Witte Sergei Yulievich (1849-1915). Count, Russian statesman. He began his career as head of the traffic service of the Odessa branch of the South-Western Railways. In 1879 he worked in St. Petersburg, as the head of the exploitation department on the board of the South-Western Railways. In 1888 he was appointed director of the department of railway affairs and chairman of the tariff committee, and in 1892 he became manager of the Ministry of Railways. At the end of the same year, Witte was appointed to the post of Minister of Finance, which he held for 11 years. In this post, he carried out the famous reform - the transition to gold circulation. Witte's undoubted merit is his implementation of a monetary reform in 1897, which strengthened a stable gold currency in Russia before the 1914 war, instead of the previous paper one, and created the preconditions for the import of foreign capital into Russia. In 1903, he assumed the duties of chairman of the Committee of Ministers. The last position was actually an honorable resignation, since the committee had no significance before the 1905 revolution. This transfer from the post of all-powerful master of finance to the post of powerless chairman of the committee occurred under the pressure of the noble-landowner elements of the government (mainly Plehve), dissatisfied with Witte’s patronizing attitude and his flirting with moderate liberals. During the events of January 9, Witte disclaimed all responsibility for the actions of the government. In the summer of 1905, Nicholas sent Witte to Portsmouth to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. For the successful completion of this assignment, Witte was elevated to the rank of count. During the days of the October strike, when the course towards an agreement with the bourgeoisie won, Witte turned out to be the most suitable person for the post of prime minister. The October 17 Manifesto is the brainchild of Witte. After the defeat of the revolution, when the autocracy felt solid ground beneath it, Witte again left the stage. Witte's last fall from grace lasted until his death (1915). All 1000 biographies in alphabetical order:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
He had the opportunity to shine dazzlingly in the diplomatic field, to witness the Crimean War, the abolition of serfdom, the reforms of the 60s, the rapid development of capitalism, the Russo-Japanese War, and the first revolution in Russia. S. Yu. Witte is a contemporary of Alexander III and Nicholas II, P. A. Stolypin and V. N. Kokovtsov, S. V. Zubatov and V. K. Pleve, D. S. Sipyagin and G. E. Rasputin.
The life, political affairs, and moral qualities of Sergei Yulievich Witte always evoked contradictory, sometimes polar opposite, assessments and judgments. According to some memoirs of his contemporaries, we have before us “an exceptionally gifted”, “highly outstanding statesman”, “superior in the variety of his talents, the vastness of his horizons, the ability to cope with the most difficult tasks with the brilliance and strength of his mind of all the people of his time.” According to others, he is “a businessman completely inexperienced in the national economy,” “suffering from amateurism and poor knowledge of Russian reality,” a gentleman with “an average philistine level of development and the naivety of many views,” whose policies were characterized by “helplessness, unsystematicness and... unprincipledness.”
Characterizing Witte, some emphasized that he was “European and liberal,” others that “Under no circumstances was Witte either a liberal or a conservative, but at times he was deliberately reactionary.” Moreover, the following was written about him: “a savage, a provincial hero, an insolent and libertine with a sunken nose.”
So who was this person - Sergei Yulievich Witte?
He was born on June 17, 1849 in the Caucasus, in Tiflis, in the family of a provincial official. Witte's paternal ancestors came from Holland and moved to the Baltic states in the middle of the 19th century. received hereditary nobility. On his mother's side, his ancestry was traced back to the associates of Peter I - the princes Dolgoruky. Witte's father, Julius Fedorovich, a nobleman of the Pskov province, a Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy, served as director of the department of state property in the Caucasus. Mother, Ekaterina Andreevna, was the daughter of a member of the main administration of the governor of the Caucasus, former Saratov head of the regional administration Andrei Mikhailovich Fadeev and Princess Elena Pavlovna Dolgorukaya. Witte himself was very happy to emphasize his family ties with the Dolgoruky princes, but did not like to mention that he came from a family of little-known Russified Germans. “In general, my entire family,” he wrote in his “Memoirs,” was a highly monarchical family, “and this edge of character remained with me by inheritance.”
The Witte family had five children: three sons (Alexander, Boris, Sergei) and two daughters (Olga and Sophia). Sergei spent his childhood in the family of his grandfather A. M. Fadeev, where he received the usual upbringing for noble families, and “the initial education,” recalled S. Yu. Witte, “was given to me by my grandmother ... she taught me to understand the text and write” .
At the Tiflis gymnasium, where he was next sent, Sergei studied “very poorly”, preferring to study music, fencing, and horse riding. As a result, at the age of sixteen he received a matriculation certificate with mediocre grades in science and a unit in behavior. Despite this, the upcoming state participant went to Odessa with the intention of enrolling in university. But his young age (the university accepted people no younger than seventeen years old), and on top of everything, the behavioral unit blocked his access there... He had to go to the gymnasium again - first of all in Odessa, then in Chisinau. And only after intensive study did Witte pass the exams successfully and receive a decent matriculation certificate.
In 1866, Sergei Witte entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Novorossiysk University in Odessa. “... I studied day and night,” he recalled, “and therefore throughout my stay at the university I was actually the best student in terms of knowledge.”
This is how the initial year of student life passed. In the spring, having gone on vacation, on the way home Witte received news of the death of his father (not long before this he had lost his grandfather, A. M. Fadeev). It turned out that the family was left without a livelihood: shortly before their death, grandfather and father invested all their income in the Chiatura mines company, which soon failed. Thus, Sergei inherited only his father’s debts and was forced to take on the burden of caring for his mother and little sisters. He was able to continue his studies only thanks to a scholarship paid by the Caucasian governorship.
As a student, S. Yu. Witte was not very interested in social problems. He was not worried about either political radicalism or the philosophy of atheistic materialism that excited the minds of young people in the 70s. Witte was not one of those whose idols were Pisarev, Dobrolyubov, Tolstoy, Chernyshevsky, Mikhailovsky. “... I was constantly opposed to all these trends, because according to my upbringing I was an extreme monarchist... and also a religious person,” S. Yu. Witte later wrote. His spiritual world was formed under the influence of his relatives, especially his uncle, Rostislav Andreevich Fadeev, a general, participant in the conquest of the Caucasus, a talented military publicist, known for his Slavophile, pan-Slavist views.
Despite his monarchist beliefs, Witte was elected by students to the committee in charge of the student treasury. This innocent idea did not end badly. This so-called mutual aid fund was closed as... a dangerous institution, and all members of the committee, including Witte, were under investigation. They were threatened with exile to Siberia. And only the brawl that happened to the prosecutor in charge of the case helped S. Yu. Witte avoid the fate of a political exile. The punishment was reduced to a fine of 25 rubles.
After graduating from university in 1870, Sergei Witte thought about a scientific career, about a professorship. However, my relatives - my mother and uncle - “looked very askance at my desire to be a professor,” recalled S. Yu. Witte. “Their main argument was that ... this is not a noble cause.” In addition, his scientific career was hindered by his ardent passion for the actress Sokolova, after this acquaintance with whom Witte “didn’t want to write more dissertations.”
Having chosen a career as an official, he was assigned to the office of the Odessa head of the regional administration, Count Kotzebue. And then, two years later, the first promotion - Witte was appointed head of the office. But out of the blue, all his plans changed.
Railway construction was rapidly developing in Russia. This was a new and promising branch of the capitalist economy. Various private societies arose that invested in the construction of railways amounts that exceeded investments in large-scale industry. The atmosphere of excitement surrounding the construction of railways also captured Witte. The Minister of Railways, Count Bobrinsky, who knew his father, persuaded Sergei Yulievich to try his luck as a specialist in the operation of railways - in the purely commercial field of railway business.
In an effort to thoroughly explore the practical side of the enterprise, Witte sat in the station ticket office, acted as an assistant and station manager, controller, traffic auditor, and also served as a freight service clerk and an assistant driver. Six months later, he was appointed head of the Odessa Railway traffic office, which soon passed into the hands of a private company.
However, after a promising start, S. Yu. Witte’s career almost ended completely. At the end of 1875, a train crash occurred near Odessa, causing countless casualties. The head of the Odessa Railway, Chikhachev, and Witte were put on trial and sentenced to four months in prison. However, while the investigation dragged on, Witte, while remaining in service, managed to distinguish himself in transporting troops to the theater of military operations (the Russian-Turkish battle of 1877-1878 was underway), which attracted the sensitivity of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, at whose order the prison for the accused was replaced by a two-week guardhouse.
