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Military reform in the second half of the 19th century.

Preconditions for military reform... The Crimean War showed the fundamental flaws of the feudal organization of the armed forces, which, in a military clash with the bourgeois states, were unable to ensure the country's defense. So, although Russia in terms of population surpassed France and England, taken together, it did not have trained reserves and during the war there was no one to replenish the Russian army. This was due to the fact that the Russian army was recruited on the basis of a recruitment of tax-paying estates (peasants and burghers). The soldiers served for 25 years, i.e. practically for life. Therefore, the army, both in peacetime and in wartime, had virtually the same strength. There was practically no military-trained reserve for deploying the army during the war and replenishing combat losses.

The officer corps was recruited from the nobility, i.e. appointments to command positions were made not for merit and knowledge, but on the basis of class affiliation, under patronage. Hence the extremely weak general and combat training of the command staff, especially the highest.

A confused, chaotic system of military control, outdated weapons (as a result of the backwardness of industry), extremely weak maneuverability of troops forced to move to the place of hostilities on foot, sometimes thousands of kilometers due to the underdevelopment of the railway network - all this added to the overall unsightly picture of the state of the army.

The need for military reform was clear even to the autocratic government. Its preparation began in 1862, when General (in the future Field Marshal) D.A. Milyutin, a liberal-minded professor at the Military Academy. The new Charter on conscription was put into effect on January 1, 1874.

The essence of military reform... It consisted primarily in changing the system of manning the army and navy. Instead of recruiting from among the taxable estates, universal conscription... The terms of active service were established: in the army - six years and nine years in the reserve; in the navy - seven years and three years in reserve.

Thus, the new manning system made it possible to create a reserve of military trained for the deployment of armed forces during the war. However, this reserve was comparatively small due to too long active periods. The army was not able to accept everyone who was subject to annual conscription. Therefore, the conscripts drew lots. The one who got it by lot was enlisted in active service, and the rest - in the militia of the II category, which was practically not called up for service.

However, the army was viewed by the tsarist government not only as intended for the defense of the country, but also as an armed support of state power. To suppress peasant riots, a well-trained soldier was needed, who obediently carried out any order of the officers.

During the Crimean War, an acute shortage of officer cadres, especially junior officers, was revealed. Therefore, an important task of the reform was to strengthen and renew the officer cadres.

A wide network of military schools was created. In peacetime, officers, as a rule, were made to those who graduated from military schools and passed the relevant state examinations. Persons with higher education were called up for active service for six months, and with secondary education - for a year and a half, then they took an exam for an officer's rank and were retired as junior officers.

The reform opened the way for the officer corps of the different ranks of the intelligentsia. but only in the positions of junior officers. Generals and senior officers were still mostly high-born nobles.

The military command apparatus was reorganized, all branches of which began to be subordinate to the minister of war (and in the case of the navy, to the minister of the sea). The country's territory was divided into 15 military districts, headed by the commanders of the military districts. A military judicial reform was carried out and corporal punishment was abolished. However, the beating of the soldiers by the officers continued, as before, the gap between the privileged officers and the mass of soldiers who had no rights remained, separating the "master" from the "muzhik". An important component of the military reform was the rearmament of the army with modern weapons for those times and the construction of a steam armored fleet. New military regulations were introduced and the training of troops was reorganized.

Introduction

The topic of military reforms was not chosen by chance, since the army is currently undergoing reform in our country. In this regard, the study of the experience of military reforms in the mid-19th century is of practical and scientific interest.

The topic of military reforms in the 60-70s. covered in the general literature on Russian history: in the multivolume history of the USSR from ancient times to the present day, volume 5, in the general historical and legal literature Lepikhov M.I. History of the state and law of Russia. 1996, Isaev I.A. History of the state and law of Russia. 1996, Chistyakov O.I., Novitskaya T.E. Reforms of Alexander II, 1998, Titov Yu.P. Reader on the history of state and law of Russia. M., 2004., In general works on military history Leonov, Harichkin. Military reforms in the history of the Russian state (XIX-early XX): experience and lessons. Issue 3.M., 1994. , in monographs devoted to the history of the reign of the reformer Tsar Alexander II Zayonchkovsky P.A. Russian autocracy at the end of the nineteenth century. M .: Thought, 1970. Ch. 5-8, Chistyakov O.I., Novitskaya T.E. Reforms of Alexander II, 1998. ... A separate monograph by Zayonchkovsky, Military Reforms of 1860-1870 in Russia, is devoted to military reforms.

The main historical component of the studied topic was legislative acts on the implementation of military reforms, published in collections of legislative materials. Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire, 1874. Collection 2-e.T. 49. Dept. No. 52983, 1874.

Purpose: to reveal the causes, content, consequences and significance of military reforms.

To achieve this goal, the tasks are set: to consider the essence of the new order of manning the army, changes in its organization and management, to characterize measures for rearmament of troops and changes in the training and education of troops.

military reform russia army

Preconditions and causes of military reforms in the mid-19th century

The first half of the 19th century was characterized by an ever-increasing crisis of the feudal-serf system as a result of the development in the depths of its new capitalist relations. This process of decomposition of the feudal-serf system led to the growth of class contradictions and the emergence of a new bourgeois ideology.

Fear of a revolutionary explosion and the desire to strengthen the system of state administration necessitated some small reforms designed to preserve the foundations of the feudal-serf system. These measures were also conditioned by the economic changes that took place under the influence of the development of capitalism.

However, these minor reforms could not make any significant changes in the conditions of the crisis of the entire system of the feudal-serf state.

In the field of foreign policy, tsarism acted in the role of an all-European gendarme, setting itself the task of preserving the feudal-serf system in Western Europe as well.

The backwardness of the feudal economy, the decay of the entire system of the autocratic-noble state as a whole, all this determined the state of one of the main instruments of state power - the army. The military defeat in the Crimean War left no one in doubt about the need for reforms in the military field.

The supply of small arms to the troops was carried out by three factories: Tula, Sestroretsk and Izhevsk, the productivity of which was designed to produce one hundred thousand guns per year. Due to the primitive equipment of these factories and the low productivity of serf labor, an average of only 52,000 guns were produced. The production of gunpowder was also not in the best condition. Gunpowder factories - Kazan, Okhtensky and Shostensky produced annually a little more than fifty thousand poods of gunpowder, which was about 50% of their production capacity.

Small arms consisted almost exclusively of smooth-bore percussion and flintlock rifles. The firing range of these rifles did not exceed three hundred steps with a very insignificant hitting accuracy.

Artillery armament consisted of smooth-bore, muzzle-loading cannons, cast iron and copper. The sighting range of both field and heavy artillery guns did not exceed 400-500 fathoms.

Because of this, the armament of the army was extremely imperfect and insufficient in quantitative terms.

By the beginning of the 50s, the Russian army consisted of both regular and irregular troops, a total of 1,084,700 people.

The peculiarity of the pre-reform army was that its numerical strength almost did not change during wartime, that is, the army did not have the ability to deploy during the war; this was due to the specifics of its acquisition.

The army was recruited with rank-and-file personnel according to the recruiting charter of 1831. Military service was compulsory only for the tax-paying estates. The service life was set at twenty-five years. The draft age is from twenty to thirty-five years. The annual contingent of recruits averaged eighty thousand.

Recruits enlisted in the army were freed from serfdom. Consequently, in the conditions of the existence of serfdom, it was impossible to increase the number of conscripts and create cadres of a trained reserve.

Since 1834, soldiers who had served in the army for 15-20 years were dismissed on temporary leave, which was intended to ensure the deployment of the army in case of war. However, this measure did not bring any significant results.

The army was recruited with officers from among those who graduated from the cadet corps and special military schools, from "undersized nobles" who did not receive any education and entered the army voluntarily as cadets, and non-commissioned officers of general terms of service, that is, recruited.

All training was characterized by the preparation of troops for reviews and parades, and not for actions in the war. Combat training was carried out in the spirit of the Prussian front-line drill, which set as its task the transformation of a soldier into a soulless dummy, devoid of any initiative and only able to mechanically carry out the command of the superiors.

This system of training troops fully corresponded to the class interests of the feudal-serf state during the period of its disintegration.

Analyzing the state of the Russian army on the eve of reforms, the following conclusions can be drawn:

The backwardness of the feudal-serf economy determined the imperfection of the armament of the Russian army.

The shortcomings of manning, methods of training troops and organization of the army were also determined by the entire system of the feudal-serf state, and no, even private, improvements were possible under the conditions of the existence of this system.

The general state of the army reflected in itself, as a focus, the process of decay of the entire system of the autocratic-serf state.

The military defeat in the Crimean War left no one in doubt about the need for reforms in the military field. Due to the backwardness of the socio-economic and political system, once one of the best armies in the world was brought to complete decomposition and became unsuitable not only for an offensive, but also for a defensive war. Any partial measures to improve it could not correct the situation.

On June 4, 1855, a note was sent to Alexander II by General F.V. Ridiger, in which he criticized the existing military system Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. S. 382 .. In the second note presented to the emperor on July 23 of the same year, F.V. Ridiger outlined his proposals for the transformation of the army. The general's recommendations boiled down to five points: first, to decentralize military command; second, to change the nature of the training of troops, to radically revise all military regulations; third, to improve the quality of officer training by increasing the number of military educational institutions; fourthly, to carry out certification of senior command personnel when appointing commanders of individual units to positions, while providing for the dismissal from service of all persons who do not meet the necessary requirements; fifth, to create special commissions to discuss the proposed issues in the same place. S. 383-386. ... The emperor approved both notes, and on July 20, 1855, a special commission was created under the leadership of Adjutant General F.V. Ridiger, and after his death the commission was headed by General N.F. Plautin.

Appointed on April 17, 1856 to the post of Minister of War N.O. Sukhozanet has taken a number of significant steps to transform the armed forces. By the highest decree on December 25, 1856, all soldiers' children were expelled from the military department and turned into free taxable estates. / PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 31. No. 31313. ... In 1857, the military settlements introduced since 1810 were finally canceled. The highest approved rules on the management procedure of the Department of Higher Settlements of the Military Department // Decree. op. Collected 2. T. 32. No. 32555. In 1859, the obligatory term of service in the ground forces was reduced to 15, and in the navy - to 14 years. op. Collected 2. T. 34. No. 34882. ... The militia was disbanded, and the recruitment call decreased by 1/4. However, in order to carry out the necessary radical transformations, Lieutenant General N.O. Sukhozanet was unusable. The creation of an army of a new era required figures with a new political outlook, a broad military outlook and a deep understanding of the defining trends in the development of military art Fedorov A.V. . Russian army in the 50-70s XIX century. M., 1959.S. 24.

The most important reforms began in the army after the appointment as Minister of War on November 9, 1861, Adjutant General D.A. Milyutin. Milyutin, carrying out transformations in the army, expanded and deepened the ideas of F.V. Ridigera Kersnovsky, A.A.

The Minister of War was faced with an extremely difficult task - to reorganize the entire system of military command and structure of the army. At the same time, it was necessary to reduce military spending and make sure that this did not damage the combat capability of the army.

Many new people were involved in drawing up the transformation program. The new minister took care of the appointment of energetic and proactive officers to the number of his closest employees: F.L. Heiden, K.P. Kaufman, A.A. Danzas, N.I. Karlgof and others, explaining the personnel reshuffle in this way: "It is possible to take up the alteration of everything old only with new people" Milyutin, DA Memories. 1860-1862. M .: Publishing house "Russian Archive", 1999. P. 245. A special role in the development and editing of the reform program was played by F.G. Ustryalov, a former major expert in military legislation, and V.M. Anichkov, professor at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, specialist in military command and control.

This team, led by Dmitry Alekseevich, has become the center of a huge organizational and analytical work. To analyze the state of affairs, comprehensively review and discuss all parts of the Russian military structure, Milyutin called meetings almost daily, opened free access to "all extraneous assumptions, opinions and projects", created special commissions to discuss and prepare the most significant issues. As a result, the War Ministry received “a huge number of various notes and projects, of which only a few turned out to be suitable for anything” Ibid. P. 244. This did not stop the minister, he understood that only in the process of living activity an atmosphere of initiative and creativity, participation in an important state cause, is created.

A large role in the development of the reform program was played by the commission, which worked out the problems of the composition and general organization of the army, which, on behalf of Milyutin, was headed by Major General A.K. Baumgarten. In a short time, the commission demanded from various departments of the ministry "considerations of needs and shortcomings." The result of the ministry's activities was brilliant: in less than two months the program of transformations in the main directions of the war ministry's activities was created, and already on January 15, 1862, Milyutin handed it over to Alexander II in the form of an All-Subject Report, which consisted of 10 sections on the main directions of military affairs. This report, approved by the emperor at the end of January, became a program of practical actions for D.A. Milyutin. It covered literally all areas of life and activities of the armed forces Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. S. 170-172. ...

In the reform itself, several directions can be distinguished: 1) reorganization of military command; 2) reform of military educational institutions; 3) changing the system of manning the armed forces by introducing universal military service; 4) transformation of military courts; 5) rearmament of the army. All these activities were carried out in two periods. The first period (from 1861 to 1874) consisted in the preparation of material conditions and military administration for the formation of a mass army. The second period (from 1874) was characterized by the completion of the military reforms of the 60s and 70s and the creation of a mass army on the basis of the adopted new Charter on conscription.

One of Milyutin's first reforms was the reorganization of the system of central military command and the creation of territorial bodies in the form of district headquarters (the creation of a military district system).

In May 1862, Milyutin presented to Alexander II proposals under the title "The main foundations of the proposed structure of military administration in the districts." This document was based on the following provisions:

1. To eliminate the division in peacetime into armies and corps, consider the division as the highest tactical unit.

2. Divide the territory of the entire state into several military districts.

3. At the head of the district, put a chief, who will be entrusted with overseeing the active forces and command of local troops, as well as entrusting him with managing all local military institutions Dobrovolsky, A. Fundamentals of organizing central military command in Russia [Electronic resource] / A. Tristar Investment: [site]. - Access mode: http://www.lionpalace.ru/warminist/reformamilutina/. - Title from the screen. (03.24.12) ..

Thus, Milyutin proposed creating a territorial, district system in which supply and material and technical functions were assigned to the district headquarters, and the operational command was concentrated in the hands of divisional commanders. The new system significantly simplified military administration and eliminated the excessive centralization of the War Department.

In accordance with these plans, the need to create 15 military districts was indicated: Finland, St. Petersburg, Baltic (Riga), North-West (Vilno), Kingdom of Poland, South-West (Kiev), South (Odessa), Moscow, Kharkov, Verkhnevolzhsky ( Kazan), Nizhnevolzhsky (Saratov), ​​Caucasian (Tiflis), Orenburg, West Siberian (Omsk), East Siberian (Irkutsk) Ibid ..

The structure of the main district administration was to include: 1) General command and staff; 2) District quartermaster; 3) Artillery control; 4) Engineering management; 5) Medical and hospital management Code of military decrees 1869 Part 1, book. 2. Military District Directorates. St. Petersburg: State Printing House, 1893. S. 183. Art. 3 ..

In 1862, instead of the First Army, the Warsaw, Kiev, Vilna and Odessa military districts were established. Great reforms in Russia. 1856-1874: collection / ed. L.G. Zakharova, B. Eklof, J. Bushnell. M .: Publishing house of Moscow University, 1992. S. 247 .. Following this, in August 1864, the "Regulations on military districts" were approved, on the basis of which all military units and military institutions located in the district were subordinate to the commander of the district troops. Thus, he became the sole boss. In the border districts, the Commander was entrusted with the duties of the governor-general. In his person, all military and civilian power was concentrated. The Code of Military Regulations of 1869 Part 1, Vol. 2. Military District Directorates. S. 183-184. Art. 2-6 ..

In 1864, 6 more military districts were created: Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Kharkov and Kazan. And in subsequent years, the Caucasian, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian military districts were formed. Each district was both a military command and control body and a military-administrative structure. This made it possible to quickly command the troops, ensured the rapid deployment of the army in case of war - Access mode: http://www.lionpalace.ru/warminist/reformamilutina/. - Title from the screen. (03.24.12) ..

Along with the reform of local military administration in 1862-1867. the reorganization of the Ministry of War also took place. The main problem of the existing structure was the lack of a unified management, which was paradoxically combined with the centralization of the department, brought to the point of absurdity.

In 1862, two main directorates were created: artillery and engineering, and in 1863, the department of the General Staff was reorganized. It was merged with the military topographic depot and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff and received the name of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Later, in connection with the introduction of the military district system, in 1866 the Main Directorate of the General Staff and the Inspection Department were merged into one directorate called the General Staff Dobrovolsky, A. Fundamentals of the organization of the central military administration in Russia [Electronic resource] / A. Dobrovolsky // Tristar Investment: [site]. - Access mode: http://www.lionpalace.ru/warminist/reformamilutina/. - Title from the screen. (03.24.12) ..

In 1868, the reorganization of the War Ministry was completed, and on January 1, 1869, a new "Provision on the War Ministry" came into effect Zayonchkovsky P. A. Military reforms of 1860-1870 in Russia. M .: MGU, 1952. S. 58 .. According to the "Regulations", the War Ministry consisted of the Imperial Main Apartment, the Military Council, the Main Military Court, the Office of the War Ministry, the General Staff and 7 main directorates (quartermaster, artillery, engineering, military medical, military educational institutions, naval and irregular troops), as well as the directorate of the inspector general of cavalry, inspector of rifle battalions and the committee on the wounded. Establishment of the Ministry of War // Military legislation of the Russian Empire: Code of Russian military law. Moscow: Military University, 1996. T. 10.S. 83-84 ..

Simultaneously with the implementation of the military reform, in 1868, the "Regulations on the field control of troops in wartime" was developed. The Imperially approved Regulations on the Field Control of Troops in Wartime // PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 43. No. 45729 .. According to this document, the troops in the theater of operations formed one or more armies, at the head of each of which was the commander-in-chief, subordinate directly to the emperor. The heads of military districts were responsible for supplying the troops with all the necessary resources and were accountable to the commander-in-chief of the army. Establishment of the Ministry of War // Military legislation of the Russian Empire: Code of Russian military law. T. 10. From 84-86 .. "Position ..." greatly simplified the structure of field management of the army in the field and significantly expanded the capabilities of commanders, who were given the right to conduct hostilities, in accordance with the situation and guided by the approved general plan.

