. Harding urged Izvolsky to support the English reform program in Macedonia.
During the discussion on the Macedonian issue, Izvolsky tried to give the English program a moderate character. He did not hide from his British interlocutor that Russia feared Germany's military superiority. Despite this, the Russian minister said, Russia must conduct its policy “with the greatest caution towards Germany and not give it any reason to think that Russia’s rapprochement with England will lead to a corresponding deterioration in Russia’s attitude towards Germany.” Harding agreed that there was no need to irritate the Germans.
He admitted that for Russia “caution is even more necessary” than for England. Therefore, he advised the Russian government to quickly restore the military power of its country. “It must not be overlooked,” said Harding, “that as a result of the very significant increase in the German naval program in England, a deep distrust has been created in the future intentions of Germany. This distrust will intensify over time as the German naval program is implemented and the increase in taxation in England is necessary "by forced naval countermeasures. In 7 or 8 years a crisis may arise in which Russia, if strong in Europe, may become the arbiter of peace and exert a far greater influence in securing it than any Hague Conference." In this regard, a communique was issued in which it was reported that complete agreement had been reached between Russia and England on all international problems.
But tsarist Russia still had to restore its power, weakened by the unsuccessful war with Japan and the upheavals of 1904-1905 pp. In the meantime, its opponents were in a hurry to take advantage of the favorable moment to strengthen their positions on the Balkan Peninsula. First of all, Austrian diplomacy took on this. Austrian Foreign Minister Ehrenthal began this task at the beginning of 1908. He put forward a project for the construction of a railway from the Austrian border through the Novobazarskiy sanjakov to Thessaloniki. This road was supposed to provide Austria with a route to the Aegean Sea. On January 27, 1908, Aehrenthal publicly announced his plan.
Erenthal's speech caused extreme excitement in Russia. A railway to Thessaloniki would strengthen Austrian influence throughout the western half of the Balkan Peninsula. As Izvolsky put it, “the implementation of the Austrian plan would lead to the Germanization of Macedonia.” It was clear that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austrian minister’s project. In February, a meeting of ministers was convened in St. Petersburg. At it, Izvolsky proposed using rapprochement with England to abandon the purely defensive policy that Russia has followed in the East in recent years.
Back in 1907, during negotiations with the British, Izvolsky sought England’s consent to change the international legal regime of the straits. He wanted Russia to receive the right to free passage through the straits for its military ships, both from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and back. Then England avoided a formal agreement on this issue. But E. Gray did not deprive Izvolsky of some hopes for the future. These hopes guided Izvolsky when he raised the question of Russia's bold policy in the Middle East. However, the rest of the Russian ministers who were participants in the meeting unanimously rejected Izvolsky's proposal. The military unpreparedness of Russia, whose armed forces had not yet been reorganized after the defeat in the Far East, was pointed out. Finance Minister Kokovtsov also denied. But P. A. Stolypin objected with particular decisiveness to Izvolsky’s warlike plans. A few days later, on February 10, the Council of National Defense made the following decision: “As a result of the extreme breakdown of the material part of the army and the unfavorable internal state, it is now necessary to avoid the use of such aggressive measures that could cause political complications.”
Thus, Izvolsky had to limit himself to the use of diplomatic means. He began by contrasting the Austrian railway project with his own counterproject. Izvolsky planned to build a railway from one of the Adriatic ports of Albania to the Danube. This line was supposed to give Serbia access to the sea, economically and politically independent from Austria-Hungary. This would weaken the bondage in which Austria-Hungary held Serbia. It is clear that the Danube-Adriatic railway project was extremely unprofitable for the Austrians. The British promised to support Izvolsky's project on the condition that Russia would be in agreement with England on the issue of reforms in Macedonia. Now it was Ehrenthal's turn to resort to confusion about railway BUILDING in the Balkans.
A serious international conflict arose in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908.
Under the terms of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, these two provinces were occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops, but remained formally part of.
After the Young Turk revolution, the ruling circles of Austria-Hungary, fearing the further development of the revolutionary and national liberation movement in the Balkans, came to the conclusion that the moment had come for the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
To this end, Austria-Hungary decided to enter into a behind-the-scenes conspiracy with Tsarist Russia in order to, by promising it compensation on the issue of the Straits, obtain its consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For its part, the tsarist government, after the unsuccessful war with Japan and the shocks experienced during the revolution of 1905-1907, wanted to achieve some kind of foreign policy success.