In 1877, S. Yu. Witte became the head of the Odessa Railway, and after the end of the war - the head of the operational department of the Southwestern Railways. Having received this direction, he moved from the periphery to St. Petersburg, where he took part in the work of Count E. T. Baranov’s commission (to study the railway business).
Service in private railway companies had a very strong influence on Witte: it gave him management skills, taught him a prudent, businesslike approach, a sense of the situation, and determined the range of interests of the future financier and statesman.
By the beginning of the 80s, the name of S. Yu. Witte was already quite well known among railway businessmen and in the circles of the Russian bourgeoisie. He was familiar with the largest “railway kings” - I. S. Bliokh, P. I. Gubonin, V. A. Kokorev, S. S. Polyakov, and knew the future Minister of Finance I. A. Vyshnegradsky. Already in these years, the versatility of Witte’s energetic nature was evident: the qualities of an excellent administrator, a sober, practical businessman were well combined with the abilities of a scientist-analyst. In 1883, S. Yu. Witte published “Principles of railway tariffs for the transportation of goods,” which brought him fame among specialists. This was, it is appropriate to say, not the first and certainly not the last service to come from his pen.
In 1880, S. Yu. Witte was appointed manager of the South-Western roads and settled in Kyiv. A successful career brought him material well-being. As a manager, Witte received more than any minister - over 50 thousand rubles a year.
Witte did not take an active part in political life during these years, although he collaborated with the Odessa Slavic Benevolent Society, was well acquainted with the famous Slavophile I. S. Aksakov and, moreover, published a few articles in his newspaper “Rus”. The young entrepreneur preferred “the environment of actresses” to serious politics. “... I knew all the more or less prominent actresses who were in Odessa,” he later recalled.
The murder of Alexander II by the Narodnaya Volya radically changed S. Yu. Witte’s attitude towards politics. After March 1, he actively became involved in the big political game. Having learned about the death of the emperor, Witte wrote a message to his uncle R. A. Fadeev, in which he presented the idea of creating a noble secret organization to protect the new sovereign and fight the revolutionaries using their own methods. R. A. Fadeev picked up this idea and, with the help of Adjutant General I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, created the so-called “Sacred Squad” in St. Petersburg. In mid-March 1881, S. Yu. Witte was sublimely initiated into the squad and soon received his first assignment - to launch an attempt on the life of the famous revolutionary populist L. N. Hartmann in Paris. Fortunately, the “Holy Squad” soon compromised itself with inept espionage and provocateur activities and, after existing for a little over a year, was liquidated. It must be stated that Witte’s presence in this organization did not at all embellish his biography, although it gave him the opportunity to demonstrate ardent loyal feelings. After the death of R. A. Fadeev in the second half of the 80s, S. Yu. Witte moved away from the people of his circle and moved closer to the Pobedonostsev-Katkov group, which controlled state ideology.
By the mid-80s, the scale of the Southwestern Railways ceased to satisfy Witte's ebullient nature. The ambitious and power-hungry railway entrepreneur persistently and patiently began to prepare his own further advancement. This was fully facilitated by the fact that the authority of S. Yu. Witte as a theorist and practitioner of the railway industry attracted the sensitivity of the Minister of Finance I. A. Vyshnegradsky. And besides, the episode helped.
On October 17, 1888, the Tsar's train crashed in Borki. The reason for this was a violation of the rules of basic train traffic rules: the heavy composition of the royal train with two freight locomotives was traveling above the established speed. S. Yu. Witte previously warned the Minister of Railways about the possible consequences. With his characteristic rudeness, he once said in the presence of Alexander III that the emperor’s neck would be broken if the royal trains were driven at an illegal speed. After the crash in Borki (from which, in general, neither the emperor nor his family members suffered), Alexander III remembered this warning and expressed pleasure in having S. Yu appointed to the newly approved post of director of the department of railway affairs in the Ministry of Finance Witte.
And although this meant a three-fold reduction in salary, Sergei Yulievich did not hesitate to part with a profitable place and the position of a successful businessman for the purpose of the government career that beckoned him. Simultaneously with his appointment to the post of director of the department, he was immediately promoted from titular to actual state councilor (i.e., received the rank of general). It was a dizzying leap up the bureaucratic ladder. Witte is among I. A. Vyshnegradsky’s closest collaborators.
The department entrusted to Witte immediately becomes exemplary. The new director manages in practice to argue for the constructiveness of his ideas about state regulation of railway tariffs, to show a breadth of interests, a remarkable genius as an administrator, and strength of mind and character.
In February 1892, having successfully used the conflict between two departments - transport and financial, S. Yu. Witte sought appointment to the post of manager of the Ministry of Railways. However, he remained in this post for only a short time. In the same year, 1892, I. A. Vyshnegradsky fell seriously ill. In government circles, a behind-the-scenes battle began for the influential post of Minister of Finance, in which Witte took an active part. Not overly scrupulous and not particularly picky about the means to achieve the goal, using both intrigue and gossip about the mental disorder of his patron I. A. Vyshnegradsky (the one who had absolutely no intention of leaving his post), in August 1892. Witte achieved the position of manager of the Ministry of Finance. And on January 1, 1893, Alexander III appointed him Minister of Finance with simultaneous promotion to Privy Councilor. The career of 43-year-old Witte has reached its shining peak.
True, the road to this peak was dramatically complicated by the marriage of S. Yu. Witte to Matilda Ivanovna Lisanevich (née Nurok). This was not his first marriage. Witte's first wife was N.A. Spiridonova (née Ivanenko), the daughter of the Chernigov leader of the nobility. She was married, but was not happy in her marriage. Witte met her back in Odessa and, having fallen in love, obtained a divorce. S. Yu. Witte and N. A. Spiridonova got married (apparently in 1878). However, they did not live long. In the fall of 1890, Witte's wife died suddenly.
About a year after her death, Sergei Yulievich met a lady (also married) in the theater who made an indelible impression on him. Slender, with gray-green sad eyes, a mysterious smile, a bewitching voice, she seemed to him the embodiment of charm. Having met the lady, Witte began to gain her favor, convincing her to end the marriage and marry him. In order to obtain a divorce from her intractable husband, Witte had to pay compensation and, moreover, resort to threats of administrative measures.
In 1892, he married the woman he loved dearly and adopted her child (he did not have any children of his own).
His new marriage put him in a very delicate social position. A high-ranking dignitary turned out to be married to a divorced Jewish woman, and even as a result of a scandalous story. Sergei Yulievich, moreover, was ready to “determine the end” of his career. However, Alexander III, having delved into all the details, said that that same marriage only increased his respect for Witte. Nevertheless, Matilda Witte was not accepted either at court or in high society.
It should be noted that Witte’s relationship with high society was not easy at all. High-society Petersburg looked askance at the “provincial upstart.” He was offended by Witte's harshness, angularity, non-aristocratic manners, southern accent, and poor French pronunciation. Sergei Yulievich became a favorite character in metropolitan jokes for a long time. His rapid progress caused undisguised envy and hostility on the part of officials.
Along with this, Emperor Alexander III obviously favored him. “... He treated me especially favorably,” wrote Witte, “he loved me extremely,” “he trusted me until the last day of his life.” Alexander III was impressed by Witte's directness, his courage, independence of judgment, moreover, the sharpness of his expressions, and the complete absence of servility. And for Witte, Alexander III remained the ideal autocrat until the end of his life. “A true Christian”, “a faithful heir to the Orthodox Church”, “an ordinary, tough and honest man”, “an outstanding emperor”, “a man of his word”, “royally noble”, “with royal lofty thoughts” - this is how Witte characterizes Alexander III .
Having taken the chair of the Minister of Finance, S. Yu. Witte received great power: the department of railway affairs, trade, and industry were now subordinate to him, and he could put pressure on the conclusion of the most important issues. And Sergei Yulievich actually showed himself to be a sober, prudent, flexible politician. Yesterday's Pan-Slavist, Slavophile, confident supporter of Russia's original path of development in a short time turned into an industrializer of the European standard and declared his readiness to quickly bring Russia into the ranks of advanced industrial powers.
By the beginning of the 20th century. Witte’s economic platform has acquired completely finished outlines: within about ten years, to catch up with the more industrially developed countries of Europe, to take a strong position in the markets of the East, to ensure the accelerated industrial formation of Russia by attracting foreign capital, accumulating internal resources, customs protection of industry from competitors and encouragement export A special role in Witte’s program was given to foreign capital; The Minister of Finance advocated their unlimited involvement in Russian industry and railway work, calling it a cure against poverty. He considered unlimited government intervention to be the second most important mechanism.