Thus, the reform of military command made it possible to eliminate excessive centralization, significantly increase initiative and responsibility for decisions made on the ground, and cut the military command apparatus by almost half.

In close connection with the issues of military command was the question of the correspondence of persons to the positions entrusted to them by Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1 S. 170-172. ... “The improvement and dignity of the army,” reported the Minister of War, “increasingly depends on a good choice of chiefs at various levels of the service hierarchy. Without this essential condition, all the best measures taken to improve the troops and their control will be fruitless. " Memories. 1860-1862. From 314 .. To solve this problem, it was necessary to pay attention to: 1) manning the army with officers; 2) the procedure for their passage of service Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. S. 170-172. ...

In the pre-reform period, the army was recruited with officers at the expense of graduates of cadet corps and special military schools (artillery, engineering, etc.), which accounted for about 30% of the officer corps. The main body of the officer corps (about 60%) was recruited at the expense of cadets and volunteers, who were entitled to a grace period of service when conferring the first officer rank. They were enrolled in the regiments after passing a simple exam and, having served for two years, with a positive attestation received the officer rank Volkov S. V. Russian officer corps [Electronic resource] // Adjutant: [site] / Access mode: http: //www.adjudant .ru / officer / 03-1.htm. Title from the screen. (17.04.12) ..

In addition, the army was recruited from non-commissioned officers who served in the army for 10-12 years and passed a simple exam. The government resorted to the latter measure mainly during the war, since with the promotion of officers, they were given personal nobility in the same place ..

During the Crimean War, strong flaws in the officer training system were revealed. The question arose about the reorganization of military educational institutions in order to improve the quality of officer training and increase the number of candidates of the corresponding level Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. P.446. ...

In the course of the reorganization of military educational institutions, ineffective cadet corps (with the exception of Pages and Finland), which created an unnecessary burden on the military budget, were eliminated. Special classes of cadet corps, where persons with secondary education were admitted, were transformed into military schools with a two-year term of study. On the basis of the general education classes of the cadet corps, military gymnasiums with a seven-year term of study (preparatory class and six basic classes) were opened, which were educational institutions that were advanced in their organization and program. Their graduates then entered military schools SV Volkov. Russian officer corps [Electronic resource] // Adjutant: [site] / Access mode: http://www.adjudant.ru/officer/03-1.htm. Title from the screen. (17.04.12) ..

On average, about 460 people graduated from military schools annually. However, the army continued to experience a shortage of officers. In this regard, another type of military educational institutions was created - cadet schools with a two-year period of study. They were created with the aim of providing the lower ranks of the regular troops from among the chief officer's children, as well as the noblemen among the noblemen, the scientific and combat education necessary for an officer. The cadet schools admitted persons who had training in the volume of four classes of a secondary general education school. These schools were subordinate to the chiefs of staff of the military districts. Military gymnasiums with a four-year period of study were also opened, preparing for admission to the cadet schools Volkov SV Russian officer corps [Electronic resource] // Adjutant: [site] / Access mode: http://www.adjudant.ru/officer /03-1.htm. Title from the screen. (17.04.12) ..

In the system of military educational institutions, various schools of the military department also functioned, preparing gunsmiths, pyrotechnics, clerks, topographers, draftsmen, engravers, etc. Their graduates were obliged to serve as lower ranks in their specialty for 10 to 12 years Ibid ..

Serious attention was also paid to the training of pedagogical personnel for military educational institutions.

The training of senior officers was carried out at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the Nikolaev Engineering, Mikhailovskaya Artillery and Medical-Surgical Academies. In 1867, the Aleksandrovsk Military Law Academy was also opened.

In the 60s, there were some changes in the regulations on academies. The requirements for admission to the Academy of the General Staff were increased. Only officers who had at least four years of military service in combatant positions began to be admitted to the entrance exams. In the Mikhailovskaya Artillery and Nikolaev Engineering Academy, only persons who have regularly served in the ranks for at least two years began to be admitted to the service Volkov SV Russian officer corps [Electronic resource] // Adjutant: [site] / Access mode: http: // www .adjudant.ru / officer / 03-1.htm. Title from the screen. (17.04.12) ..

Particular attention in the academies was paid to improving the quality of teaching, studying the art of war, taking into account the experience of recent wars. Much attention was paid to practical training.

The system of educational institutions in the navy had its own specifics. In addition to educational institutions that train combatant naval officers, it included institutions for the training of navigators, technical engineers, naval gunners and shipbuilders (ship engineers). As in the army, naval educational institutions that train officers could be divided into two groups: those giving their graduates the first officer's rank (or the right to be promoted to officers) and those in which persons who already have officers' ranks raised their education. The first group includes naval schools (Marine Corps, Marine Engineering School), and the second includes the academy and various officer classes and schools (Nikolaev Naval Academy). The specificity of naval education was the fact that, unlike the army in the navy, both educational institutions that give the first officer rank graduated their students with a general higher education as higher educational institutions (only academies were such in the army) there ..

Thus, the reorganization of military educational institutions made it possible to significantly increase the composition of the officer corps and raise its educational level. However, the reform did not create a reserve of officers for the reserve troops. As before, education was received mainly by people from the nobility. For representatives of other classes, access to military educational institutions was practically closed.

The most important of the military reforms, in our opinion, is the introduction of universal military service. This measure affected the interests of all social strata of society and showed its readiness to further advance along the path of democratization.

Developed in the first quarter of the 18th century. the recruiting system of manning corresponded to the feudal-serf social basis of tsarist Russia P.L. Lobko. Notes of the military administration for military and cadet schools. SPb .: Publishing house Printing house and lithography Hohenfelden and Co., 1877. P. 34. For its time, it was the most advanced and became a progressive step in the history of the Russian army, having a great influence on the armies of Western Europe.

Under the existing system, the state was forced to maintain a large army in terms of numbers, which weighed down the country's budget. For peacetime, the size of the army was large, but for the military, it was always insufficient. In the course of the war, it was necessary to resort to reinforced recruits, to replenish the army with an untrained contingent. The lack of a trained reserve created a chronic shortage of regiments both in wartime and in peacetime. Thus, the recruiting system limited the ability to receive quickly and timely trained recruits.

A big drawback of the recruiting system was that, with the existing long service life, the army constantly consisted of more older soldiers than young ones. Initially, life-long military service by the law of 1793 and the confirming decree of the Governing Senate of January 1, 1805 was set at 25 years On the recruitment of recruits from 500 souls to 4 people // PSZRI. Collected 1. T. 28. No. 21891; Rediger A.F. The manning and arrangement of the armed forces. SPb., 1913. Part 2.P. 132. In 1818, the term of service in the guard was reduced to 22 years. Collected 1. T. 35. No. 27513. ... The 1834 law provided for 20 years, of which 15 years in active service and 5 years in reserve. After this period, an ordinary recruit was dismissed on an indefinite leave for 5 years On the terms of service of lower ranks in the Guard and the Army // Decree. op. Collected 2. T. 9. No. 7373; The highest approved Regulation on the dismissed lower ranks of the military-land department on indefinite leave // ​​Decree. op. # 7374; On the reckoning of the lower ranks of the Guards Corps, dismissed on indefinite leave, to the reserve Guards half-battalions, half-squadrons and Artillery half-batteries // Decree. op. No. 7540; Imperially approved Additional Rules to the Regulation on the dismissal of lower ranks of the military land department on indefinite leave, imperially approved on August 30, 1834 // Decree. op. No. 7664. ... In 1856, by decree of the emperor, rules were adopted that regulate the issue of dismissing lower ranks on leave and resignation. op. Collected 2. T. 31. No. 30493. ... This legal act did not change the terms of service, it only, along with indefinite leave, allowed dismissal on temporary leave. In 1864, instead of the rules, the Regulation was adopted, according to which the vacation was divided into: a) indefinite, b) temporary, c) short-term, d) long-term to improve health The highest approved Rules on the dismissal of lower military ranks on vacation and retirement // Decree. op. Collected 2. T. 39. No. 41306 .. On September 8, 1859, in the highest Decree given to the Governing Senate, the obligatory term of service of ordinary ranks was established for those who entered after September 8 (1859) 12 years before indefinite leave and 15 years before resignation, and recruited before the issuance of the decree - 15 years before indefinite leave and 20 years before resignation On the reduction of the terms of compulsory service of lower ranks in the Military and Naval Departments // Decree. op. Collected 2. T. 34. No. 34882 .. In 1868, on the eve of the introduction of universal military service, the term of military service was 10 years and 5 years on leave for those who entered after September 8, 1859, and those who entered before this date received the right for dismissal on indefinite leave after 13 years of service, with vacation - 7 years Kersnovsky, A.A. History of the Russian Army [Electronic resource] / А.А. Kersnovsky // Military literature [site]. - Access mode: http://militera.lib.ru/h/kersnovsky1/10.html. Title from the screen. (03/14/12) ..

Thus, the foundation was laid for the formation of a reserve of the armed forces. The shortening of the period of military service to some extent made it possible to solve the problem of the formation of a trained replenishment.

Also, the disadvantage of the recruiting system of recruiting was the numerous benefits that gave exemption from military service on class and estate grounds. The nobility, merchants and clergy were exempted from compulsory service. On a national basis, a number of peoples of Siberia, residents of the Caucasus, Bashkiria, Bessarabia, Crimean Tatars, Armenians and Tatars of the Astrakhan province were released from service by the Highest approved Recruiting Charter // PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 6. No. 4677. On a territorial basis, all residents of remote regions of Siberia, residents of the Arkhangelsk province were released. This also included exemptions for resettlement rights. This right was enjoyed by immigrants from Western Europe - the Germans in the Volga region, Ukraine and the Caucasus, as well as numerous immigrants from the Balkans. Inhabitants of the provinces of Livonia, Kurland, Estland sent recruitment according to a special rule in the same place .. Benefits in military service were also given by education.

In general, in the middle of the century, the number of persons exempted from military service on the basis of the listed criteria ranged from 5 to 6 million people, which was equal to 20% of the population of the European part of Russia, excluding Poland and Finland Rediger A.F. The manning and arrangement of the armed forces. Part 1.P. 82.

The idea of ​​the need to reform the manning system of the armed forces appeared immediately after the end of the Crimean War. However, serfdom stood in the way of solving this issue as an insurmountable wall. The first considerations regarding this at the state level were expressed in the early 60s of the XIX century.

Becoming the head of the Ministry of War, D.A. Milyutin saw the primary task of reforming the army in the need to introduce a new manning system. In the most submissive report to the War Ministry in 1862, the Minister of War attributed to the main shortcomings of the existing manning system the maintenance of a huge army in peacetime and at the same time the impossibility of a significant increase in its number in the event of war due to the lack of trained reserve personnel Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. S. 432-434. ...

In 1862, on the initiative of Adjutant General D.A. Milyutin to revise the Recruiting Charter at the State Council, a special commission was formed under the chairmanship of the State Secretary of the Actual Privy Councilor N.I. Bakhtina Bogdanovich M.I. Historical sketch of the activities of the military administration in Russia in the first 25th anniversary of the prosperous reign of Emperor Alexander Nikolaevich. 1855-1880 T. 3.P. 102.

All the work on drawing up a new Recruiting Charter, according to D.A. Milyutin, depended on the solution of two fundamental issues: firstly, “to what extent could the existing numerous exemptions and benefits for serving recruitment service, exemption from it up to 20% of the population, and secondly, as far as possible with the abolition of serfdom state to change the civil status of a soldier who has served his term, torn away from his primitive state when he enters the service ”Milyutin, D.А. Memories. 1860-1862. P. 228 .. The solution of these fundamental issues went far beyond the competence of the commission, which led to the fruitlessness of its work. Weak support from the emperor, constant attacks from the conservative part of society also negatively affected the activities of the commission.

Conceived by D.A. Milyutin, the reform to change the system of manning the armed forces in 1862 did not find support from the government. Such a reform was carried out in 1874. It was preceded by the work of a commission created on November 17, 1870 under the chairmanship of the Chief of the General Staff, General F.L. Heyden Zayonchkovsky P. A. Military reforms of 1860-1870 in Russia. Pp. 320-324 .. The result of the commission's work was the adoption on January 1, 1874 by Alexander II of the Charter on military service Manifesto on the introduction of universal military service // PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 49, No. 52982; The highest approved opinion of the State Council on the introduction of general military service // Decree. op. No. 52983. ... The charter defined military service as "... universal, all-class, with the abolition of those exemptions and benefits, according to which approximately one-sixth of the population of the state was exempted from military service." The manning and arrangement of the armed forces. Part 1.P. 86. The principles of manning the armed forces, established in the times of Peter the Great, were revived. The adoption of the Charter on military service was a logical consequence of equalizing the civil rights of all estates and the abolition of serfdom among the peasants.

The new law on the manning of the army created the prerequisites for solving one of the main tasks of reorganizing the army, namely, the formation of a stock of trained reserves necessary in the event of war to deploy the army into the active one.

The main method of recruiting the lower ranks was conscription. In addition to this method, there was also voluntary enrollment in military service - volunteers and "hunters" Lobko PL. Notes of the military administration for military and cadet schools. P. 69. In accordance with the adopted legal act, all males between the ages of 20 and 40, without exception, were subject to conscription. Ibid. P. 38. Some of the recruits entered service in the permanent troops, subdivided into land and sea troops, some were enlisted in the militia, which was convened only under extreme wartime circumstances. The militia "... consisted of all the male population not included in the permanent troops, but capable of carrying weapons, conscripted up to forty years of age, including those dismissed from the army and navy reserves." Collected 2. T. 49. No. 52983. ... The question of which of the conscripts was enrolled in the permanent troops, and who in the militia, was decided by lot. Only one age of the male population was called by lot, namely young people who, on January 1 of the year when the set was made, celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Reform of Alexander II / Comp. O.I. Chistyakov, T.E. Novitskaya. P. 339.

The general term of service in the ground forces for conscripts was set at 15 years, of which 6 years of active service and 9 years of being in the reserve. The charter made an exception for recruits assigned to regiments located in the Turkestan military district, as well as in the Semipalatinsk, Trans-Baikal, Yakutsk, Amur and Primorsk regions. For them, a 10-year service life was established, of which 7 years fell on active service and 3 years in reserve in the same place. P. 340.

Despite the fact that the new law obliged all estates to serve in the army, “... in reality, it did not ensure the introduction of truly universal military service, that is, an obligation that evenly extended to the entire male population of the country, regardless of property and legal status, as well as nationality. »Fedorov A.V. Social and political movement in the Russian army. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1958.S. 212. The charter did not apply to the military Cossack population, to the indigenous and Russian inhabitants of Transcaucasia, to the non-Russian population of the North Caucasus. A special procedure for the execution of military service was provided for Finland, which had significant independence. Most of the "foreign" population was exempted from military service. The population of the Turkestan Territory and Central Asia, the Primorsky and Amur regions, some districts of the Yakutsk, Tomsk, Tobolsk and Arkhangelsk provinces did not serve at all in the army. Benefits were preserved for 20 years for the Mennonites who moved to Russia and took Russian citizenship in the 50-60s. XIX century.

In addition to benefits on a national basis, the Charter determined various exemptions from military service and from active service in peacetime, deferrals from entering the service or enrolling in the reserve, benefits for education and family reasons.

The broadest benefits were provided by the Charter on marital status. There were three categories of privileged persons. The first category included only sons, the second - sons whose parents had sons under the age of 18; the third category consisted of persons whose older brother was in active service or died during the war. The imperially approved opinion of the State Council on the introduction of general military service // PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 49. No. 52983. ...

In addition to benefits on marital status, which made it easier for the privileged classes to serve up military service, the law provided a system of benefits for education, widely developed, as nowhere in Western Europe, V. Fedorov. On the issue of military service in Russia. Rostov n / D., 1906.S. 9. These benefits consisted in obtaining a deferral for persons studying in secondary and higher educational institutions, up to a certain age - from 22 to 28 years. Depending on the education they received, the terms of service were reduced for conscripts; they had the right to enter the service as volunteers. The amount of reduction in active service depended on the education received. In this regard, all young people were divided into 4 categories of Reforms of Alexander II / Comp. O.I. Chistyakov, T.E. Novitskaya. S. 346-347. ... The volunteers who entered the ground forces, according to the degree of education, were divided into three categories Lobko P.L. Notes of the military administration for military and cadet schools. P. 46.

The charter also provided for benefits exclusively for persons of the propertied classes, for those who did not have education, other advantages, but owned capital. These are benefits in terms of property and economic status. Such a category of persons was deferred from entering the service for no more than 2 years Bogdanovich M.I. Historical sketch of the activities of the military administration in Russia in the first 25th anniversary of the prosperous reign of Emperor Alexander Nikolaevich. 1855-1880 T. 5.P. 98.

Professors, health workers with a doctorate in medicine, a master of veterinary sciences and persons of other professions requiring special education were exempted from entering active service in peacetime. The charter also provided for exemptions by rank, occupation and bodily disabilities V. Fedorov. On the issue of military service in Russia. P. 11..

Thus, the Charter on conscription made it possible to increase the size of the army, to create a trained reserve necessary for the deployment of the army in wartime. Among the progressive moments of the new law was the fact that it abolished the basic privileges of the nobility, granted back in the reign of Catherine II. The establishment of benefits for education stimulated the development of education. The introduction of universal conscription ensured the transformation of the Russian armed forces into a modern mass army.

Simultaneously with the improvement of the manning system of the armed forces, the process of rearmament of the army took place. Great attention was paid to the issues of equipping troops with new types of weapons. Firstly, because the weapons were extremely backward, and secondly, because the 60s. XIX century. were the time of the growing importance of military technology. “Given the present state of the art of war,” noted D.A. Milyutin, - artillery technology has become extremely important. The perfection of weapons now gives a decisive preponderance of the army, which in this respect will be ahead of others ... ”Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. P. 135.