In September 1908, a meeting between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Izvolsky and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ehrenthal took place in Buchlau. The secret deal concluded here was that Tsarist Russia agreed to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, and the latter in return agreed to the opening of the Black Sea straits for the Russian navy.
Soon, tsarist diplomacy received the same consent from Germany, although it was expressed in a general form and conditional on Germany receiving “compensation.” The Italian government was also ready to support Tsarist Russia on the issue of the straits, provided that Russia agreed to Italy's capture of Tripolitanpi.
However, the solution to the issue of the straits in the sense desired by Russia depended not so much on Austria-Hungary, Germany or Italy, but on England, as well as on France.
To gain their support, Izvolsky went to Paris and London. Deciding not to wait; While Russia reached an agreement with all interested powers, the Austro-Hungarian government officially announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 7, 1908.
This dealt a blow simultaneously to the Young Turk revolution, to the national aspirations of the South Slavs, and to the diplomatic plans of Tsarist Russia.
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary caused violent protests in Turkey and Serbia. The tsarist government also tried to object to the unilateral actions of Austria-Hungary, demanding that the issue be discussed at an international conference.
Izvolsky's calculation that France and England would support his policy on the issue of the straits did not materialize. The French government took an evasive position, while the English government directly refused support. Germany actively helped its Austro-Hungarian ally.
The conflict continued for several months. In the end, Austria-Hungary, with the assistance of Germany, managed in February 1909 to obtain Turkish consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for monetary compensation.
Following this, the Austro-Hungarian government began to concentrate its troops on the border of Serbia, and the German government in March of the same year demanded from Russia that it not only agree with the completed act of annexation, but also achieve such consent from Serbia.
Unprepared for war, the tsarist government was forced to accept the German demand and retreat. Izvolsky had to resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Bosnian crisis sharply aggravated contradictions in the Balkans, especially between Russia and Serbia, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary, on the other.
Although this crisis revealed cracks within the Entente, it showed even more the depth of disagreements between the two main imperialist groups - the Anglo-Franco-Russian and the Austro-German.
Germany and its ally in the military bloc, Austria-Hungary, sought to turn the Balkans and Turkey into the sphere of their economic, political and military influence, which affected the interests of the Entente countries in this region and deepened their contradictions with the Austro-German bloc. The events that unfolded in 1908 - 1909 took on an explosive character. in the Balkans and became known as the "Bosnian crisis".
Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Serbs and Croats, was occupied indefinitely by the troops of Austria-Hungary by decision of the Berlin Congress in 1878, but continued to be considered Turkish possessions. Austria-Hungary considered these provinces, which were of great strategic importance, as a springboard for strengthening its influence in the Balkans and had long been nurturing plans for their final annexation.
In 1908, a revolution began in Turkey. The absolutist regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown, and the military came to power, belonging to the bourgeois-nationalist organization “Unity and Progress” (referred to in Europe as the “Young Turks”), who introduced a constitution in the country. The revolution in Turkey caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkans, but the Young Turk government brutally suppressed the movement that had begun.
The Young Turk Revolution was seen by Austria-Hungary as a convenient pretext to carry out the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In connection with this intention of Austria-Hungary, Russian Foreign Minister A.P. Izvolsky believed it was possible to negotiate with the Vienna cabinet on compensation for Russia in exchange for its recognition of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. He knew that the issue of occupation of these territories had already been finally decided by the Vienna cabinet, and under these circumstances it would have been necessary to either confine oneself to a fruitless protest from the Russian side, or resort to threats, which was fraught with the outbreak of a military conflict.
On September 2-3 (16-17), 1908, in the Austrian castle of Buchlau, Izvolsky met with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count A. Ehrenthal. An oral ("gentleman's") agreement was concluded between them. Izvolsky agreed to Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in exchange for Ehrenthal's promise to support Russia's demand to open the Black Sea straits for the passage of Russian military ships and the provision of territorial compensation to Serbia. It also provided for the withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Turkish province - the New Bazar Sanjak - and the Austrian side's renunciation of claims to it. Izvolsky took full responsibility for the negotiations.
These issues had to be resolved at an international conference of European powers, participants in the Berlin Congress of 1878 - Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy. To prepare for this conference and clarify the position of the powers, Izvolsky went on a tour of European capitals.