And this was not a simple declaration. In 1894-1895 S. Yu. Witte achieved stabilization of the ruble, and in 1897 he did what his predecessors had failed to do: he introduced a gold currency appeal, providing the country with hard currency and an influx of foreign capital until the first important war. In addition, Witte grossly increased taxation, especially indirect taxation, and introduced a wine monopoly, which soon became one of the main sources of the government budget. Another major event carried out by Witte at the beginning of his activity was the conclusion of a customs agreement with Germany (1894), after which S. Yu. Witte became interested, moreover, O. Bismarck himself. This damnably flattered the young minister’s vanity. “... Bismarck... paid special attention to me,” he later wrote, “and several times through his acquaintances he expressed the highest point of view about my personality.”
During the economic boom of the 90s, Witte’s organization worked excellently: an unprecedented number of railways were built in the country; by 1900, Russia became the world's number one oil producer; Russian government bonds were highly quoted abroad. The authority of S. Yu. Witte grew immeasurably. The Russian Finance Minister became a popular figure among Western entrepreneurs and attracted favorable attention from the foreign press. The domestic press harshly criticized Witte. Former like-minded people accused him of inculcating “state socialism,” adherents of the reforms of the 60s criticized him for the use of state intervention, Russian liberals perceived Witte’s program as “a grandiose sabotage of the autocracy,” which distracted the sympathy of society from socio-economic and cultural-political reforms.” the only state member of Russia was not the subject of previously varied and contradictory, but persistent and passionate attacks, like my ... husband, - Matilda Witte later wrote. - At court he was accused of republicanism, in radical circles he was credited with the desire to curtail the rights of the people in in favor of the monarch. The landowners reproached him for seeking to ruin them in favor of the peasants, and the radical parties for seeking to deceive the peasantry in favor of the landowners." Moreover, he was accused of friendship with A. Zhelyabov, of trying to lead to the decline of Russian agriculture in order to bring benefits to Germany.
In reality, the entire policy of S. Yu. Witte was subordinated to a single goal: to implement industrialization, achieve successful development of the Russian economy, without affecting the political system, without changing anything in public administration. Witte was an ardent supporter of autocracy. He considered an unlimited monarchy “the best form of government” for Russia, and everything he did was done in order to strengthen and “preserve autocracy.
For the same purpose, Witte begins to develop the peasant question, trying to achieve a revision of agrarian policy. He realized that it was not impossible to expand the purchasing power of the domestic market only through the capitalization of peasant farming, through the transition from communal to private land ownership. S. Yu. Witte was a staunch supporter of private peasant ownership of land and strenuously sought the government's transition to a bourgeois agrarian policy. In 1899, with his participation, the government developed and adopted laws abolishing mutual responsibility in the peasant community. In 1902, Witte achieved the creation of a special commission on the peasant question (“Special meeting on the needs of the agricultural industry”), which aimed to “establish personal property in the countryside.”
However, Witte’s long-time enemy V.K. Plehve, appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, stood in Witte’s way. The agrarian questioning motive turned out to be the arena of confrontation between two influential ministers. Witte never succeeded in realizing his ideas. However, the initiator of the government’s transition to bourgeois agrarian policy was S. Yu. Witte. As for P. A. Stolypin, later Witte repeatedly emphasized that he “robbed” him and used ideas of which he himself, Witte, was a convinced supporter. It was precisely because of this that Sergei Yulievich could not remember P. A. Stolypin without a feeling of bitterness. “... Stolypin,” he wrote, “had a very superficial mind and almost a complete lack of state culture and education. In terms of education and intelligence... Stolypin was a type of bayonet cadet.”
Events of the beginning of the 20th century. put all Witte's grandiose undertakings in doubt. The global economic crisis has severely slowed down the formation of industry in Russia, the influx of foreign capital has decreased, and the budgetary balance has been disrupted. Economic expansion in the East aggravated Russian-British contradictions and brought the war with Japan closer.
Witte's economic "system" was positively shaken. This made it possible for his opponents (Plehve, Bezobrazov, etc.) to gradually push the Minister of Finance out of power. Nicholas II willingly supported the campaign against Witte. It should be noted that quite complex relations were established between S. Yu. Witte and Nicholas II, who ascended the Russian throne in 1894: on the part of Witte, distrust and disdain were demonstrated, on the part of Nicholas, distrust and hatred. Witte crowded the restrained, outwardly correct and well-mannered tsar, insulting him all the way, without noticing it, with his harshness, impatience, self-confidence, and inability to hide his native disrespect and disdain. And there was one more situation that turned simple dislike for Witte into hatred: after all, it was in no way forbidden to get settled without Witte. Always, when a truly enormous intelligence and resourcefulness were required, Nicholas II, albeit with gnashing of teeth, turned to him.
For his part, Witte gives a very sharp and bold characterization of Nikolai in “Memoirs”. Listing the countless advantages of Alexander III, he always makes it clear that his offspring in no way possessed them. About the sovereign himself, he writes: “... Emperor Nicholas II... was a kind man, far from stupid, but shallow, weak-willed... His main qualities were courtesy when he wanted it... cunning and complete spinelessness and lack of will." Here he adds a “proud character” and a rare “grudge.” In S. Yu. Witte’s “Memoirs,” the Empress also received many unflattering words. The author calls her a “strange person” with a “narrow and stubborn character”, “with a stupid egoistic character and a narrow worldview.”
In August 1903, the campaign against Witte was successful: he was removed from the post of Minister of Finance and appointed to the post of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers. Despite the loud name, it was an “honorable resignation”, since the new post was disproportionately less influential. At the same time, Nicholas II did not intend to completely remove Witte, because the Empress-Mother Maria Fedorovna and the Tsar’s brother, the huge Prince Mikhail, directly sympathized with him. In addition, for any episode, Nicholas II himself wanted to have such an experienced, intelligent, energetic dignitary at hand.
Having been defeated in the political struggle, Witte did not return to private enterprise. He set himself the goal of regaining lost positions. Remaining in the shadows, he tried not to completely discredit the tsar, more often attract the “highest attention” to himself, strengthened and established connections in government circles. Preparations for war with Japan made it possible to begin an active struggle for a return to power. However, Witte's hopes that with the beginning of the war Nicholas II would call him were not justified.
In the summer of 1904, the Socialist-Revolutionary E. S. Sozonov killed Witte’s longtime enemy, Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve. The disgraced dignitary made every effort to occupy the vacant position, but even here bad luck awaited him. Despite the fact that Sergei Yulievich successfully completed the mission entrusted to him - he concluded a new agreement with Germany - Nicholas II appointed Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky as Minister of Internal Affairs.
Trying to direct attention to himself, Witte takes an active part in meetings with the tsar on the issue of attracting elected representatives from the population to participate in legislation, and tries to expand the competence of the Committee of Ministers. He also uses the events of “Bloody Sunday” to provide evidence to the Tsar that without him, Witte, he would not have been able to get by, that if the Committee of Ministers under his chairmanship had been endowed with real power, then such a turn of events would have been impossible.
Finally, on January 17, 1905, Nicholas II, despite all his hostility, nevertheless turns to Witte and instructs him to create a meeting of ministers on “measures necessary to calm the country” and possible reforms. Sergei Yulievich obviously hoped that he would be able to transform this meeting into a leadership of the “Western European model” and become its head. However, in April of the same year, new royal disfavor followed: Nicholas II closed the meeting. Witte found himself out of work again.
True, this time the fall lasted only for a short time. At the end of May 1905, at the next military meeting, the need for an early end to the war with Japan became irrevocably clear. Witte, who had repeatedly and extremely successfully acted as a diplomat, was entrusted with conducting difficult peace negotiations (negotiated with China on the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, with Japan - on a joint protectorate over Korea, with Korea - on Russian military instruction and Russian financial management, with Germany - on concluding a trade agreement, etc.), while showing remarkable abilities.
Nicholas II was extremely reluctant to send Witte as Ambassador Extraordinary. Witte had been pushing the Tsar for a long time to initiate peace negotiations with Japan, so that “even though the cat cried, he could calm Russia down.” In a letter to him dated February 28, 1905, he indicated: “The continuation of the war is more than dangerous: the state, given the current state of mind, will not endure further casualties without terrible catastrophes...”. He generally considered the war disastrous for the autocracy.