The program of equipping the military ground forces with new types of weapons, which took a special place in the report of D.A. Milyutin on January 15, 1862, provided for a number of events. A special place was given to the rearmament of the army with small arms. From 1826 to 1869, the Russian army had up to 38 different models of rifles and pistols Markevich V.E. Hand firearms. L., 1937.T. 1.S. 214. This variety of firearms made it difficult to study. Therefore, it was planned to equip the infantry with the same type of gun.

In order to arm the artillery, the program provided for the implementation of a number of urgent measures already in 1862. So, in equipping field artillery, the program planned during 1862 to complete the arming of light and some lightweight batteries with 4-pound rifled cannons. Particular attention was paid to the rearmament of the fortress artillery. The program noted that the Russian "... coastal and land fortresses still retain their former armament with smooth-bore guns, on wooden, mostly rotten carriages and platforms from time to time, why a significant part of the guns is not capable of long-term action" Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. S. 456. Already in 1863, in order to improve the equipping of fortresses with new types of weapons, a special committee of representatives of the artillery, naval and mining departments was created under the chairmanship of Comrade General Feldzekhmeister General Barantsev.

It should be noted that, along with a special committee, a number of bodies in charge of rearmament of the army already operated in the Ministry of War, namely, the Artillery Committee's Arms Commission under the leadership of the Inspector of rifle battalions McLenburg-Strelitzky and the Artillery Department of the Military Scientific Committee, the Artillery Committee. Artillery Committee // PSZRI. Collected 2. T. 34. No. 34514. ...

Attention was paid not only to the quantitative aspect of equipping the fortress artillery, but also to improving the quality of the guns. In this regard, the War Ministry raised the question of replacing copper and cast iron tools with steel ones.

Submitted by D.A. Milyutin's program for the rearmament of the army could not be carried out in a short time. There were certain difficulties on the way of equipping the military ground forces with new types of weapons and military equipment. One of the first to point out the industrial backwardness of the country, and as a consequence - the backwardness of the military industry. The technical and economic backwardness of Russia also led to its dependence on foreign countries. This was repeatedly noted in the reports of the Minister of War, in the reports of the artillery department. So, in 1865, the artillery department in its report to the War Ministry indicated: "... the Sestroretsk plant did not complete 20,000 rifles during the year, which happened due to the dilapidation of some mechanisms" Fedorov V.G. Armament of the Russian army in the 19th century. SPb .: Publishing house "Association of Art Press, 1911. S. 158.. Therefore, it was necessary to place orders for the manufacture of weapons abroad, which was unprofitable for Russia from the financial side, and also created other problems in the same place. P. 120. As a result of the country's technical and economic backwardness, inventions of Russian artillerymen became the property of states hostile to Russia, and often ordered guns were made primarily for foreign armies. P. A. Zayonchkovsky. Military reforms of 1860-1870. in Russia. P. 165.

The desire of the War Ministry to free itself from foreign dependence in supplying its troops with new types of weapons ran up against the scarcity of funds in the state treasury.

The War Ministry paid special attention to the technical improvement of military enterprises. So, reconstructed in the 60-70s. Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories made it possible to overcome Russia's lag behind the West in small arms. Steel plants built in the same period - Obukhovsky and Motovilikhinsky - made it possible to cast steel on them, which was superior in quality to the best foreign samples. In 1869, the largest cartridge plant in Europe was built in St. Petersburg, which produced products superior in their parameters to those of the American and British. In general, the economic backwardness of the country was a great obstacle to the development of the military industry and the implementation of inventions of Russian scientists. This made the rearmament of the Russian army dependent on foreign supplies Bogdanovich M.I. Historical sketch of the activities of the military administration in Russia in the first 25th anniversary of the prosperous reign of Emperor Alexander Nikolaevich. 1855-1880 T. 2.P. 204.

However, despite all the difficulties that the War Ministry had to face in equipping the ground forces with advanced military equipment, during the 60-70s. XIX century. the armament of the Russian army was significantly improved. This happened thanks to the successes of Russian inventors and scientists in the field of military technology. For equipping artillery with new types of weapons, which in many respects surpassed their foreign counterparts, the achievements of Russian scientists and engineers P.M. Obukhova, N.V. Kalakutsky, A.S. Lavrova, N.V. Maievsky, D.K. Chernova, I.A. Vyshnegradskiy, A.P. Davydova and others.

In 1873, the armament designed by the Russian inventor V.S. Baranovsky, the world's first rapid-fire cannon. She had a recoil device and was equipped with an optical sight. Retired artillery officer A.P. Davydov for the first time in the world invented a device for automatic firing from large-caliber guns Zayonchkovsky P. A. Military reforms of 1860-1870. in Russia. S. 197.

However, despite the presence in Russia of the largest inventions in the field of artillery, the state of weapons by the end of the 80s. did not correspond to the world level of development of military technology.

It should be noted that wars had a special influence on the rearmament processes. So, the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. caused the need to further improve the quality of field artillery batteries and strengthen the fortress artillery. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 exacerbated the need to re-equip the army with small arms, accelerated the process of replacing Minier rifles with needle guns of the Karle system, loaded from the breech with paper cartridges. But soon the War Ministry began to equip the ground forces with a more advanced rifle from the Czech rifle master Krnka. To study the Berdan rifle in 1868, D.A. Milyutin sent a special commission to the United States, headed by Colonel Gorlov, a member of the Artillery Committee. After a thorough check, the commission made a number of improvements to the Berdan rifle, then it was adopted by the Russian army. In the USA, it was rightly called the "Russian rifle". In many qualities, the rifle was superior to the guns adopted for service in the Western European armies. Fedorov V.G. Armament of the Russian army in the 19th century. P. 128.

Although the War Ministry failed to equip the entire Russian army with advanced military equipment, the transformations carried out also improved the army's combat capability compared to the period of the Crimean War. This was fully confirmed by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. This military campaign ended with the victory of the Russian army over the Turkish one, revealed many weak points in the general state of the Russian ground forces, and revealed the shortcomings in the armament of the army. Their main reasons are the incompleteness of rearmament and, in general, military reforms due to the incompleteness of the bourgeois reforms of the period under review.

In the 60s of the nineteenth century, a military-judicial reform was carried out in the Russian army, the essence of which was to introduce new, more humane views on military service, improve the moral state of the army, and form a sense of duty and honor among servicemen.

During the implementation of the reform, the following were introduced: "Disciplinary Charter", "Charter of Internal Service", "Military Charter on Punishments" and "Military Judicial Charter", which set out the fundamentals of a military court case. These documents emphasized that military service is the highest form of service to the Motherland.

The statutes proclaimed the protection of the honor and dignity of the soldier. The main offense was considered a violation of duty. In 1863, the army abolished spits, whips, branding and other corporal punishments disgracing human dignity, but the rods were retained as a “temporary measure”. In the same year, the "Regulation on the protection of military discipline and disciplinary sanctions" was approved, a court of the society of officers was established, which gave them the right to remove from their midst those unworthy to wear a military uniform Danilov, P.A. Development of military management in Russia / P.A. Danilov, D.A. Rock // Centenary of the Ministry of War. Vol. 1. S. 463-464. ...

In 1867, a new military-judicial charter began to operate. With its introduction, the Main Military Judicial Directorate was created, which was part of the Ministry of War, the Main Military Court and, under it, the Chief Military Prosecutor. The charter provided for three types of military courts: regimental courts, military district courts and the Main military court, located in St. Petersburg, Ibid. S. 465-466. ...

The new organization of legal proceedings provided for publicity, but at the same time it should be noted that the military courts were dependent on the military commanders, which deprived them of their independence. This was especially true of the regimental courts, which were fully subordinate to the regimental commanders, which created certain preconditions for administrative arbitrariness.

Thus, the military reforms of the 1860s-1870s were of progressive importance and affected all aspects of military command and control and organization of troops. They contributed to the creation of a mass army of a modern type, strengthening and increasing its combat effectiveness.

The main results of the military reforms of 1860-1870 are:

1. Introduction of the military district military command and control system;

2. Reorganization of the War Ministry and the General Staff, which became a military command and control body subordinate to the Minister of War;

3. Introduced universal all-class conscription and reduced service life;

4. A military-judicial reform has been carried out and the system of corporal punishment of soldiers has been abolished.

5. The rearmament of the army and navy began with new modern models of equipment and weapons.

6. Reforms of military educational institutions have significantly changed the entire system of officer training; the issue of staffing the troops with officers in peacetime has been resolved.

Introduction

Chapter I. Great reforms of the 60-70s. and their influence on the transformation of the army and navy in the second half of the 19th century

1 Great reforms 60-70 as the basis for the development of the army and navy of the Russian state in the post-reform period

2 Post-reform transformation of the Russian army and navy in the second half of the 19th century

Chapter II. The development of the army and navy of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

1 The composition and organization of the military land forces in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

2 Composition and organization of the navy in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

Conclusion

List of sources and literature

Introduction

Russian empire reform liberal army navy

The experience of domestic military development testifies to the fact that at critical stages in the development of a state, profound transformations of its entire military system were often carried out. Fundamental changes in the military organization in different periods of history were called military reforms. Military reforms are profound in content and carried out within a certain time frame by decision and under the leadership of the highest political bodies of state power, transformations of the military organization of the state.

The objective prerequisites for military reforms of that time were prepared by carrying out the most important measures in society in terms of political and economic changes. The main directions of the modernization of Russia in the second half of the 19th century were the abolition of serfdom, the reform of the central bodies of state administration, the judicial system, education, and local self-government. These and other transformations had a great impact on the economic development of the country, the formation of a new system of social relations, and changed the life of all segments of the population of the Russian Empire.

The transformation of the state's armed forces also played an important role in these processes.

The purposeour work is to study the experience of transforming the army and navy of the Russian Empire in the context of military reforms in the second half of the 19th century and an examination of the evolution and development of the military land forces and the navy in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

The set goal of the course work is achieved by solving the following tasks:

.Analyze the impact of liberal reforms in the 60-70s. XIX century on the transformation of the army and navy in the second half of the XIX - early XX centuries;

.Analyze the main directions of the transformations that took place in the armed forces under the influence of military reforms in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries;

.Trace the evolution and development of the composition and organization of the military land forces in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries;

.Show the transformation of the composition and organization of the navy in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

Research objectis the army and navy of Russia in the second half of the XIX - early XX centuries.

The subject of researchis the experience of implementing, in the context of military reforms, transformations in the armed forces, which were turning points in the history of the army and navy of Russia in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

Chronological scope of the studyinclude the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. The lower boundary of the study corresponds to the beginning of the Great Reforms of the 60s and 70s. and the Milyutin transformations associated with the defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which had a great influence on the further development of the Russian armed forces. The upper border is 1914. - connected with the eve of the First World War and changes in the army and navy on the specified date.

Historiography of the problem.In the study and coverage of the problem of transforming the army and navy of the Russian state in the context of military reforms 60-70. XIX century. and the evolution of the military land forces and the navy of the Russian Empire at the turn of the century in the historical literature, three main periods can be distinguished: the first - the pre-revolutionary period (early 70s. XIX century. - February 1917); the second - the Soviet period (October 1917 - December 1991); the third is modern or post-Soviet (from 1992 to the present day). This periodization, in our opinion, is primarily due to the objective conditions of social development, as well as the level and content of scientific research related to this problem.

In the pre-revolutionary period of the development of historiography, questions about the reform of the Russian army in the 1860-1870s. were not the subject of special scientific research. In some works, partially covering this problem, only facts were presented, mostly devoid of significant analysis. They concluded that the decisive role in determining the further development of the armed forces belonged to the monarchs. For example, in the multivolume work of Lieutenant General M.I.Bogdanovich, there is practically no serious analysis of the problems of military development. A similar shortcoming is characteristic of the multivolume work "Centenary of the War Ministry". This edition included a general historical essay "Development of military command in Russia", prepared by P.A. Danilov, as well as individual articles on the history of various departments of the Military Department. Of interest to researchers is the work of Colonel P.A. Danilov. In it, the author covers in detail the most important transformations carried out by the Ministry of War in the 60-70s. XIX century.

Interesting, in our opinion, is the work of the professor of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff A.F. Rediger "Manning and Arrangement of the Armed Force", which examines the Russian army in comparison with the European armed forces: Austro-Hungarian, French, Italian, German. Rediger used a lot of statistical materials. Nevertheless, this publication can be considered a full-fledged study only with a stretch, since the author based his conclusions solely on the "Most Subject Reports" of the Ministry of War. Rediger did not set himself the task of identifying problematic issues and getting to the truth, but, nevertheless, he tried to assess the Russian army. The weak side of this work is the consideration of military issues without regard to political events and the economic state of the country.

In 1911, The History of the Russian Army and Navy was published in 15 volumes. For this topic, volume 13 is most important, it is in it that the armed forces of Russia are considered during the reign of Alexander II and subsequent rulers. This work is of considerable interest, since it contains information about the composition of the army, recruiting by type of troops, and even about the life of the soldiers.

The study of the pre-revolutionary historiography of the transformation of the army and navy of Russia shows that each of the authors gave his own vision of events, their reasons that influenced the Armed Forces and the development of Russia as a whole. All authors of that period, regardless of their points of view, contributed to the creation of historiography on this research topic.

The second (Soviet) period of historiography is characterized by a significant degree of Soviet ideology in highlighting the main problems of the transformation of the army and navy in the context of military reforms in the second half of the 19th century and the evolution of the military land forces and the navy at the turn of the century. The research was based on an ideological principle. The attention of researchers in Soviet times was devoted to a holistic coverage of the development of the armed forces, the relationship between state and military command and control bodies, etc.

Special works appeared related to the problem under study, first of all, the works of L.G. Bloodless. His monograph, based on extensive documentary materials, examines many problems associated with the state of the military-economic potential of the Russian army and navy in the period under study. The monograph "The Army and Navy of Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century" contains a significant amount of statistical material. Much attention is paid to the changes that have taken place in the organization of command and control and technical equipment of the army and navy. Meanwhile, the monograph does not pay enough attention to the problem of the influence of the changed during the revolution of 1905-1907. the political conjuncture for the construction of the army and navy.

Among other Soviet studies, one should mention the fundamental works of the historian P.A. Zayonchkovsky. In the works "Military reforms of the 1860-1870s in Russia" and "Autocracy and the Russian army at the turn of the XIX - XX centuries. 1881-1903 "the author, tracing the implementation of military reforms, notes that the transformations in the army were a direct result of the socio-economic shifts that took place in Russia in the post-reform era. Zayonchkovsky P.A. highlights one of the most important problems - the process of rearmament of the army, which could be carried out only on the basis of the development of Russian military-technical thought. At the same time, these works do not cover a number of issues of the organization and structure of the army: the commissariat, the military-sanitary unit, the military-judicial department, etc.

The problems of the development of the army and navy of the Russian Empire in the post-reform period are reflected in the 4-volume work of General A.A. Kersnovsky "History of the Russian Army". As the author noted, in his work he sought to show "... the originality of Russian military art." The work also presents some analysis of military reforms, the key role of the Minister of War D.A. Milyutin in their implementation.

The history of the development of domestic submarine shipbuilding is described in detail in the work of G.M. Trusov, who, based on the study of numerous archival documents and literary sources, systematized and summarized extensive material on this problem. The monograph describes in detail the tests, combat training, the participation of Russian submarines in the Russian-Japanese war, the cases of their accidents and deaths, but of greater interest to us is the emergence of submarine shipbuilding, as well as the organization and composition of the first submarines and their evolution in the subsequent period ...

The third (modern) period of the historiography of the problem begins in post-Soviet Russia and continues to the present. It is caused by cardinal changes in the socio-political life of the country and is characterized by the manifestation of increasing interest in the study of military issues. A surge of interest is caused by the attention of society to the processes taking place in the army and navy in recent decades, as well as by the opportunities that have opened up for studying the historical retrospective on this topic in new conditions.

Of greatest interest, in our opinion, is the joint work of Russian and foreign scientists edited by L. G. Zakharova, B. Eklof and J. Bushnell. The resulting work is, in fact, the first experience in modern historiography of examining the most important transformations of the 19th century in aggregate, in interconnection, against their economic and social background. We would like to place special emphasis on the work of J. Bushnell “D. Milyutin and the Balkan War: A Test of Military Reform ", in which he, using the example of studying the Russian-Turkish war, reveals the vices and shortcomings of the military reforms of the 60-7 years. XIX century.

History of the Russian fleet in the 19th - early 20th centuries (before the First World War) is reflected in the joint work of V.A.Zolotarev and I.A.Kozlov. The monograph examines the most important stages in the development of the Russian navy during this period, shows its participation and role in the wars waged by Russia. For us, of particular interest is the state of the navy for the period under study, its organization, composition, as well as the subsequent development of the naval forces of the Russian Empire.

Among other modern studies, the fundamental work of C.B. Volkov, in which the development of the officer corps in Russia from the first years of its existence to the beginning of the 20th century is analyzed from the standpoint of the latest achievements of Russian historical science. It also examines a number of aspects of the socio-economic, professional, cultural and educational level of officers in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. Unfortunately, the author pays very little attention to the Russian naval officer corps.

Source baseresearch is represented by two main groups. The first group includes official documents of the highest authorities and administration of the Russian Empire. First of all - the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. It contains most of the laws and regulations related to transformations in the military sphere during the period under study. Of great interest are the annual Codes of Military Regulations, in which laws and regulations concerning the organization of army life are published. Important is the "Charter on military service ..." published in 1874 - the law on the conscription of soldiers into military service.

You can learn about the army command and control system from the "Regulations on the Field Command of Troops in Wartime".

Russian legislation of the 10th - 20th centuries is also of considerable interest, namely volume 8, which provides a general description of the judicial reform. Included are laws on changing the judicial system of Russia, the criminal process, and in part - criminal law: the establishment of judicial regulations, the Charter of criminal proceedings, the Charter on punishments imposed by justices of the peace.

The second group of sources includes memoirs of prominent statesmen of that period, namely “Memoirs of D.A. Milyutin ".