Germany and Italy gave their consent in a general, non-binding form, but at the same time they demanded certain compensation for themselves. France and England, despite their allied relations with Russia, were not interested in changing the regime of the straits and actually refused to support it in this matter. France conditioned its position on the opinion of the British cabinet. In London they referred to the need to obtain Turkey's consent to change the regime of the straits.
On September 29 (October 10), 1908, when Izvolsky was on a tour of European capitals, Austria-Hungary officially announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this time, in order to attract Bulgaria to his side, Erenthal secretly agreed with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand to grant her complete independence. Under the terms of the Berlin Congress of 1878, although Bulgaria was an autonomous principality, it paid tribute to Turkey, and the elected Bulgarian prince was confirmed by the Turkish Sultan. Relying on the support of Austria-Hungary, Ferdinand declared himself king and Bulgaria an independent kingdom.
Russia, Serbia and Turkey protested against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia even mobilized its army. England and France, under various pretexts, avoided taking any measures against the actions of Austria-Hungary. England put forward a project to neutralize the straits and even sent its squadron to the Dardanelles, and advised the Turkish government to be more vigilant and strengthen the Bosphorus. Turkey, for a subsidy from England of 2.5 million pounds sterling in February 1909, renounced its rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Izvolsky’s actions were opposed by Stolypin, who reasonably pointed out that an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary on these terms would cause strong discontent among both the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and public opinion in Russia itself. He believed that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary would inevitably cause strong opposition from the Balkan peoples and thereby contribute to their unity under the auspices of Russia.
Austria-Hungary, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that Serbia recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly threatening it with war, demonstratively began military preparations and concentrated its troops on the Serbian border. Germany decisively took the side of Austria-Hungary. On March 8 (21), 1909, she presented Russia with an ultimatum - to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, abandon the demand for convening an international conference on the Bosnian issue and influence Serbia to accept the terms of the Vienna cabinet. Germany explicitly stated the likelihood of military action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia if the ultimatum was not accepted. Germany openly went to extreme measures. In Berlin they said that “the best moment to settle accounts with the Russians” had come.
On the day the Tsarist government received the German ultimatum, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Nicholas II. Russia's unpreparedness for war was recognized, as were internal social circumstances. Stolypin took a firm position to avoid war by any means, pointing out that “to unleash a war means to unleash the forces of revolution.” On March 12 (25), 1909, Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II about the Russian government’s agreement to accept Germany’s demands. A few days later, Serbia also announced its acceptance of Austria-Hungary’s demands. The failure of Russian diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis was caustically dubbed “diplomatic Tsushima” in Russia itself.
The failure of Russian diplomacy temporarily weakened the position of the Germanophile group in Russia. At the same time, right-wing newspapers launched a noisy campaign against England and France, which did not support Russia in the most acute moments of the crisis.
Germany regarded the outcome of the Bosnian crisis as a favorable factor in the weakening of Russia's influence in the Balkans and the split of the Entente. Germany itself sought to strengthen its influence in the Balkans and oust Russia, France and England from the countries of the Middle East, but it was precisely this desire of Germany that further united the Entente bloc, and the result of the Bosnian crisis was an intensification of the arms race. In Russia, efforts were made to develop a program to reorganize the army and navy and equip them with new types of weapons. In order to centralize all military affairs, the State Defense Council was abolished in August 1909, and all institutions of the military department, including the General Staff and the general inspectors of individual branches of the military, were subordinated to the Minister of War. After the Bosnian crisis, the Russian General Staff was even more convinced that war was imminent, and also that Russia’s most likely opponents in this war would be Austria-Hungary and Germany. In 1910, a new deployment of the army was approved with the goal of a more even distribution of troops throughout the country. The areas where troops and equipment were concentrated were moved away from the borders so as not to expose them to enemy attack in the very first days of the war. The officer corps was expanded, in which the proportion of representatives of the non-noble classes increased.
The Bosnian crisis contributed to the rapprochement between Russia and Italy. In October 1909, a secret agreement was signed between Russia and Italy in the Italian town of Raccongi. It provided for Italian support in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and assistance in opening the Black Sea straits to Russian warships in exchange for Russia's benevolent neutrality in the event of Italy's capture of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (in North Africa), which were under Turkish rule. The treaty also provided for joint diplomatic pressure by Italy and Russia on Austria-Hungary if it violated the status quo in the Balkans. The Russo-Italian Treaty of 1909 marked an important step in Italy's emerging departure from the Triple Alliance.