On August 23, 1905, the Portsmouth Peace was signed. This was Witte's brilliant Victoria, confirming his outstanding diplomatic abilities. The talented diplomat managed to emerge from a hopelessly lost war with minimal losses, while achieving “quite a decent peace” for Russia. Despite his close reluctance, the tsar appreciated Witte’s merits: for the Peace of Portsmouth he was awarded the title of count (it is appropriate to say that Witte was immediately mockingly nicknamed “Count of Polosakhalinsky,” thereby accusing him of ceding the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan).
Returning to St. Petersburg, Witte plunged headlong into politics: he took part in Selsky’s “Special Meeting,” where projects for further government reforms were developed. As the revolutionary events intensify, Witte more and more persistently demonstrates the need for a “strong government”, convincing the Tsar that he, Witte, can play the role of the “savior of Russia”. At the beginning of October, he addresses the Tsar with a note in which he sets out a whole program of liberal reforms. In critical days for the autocracy, Witte inspired Nicholas II that he had no choice but to either establish a dictatorship in Russia, or Witte’s premiership and make a system of liberal steps in the constitutional direction.
Finally, after painful hesitation, the tsar signed the protocol drawn up by Witte, the one that went down in history as the Manifesto of October 17. On October 19, the tsar signed a decree on reforming the Council of Ministers, headed by Witte. In his career, Sergei Yulievich reached the top. During the critical days of the revolution, he became the head of the Russian government.
In this post, Witte demonstrated amazing flexibility and ability to maneuver, acting in the emergency conditions of the revolution either as a firm, ruthless guardian or as a skilled peacemaker. Under the chairmanship of Witte, the leadership dealt with a wide variety of issues: reorganized peasant land ownership, introduced a state of exception in various regions, resorted to the use of military courts, the death penalty and other repressions, prepared for the convening of the Duma, drafted the Basic Laws, and implemented the freedoms proclaimed on October 17 .
However, the Council of Ministers headed by S. Yu. Witte never became similar to the European cabinet, and Sergei Yulievich himself served as chairman for only six months. The increasingly intensifying conflict with the tsar forced him to resign. This happened at the end of April 1906. S. Yu. Witte was in full confidence that he had fulfilled his main task - to ensure the political stability of the regime. The resignation essentially marked the end of his career, although Witte did not retire from political activities. He was still a member of the State Council and often appeared in print.
It should be noted that Sergei Yulievich was expecting a new appointment and tried to bring it closer; he waged a fierce struggle, initially against Stolypin, who took the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, then against V.N. Kokovtsov." Witte hoped that the departure of his influential opponents from the state stage would allow him to return to active political activity.He did not lose hope until the last day of his life and, moreover, was ready to resort to the help of Rasputin.
At the beginning of the first important war, predicting that it would end in collapse for the autocracy, S. Yu. Witte declared his readiness to take over the peacekeeping mission and try to enter into negotiations with the Germans. But he was already mortally ill.
S. Yu. Witte died on February 28, 1915, just shy of 65 years old. He was buried modestly, “in the third category.” There were no official ceremonies. Moreover, the deceased’s work office was sealed, papers were confiscated, and a thorough search was carried out at the villa in Biarritz.
Witte's death caused quite a wide resonance in Russian society. The newspapers were full of headlines like: “In Memory of a Great Man”, “Great Reformer”, “Giant of Thought”... Many of those who knew Sergei Yulievich came forward with their memoirs.
After Witte's death, his political activities were assessed as controversial as hell. Some wholeheartedly believed that Witte had rendered a “great service” to his homeland, others argued that “Count Witte did not live up to the hopes placed on him”, that “he did not bring any real benefit to the country”, and moreover, on the contrary, his occupation “should rather be considered harmful.”
The political affairs of Sergei Yulievich Witte were indeed very contradictory. At times it combined the incompatible: the attraction to the unlimited attraction of foreign capital and the struggle against the international political consequences of this attraction; commitment to unlimited autocracy and comprehension of the need for reforms that undermined its traditional foundations; The Manifesto of October 17 and subsequent measures that reduced it in practice to zero, etc. But no matter how the results of Witte’s policy are assessed, one thing is clear: the meaning of his entire life, all his activities was to serve “great Russia.” And both his like-minded people and his opponents could not help but admit this.
He quickly ascended to the political Olympus. The largest transformations in Russia are associated with his name: industrial modernization, monetary reform of 1895-1897, as well as the Portsmouth Peace and the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. S.Yu. Witte did a lot of useful things for the development of the domestic economy, reforming the political system, and in the field of foreign policy. A new type of statesman appears before posterity: he is not only an energetic and convinced reformer, but also a talented practitioner, all of whose merits corresponded to the needs of the era he was living through.
The head of the Ministry of Railways, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the first head of the Council of Ministers, a member of the State Council - these were the main official positions in which his activities took place. This famous dignitary had a noticeable, and in many cases decisive, influence on various areas of foreign, but especially internal policy of the empire, becoming a kind of symbol of the state system. The significance and scale of his historical role are comparable only with the personality of another outstanding administrator-transformer during the decline of the monarchy - Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin.
S. Yu. Witte was born on June 17, 1849 in Tiflis into a poor noble family. Having passed the exam for a gymnasium course as an external student, he entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Novorossiysk University. In 1869, he began serving in the office of the Odessa Governor-General, where he was responsible for accounting for railway traffic, and a year later he was appointed head of the traffic service of the state-owned Odessa Railway.
In 1879 he worked in St. Petersburg, as the head of the operation department on the board of the South-Western Railways. After the tragedy at Borki station, where members of the imperial family were injured in 1888, Witte, on the initiative of Alexander III, was appointed director of the department of railway affairs and chairman of the tariff committee, and in 1892 became manager of the Ministry of Railways.
At the end of the same year, Witte was appointed to the post of Minister of Finance, which he held for 11 years. Witte took an important step in strengthening the position of the Russian ruble in the world by making the transition to gold circulation in 1897.
He understood that the accumulation of funds in the state budget was not proceeding at a sufficient pace to develop industry and accelerate the pace of industrialization. That is why, in 1896, Witte came up with the idea of a state wine monopoly, which, however, was actually introduced only in the period 1906-1917.
In 1903, Witte, having taken the post of chairman of the Committee of Ministers, was actually removed from business due to court intrigues. The post of chairman of the committee of ministers before the 1905 revolution was more of an honorary exile than an opportunity for Witte to prove himself as a statesman.
Nicholas II, under the influence of right-wing court groups, sent Witte to Portsmouth to sign a peace treaty with Japan. Sending Witte is another way to undermine his reputation. It is worth noting that the complete failure of the military campaign of the Russian army during the war guaranteed Japanese diplomacy carte blanche to present territorial demands to Russia. In particular, Japan demanded that the entire island be transferred to it. Sakhalin. Witte managed to reduce the size of territorial losses by half. For this achievement, as well as for his long service to the state, Nicholas II granted Vita the title of count, and the court clique added the prefix “Semi-Sakhalin”.
With the beginning of the first Russian revolution in 1905, Witte had the opportunity to become chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire, but as soon as the authorities began to implement reactionary measures, Witte retired. Witte's last fall from grace lasted until his death.
In the history of Russia at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. S.Yu. Witte occupies an extremely important place. The head of the Ministry of Railways, the long-term Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the first head of the Council of Ministers, a member of the State Council - the official posts of this politician, who became a symbol of the possibility and at the same time of the helplessness of the state system.
In 1892, Witte took over as Minister of Finance. Witte's most important task was to encourage the development of domestic industry. He considered industry to be the locomotive of the national economy. In his activities he relied on the concept of Friedrich List - “ theory of national economy”, the essence of which was that “poor countries” need to achieve a balance of imports and exports with the help of customs protection.
Industrialization required significant capital investments from the budget, which was supposed to ensure the implementation of the developed policy. One of the directions of the reform he carried out was the introduction in 1894 of state wine monopoly, which became the main budget revenue item (365 million rubles per year). Were increased taxes, primarily indirect (they grew by 42.7% in the 90s). Was introduced, i.e. free exchange of rubles for gold.
The latter made it possible to attract foreign capital into the Russian economy, because foreign investors could now export gold rubles from Russia. customs tariff protected domestic industry from foreign competition, the government encouraged private enterprise. During the years of the economic crisis of 1900 - 1903. the government generously subsidized both government and private enterprises. Getting widespread concession system, issuing government orders to entrepreneurs for a long period at inflated prices. All this was a good stimulator for domestic industry.