"Memoirs" by Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin reflect the difficult and crucial time for Russia at the end of 1860-1862. - the very eve of the abolition of serfdom and the first two years of liberation. The memoirist perceived and conveyed the unusualness and depth of the changes that took place in the country especially vividly, since he did not have to observe the gradualness and sequence of changes. He saw the result of them all of a sudden, after a four-year stay in the Caucasus. Milyutin left Petersburg before the onset of the "thaw" (the term of those years), he parted with the Empire of Nicholas I, and returned to renewing Russia, throwing off the shackles of serfdom. And he was amazed at what he saw.

The main plots of Milyutin's Memoirs - the implementation of the peasant reform of 1861, the growth of the revolutionary liberation movement, university riots, the policy of autocracy in the outskirts, especially in the Caucasus and Poland, the international position of Russia - are organically intertwined with the story of the War Ministry. The young minister of war devoted whole chapters to the activities of this department.

The memoirs of Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin, one of the architects of the Great Reforms of the era of Alexander II, who for many years held the post of Minister of War, make it possible, having looked at the life of the sixties bureaucracy from the inside, to understand the exceptional complexity of the position of a high-ranking official of liberal views in imperial Russia. On the one hand, there are strict norms of corporate ethics, on the other, a sober assessment of the situation and the awareness of the inevitability of innovations; on the one hand, there is the moral need to maintain an independent position, on the other, the practical need to maneuver and make compromises.

Milyutin's "memoirs" open up a completely different perspective of seeing historical events than that of a private person or a public figure, namely the perspective of a professional. This particular view is evidenced by the very tone of the memories, where analytical dryness invariably prevails over poetic inspiration and nostalgic sadness.

Chapter I. Great reforms of the 60-70s. and their influence on the transformation of the army and navy in the second half of the 19th century

.1 Great reforms of the 60-70s. as the basis for the development of the army and navy of the Russian state in the post-reform period

Second half of the 19th century was marked by major, truly epochal changes in the Russian Empire, which covered all spheres of life of the state and society. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 was followed by reforms - zemstvo (1864), judicial (1864), censorship (1865), police (1864), financial (1866), education (1867), city (1870) and military (60s - 70s). They were held on the initiative of Tsar-Liberator Alexander II under the direct painful impression of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War.

On the eve of the reforms, Alexander II and the leading people of the state saw that the Russian Empire in socio-economic development lagged more and more behind the European powers that were once equal in power. Alexander II was also aware of the reasons for this lag. The main one was the lack of rights of the majority of the people. The tsar understood that "the age requires the liberation of the peasants." The fact that hired labor is more profitable than serf labor, that serfdom hindered the development of agriculture and commodity grain production, was well known to the government even earlier. Moreover, the crisis phenomena did not characterize this particular moment. The economy did not collapse: 1856 was fruitful, the country exported grain. But the symptoms of the insolvency of the existing serf economic system loudly declared themselves in the field of finance. During the period from 1853 to 1856. the total deficit increased from 52 million to 307 million rubles. silver, the gold security of paper money decreased by more than 50%. A significant part of the budget (up to 42%) went to the army. The Crimean War showed that the Russian army was armed incomparably worse than the enemy. The fleet consisted mainly of sailing ships, significantly inferior to the steam Anglo-French fleet. The Crimean campaign revealed another vulnerability of the empire - the lack of roads. During the reign of Nicholas I, 963 versts of railways were built. In the US, by comparison, 8,500 miles. There were 5625 miles of highways, excluding Finland, the Kingdom of Poland and the Caucasus. As a result, the delivery of food from Perekop to Simferopol took more than a month: the carts moved at a speed of 4 versts a day. Reinforcements from Moscow to Crimea sometimes went for three months, Anglo-French reinforcements reached the front by sea in three weeks. The state of the army, which was the main expenditure part of the Russian budget, is evidenced by the terrible figures about the soldiers who died from illness, which are given by the Minister of War Chernyshev in the report "Historical Review of the Military Land Administration from 1825 to 1850." The document, published on the 25th anniversary of the reign of Nicholas I, testified that 1062839 "lower ranks" died from diseases in 25 years. During the same time in battles - during the wars with Persia, Turkey, in the Caucasus, the suppression of the Polish uprising, the intervention in Hungary - 30,233 people were killed. During this period, the army consisted of 2,600,407 soldiers, therefore, 40% of the available composition of the "lower ranks" died from diseases ... Perhaps no army in the world has known such a ratio of those killed in battle and those who died from disease over a quarter of a century. The Crimean War made these statistics obvious to the whole society.

Thus, transformations in all spheres of the life of Russian society were vital. But the difficulty lay in the fact that the transformations were based on the socio-economic reform, i.e. a reform that affected the interests of the main classes of society. In addition, it had to take place in the context of a general crisis.

One of the main reforms was the abolition of serfdom. On February 19, 1861, the emperor signed the Manifesto on the Abolition of Serfdom and the Regulations explaining this document. He did this contrary to the opinion of the conservative majority of the State Council. The peasant reform was carried out in three stages. At the first stage (1861-1863), the transformation processes concerned the life of the peasants who belonged to the landowners. With the publication in 1863 of the Regulations on the land arrangement of specific peasants, the second stage of serf reform began. The third, final stage concerned the state rural inhabitants, who, by decree of the emperor in 1866, began to possess land plots without the right of redemption.

Despite the fact that the peasant reform was half-hearted, since it “did not satisfy the aspirations of the peasant masses, did not quench their thirst for land,” its main task was achieved - serfdom was abolished. This allowed rural inhabitants to receive personal freedom, the right to dispose of their destiny and their property, the ability to change their class status and receive an education. In addition, the reform led to other transformations and was a step forward along the path of modernizing Russia along the European model. Only after the abolition of serfdom did it become possible to carry out the long-overdue military reform.

The abolition of serfdom cleared the ground for the introduction of all-estate zemstvo self-government. The zemstvo reform, carried out four years after the peasant reform, was carried out in a different environment. To replace the supporters of democratic reforms, such as the Minister of Internal Affairs S.S. Lanskoy, Minister of State Property P.D. Kiselev, brother of the Minister of War N.A. Milyutin, people who are not interested in transformational processes have come, "... the leadership of the preparation of the reform fell into the hands of the party that looked disapprovingly at the bold transformational activity, deeply regretting the old days." In April 1862, who headed the commission for the preparation of the reform of local government, P.A. Valuev in connection with the resignation of N.A. Milyutin set to work on the Zemstvo reform only because the mighty force of events did not allow it to be avoided.

Compiled under the leadership of P.A. Valuev's draft Regulation on provincial and district zemstvo institutions on January 1, 1864 was approved by the emperor. In accordance with this document, a system of local self-government was introduced in 33 provinces of Russia. Zemstvos were not created in the Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan provinces, in the Cossack regions. The reason was the lack of a sufficient number of landowners there to form a landowning curia. Excluded from the law are 9 western provinces, where the government feared the influence of the "unreliable" Polish element.

The electoral system of zemstvos was built on the liberal principle of property qualification. There were three curiae - landowning, urban and peasant. At the county congresses, elections of vowels to the county zemstvo assembly took place, and at the zemstvo meetings, provincial vowels were elected.

Zemstvo institutions were dominated by the nobility, which made it safe for the government. But even this did not push the monarch to a decisive step towards the introduction of an all-Russian zemstvo, although the draft of this reform was proposed by M.M. Speransky. Despite the existing shortcomings of the zemstvo reform, the zemstvo progressively contributed to the national development of the country. Thanks to the established institutions, for the first time in the history of Russia, teachers appeared in the villages, health care improved, and local industry and trade began to develop.

6 years after the implementation of the zemstvo reform, all-estate self-government began to be applied in cities in accordance with the Regulations of June 16, 1870.The reform in the cities was carried out without taking into account the views and proposals of the advanced elements of society, who believed that simultaneously with the property qualification for city vowels it was necessary to establish and educational qualifications in order to introduce the largest number of intelligent inhabitants of the city into the city councils; that it is necessary to abolish the division of urban society into categories in order to strengthen the unity of urban interests, and to subordinate the activities of dumas to public control. As a result of the reform, the range of activities of city government bodies and their subordination to administrative supervision were placed approximately in the same framework that the Regulations of 1864 created for zemstvos.

The reform of local government not only simplified its organization and weakened bureaucratic tutelage on the part of the government apparatus, but also changed the status of local civilian authorities in relation to military power. If in the pre-reform period the governor-general was simultaneously a civil and military commander in the province, then from the moment of the founding of the districts and the concentration in the hands of the district commander of the guard and garrison services of troops and commandant administration in most of the central provinces of Russia, a new position of the provincial military chief was established, directly subordinate military district administration. The governor began to represent only civil authorities.

The renewal of the state mechanism, due to the emancipation of the estates, was facilitated by the formation of new judicial institutions. The judicial reform was the most democratic and consistent in the reforms of Alexander II. Of all the reforms of 1861-1874. it was in the judicial reform that the liberal-democratic principle was expressed with the greatest force. A.A. Kiesewetter, recognizing the judicial reform as the most successful among others, noted a number of reasons that contributed to this success: “On the one hand, the development of judicial reform was not complicated by the class struggle that was initiated by the peasant reform. On the other hand, the preparation of the judicial reform was carried out strictly systematically: private developments were preceded by the establishment of the fundamental foundations of the entire transformation and their approval by law, from which no deviations were then allowed. Finally, the development of the judicial reform fell into the good, reliable hands of a circle of young lawyers ardently devoted to the good of Russia, headed by Zarudny. "

As a result of judicial reforms, four laws were passed: the Establishment of Judicial Regulations, the Statute of Criminal Proceedings, the Statute of Civil Proceedings and the Statute on Punishments Imposed by Justices of the Peace.

The judicial reform radically changed the judicial system, procedural and, in part, the substantive law of the Russian Empire. It introduced the principle of the independence of judges, guaranteeing it by the election of justices of the peace and the irreplaceability of judges of general judicial seats, their high salaries, the establishment of special judicial districts that did not coincide with the administrative division of the state. The reform confirmed the principle of the all-class court, establishing a single jurisdiction of all classes in criminal and civil cases for the new court. The jury was introduced. For the first time, a real advocacy was established. The prosecutor's office was also reorganized, freed from the function of general supervision and focusing on work in court.

Of course, the judicial reforms did not escape their drawbacks. But these shortcomings concerned particulars and did not detract from the great merits of the judicial statutes of Emperor Alexander II. The judicial reform of 1864 granted "a speedy, rightful and merciful judgment," equal for all estates. The characteristic features of the Russian court were its incorruptibility and rare independence, which so distinguished it from the corrupt Western European magistracy, which was entirely in the hands of political parties, financial circles and the political police. Judicial reform has also contributed to the reorganization of the military courts on the basis of democratic principles. Military courts from 1867 began to operate on the same principles as civil ones.

The needs of progressive development demanded to reform and streamline all spheres of life in feudal Russia - in particular, and finances, which were completely upset during the Crimean War. In 1860, Alexander II ordered to abolish from January 1, 1863 the ransom system, under which private individuals were left to collect indirect taxes from the population for salt, tobacco, wine, etc. Instead of farms full of abuses, a more civilized excise system was introduced, which regulated the flow of indirect taxes into the treasury, and not into the pockets of tax farmers. In the same 1860, a single State Bank of Russia was established (instead of the previous variety of credit institutions) and the state budget was streamlined: for the first time in the country, a list of income and expenses began to be published.

After these reforms, the financial policy of tsarism became more rational, but retained the general class orientation. Peasants, petty bourgeois and artisans continued to pay the feudal poll tax, which was introduced by Peter I and from which the privileged estates (nobility, clergy, merchants) were liberated, and the peasants, moreover, were suffocating from quitrent and redemption payments to the state. The state budget, as before, was built in the interests of protecting the "top" from the "bottom": more than 50% of expenditures went to the maintenance of the army and the state apparatus, and only 9% - to public education, medicine, social care.

In the field of public education, the reform contributed to the spread of elementary literacy in society. She destroyed the noble caste of secondary and higher educational institutions, opened access for other social strata of the country. This was reflected in military educational institutions. With the creation of cadet schools, representatives of other social groups, along with the nobility, were able to become officers.

Thus, the socio-economic changes in post-reform Russia created the conditions for broad transformations of the Russian army on a liberal basis. Armed forces of the Russian Empire in the last third of the XIX century. acted in a triune capacity: as an important instrument of the great-power, imperial policy of tsarism; the stronghold of Russian statehood, security and stability of the Russian state and its population; a specific social organism closely linked with the Russian society. Being already, therefore, simultaneously conservative and dynamic, the armed forces were sensitive to social changes, reflected painful phenomena and processes in society and the state, in world development. All this complicated the task of reforming them.

1.2 Post-reform transformation of the Russian army and navy in the second half of the 19th century

The military defeat in the Crimean War left no one in doubt about the need for reforms in the military field. Due to the backwardness of the socio-economic and political system, once one of the best armies in the world was brought to complete decomposition and became unsuitable not only for an offensive, but also for a defensive war. Any partial measures to improve it could not correct the situation.

June 1855, a note was sent to Alexander II by the commander-in-chief of the guards and grenadier corps, General F.V. Ridiger, in which he criticized the existing military system. In a second note presented to the emperor on July 23 of the same year, F.V. Ridiger outlined his proposals for the transformation of the army. The general's recommendations boiled down to five points: first, to decentralize military command; second, to change the nature of the training of troops, to radically revise all military regulations; third, to improve the quality of officer training by increasing the number of military educational institutions; fourthly, to carry out certification of senior command personnel when appointing commanders of individual units to positions, while providing for the dismissal from service of all persons who do not meet the necessary requirements; fifth, to create special commissions to discuss the proposed issues. The emperor approved both notes, and on July 20, 1855, a special commission was created under the leadership of Adjutant General F.V. Ridiger, and after his death the commission was headed by General N.F. Plautin.

Appointed on April 17, 1856 to the post of Minister of War N.O. Sukhozanet has taken a number of significant steps to transform the armed forces. By the highest decree on December 25, 1856, all soldiers' children were expelled from the military department and turned into free tax-paying estates. In 1857, the military settlements that had been introduced since 1810 were finally canceled. In 1859, the obligatory term of service in the ground forces was reduced to 15, and in the navy - to 14 years. The militia was disbanded, and the recruitment call decreased by 1/4. However, in order to carry out the necessary radical transformations, Lieutenant General N.O. Sukhozanet was unusable. The creation of an army of a new era required figures with a new political outlook, a broad military outlook and a deep understanding of the defining trends in the development of military art.

The most important reforms began in the army after the appointment as Minister of War on November 9, 1861, Adjutant General D.A. Milyutin. Milyutin, carrying out transformations in the army, expanded and deepened the ideas of F.V. Ridiger.

The Minister of War was faced with an extremely difficult task - to reorganize the entire system of military command and structure of the army. At the same time, it was necessary to reduce military spending and make sure that this did not damage the combat capability of the army.

Many new people were involved in drawing up the transformation program. The new minister took care of the appointment of energetic and proactive officers to the number of his closest employees: F.L. Heiden, K.P. Kaufman, A.A. Danzas, N.I. Karlhoff and others, explaining the personnel reshuffle in this way: "It is possible to take on the alteration of everything old only with new people." A special role in the development and editing of the reform program was played by F.G. Ustryalov, a former major expert in military legislation, and V.M. Anichkov, professor at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, specialist in military command and control.

This team, led by Dmitry Alekseevich, has become the center of a huge organizational and analytical work. To analyze the state of affairs, comprehensively review and discuss all parts of the Russian military structure, Milyutin called meetings almost daily, opened free access to "all extraneous assumptions, opinions and projects", created special commissions to discuss and prepare the most significant issues. As a result, the War Ministry received "a huge variety of notes and projects, of which only a few turned out to be suitable for anything." This did not stop the minister, he understood that only in the process of living activity an atmosphere of initiative and creativity, involvement in an important state cause is created.

A large role in the development of the reform program was played by the commission, which worked out the problems of the composition and general organization of the army, which, on behalf of Milyutin, was headed by Major General A.K. Baumgarten. In a short time, the commission demanded from various departments of the ministry "considerations of needs and shortcomings." The result of the ministry's activities was brilliant: in less than two months the program of transformations in the main directions of the war ministry's activities was created, and already on January 15, 1862, Milyutin handed it over to Alexander II in the form of an All-Subject Report, which consisted of 10 sections on the main directions of military affairs. This report, approved by the emperor at the end of January, became a program of practical actions for D.A. Milyutin. It covered literally all areas of the life and activities of the armed forces.

In the reform itself, several directions can be distinguished: 1) reorganization of military command; 2) reform of military educational institutions; 3) changing the system of manning the armed forces by introducing universal military service; 4) transformation of military courts; 5) rearmament of the army. All these activities were carried out in two periods. The first period (from 1861 to 1874) consisted in the preparation of material conditions and military administration for the formation of a mass army. The second period (from 1874) was characterized by the completion of the military reforms of the 60s and 70s and the creation of a mass army on the basis of the adopted new Charter on conscription.

One of Milyutin's first reforms was the reorganization of the system of central military command and the creation of territorial bodies in the form of district headquarters (the creation of a military district system).

In May 1862, Milyutin presented to Alexander II proposals under the title "The main foundations of the proposed structure of military administration in the districts." This document was based on the following provisions:

To eliminate the division in peacetime into armies and corps, consider the division as the highest tactical unit.

Divide the territory of the entire state into several military districts.

At the head of the district, appoint a chief, who will be entrusted with the supervision of the active forces and the command of local troops, and also entrust him with the management of all local military institutions.

Thus, Milyutin proposed creating a territorial, district system in which supply and material and technical functions were assigned to the district headquarters, and the operational command was concentrated in the hands of divisional commanders. The new system significantly simplified military administration and eliminated the excessive centralization of the War Department.

In accordance with these plans, the need to create 15 military districts was indicated: Finland, St. Petersburg, Baltic (Riga), North-West (Vilno), Kingdom of Poland, South-West (Kiev), South (Odessa), Moscow, Kharkov, Verkhnevolzhsky ( Kazan), Nizhnevolzhsky (Saratov), ​​Caucasian (Tiflis), Orenburg, West Siberian (Omsk), East Siberian (Irkutsk).