In September 1911, the Italo-Turkish War began. Russia decided to take advantage of Turkey’s failures in this war to create a favorable regime for the Black Sea Straits. He was sent to Turkey by Ambassador N.V. Charykov, who was tasked with obtaining consent from the Turkish government to open the Black Sea straits to Russian military vessels in exchange for Russian assistance in protecting the straits and adjacent territories. Charykov was also given another task - to achieve the unification of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro into the Balkan Union under the auspices of Russia in order to counter the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. It was also planned to join Greece and Romania to this union.
Back in October 1904, Germany, taking advantage of Russia's failures in the war with Japan, made an attempt to tear it away from the alliance with France, but negotiations that lasted until December of the same year did not produce results. The second attempt by Germany was made at the final stage of the Russo-Japanese War. In July 1905, the German Emperor Wilhelm II paid a visit to Nicholas II, who was vacationing on the island. Bjorke in the Finnish skerries (near Vyborg). Here he managed to persuade Nicholas II to sign an agreement on mutual military assistance in the event of an attack on Russia or Germany by another European power. At the same time, William II hinted that this meant England, and not France, which might join this treaty. However, in its essence, the treaty was directed against France, which deprived Russia of its main ally and creditor. The form of the treaty was defensive and came into force at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.
This treaty was in the nature of a personal agreement between the two monarchs without the knowledge of their foreign ministers. S.V. Witte, who arrived from Portsmouth after the signing of peace with Japan, and Foreign Minister V.N. Lamzdorf, after much persuasion from the tsar, convinced him to disavow the agreement: without formally abandoning it, introduce a number of amendments and conditions into it that would nullify it. In November 1905, Wilhelm II was informed that Russia's obligations towards Germany did not apply in the event of a war between Germany and France. This was a diplomatic refusal, and the treaty did not enter into force, which strengthened Russia's relations with France. At the beginning of April 1906, France provided Russia with a new loan in the amount of 2250 million francs (850 million rubles).
At the same time, Russia did not want to aggravate relations with Germany. In July 1907, Wilhelm II met with Nicholas II in Swinemünde. An agreement was concluded between them to maintain the status quo in the Baltic Sea. Sweden and Denmark joined this treaty.
Germany and its ally in the military bloc, Austria-Hungary, sought to turn the Balkans and Turkey into the sphere of their economic, political and military influence, which affected the interests of the Entente countries in this region and deepened their contradictions with the Austro-German bloc. The events that unfolded in 1908 - 1909 took on an explosive character. in the Balkans and became known as the "Bosnian crisis".
Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Serbs and Croats, was occupied indefinitely by the troops of Austria-Hungary by decision of the Berlin Congress in 1878, but continued to be considered Turkish possessions. Austria-Hungary considered these provinces, which were of great strategic importance, as a springboard for strengthening its influence in the Balkans and had long been nurturing plans for their final annexation.
In 1908, a revolution began in Turkey. The absolutist regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown, and the military came to power, belonging to the bourgeois-nationalist organization “Unity and Progress” (referred to in Europe as the “Young Turks”), who introduced a constitution in the country. The revolution in Turkey caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkans, but the Young Turk government brutally suppressed the movement that had begun.
The Young Turk Revolution was seen by Austria-Hungary as a convenient pretext to carry out the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In connection with this intention of Austria-Hungary, Russian Foreign Minister A.P. Izvolsky believed it was possible to negotiate with the Vienna cabinet on compensation for Russia in exchange for its recognition of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. He knew that the issue of occupation of these territories had already been finally decided by the Vienna cabinet, and under these circumstances it would have been necessary to either confine oneself to a fruitless protest from the Russian side, or resort to threats, which was fraught with the outbreak of a military conflict.
On September 2-3 (16-17), 1908, in the Austrian castle of Buchlau, Izvolsky met with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count A. Ehrenthal. An oral ("gentleman's") agreement was concluded between them. Izvolsky agreed to Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in exchange for Ehrenthal's promise to support Russia's demand to open the Black Sea straits for the passage of Russian military ships and the provision of territorial compensation to Serbia. It also provided for the withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Turkish province - the New Bazar Sanjak - and the Austrian side's renunciation of claims to it. Izvolsky took full responsibility for the negotiations.
These issues had to be resolved at an international conference of European powers, participants in the Berlin Congress of 1878 - Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy. To prepare for this conference and clarify the position of the powers, Izvolsky went on a tour of European capitals.