However, the process of industrialization in Russia was contradictory. Capitalist methods of management (profit, cost, etc.) did not affect the public sector of the economy - the largest in the world. These were defense factories. And this created a certain imbalance in the capitalist development of the country.
In his reform activities, Witte had to experience resistance from the aristocracy and high officials, who had great influence on the reigning persons. Witte's most active opponent was the Minister of the Interior VC. Plehve. His course of social policy is opposition to reforms, advocacy conservative development principle, which invariably preserves the privileges of the nobility to power, and, consequently, the preservation of feudal remnants. This trend of confrontation between reforms and counter-reforms at the turn of the two centuries ended not in Witte’s favor.
Changes in the global economic situation at the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. led to a crisis in industries that developed intensively in the 90s. — metallurgy, mechanical engineering, oil and coal mining industries. The minister's opponents accused him of the decline in Russian production and called his policies adventurous and destructive for Russia. Dissatisfaction with Witte's policies led to his resignation in 1903.
He returned to the political arena in the fall 1905 as head of the Council of Ministers. In August 1905, he managed to conclude the Portsmouth Peace with Japan; for this diplomatic success, Nicholas II granted him the title of count. The Russian reformer again found himself in demand in the political life of the country.
Russian statesman and financial figure, Secretary of State (1896), Acting Privy Councilor (1899), Count (since September 25, 1905). Honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1893), Free Economic Society (1894), Russian Geographical Society (1895) and a huge number of other societies, Minister of Finance of the Russian Empire in 1892-1903. Sergei Yulievich Witte born June 17 (June 29, new style) 1849 in Tiflis.
Of the Orthodox faith, he belonged to a family of immigrants from Holland (sometimes it is indicated that he came from a Baltic-German family) who moved to the Baltic states in the 18th century. and received hereditary Russian nobility only in 1856. Grandfather (died in 1846) - a forest surveyor, served the rank of titular councilor. The family was included in the noble genealogy book of the Pskov province.
Father - Julius Fedorovich (Christopher Heinrich Georg Julius) Witte (1814-1868), head of the office of the Caucasian governor, head of the Department of Agriculture and Agriculture in the Caucasus. In connection with his marriage, he converted from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy. Mother - Ekaterina Andreevna Fadeeva (1819-1898), daughter of the former Saratov governor Andrei Mikhailovich Fadeev and Princess Elena Pavlovna Dolgorukaya. In addition to Sergei, they had sons Alexander (1846-1884), a participant in the Russian-Turkish war; Boris (1848-?), Chairman of the Odessa Court Chamber; as well as two daughters.
The first wife (since 1879) - Nadezhda Ivanovna Ivanenko, the daughter of the Chernigov leader of the nobility, had a daughter Sophia from her first marriage, was often ill and died in 1890. Nadezhda Ivanovna in her first marriage - Spiridonova; Witte achieved her divorce from her first husband.
The second wife (since 1892) is Matilda Ivanovna Nurok (according to other sources, Khotimskaya), in Lisanevich’s first marriage (1863-after 1924), a baptized Jew. She had a daughter, Vera, from her first marriage. Witte also obtained her divorce from her husband using money and threats; in connection with this, his wife was never accepted either at court or in high society, which extremely annoyed Witte throughout his life. Didn't have any children of his own. He officially gave his stepdaughters Sophia (in 1889) and Vera his surname and patronymic. Vera married diplomat K.V. in 1904. Naryshkina and had a son, Lev (his descendants live in France).
He had no family estates; he left several houses as an inheritance to his wife - in St. Petersburg (on Kamenny Island), Brussels, Biarritz, etc., as well as, apparently, large sums in banks in Berlin and London. He owned a dacha near Sochi.
Childhood and adolescence of S.Yu. Witte passed in the house of his uncle, General R.A. Fadeev, a famous military historian close to Slavophile circles. The “ultra-Russian spirit” reigned in the house, the cult of autocratic monarchism, which had a deep influence on the young man. Witte received his initial education at home: his grandmother taught him reading and writing, and tutors taught him French. At the Tiflis gymnasium, Witte did not study well, received a certificate with bad grades and a unit in behavior. I didn’t immediately enter Novorossiysk University.
After passing the final exams as an external student at the Chisinau Gymnasium (1866), with a new certificate, he entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Novorossiysk University in Odessa, from which he graduated with a Candidate of Mathematical Sciences (1870). At the university he was distinguished by his Slavophile and monarchist views. He was an excellent student and dreamed of a scientific and teaching career. They said that Witte did not receive a gold medal due to the fact that on the eve of his final exams he became interested in the actress Sokolova. He wrote a dissertation on the topic of infinitesimal quantities; The work was more a philosophical than a mathematical work, so it was considered a failure, which was a serious disappointment for Witte. In addition, difficult family circumstances that arose in connection with the death of my grandfather and father also had an impact. During their lifetime, they unsuccessfully invested money in coal mines, and the family found themselves almost destitute.
In this regard, on May 1, 1870, at the age of 21, Witte entered the public service in the directorate of the Odessa Railway as a stationmaster with a salary of 75 rubles. per month. To find out how the railway junction worked, he tried all the professions: he sold tickets, sounded the whistle when the train left the station.
In those years, the Ministry of Railways made a lot of efforts to attract university graduates to the service. Sergei Yulievich proved himself quite successfully in his chosen field, which was explained both by his connections and his own extraordinary abilities.
In 1871, he entered the office of the Novorossiysk and Bessarabian Governor-General as an official with the rank of collegiate secretary, where he dealt with issues of railway traffic service. In 1873 he was appointed assistant to the mayor. After the abolition of the General Government, in 1874 he became an official in excess of the staff in the Department of General Affairs of the Ministry of Railways. At the same time, he served in the management of the state-owned Odessa Railway, where he held the positions of cargo service clerk, assistant driver, traffic controller, and assistant head of road operation.
However, his public service was not so successful due to a conflict with the Ministry of Railways: in 1878 he resigned at the request, while still in the relatively low rank of titular councilor. After leaving the Ministry of Railways, Sergei Yulievich became an assistant to the traffic manager and the head of operation of the Odessa Railway, which by that time had become the property of a private company (a year later it merged with the joint stock company of South-Western Railways). In this position, he gained a reputation as a managerial administrator, which became especially noticeable during the Russian-Turkish War. Subsequently, he worked in private railway companies for about 20 years. This service contributed to the formation of Witte as a financier and administrator.
Since 1878 - head of the department for the operation of South-Western roads in St. Petersburg. At that time, he participated in the so-called “Baranovskaya” government commission (Adjutant General E.T. Baranov) to study the railway business in Russia, in the creation of the Charter of Russian Railways.
Since 1880, head of operation of the South-Western roads, since 1886 - their manager (Kyiv). At the same time, Witte became a major specialist in the development of railway tariffs (due to the attraction to scientific and theoretical understanding of practice). The head of the South-Western Roads Society was I.A. Vyshnegradsky, who in 1897 became Minister of Finance and patronized Sergei Yulievich.
His authority in the management of the railway business was extremely high; he proposed developing a special law that would put the tariff business under the control of the government, and also introduced a project to create a new department in the Ministry to manage the tariff part of the railways (of which he later became the head). Thus began Witte’s dizzying public career.
In 1881, after the assassination of the Tsar, Witte for some time headed the Kiev branch of the secret monarchist organization "Sacred Squad".
When new tariff institutions were formed under the Ministry of Finance, Witte became director of the Department of Railway Affairs and chairman of the tariff committee in March 1889. He was appointed to this position almost personally by Alexander III. The reason for the patronage was their chance meeting in 1888, when Sergei Yulievich, as the head of the South-Western Railways, demanded a reduction in the speed of the royal train. The emperor was unhappy, but complied. Two months later, on the way from Yalta to Moscow, the royal train derailed. The conversation with the “stubborn” Witte was remembered, and he was brought in as an expert to investigate this incident.
After his appointment as director, the emperor paid him an additional 8 thousand rubles in addition to his maintenance. per year from your own pocket, because The official salary of the director was 16 thousand, and in the private sector the manager received 50 thousand rubles. in year. At the same time, “in one fell swoop” he was promoted to full state councilor - a rank corresponding to his new rank.
In 1891, Witte introduced a new railway tariff based on the principles of competition. In his work, he used scientific and statistical data, introduced technical improvements that increased the speed of trains, which significantly increased the net income from their operation. The tariff played an exceptional role in Russia's foreign trade policy and became a protective barrier for the developing domestic industry.