The structure of the main district administration was to include: 1) General command and staff; 2) District quartermaster; 3) Artillery control; 4) Engineering management; 5) Medical and hospital management.

In 1862, instead of the First Army, the Warsaw, Kiev, Vilna and Odessa military districts were established. Following this, in August 1864, the "Regulations on military districts" were approved, on the basis of which all military units and military institutions located in the district were subordinate to the commander of the district troops. Thus, he became the sole boss. In the border districts, the Commander was entrusted with the duties of the governor-general. All military and civilian power was concentrated in his face.

In 1864, 6 more military districts were created: Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Kharkov and Kazan. And in subsequent years, the Caucasian, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian military districts were formed. Each district was both a military command and control body and a military-administrative structure. This made it possible to promptly command the troops, ensured the rapid deployment of the army in case of war.

Along with the reform of local military administration in 1862-1867. the reorganization of the Ministry of War also took place. The main problem of the existing structure was the lack of a unified management, which was paradoxically combined with the centralization of the department, brought to the point of absurdity.

In 1862, two main directorates were created: artillery and engineering, and in 1863, the department of the General Staff was reorganized. It was merged with the military topographic depot and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff and received the name of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Later, in connection with the introduction of the military district system, in 1866 the Main Directorate of the General Staff and the Inspection Department were merged into one directorate called the General Staff.

In 1868, the transformation of the Ministry of War was completed, and on January 1, 1869, a new "Regulation on the Ministry of War" came into effect. According to the "Regulation", the War Ministry consisted of the Imperial Main Apartment, the Military Council, the Chief Military Court, the Office of the Ministry of War, The General Staff and 7 main directorates (quartermaster, artillery, engineering, military medical, military educational institutions, naval and irregular troops), as well as the directorate of the inspector general of cavalry, inspector of rifle battalions and the committee on the wounded.

Simultaneously with the implementation of the military reform, in 1868, the "Regulations on the field command of troops in wartime" was developed. According to this document, the troops in the theater of operations formed one or more armies, each of which was headed by a commander-in-chief, who was directly subordinate to the emperor. The heads of the military districts were responsible for supplying the troops with all the necessary resources and were accountable to the commander-in-chief of the army. "Position ..." greatly simplified the structure of field management of the army in the field and significantly expanded the capabilities of the commanders-in-chief, who were given the right to conduct hostilities in accordance with the situation and guided by the approved general plan.

Thus, the reform of military command made it possible to eliminate excessive centralization, significantly increase initiative and responsibility for decisions made on the ground, and cut the military command apparatus by almost half.

In close connection with the issues of military command was the question of the correspondence of persons to the positions that are entrusted to them. “The improvement and dignity of the army,” reported the Minister of War, “increasingly depends on a good choice of chiefs at various levels of the service hierarchy. Without this essential condition, all the best measures taken to improve the troops and their control will be fruitless. " To solve this problem, it was necessary to pay attention to: 1) manning the army with officers; 2) the procedure for their service.

In the pre-reform period, the army was recruited with officers at the expense of graduates of cadet corps and special military schools (artillery, engineering, etc.), which accounted for about 30% of the officer corps. The main body of the officer corps (about 60%) was recruited at the expense of cadets and volunteers, who were entitled to a grace period of service when conferring the first officer rank. They were enrolled in the regiments after passing a simple exam and, having served for two years, with a positive attestation received an officer's rank.

In addition, the army was recruited from non-commissioned officers who served in the army for 10-12 years and passed a simple exam. The government resorted to the latter measure mainly during the war, since with the promotion of officers they were given personal nobility.

During the Crimean War, strong flaws in the officer training system were revealed. The question arose of reorganizing military educational institutions in order to improve the quality of officer training and increase the number of candidates of the appropriate level.

In the course of the reorganization of military educational institutions, ineffective cadet corps (with the exception of Pages and Finland), which created an unnecessary burden on the military budget, were eliminated. Special classes of cadet corps, where persons with secondary education were admitted, were transformed into military schools with a two-year term of study. On the basis of the general education classes of the cadet corps, military gymnasiums with a seven-year term of study (preparatory class and six basic classes) were opened, which were educational institutions that were advanced in their organization and program. Their graduates then entered military schools.

On average, about 460 people graduated from military schools annually. However, the army continued to experience a shortage of officers. In this regard, another type of military educational institutions was created - cadet schools with a two-year period of study. They were created with the aim of providing the lower ranks of the regular troops from among the chief officer's children, as well as the noblemen among the noblemen, the scientific and combat education necessary for an officer. The cadet schools admitted persons who had training in the volume of four classes of a secondary general education school. These schools were subordinate to the chiefs of staff of the military districts. Military gymnasiums with a four-year term of study were also opened, preparing them for admission to the cadet schools.

In the system of military educational institutions, various schools of the military department also functioned, preparing gunsmiths, pyrotechnics, clerks, topographers, draftsmen, engravers, etc. Their graduates had to serve as lower ranks in their specialty for 10 to 12 years.

Serious attention was also paid to the training of pedagogical personnel for military educational institutions.

The training of senior officers was carried out at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the Nikolaev Engineering, Mikhailovskaya Artillery and Medical-Surgical Academies. In 1867, the Aleksandrovsk Military Law Academy was also opened.

In the 60s, there were some changes in the regulations on academies. The requirements for admission to the Academy of the General Staff were increased. Only officers who had at least four years of military service in combatant positions began to be admitted to the entrance exams. The Mikhailovskaya Artillery and Nikolaevsk Engineering Academy began to admit only persons who had regularly served in the ranks for at least two years.

Particular attention in the academies was paid to improving the quality of teaching, studying the art of war, taking into account the experience of recent wars. Much attention was paid to practical training.

The system of educational institutions in the navy had its own specifics. In addition to educational institutions that train combatant naval officers, it included institutions for the training of navigators, technical engineers, naval gunners and shipbuilders (ship engineers). As in the army, naval educational institutions that train officers could be divided into two groups: those giving their graduates the first officer's rank (or the right to be promoted to officers) and those in which persons who already have officers' ranks raised their education. The first group includes naval schools (Marine Corps, Marine Engineering School), and the second includes the academy and various officer classes and schools (Nikolaev Naval Academy). The specificity of naval education was the fact that, unlike the army in the navy, both educational institutions giving the first officer rank graduated their students with a general higher education as higher educational institutions (only academies were such in the army).

Thus, the reorganization of military educational institutions made it possible to significantly increase the composition of the officer corps and raise its educational level. However, the reform did not create a reserve of officers for the reserve troops. As before, education was received mainly by people from the nobility. For representatives of other classes, access to military educational institutions was practically closed.

The most important of the military reforms, in our opinion, is the introduction of universal military service. This measure affected the interests of all social strata of society and showed its readiness to further advance along the path of democratization.

Developed in the first quarter of the 18th century. the recruiting system of manning corresponded to the feudal-serf social basis of tsarist Russia. For its time, it was the most advanced and became a progressive step in the history of the Russian army, having a great influence on the armies of Western Europe.

Under the existing system, the state was forced to maintain a large army in terms of numbers, which weighed down the country's budget. For peacetime, the size of the army was large, but for the military, it was always insufficient. In the course of the war, it was necessary to resort to reinforced recruits, to replenish the army with an untrained contingent. The lack of a trained reserve created a chronic shortage of regiments both in wartime and in peacetime. Thus, the recruiting system limited the ability to receive quickly and timely trained recruits.

A big drawback of the recruiting system was that, with the existing long service life, the army constantly consisted of more older soldiers than young ones. Initially, the life term of military service by the law of 1793 and by the confirming decree of the Governing Senate of January 1, 1805 was set at 25 years. In 1818, the term of service in the guard was reduced to 22 years. The 1834 law provided for 20 years, of which 15 years in active service and 5 years in reserve. After this period, an ordinary recruit was dismissed on an indefinite leave for 5 years. In 1856, by decree of the emperor, rules were adopted regulating the issue of dismissing lower ranks on leave and resignation. This legal act did not change the terms of service, it only, along with indefinite leave, allowed dismissal on temporary leave. In 1864, instead of the rules, a Regulation was adopted, according to which the vacation was divided into: a) indefinite, b) temporary, c) short-term, d) long-term to improve health. On September 8, 1859, in the highest Decree given to the Governing Senate, the compulsory term of service for ordinary ranks was established for those who entered after September 8 (1859) 12 years before indefinite leave and 15 years before resignation, and those recruited before the decree was issued - 15 years before indefinite leave and 20 years before retirement. In 1868, on the eve of the introduction of universal conscription, the term of military service was 10 years and 5 years on leave for those who entered after September 8, 1859, and those who entered before this date received the right to dismissal on indefinite leave after 13 years of service. with vacation - 7 years.

Thus, the foundation was laid for the formation of a reserve of the armed forces. The shortening of the period of military service to some extent made it possible to solve the problem of the formation of a trained replenishment.

Also, the disadvantage of the recruiting system of recruiting was the numerous benefits that gave exemption from military service on class and estate grounds. The nobility, merchants and clergy were exempted from compulsory service. A number of peoples of Siberia, the inhabitants of the Caucasus, Bashkiria, Bessarabia, Crimean Tatars, Armenians and Tatars of the Astrakhan province were released from service on a national basis. On a territorial basis, all residents of remote regions of Siberia, residents of the Arkhangelsk province were released. This also included exemptions for resettlement rights. This right was enjoyed by immigrants from Western Europe - the Germans in the Volga region, Ukraine and the Caucasus, as well as numerous immigrants from the Balkans. Residents of the provinces of Livonia, Courland, Estland sent recruitment according to a special rule. Education also gave benefits in military service.

In general, in the middle of the century, the number of persons exempted from military service on the grounds listed ranged from 5 to 6 million people, which was equal to 20% of the population of the European part of Russia, excluding Poland and Finland.

The idea of ​​the need to reform the manning system of the armed forces appeared immediately after the end of the Crimean War. However, serfdom stood in the way of solving this issue as an insurmountable wall. The first considerations regarding this at the state level were expressed in the early 60s of the XIX century.

Becoming the head of the Ministry of War, D.A. Milyutin saw the primary task of reforming the army in the need to introduce a new manning system. In the most submissive report to the Ministry of War of 1862, the Minister of War attributed the maintenance of a huge army in peacetime and at the same time the impossibility of a significant increase in its number in case of war due to the lack of trained reserve personnel to the main shortcomings of the existing manning system.

In 1862, on the initiative of Adjutant General D.A. Milyutin to revise the Recruiting Charter at the State Council, a special commission was formed under the chairmanship of the State Secretary of the Actual Privy Councilor N.I. Bakhtin.

All the work on drawing up a new Recruiting Charter, according to D.A. Milyutin, depended on the solution of two fundamental issues: firstly, “to what extent could the existing numerous exemptions and benefits for serving recruitment, exemption from it up to 20% of the population be limited, and, secondly, how much was possible with the abolition of serfdom state to change the civil status of a soldier who has served his term, cut off from his primitive state when he enters the service. " The solution of these fundamental issues went far beyond the competence of the commission, which led to the futility of its work. Weak support from the emperor, constant attacks from the conservative part of society also negatively affected the activities of the commission.

Conceived by D.A. Milyutin, the reform to change the system of manning the armed forces in 1862 did not find support from the government. Such a reform was carried out in 1874. It was preceded by the work of a commission created on November 17, 1870 under the chairmanship of the Chief of the General Staff, General F.L. Heiden. The result of the commission's work was the adoption on January 1, 1874 by Alexander II of the Charter on military service. The charter defined military service as "... universal, all-class, with the abolition of those exemptions and benefits, according to which approximately one-sixth of the population of the state was exempted from military service." The principles of manning the armed forces, established in the times of Peter the Great, were revived. The adoption of the Charter on military service was a logical consequence of equalizing the civil rights of all estates and the abolition of serfdom among the peasants.

The new law on the manning of the army created the prerequisites for solving one of the main tasks of reorganizing the army, namely, the formation of a stock of trained reserves necessary in the event of war to deploy the army into the active one.

The main method of recruiting the lower ranks was conscription. In addition to this method, there was also voluntary admission to military service - volunteers and "hunters". In accordance with the adopted legal act, all males between the ages of 20 and 40, without exception, were subject to conscription. Some of the recruits entered service in the permanent troops, subdivided into land and sea troops, some were enlisted in the militia, which was convened only under extreme wartime circumstances. The militia "... was made up of all the male population not included in the permanent troops, but capable of carrying weapons, called up until the age of forty, including those dismissed from the army and navy reserves." The question of which of the conscripts was enrolled in the permanent troops, and who in the militia, was decided by lot. By lot, only one age of the male population was called, namely young people who, on January 1 of the year when the set was made, turned 20 years old.

The general term of service in the ground forces for conscripts was set at 15 years, of which 6 years of active service and 9 years of being in the reserve. The charter made an exception for recruits assigned to regiments located in the Turkestan military district, as well as in the Semipalatinsk, Trans-Baikal, Yakutsk, Amur and Primorsk regions. For them, a 10-year service life was established, of which 7 years fell on active service and 3 years in reserve.

Despite the fact that the new law obliged all estates to serve in the army, “... in reality, it did not ensure the introduction of truly universal military service, that is, an obligation that evenly extended to the entire male population of the country, regardless of property and legal status, as well as nationality. ". The charter did not apply to the military Cossack population, to the indigenous and Russian inhabitants of Transcaucasia, to the non-Russian population of the North Caucasus. A special procedure for the execution of military service was provided for Finland, which had significant independence. Most of the "foreign" population was exempted from military service. The population of the Turkestan Territory and Central Asia, the Primorsky and Amur regions, some districts of the Yakutsk, Tomsk, Tobolsk and Arkhangelsk provinces did not serve at all in the army. Benefits were preserved for 20 years for the Mennonites who moved to Russia and took Russian citizenship in the 50-60s. XIX century.

In addition to benefits on a national basis, the Charter determined various exemptions from military service and from active service in peacetime, deferrals from entering the service or enrolling in the reserve, benefits for education and family reasons.

The broadest benefits were provided by the Charter on marital status. There were three categories of privileged persons. The first category included only sons, the second - sons whose parents had sons under the age of 18; the third category was made up of persons whose older brother was in active service or died during the war.

In addition to benefits on marital status, which made it easier for the privileged classes to serve up military service, the law provided a system of benefits on education that was widely developed, like nowhere else in Western Europe. These benefits consisted in obtaining a deferral for persons studying in secondary and higher educational institutions, up to a certain age - from 22 to 28 years. Depending on the education they received, the terms of service were reduced for conscripts; they had the right to enter the service as volunteers. The amount of reduction in active service depended on the education received. In this respect, all young people were divided into 4 categories. The volunteers who entered the ground forces were subdivided into three categories according to the degree of education.

The charter also provided for benefits exclusively for persons of the propertied classes, for those who did not have education, other advantages, but owned capital. These are benefits in terms of property and economic status. Such a category of persons was deferred from entering the service for no more than 2 years.

Professors, health workers with a doctorate in medicine, a master of veterinary sciences and persons of other professions requiring special education were exempted from entering active service in peacetime. The charter also provided for exemptions for rank, occupation and for bodily disabilities.

Thus, the Charter on conscription made it possible to increase the size of the army, to create a trained reserve necessary for the deployment of the army in wartime. Among the progressive moments of the new law was the fact that it abolished the basic privileges of the nobility, granted back in the reign of Catherine II. The establishment of benefits for education stimulated the development of education. The introduction of universal conscription ensured the transformation of the Russian armed forces into a modern mass army.

Simultaneously with the improvement of the manning system of the armed forces, the process of rearmament of the army took place. Great attention was paid to the issues of equipping troops with new types of weapons. Firstly, because the weapons were extremely backward, and secondly, because the 60s. XIX century. were the time of the growing importance of military technology. “Given the present state of the art of war,” noted D.A. Milyutin, - artillery technology has become extremely important. The perfection of weapons now gives a decisive preponderance of the army, which in this respect is ahead of others ... ".

The program of equipping the military ground forces with new types of weapons, which took a special place in the report of D.A. Milyutin on January 15, 1862, provided for a number of events. A special place was given to the rearmament of the army with small arms. From 1826 to 1869, the Russian army had up to 38 different models of guns and pistols. This variety of firearms made it difficult to study. Therefore, it was planned to equip the infantry with the same type of gun.

In order to arm the artillery, the program provided for the implementation of a number of urgent measures already in 1862. So, in equipping field artillery, the program planned during 1862 to complete the arming of light and some lightweight batteries with 4-pound rifled cannons. Particular attention was paid to the rearmament of the fortress artillery. The program noted that the Russian "... coastal and land fortresses still retain their former armament with smooth-bore guns, on wooden, mostly rotten carriages and platforms, which is why a significant part of the guns are not capable of long-term action." Already in 1863, in order to improve the equipping of fortresses with new types of weapons, a special committee of representatives of the artillery, naval and mining departments was created under the chairmanship of Comrade General Feldzekhmeister General Barantsev.

It should be noted that, along with a special committee, a number of bodies in charge of rearmament of the army were already operating in the Ministry of War, namely the Artillery Committee's Weapons Commission under the leadership of the Inspector of the Macklenburg-Strelitzky rifle battalions and the Artillery Department of the Military Scientific Committee, the Artillery Committee.

Attention was paid not only to the quantitative aspect of equipping the fortress artillery, but also to improving the quality of the guns. In this regard, the War Ministry raised the question of replacing copper and cast iron tools with steel ones.

Submitted by D.A. Milyutin's program for the rearmament of the army could not be carried out in a short time. There were certain difficulties on the way of equipping the military ground forces with new types of weapons and military equipment. One of the first to point out the industrial backwardness of the country, and as a consequence - the backwardness of the military industry. The technical and economic backwardness of Russia also led to its dependence on foreign countries. This was repeatedly noted in the reports of the Minister of War, in the reports of the artillery department. So, in 1865, the artillery department in its report to the War Ministry indicated: "... the Sestroretsk plant did not complete 20,000 rifles during the year, which was due to the dilapidation of some mechanisms." Therefore, it was necessary to place orders for the manufacture of weapons abroad, which was unprofitable for Russia from the financial side, and also created other problems. As a result of the country's technical and economic backwardness, inventions of Russian artillerymen became the property of states hostile to Russia, and often ordered guns were made primarily for foreign armies.