Germany and Italy gave their consent in a general, non-binding form, but at the same time they demanded certain compensation for themselves. France and England, despite their allied relations with Russia, were not interested in changing the regime of the straits and actually refused to support it in this matter. France conditioned its position on the opinion of the British cabinet. In London they referred to the need to obtain Turkey's consent to change the regime of the straits.
On September 29 (October 10), 1908, when Izvolsky was on a tour of European capitals, Austria-Hungary officially announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this time, in order to attract Bulgaria to his side, Erenthal secretly agreed with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand to grant her complete independence. Under the terms of the Berlin Congress of 1878, although Bulgaria was an autonomous principality, it paid tribute to Turkey, and the elected Bulgarian prince was confirmed by the Turkish Sultan. Relying on the support of Austria-Hungary, Ferdinand declared himself king and Bulgaria an independent kingdom.
Russia, Serbia and Turkey protested against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia even mobilized its army. England and France, under various pretexts, avoided taking any measures against the actions of Austria-Hungary. England put forward a project to neutralize the straits and even sent its squadron to the Dardanelles, and advised the Turkish government to be more vigilant and strengthen the Bosphorus. Turkey, for a subsidy from England of 2.5 million pounds sterling in February 1909, renounced its rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Izvolsky’s actions were opposed by Stolypin, who reasonably pointed out that an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary on these terms would cause strong discontent among both the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and public opinion in Russia itself. He believed that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary would inevitably cause strong opposition from the Balkan peoples and thereby contribute to their unity under the auspices of Russia.
Austria-Hungary, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded that Serbia recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly threatening it with war, demonstratively began military preparations and concentrated its troops on the Serbian border. Germany decisively took the side of Austria-Hungary. On March 8 (21), 1909, she presented Russia with an ultimatum - to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, abandon the demand for convening an international conference on the Bosnian issue and influence Serbia to accept the terms of the Vienna cabinet. Germany explicitly stated the likelihood of military action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia if the ultimatum was not accepted. Germany openly went to extreme measures. In Berlin they said that “the best moment to settle accounts with the Russians” had come.
On the day the Tsarist government received the German ultimatum, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Nicholas II. Russia's unpreparedness for war was recognized, as were internal social circumstances. Stolypin took a firm position to avoid war by any means, pointing out that “to unleash a war means to unleash the forces of revolution.” On March 12 (25), 1909, Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II about the Russian government’s agreement to accept Germany’s demands. A few days later, Serbia also announced its acceptance of Austria-Hungary’s demands. The failure of Russian diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis was caustically dubbed “diplomatic Tsushima” in Russia itself.
The failure of Russian diplomacy temporarily weakened the position of the Germanophile group in Russia. At the same time, right-wing newspapers launched a noisy campaign against England and France, which did not support Russia in the most acute moments of the crisis.
Germany regarded the outcome of the Bosnian crisis as a favorable factor in the weakening of Russia's influence in the Balkans and the split of the Entente. Germany itself sought to strengthen its influence in the Balkans and oust Russia, France and England from the countries of the Middle East, but it was precisely this desire of Germany that further united the Entente bloc, and the result of the Bosnian crisis was an intensification of the arms race. In Russia, efforts were made to develop a program to reorganize the army and navy and equip them with new types of weapons. In order to centralize all military affairs, the State Defense Council was abolished in August 1909, and all institutions of the military department, including the General Staff and the general inspectors of individual branches of the military, were subordinated to the Minister of War. After the Bosnian crisis, the Russian General Staff was even more convinced that war was imminent, and also that Russia’s most likely opponents in this war would be Austria-Hungary and Germany. In 1910, a new deployment of the army was approved with the goal of a more even distribution of troops throughout the country. The areas where troops and equipment were concentrated were moved away from the borders so as not to expose them to enemy attack in the very first days of the war. The officer corps was expanded, in which the proportion of representatives of the non-noble classes increased.
The Bosnian crisis contributed to the rapprochement between Russia and Italy. In October 1909, a secret agreement was signed between Russia and Italy in the Italian town of Raccongi. It provided for Italian support in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and assistance in opening the Black Sea straits to Russian warships in exchange for Russia's benevolent neutrality in the event of Italy's capture of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (in North Africa), which were under Turkish rule. The treaty also provided for joint diplomatic pressure by Italy and Russia on Austria-Hungary if it violated the status quo in the Balkans. The Russo-Italian Treaty of 1909 marked an important step in Italy's emerging departure from the Triple Alliance.