Sergei Yulievich paid great attention to the development and equipment of the Odessa port, and actively contributed to the construction of the Great Siberian Railway. In the fall of 1890, he accompanied Vyshnegradsky on his trip to Central Asia, after which he proposed expanding cotton production there and creating a raw material base for the textile industry.
In February-August 1892 he was the manager of the Ministry of Railways; managed to temporarily eliminate the large accumulations of untransported cargo on the railway that had become commonplace. Continued the policy of I.A. Vyshnegradsky, aimed at concentrating railways in the hands of the state through the purchase of private railways and state-owned construction.
August 30, 1892 S.Yu. Witte was entrusted with the management of the Ministry of Finance (instead of I.A. Vyshnegradsky), and on January 1, 1893 he was confirmed as Minister of Finance.
Main activities as Minister of FinanceThe Russian financial system, despite all the efforts of his predecessors, was weakened by the time of Witte’s appointment, the trade deficit was growing, the State Bank was printing unsecured treasury notes to pay off the budget deficit, and inflation rates were high.
At first, Witte did not have any clear economic program. To some extent, he was guided by the ideas of the German economist of the first half of the 19th century. F. Liszt, as well as the legacy of his predecessors N.H. Bunge and I.A. Vyshnegradsky. A critical understanding of the ideological and theoretical postulates of the systemic model of economic development, which was based on the principle of patronage of domestic industry, and an analysis from this point of view of the practices of the post-reform decades served as the starting point for Witte’s development of his own concept of economic policy. His main task was the creation of an independent national industry, protected at first from foreign competition by a customs barrier, with a strong regulatory role of the state. At the same time, he tried to activate the private sector, introduce a new taxation system, and simplify the procedure for organizing and operating joint-stock enterprises.
The minister significantly expanded state intervention in the economy: in addition to taking certain customs and tariff measures in the field of foreign trade and legal support for business activities, some industries (mining, metallurgy, distillery, railway construction, etc.) were administratively supported. The state-owned economy also developed actively. Patronage was provided to certain groups of entrepreneurs (primarily those associated with the highest government circles), and conflicts between them were mitigated.
Witte paid special attention to personnel policy: he issued a circular on the recruitment of persons with higher education, and sought the right to recruit personnel taking into account the practical work experience of candidates for certain positions.
The main events in the economic sphere were: wine monopoly (1894); monetary reform (1895-1897), namely the introduction of gold circulation and the establishment of the free exchange of credit rubles for gold, which stabilized the ruble and led to an influx of foreign investment; active railway construction, including the Trans-Siberian Railway. Separately, it should be said that the minister managed to achieve (for bribes to the Chinese leadership) the conclusion of a profitable Russian-Chinese concession agreement on the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway through Manchuria (1896) and on many trade benefits for Russia, including the exploitation of coal deposits.
The policy of accelerating economic development that Witte pursued was inextricably linked with attracting foreign capital to industry, banks and government loans, which was facilitated by the protective tariff of 1891 and political rapprochement with France. In 1894 and 1904 Customs agreements were concluded with Germany.
Budget and taxes.Witte's merit was that almost the entire period of his management of the Ministry of Finance was characterized by an increase in the volume of the state budget. This happened mainly due to the expansion of the state economy in the railway business (the state bought over 14 thousand versts of private roads, the length of the railway network placed under government control increased from 29 to 54 thousand versts, or by 86%) and, as already mentioned, the introduction of government sales of strong drinks, the income from which for 1896-1902. increased more than 16 times (from 27,789 thousand to 462,808 thousand rubles).
Moreover, almost all taxes were increased, except for land taxes, and a reform of trade and industrial taxation was carried out (trade tax of 1898), which, without changing its gentle nature, slightly increased taxation salaries.
As a result, the budget deficit was replaced by the systematic accumulation of free cash (due to the excess of income over expenses), which was at the disposal of the Minister of Finance and reached 381 million rubles in 1904.
In the social sphere, Witte continued the policies of his predecessors, in particular, he tried to reform industrial legislation. The law of June 7, 1899 (establishing the General Office for Factory and Mining Affairs) and the general tactics of the Ministry of Finance were consistent with the interests of industrial development, but were in conflict with the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, which insisted on the prerogative of its department in resolving labor issues.
Also in the 1890s. Witte had a polemic with I.L. Goremykin, who presented the project for the reform of zemstvo self-government, prepared two notes on this issue. The minister's objections boiled down to the fact that the principle of self-government does not correspond to an autocratic system; he proposed replacing the zemstvo system with a well-organized bureaucratic apparatus, trying to extend the general principles of his economic policy to the management of local economies.
However, already at the beginning of the 20th century. he began to advocate the widespread involvement of zemstvos in practical activities, but due to the opposition of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve, as well as A.S. Stishinsky and Prince A.G. Shcherbatov achieved only the abolition of mutual responsibility in the community (1903) and the easing of the passport regime for peasants. Later, when discussing projects for the introduction of popular representation (February 1905), he initially acted as a strong opponent of it, and then proposed the appointment of representatives instead of their election.
On January 22, 1902, on the initiative and under the chairmanship of Witte, a Special Meeting on the needs of the agricultural industry (1902-1905) was created. Local committees of the meeting (82 provincial and regional, and 536 district and district) spoke in favor of the voluntary transition of peasants from communal land ownership to household ownership. In the submitted note, Sergei Yulievich advocated the elimination of peasant class isolation in the field of law, management and land use, spoke out for free exit from the community, for restrictions on the disposal of allotment lands. His suggestions were subsequently used by P.A. Stolypin, who himself was a participant in the meeting. Nicholas II did not dare to carry out reforms, and the Special Meeting on March 30, 1905 was closed.
However, in general, the minister’s program did not include encouraging the development of agriculture, he did not see any prospects for its entry into the foreign market, and did not have established views even on issues of land management, which in Russian conditions was a mistake that made itself felt during the industrial crisis of 1899 -1902 and the outbreak of peasant unrest. Witte's financial policy was not without its shortcomings, which included an increase in the tax burden, an increase in foreign debt, and insufficient stimulation of domestic business. Even the introduction of a wine monopoly seems controversial, because it stimulated the state's direct interest in alcohol consumption by the population. Increasing the public sector through the purchase of railways also cannot be interpreted in an unambiguously positive manner.
The minister paid great attention to the development of education. At his request, the management of commercial educational institutions in 1893 was entrusted to the Ministry of Finance (as a result, 147 new educational institutions were opened in 1896-1902).
Witte played a significant role in Russian foreign policy of this period, and, above all, in the Far East, despite the fact that he was in charge of another Ministry. He and the then foreign ministers, Prince A.B. Lobanov-Rostovsky, M.N. Muravyov agreed in understanding the need to achieve success in the Far East to ensure a stable position in Europe and the Middle East. It was Witte, who concentrated in his hands all the springs of Far Eastern policy, who recommended to Nicholas II in 1900 that he appoint his like-minded person, Count V.N., as head of the foreign policy department. Lamsdorf. The latter believed that by 1902 the war with Russia had become a direct goal for Japan, but expected to reach an agreement with it on the condition of the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria without concessions from China fixed in the treaty. For his part, Witte agreed with him on the desirability of withdrawing troops and preventing war with Japan, but conditioned the evacuation on China's obligation not to grant concessions to foreigners in Manchuria without first offering them to the Russian-Chinese Bank.
At the same time, Minister of War Kuropatkin insisted on maintaining a long-term occupation, and then on annexing the north of the province to Russia. The decisive way of thinking of the minister - to demand from China the concession of not only ports, but also part of the Liaodong Peninsula (later this part made up the Kwantung Region) greatly impressed Nicholas II.
Witte supported V.N. Lamzdorf, but due to the activity of members of the A.M. Bezobrazov, who fueled the imperial ambitions of the emperor, failed, ending with his resignation from the post of Minister of Finance in August 1903 with the appointment of chairman of the Committee of Ministers and member of the State Council. He was also appointed a member of the Finance Committee and retained his post as a member of the Siberian Railway Committee. (The Bezobrazov Clique consisted mainly of large landowners who wanted to create a joint-stock company to exploit the natural resources of Korea and Manchuria.)
After his resignation from the post of minister, Witte continuously maneuvered, trying to please both the authorities and society, in 1904 he unsuccessfully tried to take the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, which had become vacant after the murder of V.K. Plehve.