The desire of the War Ministry to free itself from foreign dependence in supplying its troops with new types of weapons ran up against the scarcity of funds in the state treasury.

The War Ministry paid special attention to the technical improvement of military enterprises. So, reconstructed in the 60-70s. Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories made it possible to overcome Russia's lag behind the West in small arms. Steel plants built in the same period - Obukhovsky and Motovilikhinsky - made it possible to cast steel on them, which was superior in quality to the best foreign samples. In 1869, the largest cartridge plant in Europe was built in St. Petersburg, which produced products superior in their parameters to those of the American and British. In general, the economic backwardness of the country was a great obstacle to the development of the military industry and the implementation of inventions of Russian scientists. This made the rearmament of the Russian army dependent on foreign supplies.

However, despite all the difficulties that the War Ministry had to face in equipping the ground forces with advanced military equipment, during the 60-70s. XIX century. the armament of the Russian army was significantly improved. This happened thanks to the successes of Russian inventors and scientists in the field of military technology. For equipping artillery with new types of weapons, which in many respects surpassed their foreign counterparts, the achievements of Russian scientists and engineers P.M. Obukhova, N.V. Kalakutsky, A.S. Lavrova, N.V. Maievsky, D.K. Chernova, I.A. Vyshnegradskiy, A.P. Davydova and others.

In 1873, the armament designed by the Russian inventor V.S. Baranovsky, the world's first rapid-fire cannon. She had a recoil device and was equipped with an optical sight. Retired artillery officer A.P. Davydov for the first time in the world invented a device for automatic firing from large-caliber guns.

However, despite the presence in Russia of the largest inventions in the field of artillery, the state of weapons by the end of the 80s. did not correspond to the world level of development of military technology.

It should be noted that wars had a special influence on the rearmament processes. So, the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. caused the need to further improve the quality of field artillery batteries and strengthen the fortress artillery. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 exacerbated the need to re-equip the army with small arms, accelerated the process of replacing Minier rifles with needle guns of the Karle system, loaded from the breech with paper cartridges. But soon the War Ministry began to equip the ground forces with a more advanced rifle from the Czech rifle master Krnka. To study the Berdan rifle in 1868, D.A. Milyutin sent a special commission to the United States, headed by Colonel Gorlov, a member of the Artillery Committee. After a thorough check, the commission made a number of improvements to the Berdan rifle, then it was adopted by the Russian army. In the USA, it was rightly called the "Russian rifle". In many respects, the rifle was superior to the guns adopted for service in the Western European armies.

Although the War Ministry failed to equip the entire Russian army with advanced military equipment, the transformations carried out also improved the army's combat capability compared to the period of the Crimean War. This was fully confirmed by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. This military campaign ended with the victory of the Russian army over the Turkish one, revealed many weak points in the general state of the Russian ground forces, and revealed the shortcomings in the armament of the army. Their main reasons are the incompleteness of rearmament and, in general, military reforms due to the incompleteness of the bourgeois reforms of the period under review.

In the 60s of the nineteenth century, a military-judicial reform was carried out in the Russian army, the essence of which was to introduce new, more humane views on military service, improve the moral state of the army, and form a sense of duty and honor among servicemen.

During the implementation of the reform, the following were introduced: "Disciplinary Charter", "Charter of Internal Service", "Military Charter on Punishments" and "Military Judicial Charter", which set out the fundamentals of a military court case. These documents emphasized that military service is the highest form of service to the Motherland.

The statutes proclaimed the protection of the honor and dignity of the soldier. The main offense was considered a violation of duty. In 1863, the army abolished spits, whips, branding and other corporal punishments disgracing human dignity, but the rods were retained as a “temporary measure”. In the same year, the "Regulation on the protection of military discipline and disciplinary sanctions" was approved, and a court of the society of officers was established, which gave them the right to remove from their midst those unworthy to wear a military uniform.

In 1867, a new military-judicial charter began to operate. With its introduction, the Main Military Judicial Directorate was created, which was part of the Ministry of War, the Main Military Court and, under it, the Chief Military Prosecutor. The charter provided for three types of military courts: regimental courts, military district courts and the Main Military Court, located in St. Petersburg.

The new organization of legal proceedings provided for publicity, but at the same time it should be noted that the military courts were dependent on the military commanders, which deprived them of their independence. This was especially true of the regimental courts, which were fully subordinate to the regimental commanders, which created certain preconditions for administrative arbitrariness.

Thus, the military reforms of the 1860s-1870s were of progressive importance and affected all aspects of military command and control and organization of troops. They contributed to the creation of a mass army of a modern type, strengthening and increasing its combat effectiveness.

The main results of the military reforms of 1860-1870 are:

Chapter II. The development of the army and navy of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

.1 Composition and organization of the military land forces in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

Upon the accession to the throne of Alexander II, the Russian armed forces experienced a critical moment, usually a consequence of an unsuccessful war - they had to organize the armed forces almost anew. The main measures for the reorganization of the army, outlined by D.A. Milyutin and approved by the Supreme Council in 1873, were carried out in the main outlines with sufficient energy, despite the limited funds and difficulties associated with the war of 1877-1878.

By 1881, the military forces of the Russian Empire consisted of regular and irregular troops. The troops, in turn, were subdivided into field, serf, Cossack and militia, reserve, reserve, local and auxiliary forces. In addition, in wartime, the militia and the militia of the Cossack troops could additionally be called up. All field troops consisted of 19 corps, which were the highest tactical formation. The names of the corps were as follows: Guards, Grenadier, I-XV Army, I and II Caucasian Army Corps. The corps consisted of two or three infantry divisions (which, in turn, consisted of four regiments of four battalions each), respectively, two or three artillery brigades of 6-battery composition, attached to the infantry divisions, but not subordinate to them; one cavalry division, consisting of four regiments: dragoon, uhlan, hussar and don Cossack regiment. In addition, in the cavalry division there were, organizationally not subordinate to it, two horse artillery batteries.

Thus, the general composition of the corps had: from 32 to 48 infantry battalions, 12 squadrons, 6 Cossack hundreds, 2-3 artillery brigades and 2 horse artillery batteries. A number of military units were not part of certain corps, being directly subordinate to military districts (some infantry divisions, rifle brigades, separate battalions, engineering troops, etc.).

The reserve troops consisted of only two types of weapons - infantry and artillery. The reserve infantry consisted of 96 army battalions of 5-company composition and one 4-company guard battalion, as well as one fortress battalion; artillery - from six artillery brigades of 6-battery composition. Each of the reserve battalions, in the event of mobilization, was to deploy into a 4-battalion regiment and one battalion remaining in place for internal service (i.e., each company was deployed into a battalion). The regiments from the deployed reserve battalions were to be consolidated into 24 infantry divisions. Of the six reserve artillery brigades (36 batteries), 144 batteries were to be formed during mobilization (one battery was deployed into four). Of this number of batteries, 96 were reduced to 24 artillery brigades (4-battery) to support 24 infantry divisions formed from reserve battalions, and the remaining 48 batteries were turned into spare ones.

Finally, reserve engineering troops, which did not exist in peacetime, were to be formed in the number of 20 sapper companies from the fifth companies of 10 sapper battalions.

Reserve troops in peacetime, with the exception of cavalry and horse artillery, did not exist. In case of war, reserve infantry battalions were to be formed at the rate of one per infantry regiment and rifle brigade. The total number of these battalions was to be 19956. Spare parts of foot artillery were to be formed during mobilization from part of the reserve artillery brigades. Finally, during the war, spare engineering units were to be formed from the fifth companies of the sapper battalions, forming five reserve battalions.

The local troops were very insignificant in composition, amounting to 17 battalions and 686 local escort teams. Troops of auxiliary importance included: gendarmerie, training, disciplinary units and teams at various institutions and institutions of the military department (hospitals, military educational institutions, etc.).

Let us consider the composition of individual combat arms and the changes that have occurred in their organization during the period under study.

Infantry

In 1881, the infantry units of the field troops consisted of 48 infantry divisions (three guards, four grenadier, 1st-41st infantry), nine rifle brigades of the 4th battalion, and 42 separate battalions - eight Finnish rifle divisions and 34 line battalions (2 Orenburg, 17 Turkestan, 4 West Siberian, 4 East Siberian and 7 Caucasian).

In total, in 1881, there were 948 battalions in the infantry forces. The irregular infantry units should include three foot Cossack battalions and two militia squads, each of which approached the battalion in its composition.

During the period under review, there is an increase in infantry in the number of ranks in the company, and, consequently, in the size of the regiment and separate battalion. The numerical composition of the companies of individual infantry units was very different (from 40 to 84 rows, that is, from 80 to 168 people in a company). At the same time, during the studied time, an increase in company ranks is observed (up to 48, 58, 64 and 84). This increase occurs unevenly, mainly affecting those regiments and rifle battalions that were located in the border zone.

Along with this, there is an increase in infantry units. Thus, by 1903, the number of infantry divisions increased by four by deploying four reserve brigades into active ones, i.e. priority divisions. The total number of infantry divisions reached 52. The number of rifle brigades more than doubled (1903 - 24). This increase was mainly due to the formation of new brigades in the outskirts. So, in 1881 there was one Turkestan rifle brigade, in 1903 - eight, respectively East Siberian - one and six. At the same time, it must be said that the composition of some of these brigades has changed significantly. So, in 14 rifle brigades, instead of four separate battalions, there were four regiments of the 2nd battalion (1st and 5th rifle brigades, 1st - 2nd Finnish and all East Siberian). Thus, the strength of these brigades has doubled.

The greatest changes have taken place in the composition of the reserve infantry. First of all, part of the reserve battalions with a total of 21 were renamed serfs to provide permanent garrisons for the existing fortresses. (At one time, the opposite was done: to increase the reserve troops, the infantry fortresses were abolished). Almost all of the reserve battalions were organized into reserve brigades. There were 26 such in 1903. It is important to note that their numbering began with the 46th (there were 45 infantry divisions, except for the guards and grenadier divisions). Each regiment or battalion received a specific name and number. At the same time, the number of reserve units began with the 181st (the last regiment of the 45th active infantry division was 180th). This clearly indicated that later the reserve brigades were supposed to be turned into active infantry divisions.

So, in the field infantry troops there were 1041 battalions and in the reserve - 126. Consequently, there were 1167 infantry battalions (field and reserve).

Spare infantry units did not exist in peacetime. In wartime, the formation of 279 reserve battalions was projected.

In the summer of 1901, five machine-gun companies were formed for the first time (eight machine guns in each). They were attached to the 4th, 6th, 8th and 16th Infantry Divisions, subordinate in some cases to the chiefs of staff of the division, in others - to the commanders of one of the regiments of the division. The 5th company was attached to the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Brigade, stationed in Port Arthur. Thus, on the eve of the Russian-Japanese war, the Russian army had 40 machine guns.

From 1906 to 1908, the number of infantry at first increased slightly, but then began to decline. In 1906, it included 903 186 people, in 1907 - 882 624, in 1908 - 824 941 people.

The transformations associated with the strengthening of the army, in 1910, were expressed in relation to the infantry in its unification and bringing the composition of units to combat. The quadruple system of regiments remained unchanged, only the two-battalion system was entrenched in the rifle regiments. At the same time, changes were made in the structure of corps and divisions. The army corps now consisted of two two-brigade divisions, one Cossack regiment, a mortar division, a telegraph and searchlight company. The infantry division included two infantry brigades of two-regimental composition, an artillery brigade, a Cossack hundred, a cavalry division and a fifty convoy. In connection with the alignment of these units, the number of infantry corps increased to 37, infantry divisions - to 74 and rifle brigades - to 17. The total number of battalions increased from 1110 to 1252. The main tactical unit was a company, in which, according to wartime states, it was envisaged to have 4 officers , 20 non-commissioned officers and 202 privates.

The unification was also expressed in the fact that the category of serf infantry was abolished. This made it possible to form 7 new field divisions, one rifle brigade and, in addition, bring all existing brigades to 8 battalions. In general, the number of infantry stabilized and amounted to 1252 battalions by the middle of 1914. The number of infantry corps was 37, and the number of divisions - 113.5 ..

Cavalry

In 1881 the cavalry consisted of 20 divisions (18 cavalry divisions of the army cavalry and two of the guards). The number of 18 divisions of the army cavalry included 1-14th, three Caucasian and 1st Don Cossack. With the exception of the Caucasian and Don Cossack divisions, the divisions had the following composition: one Dragoon regiment, one Uhlan regiment, one Hussar and one Don Cossack regiment. The Caucasian cavalry divisions had one or two dragoon regiments in their composition, and the remaining two or three regiments were Cossack, belonging to the Terek or Kuban army.

The I Guards Division consisted of four regiments: the Cavalier, the Life Guards Horse and two cuirassiers - "Her Majesty" and "His Majesty", colloquially called "blue" and "yellow" cuirassiers. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division consisted of seven regiments: Life Guards. Horse-grenadier, two life-guards Uhlans, L.-GV. Dragunsky, L.-G. Gusarsky, life guard Consolidated Cossack Regiment and Life Guards. Grodno hussar regiment, as well as a separate Ural Cossack squadron. Each cavalry division was divided into two brigades (with the exception of the 2nd Guards, which was subdivided into three). The cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons. Thus, the cavalry divisions included both regular and irregular cavalry.

In addition to the indicated units of the troops, there were also Cossack cavalry regiments that were not part of the cavalry divisions. So, in the Don army there were two such regiments, the Kuban - three, the Tersk - three, the Astrakhan - one, the Orenburg - six, the Ural - two, the Siberian - one, the Transbaikal - one, the Amur - one, i.e. only 20 regiments, mainly 6-hundredth composition. The total number of cavalry was considered clearly insufficient and inadequate to the number of its future potential adversaries (Germany and Austria-Hungary). It is for this reason that since the beginning of the 80s its number has been significantly increased.

In 1882, a special commission on the organization of cavalry was created, the decisions of which were approved in the summer of 1882. All cavalry regiments, except for cuirassier regiments, were converted from four squadron regiments to six squadron regiments. This increases the number of active regular cavalry squadrons by 104 (from 224 to 328), i.e. by almost 50%, and thus the disproportionality of regular cavalry, both in relation to other types of weapons, and in comparison with the number of cavalry kept in neighboring European states, is largely reduced.

As indicated in the most submissive report of the Ministry of War for 1883, the creation of the fifth and sixth squadrons led to a reduction in their number by 1/4. However, in 1886 the former number of squadrons was restored. Along with the change in the number of squadrons, a reform was carried out that changed the nature of the cavalry regiments. All army hussar and uhlan regiments are converted into dragoons, armed with rifles and bayonets. Guards cuirassier, hussar and uhlan regiments receive the same armament. With this decisive measure, the cavalry's ability to operate with firearms is greatly enhanced. As a result of this measure, instead of 8,700 carbines and 10,240 rifles, the active cavalry will have 45,590 rifles. This reform had, undoubtedly, a positive significance from the point of view of the combat use of cavalry, but it was not brought to the end. The transformation of all cavalry regiments into dragoon regiments essentially brought the cavalry closer to the infantry mounted on a horse. In conditions when the role of fire was becoming more and more important, such a measure was necessary.

At the beginning of the XX century. the cavalry consisted of 2 corps, 26 divisions and 5 separate brigades, numbering 80,621 cavalrymen. In the next two years, the number of divisions did not change. The number of cavalry was approximately at the same level: in 1901 it was 79,682 people, in 1902 - 81,578 people. The need for a trained reserve forced the military department to form 3 cavalry brigades, consisting of 8 regiments and a guards division. The total number of cavalry had risen by the beginning of 1904 to 82,658.

During the war of 1904-1905. there was a slight increase in the number of cavalry divisions with a decrease in the number of cavalry. The number of cavalry divisions increased from 28 in 1904 to 30 in 1905, the total number of cavalry by the beginning of 1905 was 78,514 people, and at the end of 1905 due to losses it decreased to 74,300 people. Since the cavalry showed itself capable of conducting independent actions in relatively small detachments, the military department abandoned the corps organization and left the divisional one. The number of cavalry also stabilized: in 1906 the cavalry numbered 83 366 people, in 1907 - 84 562 and in 1908 - 83 517 21.

In 1909-1910. in addition to the existing 67 regiments (10 guards, 21 dragoons, 17 uhlans, 18 hussars and 1 cossack), 26 more dragoon regiments were formed; the cavalry began to have 22 divisions and 2 separate brigades, or 93 regular cavalry regiments and 19 irregular regiments - a total of 112 regiments (658 squadrons). To ensure the active role of the cavalry in the event of war, it was supposed to place it closer to the likely theaters of military operations, in particular, to concentrate 16 regiments in the Vilensky district, 39 in Varshavsky, 34 regiments in Kiev, 15 regiments in the Caucasian.

The reorganization of the army in 1910 gave an increase in cavalry to 26 divisions, but then, in order to save money, its number again decreased to the previous rate. In 1911-1913. the army had 24 cavalry divisions and 8 brigades. With this number of cavalry, the Russian army entered the world war.

Artillery.

In 1881, there were 48 artillery brigades of field foot artillery (guards, grenadier and 1st-41st field artillery brigades), each of which was assigned to an infantry division corresponding to it by number or name. All these brigades consisted of six batteries of eight guns each. Each of these brigades provided fire for its division, which amounted to 1.5 batteries per regiment, or three guns per battalion. In addition to the indicated artillery brigades, there were three more: one East Siberian 3-battery composition and two Turkestan ones, both of which consisted of seven batteries, as well as one West Siberian battery. They were intended to support the East Siberian and Turkestan rifle and line battalions. Thus, the total number of infantry field artillery batteries was 300 (299 and one guards training battery). The reserve foot artillery consisted of 6 artillery brigades, 6 batteries each, armed with 4 guns per battery.