In September 1911, the Italo-Turkish War began. Russia decided to take advantage of Turkey’s failures in this war to create a favorable regime for the Black Sea Straits. He was sent to Turkey by Ambassador N.V. Charykov, who was tasked with obtaining consent from the Turkish government to open the Black Sea straits to Russian military vessels in exchange for Russian assistance in protecting the straits and adjacent territories. Charykov was also given another task - to achieve the unification of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro into the Balkan Union under the auspices of Russia in order to counter the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. It was also planned to join Greece and Romania to this union.
BOSNIA CRISIS
French caricature of Sultan Abdul Hamid II
The creation of the Entente and the Triple Alliance led to an intensification of the struggle for control over various regions of the world. Their confrontation led to the emergence at the beginning of the 20th century. series of conflicts, any of which could lead to world war.
One of them was the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909, the cause of which was the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which nominally belonged to Turkey. This step became possible due to the deterioration of the political situation in the Ottoman Empire.
In the summer of 1903, an uprising began in Macedonia. British Foreign Secretary Lansdowne proposed that Istanbul grant autonomy to the Macedonians, thus wanting to weaken the power of the pro-German Sultan Abdul Hamid II. However, Russia and Austria-Hungary took the side of Turkey. In September 1903, at Mürzsteg Castle, the two countries signed an agreement to coordinate efforts in this direction. The Sultan was only recommended to grant the Macedonians additional rights. The position of Russia and Austria allowed Istanbul to begin suppressing the Macedonian uprising.
In 1906–1907 Anti-Turkish protests intensified in other parts of the empire. The opponents of the Sultan's power were the Young Turks - nationalistically minded officers dissatisfied with the weakness of the government. On July 24, 1908, Abdul Hamid II announced the convening of parliament. Real power in Istanbul passed to the Young Turk Committee “Unity and Progress,” which proclaimed the policy of “Ottomanism.” Its goal was to transform all the Sultan’s subjects, regardless of nationality and religion, into “Ottomans.” Naturally, such a step could not but cause protest among the Balkan peoples.
By this time, an Anglo-Russian agreement had already been concluded. In June 1908, both powers demanded that Istanbul grant Macedonia autonomy within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.
This pushed Austria to a more decisive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. To secure the consent of St. Petersburg, the head of the Austrian Foreign Ministry A. Ehrenthal invited his Russian colleague A. Izvolsky to a meeting at Buchlau Castle, which took place on September 15, 1908. Russia agreed to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange for Austria-Hungary’s commitment not to object to the opening of the Black Sea straits for the Russian navy. The terms of the agreement were not recorded on paper, which led to a diplomatic conflict. Erenthal later stated that he warned Izvolsky that annexation could occur as early as early October. Izvolsky drew attention to the fact that he demanded territorial compensation from Vienna for Serbia and Montenegro, and also proposed convening a conference on the Bosnian issue.
Izvolsky considered it necessary to obtain the consent of other great powers to change the status of the straits. However, without waiting for the results of his European visit, the government of Austria-Hungary announced on October 6, 1908 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively torpedoing the implementation of obligations on the issue of revising the status of the straits. In this situation, Izvolsky, together with Great Britain, decided to force Austria-Hungary to return Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Turks. France and Italy took the side of England and Russia, who also did not want to strengthen Austrian positions in the Balkans.
Serbia also became an ally of St. Petersburg, where, as a result of a coup d'etat, the pro-Russian prince Peter Karageorgievich came to power in 1903. Belgrade hoped to annex Bosnia to the Serbian possessions. An anti-Austrian campaign began in Serbia, which could provoke a war at any moment.
To resolve the crisis, Izvolsky proposed convening an international conference, but the Austrian-Hungarian government refused to take part in it. Vienna was supported by Berlin; on December 8, 1908, German Chancellor B. Bülow announced that if the situation worsened, Austria-Hungary could count on German help.
With the help of the Germans, Vienna managed to obtain the consent of the Turkish government to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary. On February 26, 1909, the Ottoman Empire transferred the rights to this territory for 2.5 million pounds sterling. As a result, the threat of an open Austro-Serbian conflict increased. Russia was not ready for war. The governments of Great Britain and France did not consider the Bosnian conflict as a sufficiently serious reason for entering the war. On March 22, 1909, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg presented Russia with a demand to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary and to force Serbia to do so. In case of refusal, the German government threatened to support Vienna in the impending war with the Serbs.