In an unfavorable international situation during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Witte was appointed First Commissioner for Peace Negotiations with Japan and sailed for the United States on July 14, 1905. His mission was almost impossible: the Japanese were victors, they demanded money and territories, and Nicholas II ordered not to give up an inch of land, and paying indemnity was humiliating for Russia. Realizing the impossibility of the task, the remaining officials abandoned this mission. But for Witte this was a chance to return to politics - and he took the risk. He considered it possible to moderate Japanese claims by agreeing on the mutual protection of new positions in the Far East. Sergei Yulievich also set himself a super task - to use his trip abroad to prepare a new large foreign loan.
The negotiations took place with enormous difficulty. The Japanese demanded all of Sakhalin and indemnities. Witte agreed to cede half of Sakhalin, but at the same time Japan had to formally refuse the indemnity. More than once it seemed that the discussion had reached a dead end, and diplomats packed their bags. Nicholas II did not give specific instructions.
As a result, the nerves of the Japanese gave way. In the end, they accepted Russia's terms. The hopelessly lost war ended in an “almost decent” peace. In general, the agreement of August 23, 1905 was more beneficial to Russia than might have been expected. For the Peace of Portsmouth, Witte was awarded the title of count, as well as the Order of Alexander Nevsky; Treasury funds bought him a villa in Biarritz. Behind his back, for the cession of the southern part of Sakhalin, he was called Count of Polosakhalinsky, i.e. "half-convict."
During the October All-Russian political strike of 1905, Witte insisted on a program of concessions to the bourgeoisie, which found expression in the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, which was drawn up under his leadership. At the beginning of October 1905 he advocated the creation of a strong government. Simultaneously with the publication of the Manifesto, he achieved the publication of his report with the reform program. Nicholas II did not like Sergei Yulievich; those around him suspected him of excessive ambition, but at such a moment a strong personality was needed, and Witte was returned to power. From October 24, 1905, he was chairman of the reformed Council of Ministers.
As prime minister, he was involved in pacifying the revolution and at the same time introducing civil liberties.
Carrying out a policy of maneuvering, Witte sent punitive expeditions to Siberia, the Baltic states, Poland, sent troops from St. Petersburg to suppress the Moscow armed uprising (December 1905), but at the same time negotiated cooperation with liberals (D.N. Shipov, A. I. Guchkov). When discussing the Basic Laws (1906), he insisted on limiting the rights of the State Duma and the State Council. From mid-February 1906 he was a supporter of unlimited autocracy.
At the beginning of 1906, he obtained a loan of 2.25 billion francs from French bankers, which strengthened the government’s position in the fight against the revolution. However, Witte turned out to be too “left” for the bulk of the nobility and the top of the ruling bureaucracy and too “right” for the bourgeois-liberal circles of the Octobrist-Cadet persuasion. He resigned on April 22, 1906, was dismissed from the posts of Chairman of the Council and the Committee of Ministers and was subsequently listed only in the State Council (in connection with the death of Stolypin in September 1911 - Chairman of the Finance Committee of the State Council).
After his resignation, attempts were allegedly made on his life, but they could not prove it.
Since 1906, Witte ceased to actively influence politics and stayed outside the parties. Considering it necessary to introduce public figures into the government, he criticized Stolypin and other ministers and switched to journalistic activities. During the winter of 1906-1907. under his leadership, the manuscript “The Emergence of the Russian-Japanese War” was prepared.2 At the end of 1913, he took part in the criticism of V.N., organized by right-wing circles. Kokovtsov, accusing him of abusing the wine monopoly.
Sergei Yulievich spent his last years in St. Petersburg and abroad. While remaining a member of the State Council, he took part in the work of the Finance Committee, of which he was chairman until his death. In 1907-1912. Witte wrote subjective “Memoirs”, which are of significant interest for characterizing the policies of the tsarist government and his own personality. The memoirs are extremely biased and derogatory towards almost all political figures of that time (with the exception of Alexander III), and therefore the authorities tried to seize these memoirs.
Under Soviet rule, Witte became a very popular figure due to his harsh criticism of everyone and everything, as well as the myth of his liberalism and progressiveness. In fact, he demonstrated greater loyalty to the autocracy than many right-wing politicians.
In general, he had a difficult character, was extremely proud and vindictive, did not suffer from modesty and loved veneration. In particular, in his memoirs he boasted that he had nominated many finance ministers, for example, Bunge (although he himself was then a very young man), as well as Kokovtsov, Shilov, Pleske, Bark.
Sergei Yulievich Witte died on February 28 (March 13, new style) 1915 in Petrograd and was buried in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra. On the tombstone, at his request, is carved in gold: “October 17.”
Currency reform 1895-1897
The Witte reform capped a ten-year period during which the Ministry of Finance was looking for ways to stabilize monetary circulation.
In the 1870s - 1880s. Russian finance ministers repeatedly tried to reform the monetary system, thanks to which by 1892 the principles of future transformation were formulated in the financial department: devaluation of the ruble; establishment of gold monometallism; simultaneous circulation of metal and paper money; guaranteed exchange of credit notes for gold; limiting the issue of paper money to limits not exceeding the needs of monetary circulation; granting the right to the Treasury to accept specie in payment of taxes at the existing rate; allowing individuals to use metallic currency in their relations with each other.
These principles were implemented by S.Yu. Witte during the monetary reform of 1895-1897.
In general, the reform was as follows:
- Transition to the gold standard (monometallism).
- Devaluation of the ruble by 1/3.
- Strict limits on unsecured emissions.
February 8, 1895 - Witte presented a report to Nicholas II “On the need to introduce gold circulation.”
May 24, 1895 - all offices and branches of the State Bank were given the right to accept gold coins, including 8 offices and 25 branches given the right to make payments in gold coins.
December 1, 1895 - a fixed exchange rate for the credit ruble was established: 7 rubles. 40 kopecks for a gold semi-imperial (with a face value of 5 rubles). Since 1896, the rate has been adjusted downward to the credit ruble: 7 rubles. 50 kopecks credit for 5 rubles. gold.
1897 - due to the growth of tax revenues, gold mining, net purchases of gold, and receipt of external loans, the State Bank increased gold reserves to 1095 million rubles. (from pre-reform 300 million), which is almost equal to the cost of circulating credit notes (1121 million rubles).
January 3, 1897 - the Law “On the Minting and Release of Gold Coins” was adopted, according to which:
- Gold imperials (the old denomination of 10 rubles) and semi-imperials (5 rubles) remained in circulation. A new denomination was minted on them (15 and 7.50 rubles, respectively), i.e. the ruble was devalued (by a third, if counted to the current one, and by 50%, if counted to the base);
- the operations of the State Bank for the purchase and sale of gold have lost their temporary nature;
- The gold ruble containing 0.774235 g of gold (equal to 17.424 shares) was established as a monetary unit. 10 ruble coins and 5 rub. became full-fledged gold money, i.e. The 5-ruble coin contained 5x17.424 = 87.12 shares of gold, and the 10-ruble coin contained 1 spool 78.24 shares of gold (1 spool = 96 shares);
- gold coins became legal tender without any limit on the amount;
- freedom of coinage was introduced (any bearer of 1 spool of 78.24 shares of gold received a 10-ruble coin from the state, transferring gold to the state for re-minting) - to ensure that a 10-ruble coin could not cost more than the metal contained in it;
- tolerance in weight (2/1000 of a part above or below the legal weight in a 10-ruble coin) and tolerance in fineness (1/1000 of a part above or below the legal standard) were confirmed; a maximum weight was established at which the coin was recognized as full-weight (to guarantee the content of pure metal);
- gold monometallism was introduced: full-fledged gold money and inferior silver and copper ones. This means that the content of silver and copper in the corresponding coins (say, in ruble coins) was less than what could be bought on the market for one ruble;
- The Treasury was declared the issuer of gold (full-value), silver and copper coins (change, i.e. with restrictions on acceptance by amounts and types of cash registers; only government cash registers were obliged to accept silver coins without restrictions). Coin income, which was formed due to the inferiority of silver and copper money, was included in the list of state budget revenues. At the same time, there were strict restrictions on the issue of inferior coins: the number of silver coins issued should not exceed the established standard (3 rubles per person), and the Minister of Finance sought permission to issue copper coins.
August 29, 1897 - followed by the Decree on the issuing operations of the State Bank, in accordance with which:
- The State Bank received the right to issue banknotes, and the following security in gold was required: 50%, if the issue amount did not exceed 600 million rubles. and 100% - if this amount is exceeded;
- the exchange of credit notes for gold was to be carried out without restrictions.