Horse artillery consisted of two artillery brigades and 29 horse artillery separate batteries attached to cavalry divisions.

In total, in 1881 there were 387 batteries in field artillery of all types (foot and horse, active, reserve and reserve). Finally, there was a small number of fortress and siege artillery: the first - 35 batteries and 10 companies; the second - three siege parks, each consisting of a number of departments. Artillery also included artillery parks, which supplied artillery with shells. These were 48 divisional flying and 13 mobile, each consisting of four squads. By the end of the 80s, the number of artillery remained the same, and the number of horse batteries even slightly decreased.

The increase in the number of artillery began in 1889; it reached the highest rates in the second half of the 90s. Firstly, it found its expression in the emergence of a new type of field guns - mortars, and, consequently, new subunits of artillery units. Secondly, as already mentioned, an increase in the number of reserve infantry deployed in the event of a war in 30 infantry divisions (15 in the first stage and 15 in the second) required the provision of artillery to them. In addition, the existing rifle brigades were also not provided with artillery. And, thirdly, the extraordinary development of foot artillery in all the main Western states necessitated an increase in foot field artillery in order to be able, if not to compare, then at least approach the rate of artillery given to the infantry, which had long been established in the Western states. Europe, namely, that for 1000 people there were about 4 guns operating in the troops.

In this regard, 52 foot artillery batteries were formed, unevenly distributed among artillery brigades, so that each army corps had two additional batteries (due to which the 7th and 8th batteries appeared in some artillery brigades). The increase in artillery required the development of a separate plan, which provided for the formation of new 108 batteries in the period from 1895 to 1898.

As a result of the measures taken, by the end of the 90s, more precisely, by 1899 compared with the end of the 80s, field artillery increased by 157 batteries, which were armed with 1786 guns. On January 1, 1899, the army had 530 batteries and 5532 guns.

From 1901 to 1903, the troops consisted of 56 brigades, 8 artillery regiments, 4 separate divisions and 10 batteries in foot Cossack regiments. Moreover, at the end of 1903, 3 brigades of three-battery composition and 5 spare batteries were formed. The personnel of the artillery totaled 151,142 people in 1900, 153,913 in 1901, 153,328 in 1902 and 154,925 in 1903.

During the war with Japan, the number of artillery brigades increased to 70 in 1904, and then dropped to 64 due to losses. The personnel totaled 160,490 people in 1904, and at the end of the war - 116,329 people.

From 1906 to 1909, the situation was as follows: in 1906 the artillery consisted of 57 brigades, numbering 198,771 people, in 1907 - of 64 brigades - 202,449 people, in 1908 and in 1909. - out of 58 brigades - 194 565 people.

Thus, artillery developed rather quickly as an independent type of weapon. It increasingly defined the tendencies towards mechanization and automation. From a melee weapon, it began to turn into a long-range weapon, without which operational art could not develop.

Engineering troops.

In 1881, the engineering troops were not part of these or those military formations, being subordinate mainly to the border military districts. The engineering troops consisted of five sapper brigades. The composition of the brigade was diverse. It consisted of: three sapper, two pontoon and one railway - a total of six battalions, two military telegraph parks, a field and siege engineering parks. In addition to the listed engineering troops, there was a sapper half-battalion in the Turkestan military district, and a sapper company in the East Siberian military district. The 1st reserve railway battalion was stationed in the Caucasian military district. In addition to sapper brigades, there were also auxiliary non-combatant units as part of the engineering troops, as well as two mine companies - in Kronstadt and Kerch.

During 1881-1894, there were some changes in the number and organization of the engineering troops. Thus, in 1884, two reserve sapper companies were formed at each of the 17 sapper battalions; in 1886 a separate railway brigade was formed (by separating some railway battalions from the sapper brigades). During the 80s - early 90s, the number of telegraph fleets was increased (from 10 to 17). In 1894, serious changes took place in the organization of the engineering troops, both in terms of increasing the number of troops and in terms of their organization. This organization was based on the principle of providing engineering troops to army corps and infantry divisions at the rate of one sapper battalion per army corps and one sapper company per infantry division. The composition of the sapper battalions has also changed. They consisted of three sapper companies, one telegraph one with the addition of two sapper companies of light bridge parks, i.e. pontoon teams. Thus, sapper battalions acquired a somewhat universal character. However, as before, all engineering troops were part of the sapper brigades and were subordinate to the command of the district.

The total number of engineering troops in terms of the number of battalions from 1881 to 1894 increased from 29 to 46. In 1903 the engineering troops consisted of seven sapper brigades of 5-7 battalions. Among these battalions were: sapper, pontoon, railway. Sapper battalions, in turn, usually consisted of three sapper companies and one telegraph company. In addition to these sapper brigades, there were separate sapper battalions and companies in the troops of Eastern Siberia and Turkestan, as well as fortress sapper and mine companies in total 23. In addition, the engineering troops included two river mine companies, fortress military telegraphs, fortress aeronautical squads and fortress military -Pigeon stations. Finally, the railway troops also belonged to this type of weapon. So, the engineering troops consisted of 47 battalions and 28 separate companies, which in turn equaled 7 more battalions. Thus, the total number of combat units (not counting engineering parks, aeronautical divisions and serf military telegraphs) was 54 battalions.

In 1900, the engineering troops consisted of 25.5 sapper battalions, combined into 7 sapper brigades, 8 pontoon battalions, 6 field engineering parks, 2 siege parks, 1 railway brigade (3 battalions), 2 separate railway battalions, 12 separate companies , 6 serf military telegraphs and 4 aeronautical parks. The personnel of the engineering troops totaled 31,329 people. The reserve of the engineering troops were the fortress troops, which in 1900 included 53 fortress artillery battalions, 2 fortress regiments, 28 separate fortress battalions, 10 fortress artillery companies, 3 siege fortress battalions and 5 sortie batteries. This organization of the engineering troops was preserved until the Russo-Japanese war. On the eve of it, the engineering troops included 31 sapper battalion and 1 company, 8 pontoon battalions, 14 fortress sapper companies, 9 mine companies, 4 river mine companies, 10 military telegraphs, 7 aeronautical divisions and 7 field engineering parks. As before, the serfs were ranked among the engineering troops, which in 1901 numbered 88,312 people, in 1902 - 92,831, in 1903 - 90,879, in 1904 - 96,752 people. Changes in the personnel of the engineering troops proper indicate an upward trend. By January 1, 1901, 31,329 people were in the engineering troops, in 1902 - 35,076, in 1903 - 42,739, in 1904 - 34,448 people.

The Russo-Japanese War showed the increased role of the engineer troops, especially during the period of the emergence of positional forms of struggle. In this regard, there was an increase in the number of engineering units to 8 brigades, numbering 44,449 people. During the war, the engineering troops suffered heavy losses, and in 1905 their personnel was reduced by more than half (to 20,247 people). Taking into account the increased role of the engineering troops, the military department increased the number of brigades in 1906 to 11. Accordingly, the personnel also increased: in 1906 - up to 43 267 people, in addition, 19 576 - in the railway troops, in 1907 - up to 43 652 and 12 188 - in the railway troops, in 1908 - up to 45188 and in the railway troops - 11 360 people.

In 1910, the engineering brigades were abolished. All units received a battalion organization, which lasted until the end of 1915. In 1916, all battalions were transferred to the staff of an engineering regiment (1999 people). Each regiment consisted of two battalions (engineer and technical), it included a field engineering park, a communications team and a non-combatant company. The regiment commander simultaneously served as a corps engineer.

Railway troops

Until 1908, the railway units were included in the engineering troops. Then they were separated into an independent category and subordinated to the VOSO (military communications) service of the General Staff. In 1909 they had 8 battalions in Central Russia, 2 battalions in Siberia, 2 battalions in the Caucasus and 1 Transcaspian battalion. When carrying out transformations in 1910, it was decided in case of war to form 6 battalions in Central Russia, 1 in the Caucasus and 3 in Siberia. In addition, to create 5 parks for horse-railway brigades of field roads and an automobile company. In this composition, the railway troops operated in the world war.

State militia.

In the early 80s of the XIX century. the state militia was given the importance of an auxiliary unit of the armed forces, formed only when it was necessary to exert extreme stress on all the forces and means of the state. Hence, of course, the militia was not paid due attention, especially bearing in mind that the mobilization readiness of the regular troops was far from being ensured by both personnel and materiel.

In the late 1980s, significant changes were made in the personnel and organization of the militia units. Since 1890, training sessions of militiamen of four younger ages began to be carried out. In the same year, a decision was made to deploy militia units in case of war in 40 infantry divisions, 20 cavalry regiments and 80 batteries. At the same time, a cadre of militia units was created, consisting of 2,880 people at the rate of two people for each company or battery. This cadre, which consisted mainly of non-commissioned officers, was supposed to be with the district military commanders.

In the second half of the 90s, a detailed schedule was drawn up for the formation of the first-stage militia, which provided for the deployment of not only infantry, cavalry units and field artillery batteries, but also fortress artillery companies and sapper squads.

At the beginning of the XX century. the organization of the state militia was determined by the regulation of 1891. The Committee for Mobilization of Troops decided to create 320 squads, reduced to 20 infantry divisions, 40 artillery batteries consisting of 20 artillery regiments, 80 horse hundreds of 20 regiments, 20 fortress artillery companies and 20 sapper companies - a total of 400 thousand people. In this composition, the State Council approved the staff of the militia.

When recruiting for active service, they were simultaneously enrolled in the militia. Warriors of the 1st category included those who did not serve in the troops, who were fit for service, but who received benefits for marital status, as well as those who served their term of active service and were listed from the reserve. The second category included the only sons in the family and the physically handicapped.

When discussing the fate of the state militia in 1909-1910. it was suggested that the militia would be further strengthened as it would ensure the growth of the trained reserve. In the last five years before the World War, there was an increase in the composition of the militia. By the beginning of the world war, the militia of the 1st and 2nd categories numbered more than 6 million people. It was the main reserve of human resources that replenished the active army.

Let's summarize some of the results. Russia possessed significant human resources that made it possible to deploy a massive army and continuously feed it. The constant influx of human resources made it possible to acquire all types of weapons. The composition and organization of the troops were determined by the method of waging war and battle. The development of technical means, the emergence of machine technology complicated and even changed the functions of weapons and gave birth to new ones. At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. there is a downsizing of the military ground forces, the expansion of the organizational and numerical strength, which led to the assertion of the status of the Russian army as the largest army in Europe.

2.2 The composition and organization of the navy in the second half of the XIX - early XX centuries.

The Crimean War has drawn the lines under the centuries-old history of the development of the sailing fleet. She clearly and convincingly showed that sailing ships no longer have a future, they urgently need to be replaced with steam armored ships. However, this imperative of the time could not be implemented in Russia in a short time. Its difficult economic and financial situation, industrial and technical backwardness created incredibly great difficulties in the revolutionary technical transformation of the fleet.

Armored fleet.

The scale and pace of the construction of the Russian armored fleet increased as the country's economic situation improved and the industrial revolution accelerated, which, in turn, led to its development in two stages. The first stage covered the 60-70s of the XIX century. and was characterized by the construction of small armored ships of coastal defense and the creation of cruising forces designed to conduct combat operations on oceanic communications. At the second stage, which began in the 80s, the seaworthy armored fleet was created and developed, first in the Baltic, and then in other naval theaters.

The development of industrial production and the associated successes in the field of metallurgy and mechanical engineering created the necessary economic and technical prerequisites for the construction of armored ships in Russia. But this was only one, it is true, the most important condition for the successful solution of the problem of creating a modern military fleet. Another, no less important condition, was the manning of the ships. The construction of steam ships required the recruitment of competent and technically trained people capable of servicing qualitatively new military equipment into the navy.

The number of the personnel of the fleet was reduced from 85 thousand people (in 1857) to 27 thousand (in 1878), and the service life on ships decreased from 25 years to 7 years of active service and 3 years of reserve. The law of 1863 abolished corporal punishment in the army and navy. The reduction in service life and the presence of sophisticated equipment on steam ships led to an increase in the call to the fleet of more trained people from among the factory workers, which significantly changed its social composition.

At the end of the Crimean War, there was practically no fleet in Russia. The remaining sailing ships were no longer of combat value, and there were extremely few steam ships. At the end of 1856 on the Baltic Sea there were 1 propeller-driven battleship, 1 propeller-driven frigate, 10 paddle steamers, 18 small steamers and 40 propeller-driven gunboats, in the Black Sea - 12 paddle steamers, in the White Sea - 2 small paddle steamers, in the Caspian - 8 of the same steamers, in the Far East - a screw schooner and 3 paddle steamers. All these ships were wooden and could not resist the rapidly gaining power of the armored fleets of the West.

The heads of the Naval Ministry, realizing that the absence of modern steam ships was one of the main reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, and that the Russian navy lagged significantly behind the fleets of England and France, immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty, they raised the question of it gain.

In 1857, the government approved the first shipbuilding program after the Crimean War for a period of 20 years. According to this program, it was planned to build: for the Baltic Sea - 153 propeller driven ships (18 battleships, 12 frigates, 14 corvettes, 100 gunboats and 9 paddle steamers); for the Black Sea (subject to the restrictions stipulated by the Paris Treaty) - 15 propeller driven ships (six corvettes and nine transports) and 4 paddle steamers; for the Pacific Ocean - 20 propeller driven ships (six corvettes, six clippers, five steamers, two transports and one schooner). The construction of ships for the White and Caspian Seas was also envisaged.

At the same time, the reconstruction of the shipyards of the Maritime Department began, designed for the construction of armored ships.

The construction of wooden propeller-driven ships, especially for the Baltic Fleet, proceeded rather quickly: from 1857 to 1863, 26 propeller-driven ships were built, including three battleships, seven frigates, six corvettes and seven clippers. Most of them were created in St. Petersburg.

The transition to the creation of an armored fleet required a radical restructuring of the entire shipbuilding industry, the creation of new shipyards and factories for the production of equipment and weapons for armored ships.

In the second half of the XIX century. St. Petersburg was still the main center of military shipbuilding. The largest number of shipyards was concentrated here, which, in the first place, were expanded and refurbished. Among them were state-owned: a large shipyard on Galerny Island and the New Admiralty, where armored ships were built, and private factories: Byrd (later Franco-Russian), Carr and MacPherson (Baltic Shipyard), Semyaninkov and Poletiki (Nevsky). At the end of the XIX century. all private factories were taken over by the Ministry of the Navy. Warships for the Baltic Fleet were also built at the Izhora, Putilovsk, Kronstadt and some other factories.

In the south, the largest shipbuilding plant was the Admiralteisky, located in Nikolaev, where in the 80-90s. the construction of armored ships for the Black Sea Fleet began. Small military ships were built in Sevastopol and Odessa.

However, the shipbuilding industry, despite its significant expansion and reconstruction, still could not fully meet the need of the navy for new armored ships and equipping them with modern technology. In this regard, the Russian government often placed orders abroad for the construction of warships, naval equipment and some types of weapons. Sometimes this was done without special need, out of the eternal admiration for foreign technology.

Nevertheless, already in the 70s of the XIX century. Russia possessed an excellent example of a powerful battleship with a displacement of about 10 thousand tons ("Peter the Great"). The appearance of such large ships in Russia prompted the desire to make up for their shortage in other sea powers, primarily in England. After the construction of Peter the Great, the construction of powerful ships began in a number of countries, the type of which was established in the last decade of the 19th century. The combat element of the battleships included main, medium and small artillery. The main artillery consisted of four 305-mm guns, placed in two large turrets located at the bow and stern. Medium artillery consisted of six, eight, or even twelve 152-mm guns, located along the sides in casemates or in towers. Small artillery - 37-mm and 47-mm caliber - was intended to repel attacks from destroyers.

At the beginning of the XX century. It was considered necessary to increase the displacement of the ships and the power of the engines in order to ensure a speed of up to 18 knots, as well as to restore the power of the main artillery by equipping the ship with 305-mm guns.

From the defeats of the Russian fleet in the Far East, all the naval powers drew conclusions, and Britain was the first. Built in 1906, the English battleship "Dreadnought" had an unprecedented displacement of 20 thousand tons, its steam turbines had a capacity of 23-24 thousand forces and provided a speed of 21 knots. The main thing was that ten 305-mm guns were installed on the ship, located in five towers, and twenty-four - 76-mm, located in the form of open deck installations. The armor protection was also strengthened (280 mm along the sides, up to 150 mm at the bow). The Vickers firm offered the Russian naval department a project of a ship with a displacement of 23 thousand tons, but the Technical Committee did not accept it: Russian designers independently designed a type of ship that had higher combat qualities than the Dreadnought. In 1908, under the leadership of A. N. Krylov, the Baltic Plant developed a project, which was taken as a basis. From 1909 to 1917, seven completely modern ships were built: four for the Baltic Fleet and three for the Black Sea (one battleship remained unfinished).

The new ships differed not only in their large displacement, but also in the type of vehicles. These were turbines that allowed the ship to reach speeds of up to 23 knots. The news was the introduction of three-gun turrets, the number of which was increased to four. The linear arrangement of the towers ensured the most advantageous use of all artillery from one side. A two-layer reservation system and a triple bottom ensured high survivability of the ships.

Thus, as part of the Russian fleet in the twentieth century. there were 23 battleships and 8 battleships in operation. 13 battleships and 7 battleships were built at Russian factories (one remained unfinished). Two battleships were built abroad according to Russian drawings.

Cruisers.

The development of the steam armored fleet in Russia in the 60-70s of the XIX century. characterized not only by the construction of coastal defense armored ships and the world's first seagoing battleship "Peter the Great", but also by the creation of cruising forces. A great impetus to the revival of the idea of ​​cruising operations and the development of cruising forces in the Russian fleet were the successful operations on the sea lanes of the auxiliary cruiser Alabama and the campaign of two Russian cruiser squadrons in America during the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The first Russian ships of the cruising type were steam screw clippers and corvettes with wooden unarmored hulls, on which, along with a steam engine, there was sailing equipment, which ensured the possibility of a long stay at sea without replenishing fuel supplies. In the years 1860-1864. four clippers (Almaz, Zhemchug, Izumrud and Yakhont) and two corvettes (Vityaz and Askold) were built at the shipyards of St. Petersburg. The clippers had a displacement of 1,585.7 tons, armament - three 152-mm guns and several small-caliber guns, speed up to 13 knots. The displacement of the corvettes was 2156-2217 tons, the armament was four 152-mm rifled guns and several rapid-fire small-caliber guns, the speed was 11-12 knots.

A significant drawback of these ships is the lack of armor and, therefore, the inability to fight even with small armored ships. Therefore, in the 70s, they switched to the construction of cruisers with an armored deck, which protected the ship from shells when fighting at long distances, most likely when operating on sea communications.

But armored cruisers also had a very significant drawback - the lack of side armor, which made it impossible for them to fight armored ships. In this regard, there was a need for such cruisers, which, on the one hand, would have a large radius of action and could successfully perform tasks on sea and ocean communications, and on the other hand, would have strong artillery weapons and good armor, which would provide the ability to act in conjunction with squadron battleships. Ships meeting these requirements were named armored cruisers and were first created in Russia.

The first idea to build armored cruisers was put forward by N.V. Kopytov. In 1867, he submitted to the Marine Technical Committee a project of an ocean-going armored cruiser with a displacement of 8,000 tons and a speed of 18 knots. N. V. Kopytov's project was approved. But since the Naval Ministry did not have the necessary funds to build large armored cruisers, it was decided to build armored cruisers of a smaller displacement. The project of such a cruiser was developed by A. A. Popov. On it in 1879 two ships were laid down - "General-Admiral" and "Alexander Nevsky", renamed in 1874 "Duke of Edinburgh". These ships had 175 mm armor, a displacement of about 4600 tons, speed: the first - 13.6 knots, the second - 15.3 knots. They were armed with four 203mm, two 152mm rifled and several small-caliber guns; 203-mm guns were placed in special side ledges (sponsons), 152-mm - on rotating platforms in the bow and stern of the ship.

Thus, a new class of ships appeared in Russia - armored cruisers. They soon began to be built in England and other Western European countries.

In order to build up cruising forces at a lower cost, the Naval Ministry in 1872 developed a program for the construction of eight unarmored screw iron clippers with sailing weapons, intended for joint operations with armored cruisers on ocean communications. In accordance with this program at the shipyards of St. Petersburg in 1873-1881. clippers "Cruiser", "Dzhigit", "Robber", "Rider", "Shooter", "Plastun", "Vestnik" and "Oprichnik" were built. Their displacement was a little more than 1330 tons, speed - 11-13.5 knots, armament - two or three 152-mm guns mounted on the upper deck, and 10-16 small-caliber guns.

In 1878, three high-speed steamers were bought abroad, converted into cruisers and named "Europe", "Asia" and "Africa"; their cruising range reached 14 thousand miles. In addition, in 1878 the cruiser "Zabiyaka" was ordered abroad and in 1879 entered service. At the same time, through the Committee for the Arrangement of the Voluntary Fleet, created in Russia, three ocean steamers were acquired abroad and converted into cruisers ("Russia", "Moscow" and "Petersburg").

By the beginning of the XX century. in the Russian fleet there were three types of cruisers, differing in technical and tactical properties. The most powerful, armored cruisers were intended for operations on long-distance communications. These ships had a displacement of up to 13 thousand tons, and possessed machines up to 15 thousand ind. forces, providing a speed of 19-20 knots. In their armament, the main caliber artillery was 203-mm guns. For operations on short routes, other cruisers were built - with a displacement of up to 8 thousand tons, equipped with machines up to 12-20 thousand ind. forces and armed with guns up to 6 dm. The reconnaissance and guard service was carried by light cruisers with a displacement of 3-5 thousand tons. Their machines with a capacity of 15-16 thousand forces allowed them to reach speeds of up to 20 knots. They were armed with medium and rapid-fire artillery.

Torpedo boats. Squadron destroyers.

The construction of 40 destroyers began in 1877, when the threat of an attack by the British fleet on St. Petersburg arose. The first destroyers with a displacement of 23 tons had machines with a capacity of 250 ind. forces, developed a speed of 16 knots, were armed with a bow torpedo tube. They were still suitable for coastal service, but they were not at all suitable for operations on the high seas. In the 90s, more advanced ships were built. The destroyer "Explosion" was adopted as the basis for the type (displacement 160 tons, vehicles of 800 ind. Forces, speed up to 15 knots; 37-mm gun, 2 torpedo tubes). The Sukhum and Batum destroyers ordered by British firms had similar characteristics.

Since the end of the 90s, at the Nevsky, Putilovsky, Izhora plants and at the Creighton plant, they began to build new ships, similar in type to the destroyers Anakria (bought in Germany) and Pernov (bought in France). With a slightly lower displacement, they had a higher speed (up to 21 knots). By the mid-90s, 30 such destroyers were built.

By 1905, 66 destroyer-fighters for the Baltic, 20 for the Black Sea Fleet, 18 for the Pacific Ocean and 2 for the Caspian Flotilla had entered service. After the war with Japan, large destroyers of the General Kondratenko and Ukraine type were built with a displacement of 600 - 800 tons, with machines with a capacity of 6.7 - 8.5 thousand ind. forces, possessing a speed of up to 27.5 knots and armed with two - 76-mm, four or six - 57-mm guns and two torpedo tubes. By 1910, there were 50 such destroyers on the Baltic Sea, 13 on the Black Sea, and 10 on the Pacific Ocean.

Even more powerful ships were built before World War II. The first ship of the new type was the destroyer Novik, which entered service in 1913. Its displacement reached 1260 tons, three turbines with a capacity of 40 thousand ind. forces reported him a speed of 36-37 knots. The ship was armed with four 100-mm guns, four large-caliber machine guns and four twin-tube torpedo tubes. According to this type, 36 destroyers were built for the Baltic Fleet, 16 for the Black Sea and 11 for the Pacific Ocean. They were built at the Putilovsky, Petrograd metal, Izhora plants, the Mühlgraben shipyard and at the Naval plant.

A characteristic feature of the development of destroyers was the strengthening of torpedo and artillery armament, an increase in speed and cruising range, and their adaptation to laying mines. By the beginning of the world war, all fleets consisted of 75 destroyers, 11 were being completed and 30 more were under construction. In addition, there were 45 destroyers.

Submarines.

This class of ships is the brainchild of the 20th century. Not a single state had practically no combat submarines by 1900, only experiments were carried out. In Russia, the most successful experimental designs were the boats of I. F. Aleksandrovsky and S. K. Dzhevetsky. Having established the real possibility of using such boats, the naval department proposed to its technical committee to design a boat with a displacement of 113 tons (in the submerged position - 123 tons) with two motors for working in the surface (gasoline) and underwater (electric) positions. The new boat was supposed to move at a speed of 11 knots on the surface and 5 knots under water and dive to a depth of 50 m. For this purpose, the Marine Technical Committee formed a special commission chaired by prof. I. G. Bubnova.

By the spring of 1901, Bubnov and Beklemishev presented a project that met the requirements of the ministry. The Baltic shipyard was commissioned to build it. The construction of the boat continued during 1901-1903. After testing, the boat, armed with two torpedo tubes, entered service in 1904 and was named "Dolphin". At the beginning of 1904, the Maritime Ministry proposed that the Baltic Shipyard build a second boat ("Kasatka"), also according to the project of Bubnov and Beklemishev. She had a displacement of 140 tons (under water - 177 tons), motors with a capacity of 120 and 100 ind. forces, the speed of 8.5 knots on the surface and 5.5 knots in the submerged position and was armed with 4 torpedo tubes and a machine gun. Like the first boat, "Kasatka" could submerge to 50 m. In total, it was planned to build 10 such boats by 1914. But then changes were made to the design of the boat, and the Baltic Shipyard built only 4 such boats.

With the advent of the design of I. G. Bubnov, the type of the Russian submarine was established. The construction of four boats was completed by 1905, and they were sent by rail to Vladivostok. However, submarines did not take a direct part in hostilities, but their appearance contributed to the development of design ideas. During the Russo-Japanese War, the creation of means to combat them began. The deep-sea captain Roozen invented anti-submarine nets, which later played an important role.

After the end of the war, the improvement of submarine designs continued. MP Naletov proposed the design of an underwater minelayer, which was built in Nikolaev and received the name "Crab": a displacement of 560 tons on the surface, 740 tons underwater, a speed of 7.07 knots under water and 11.8 on the surface, the maximum depth dives 36.6 m.

The dimensions of the boats built at that time did not provide a large radius of action; they could serve mainly for defensive purposes. However, in 1911-1915. construction of larger vessels began according to the designs of prof. I. G. Bubnova. They were "Walrus" and "Bars".

Under the submarine construction program, it was planned to build 18 such boats for the Baltic Sea and 12 for the Black Sea. But by the beginning of the war, these boats were not put into service due to the fact that the motors ordered in Germany for them at the beginning of the war were confiscated. I had to expand the production of diesel engines at domestic enterprises.

In 1916, the Naval Ministry announced a competition for even more powerful submarines. According to the terms of the competition, the boats of the new type were supposed to have a displacement of 970 tons (1264 tons during diving), develop a speed of 17 knots (9 under water), and have a range of up to 1300 miles. Bubnov's design turned out to be the best, but they did not start building new boats. In the future, it was planned to bring the displacement of the boats up to 1300 tons, the speed up to 20 knots on the surface and 14 under water, the radius of action - up to 1500 km. It was about the creation of boats capable of long-term autonomous navigation. By the beginning of World War II, all fleets had 48 operating boats, and 23 were under construction.

Let's summarize some of the results. Creation of an armored fleet in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. represents one of the important and at the same time difficult stages in the development of the navy. Scientists, engineers, foremen and naval sailors faced complex problems associated with the choice of the most rational types of armored ships, the development of their projects, the creation of the necessary weapons, with a reassessment of views on the tactics, organization and methods of combat training of the armored fleet. Despite all the difficulties associated with solving this complex of problems, during the second half of the XIX century. Russia created a modern armored fleet, which continued its development in subsequent years.

By the end of the 70s of the XIX century. in Russia were created quite significant defensive and cruising forces of the fleet. The defensive forces were intended to protect the capital and the coast of Russia in the Baltic and Black Seas, the cruising forces were intended to operate on oceanic communications. In case of war, a plan was developed, according to which it was planned to form several cruising detachments in the Baltic and the Far East for operations in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Conclusion

Socio-economic changes in post-reform Russia created conditions for broad transformations of the Russian army on a liberal basis. Armed forces of the Russian Empire in the last third of the XIX century. acted in a triune capacity: as an important instrument of the great-power, imperial policy of tsarism; the stronghold of Russian statehood, security and stability of the Russian state and its population; a specific social organism closely linked with the Russian society. Being already, therefore, simultaneously conservative and dynamic, the armed forces were sensitive to social changes, reflected painful phenomena and processes in society and the state, in world development. All this complicated the task of reforming them.

A feature of the military reform of the 60s - 70s. XIX century. was not only in the scale of innovations in military construction and management of the armed forces, not only in serious changes in mobilization plans and military-technical equipment, but also in a radical renewal of the type of army itself. In the course of the reform, the task of creating a cadre army was solved on a liberal basis, fundamentally different from the armed forces of the feudal era. The implementation of this took place during a period of fundamental changes in the world military art, in the context of an incredible arms race in European states. The reforms of the Russian army became part of the general European military reforms of the 60s - 70s. XIX century.

Milyutin's military reforms in the 60-70s. XIX century were an inseparable part of the liberal reforms carried out by Alexander II. The reforms were progressive and affected all aspects of military command and organization. They contributed to the creation of a mass army of a modern type, strengthening and increasing its combat effectiveness.

The main results of the military reforms of 1860-1870. are:

Introduction of the military district military command and control system;

Reorganization of the Ministry of War and the General Staff, which became the organ of military command subordinate to the Minister of War;

Introduced universal all-class conscription and reduced service life;

A military-judicial reform was carried out and the system of corporal punishment of soldiers was abolished.

The rearmament of the army and navy began with new modern models of equipment and weapons.

Reforms of military educational institutions significantly changed the entire system of officer training, and the question of staffing the troops with officers in peacetime was resolved.

The adoption of the Charter on conscription in 1874, which made it possible to increase the size of the army, to create a trained reserve necessary for the deployment of the army in wartime. Among the progressive moments of the new law was the fact that it abolished the basic privileges of the nobility, granted back in the reign of Catherine II. The establishment of benefits for education stimulated the development of education. The introduction of universal conscription ensured the transformation of the Russian armed forces into a modern mass army.

Russia possessed significant human resources that made it possible to deploy a massive army and continuously feed it. The constant influx of human resources made it possible to acquire all types of weapons. The composition and organization of the troops were determined by the method of waging war and battle. The development of technical means, the emergence of machine technology complicated and even changed the functions of weapons and gave birth to new ones. At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. there is a downsizing of the composition of the military ground forces, an expansion of the organizational and numerical strength, which led to the assertion of the status of the Russian army as the largest army in Europe.

Creation of an armored fleet in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. represents one of the important and at the same time difficult stages in the development of the navy. Scientists, engineers, foremen and naval sailors faced complex problems associated with the choice of the most rational types of armored ships, the development of their projects, the creation of the necessary weapons, with a reassessment of views on the tactics, organization and methods of combat training of the armored fleet. Despite all the difficulties associated with solving this complex of problems, during the second half of the XIX century. Russia created a modern armored fleet, which continued its development in subsequent years.

By the end of the 70s of the XIX century. in Russia were created quite significant defensive and cruising forces of the fleet.

Russian technical thought has shown its ability to independently resolve issues related to the creation of submarines. The Russian type of submarines was distinguished by high tactical and technical data. The development of the submarine fleet followed the path of increasing speed, autonomy, and strengthening weapons.

List of sources and literature

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Introduction

The relevance of our work lies in examining the laws governing the implementation of military reform in the framework of the bourgeois reforms of the second half of the 19th century.

The purpose of this work is to study the features of the military reform in the second half of the 19th century.

Achieving the goal involves solving a number of tasks:

1) consider the social situation in Russia in the second half of the 19th century;

2) determine the prerequisites for reforms in the second half of the 19th century;

3) give a description of the military sphere on the eve of the reform;

4) consider the creation of a district system and reorganization in the field of army management;

5) consider the rearmament of the army and the reorganization of military training;

6) study the organization of the army in the 70s of the XIX century.

Milyutin's military reforms in the 60s-70s. XIX century were an inseparable part of the bourgeois reforms carried out by Alexander II. Military reform of the 1860-1870s played an important role in the reorganization of the armed forces, the system of their training, recruitment and rearmament, however, due to incompleteness, it could not fully ensure the creation of solid foundations of the state's defense capability.

CHAPTER 1 Characteristics of bourgeois transformations in Russia

In the second half of the 19th century

1.1 Social situation in Russia in the second half of the XIX century

By the middle of the 19th century, Russia began to lag behind the advanced capitalist states in the economic and socio-political spheres. The international events of the middle of the century showed its weakening in the foreign policy field. Therefore, the main goal of the government's internal policy in the second half of the 19th century was to bring the economic and socio-political system of Russia in line with the needs of the time.

Domestic policy was influenced by many factors: the strengthening of the capitalist system, the emergence of new classes and social strata, and a powerful rise in the social movement. There are three stages in the domestic policy of Russia in the second half of the 19th century. The first is the preparation and implementation of the peasant reform. The second is the implementation of bourgeois reforms in the 60s and 70s. The third is a change in the 80-90s of the government course, the strengthening of conservative tendencies in it.

The first half of the 19th century was characterized by an ever-increasing crisis of the feudal-serf system as a result of the development in the depths of its new capitalist relations. This process of decomposition of the feudal-serf system led to the growth of class contradictions and the emergence of a new bourgeois ideology.

After the fall of serfdom, Russia quickly turned from an agrarian country into an agrarian-industrial one. Large-scale machine industry developed, new types of industry arose, regions of capitalist industrial and agricultural production were formed, an extensive network of railways was created, a single capitalist market was formed, and important social changes took place in the country. The influence of reforms on the development of industry begins to show itself gradually by the 70s - 80s. By the beginning of the 80s of the XIX century in Russia, in the main areas of industrial production, machine technology had already supplanted the manual one, the water wheel had practically supplanted the steam engine. Steam engines and machine tools have gained a dominant position in the mining, metalworking and textile industries. An important indicator of the industrial revolution was the rapid growth in the 60s - 70s of mechanized steam transport.

Fear of a revolutionary explosion and the desire to strengthen the system of state administration necessitated some small reforms designed to preserve the foundations of the feudal-serf system. These measures were also conditioned by the economic changes that took place under the influence of the development of capitalism. However, these minor reforms could not make any significant changes in the conditions of the crisis of the entire system of the feudal-serf state.

1.2 Preconditions for the reforms of the second half of the 19th century

By the middle of the 19th century, the general crisis of the feudal-serf system, which had been brewing since the end of the 18th century, reached its greatest acuteness. The lack of interest of the serf worker in the results of his labor "excluded the possibility of using machines and improving agricultural technology in serf estates."

The preservation of feudal-serf relations seriously hampered the development of industry. Indeed, in industry, especially mining and metallurgy in the Urals, the labor of serfs, the so-called possession workers, that is, peasants who worked out corvée in factories, was widely used. The labor was so ineffective that the owners of the factories themselves sought to get rid of them.

The event that accelerated the liquidation of the feudal system was the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which ended in the defeat of the tsarist government. The war showed the backwardness and impotence of the serf system, the inefficiency of the social and economic systems of Russia. Recruitment, increased taxes and duties, the disruption of trade and industry have exacerbated the poverty and misery of the oppressed masses above the usual level. Military defeats led to the discontent of the bourgeoisie and the nobility. In this situation, the government considered it necessary to start preparing a reform to abolish serfdom. Soon after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty, which ended the Crimean War, the new Tsar Alexander II (who succeeded Nicholas I, who died in February 1855 on the throne), speaking in Moscow before the leaders of noble societies, said, “having in mind the abolition of serfdom that it is better for it to happen from above than from below. "