March 27, 1898 - a decree was issued according to which silver and copper money were retained as small change.
Since 1899 - minting of 15 ruble coins. and 7 rub. 50 kopecks discontinued (since 1910 they began to be withdrawn from circulation).
July 7, 1899 - the Coin Charter was adopted, combining all the legal provisions of the monetary reform, as a result of which the structure of monetary circulation completely changed.
As a result, if in 1895 banknotes accounted for 91.7% of the total money supply, then by January 1914, in the total money supply, gold coins accounted for 21.2%, silver coins - 5.4%, banknotes - 73, 4%. The reform led to the strengthening of the external and internal exchange rates of the ruble.
With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the exchange of banknotes for gold was stopped. * * *
The streamlining of monetary circulation, the return of trust in money, the virtual elimination of inflation, and a major devaluation had a significant positive impact on the Russian economy and contributed to the acceleration of production growth. Witte's merit in this is obvious - it was he who convinced Alexander III to decide on reform.
On the other hand, no special financial “revolutions” happened; no new word was said in the organization of monetary circulation. Witte did what should have been done long ago. In principle, he followed the trend that existed in many countries where there was a transition to gold monometallism with the free exchange of paper money for full-fledged gold coins while limiting fiduciary emission. It is known that the reform was prepared by Reitern, Bunge and Vyshnegradsky.
“I carried out the monetary reform in such a way that the population of Russia did not notice it at all, as if nothing had happened... And not a single complaint! Not a single misunderstanding on the part of the people,” Witte wrote in his memoirs. This indicates that the reform is well organized and that there are no mistakes in resolving technical issues. On the other hand, we should not forget that the reform was carried out in peacetime, in the name of one of the most powerful monarchs in the history of Russia; then there were no problems of economic devastation, lack of a market, or deficits.
Summary: Strong personality, railway specialist, talented administrator and financier, one of the successful and remarkable ministers of finance. Although not all of his actions were correct, the country owed him the flourishing of industry, the convertible ruble, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Portsmouth Peace, and the Constitution of October 17.
Application
Controversial minister.In Russia, Witte was not liked for his very bad character. He basically did not notice people and dealt only with those he needed. They were afraid of him, entrusted him with important tasks, generously rewarded him, and at the same time they could not tolerate him. Nicholas II generally considered the overly intelligent minister to be the evil genius of his reign. Insatiable ambitions led Witte, when he was in retirement, to attempts to “flirt” with the dubious G. Rasputin. For the sake of power, he was ready for any alliances and did not have firm convictions on many fundamental issues.
In both successes and failures, undoubtedly, the personal qualities of this outstanding figure played a large role: on the one hand, irrepressible energy, determination and efficiency, and on the other, special caution in actions, sometimes bordering on cunning and the desire to please everyone and no one.
He did not hesitate to use bribes and dubious patronage to businessmen in his activities. He placed personal interests very highly and suffered from painful conceit and pride.
* * *An aphorism from Witte: “The feeling of “I” - the feeling of egoism in a good and bad sense - is one of the most powerful feelings in a person.”
* * *Witte was always an intriguer and maintained close ties with the famous “gray cardinal” Prince Meshchersky. According to some reports, it was the prince who contributed to his rapid career.
Tall, well-built, with an intelligent face, Witte gave the impression of a man with a complete absence of bureaucratic servility. The St. Petersburg aristocracy giggled at his southern accent and plebeian French, but the man’s freedom of behavior appealed to Alexander III, who loved simplicity.
Witte was characterized by boundless pragmatism, which was almost tantamount to politicking.
* * *As director of the department and then minister, Witte showed remarkable administrative abilities and organizational talent. Taking advantage of the position of the tsar's nominee, he pursued a personnel policy unusual for the state apparatus of that time: he recruited people, giving priority not to origin, rank and length of service, but, above all, to professional training, knowledge and efficiency. His behavior and attitude towards his subordinates were unusual, fell outside the usual stereotypes, and seemed to many to be overly democratic. As his employees later recalled, he allowed people to disagree with themselves, argue, and valued independence and initiative. Sergei Yulievich himself was extremely proud of the fact that many government figures emerged from the circle of his collaborators, such as finance ministers Pleske, Shipov, Kokovtsov, Bark...
Witte and bureaucracy.Despite the fact that Witte’s “complete absence of any bureaucratic type” made a great impression on his contemporaries, he, having reached the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, easily accepted the methods of achieving goals that were widely practiced in the highest bureaucratic and court environment of that time: flattery, the ability to conduct behind-the-scenes intrigue, the use of far from gentlemanly techniques in the fight against the enemy (bribery, rumors, gossip, etc.). He also did not like to admit his mistakes and often blamed his subordinates...
Comrade Minister Kovalevsky about Witte.“At first, I was struck, first of all, by Witte’s appearance: tall stature, heavy gait, sloping stance, clumsiness, hoarse voice; incorrect pronunciation with southern Russian features: intercessors A property, versatility, educational, platform, rural owners A- they cut the refined St. Petersburg ear. I didn’t like the familiarity or harshness in the address. However, little by little, these extravagant features were partly erased, and partly people got used to them.
And so, more and more, state power, originality of creativity and combat readiness to defend what he considered necessary and useful for Russia emerged in the person of Witte. Before everyone's eyes, a powerful nature appeared with fabulous speed, which gradually took possession of everything and subjugated everyone, willingly or unwillingly. Witte’s intelligence and will impressed him; the harshness and sometimes even rudeness of his speeches disarmed his opponents, who were rarely ideological, but mostly settled personal scores with him.”
Witte and family life.In his youth, Witte “knew all the more or less prominent actresses who lived in Odessa.” In his mature years, he fell in love mainly with married women. A new love caught him in the theater: he noticed a lady with expressive gray-green eyes and met her. Matilda Ivanovna Lisanevich turned out to be a married woman with a little daughter Vera (Witte adopted her).
In his memoirs, he wrote: “I persuaded Mrs. Lisanevich to separate from her husband and marry me.” The marriage of an official of his rank to a divorced woman was a scandal. In addition, Lisanevich (nee Nurok) was a baptized Jew, which could have put an end to her career. According to some reports, Witte paid Mr. Lisanevich 20 thousand rubles. compensation The marriage was blessed by Alexander III: “For me, marry even a goat. As long as things work out. Let Pobedonostsev help with the divorce.”
Always busy, Witte devoted his rare free hours to his family. Matilda Ivanovna sang gypsy romances, he himself played the flute, and his adopted daughter Vera accompanied him on the piano. Sergei Yulievich was confident in his musical talents, he tried to sing arias, but it turned out, as contemporaries noted, “squeaky and unpleasant.”
Nose S.Yu. Witte.Few people know that Witte wore an artificial nose. Testified by K.A. Kofod: “Witte, however, did not keep himself waiting. He received me casually - without a nose. He lost it at the dawn of his youth. Let me clarify: not the nose necessary in financial policy, but a bodily nose, which he made up for with a beautifully made artificial one. This last one , must have bothered him a lot, because if he didn’t think it was necessary to be dressed in state dress, he didn’t even put his nose on.During Witte’s visit to Copenhagen, one of the capital’s newspapers described his nose as a strange figure that ended unexpectedly flat. “Yeah,” I thought when I read this, “he doesn’t have much respect for the opinion of Copenhagen residents about his appearance.” (50 years in Russia. - M., 1999. P. 181).
Witte and cheesecakes.“Once at breakfast, having drunk, as always, the usual half-bottle of champagne, Witte laughed out of grief and began to assure that although neither the gold currency, nor Portsmouth, nor the constitution had given him fame and would not give him immortality, he had after all, there is one more, last chance. There is only one lasting fame on earth - the only one - culinary: you have to associate your name with some dish. There is beef Stroganov, Skobelev's meat balls... "Guriev was probably a worse minister of finance than me , and his name will be famous forever! Why? Thanks to Guryev's porridge. “So we need to, they say, invent some kind of “Wittev pies”, then this, and only this, will remain.”
On this day he was counting - in the form of immortality - on his tiny hot cheesecakes with icy grainy caviar - to go with vodka. This was, of course, just a joke." (Tkhorzhevsky I.I. The Last Petersburg. - M, 1999).
Based on materials Fedorov B.G. "All ministers of finance of Russia and the USSR 1802-2004"
– M.: Russian Economic Society, 2004. – p. 135-151