In Soviet times, it was believed that the Russian Imperial Army entered the First World War completely unprepared, was "backward" and this resulted in heavy losses, a shortage of weapons and ammunition. But this is not completely correct judgment, although the tsarist army had enough shortcomings, as well as in other armies.

The Russo-Japanese War was lost not for military reasons, but for political reasons. After it, colossal work was carried out to restore the fleet, reorganize forces, and eliminate shortcomings. As a result, by the First World War, in terms of its preparation, the level of technical equipment, the Russian army was second only to the German one. But one must take into account the fact that the German Empire was purposefully preparing for a military solution to the question of the redistribution of spheres of influence, colonies, domination in Europe and the world. The Russian imperial army was the largest in the world. Russia after mobilization fielded 5.3 million people.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of the Russian Empire was divided into 12 military districts plus the Don Cossack area. At the head of each was the commander of the troops. Men aged 21 to 43 were liable for military service. In 1906, the service life was reduced to 3 years, this made it possible to have an army of 1.5 million in peacetime, moreover, two-thirds consisted of soldiers of the second and third years of service and a significant number of reservists. After three years in active service in the ground forces, a person for 7 years was in the reserve of the 1st category, for 8 years - the 2nd category. Those who did not serve, but were fit for military service in health, because not all conscripts were taken into the army (there was an oversupply, just over half of the conscripts were taken), they were enrolled in the militia. Those enrolled in the militia were divided into two categories. The first category - in the event of war, they were supposed to replenish the army in the field. The second category - those who were removed from the combat service for health reasons were enrolled there, they planned to form battalions ("squads") of the militia from him in the war. In addition, it was possible to get into the army at will, as a volunteer.

It should be noted that many peoples of the empire were exempted from military service: Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia (they paid a special tax), Finns, small peoples of the North. True, there were small "foreign troops". These were irregular equestrian units, in which representatives of the Islamic peoples of the Caucasus could enroll on a voluntary basis.

The service was carried out by the Cossacks. They were a special military class, there were 10 main Cossack troops: Donskoye, Kubanskoye, Terskoye, Orenburg, Ural, Siberian, Semirechenskoye, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuriysk, as well as Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk Cossacks. Cossack troops put up "servicemen" and "volunteers". "Servicemen" were divided into 3 categories: preparatory (20 - 21 years old); combatant (21 - 33 years old), combatant Cossacks carried out direct service; spare (33 - 38 years old), they were deployed in case of war to replace losses. The main combat units of the Cossacks were regiments, hundreds and divisions (artillery). During the First World War, the Cossacks deployed 160 regiments and 176 separate hundreds, together with the Cossack infantry and artillery more than 200 thousand people.

Cossack Life Guards Cossack Regiment.

The main organizational unit of the Russian army was the corps, it consisted of 3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. Each infantry division during the war was reinforced with a mounted Cossack regiment. In the cavalry division there were 4 thousand sabers and 4 regiments (dragoon, hussar, uhlan, Cossack) 6 squadrons each, as well as a machine-gun command and an artillery division of 12 guns.

The infantry was armed with a 7.62-mm magazine rifle (Mosin rifle, three-line) since 1891. This rifle has been produced since 1892 at the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories, due to a lack of production capacity, it was ordered abroad - in France, the USA. In 1910, a modified rifle was adopted. After the adoption in 1908 of the "light" ("offensive") sharp-nosed bullet was followed by the modernization of the rifle, so a new curved aiming bar of the Konovalov system was introduced, which compensated for the change in the trajectory of the bullet. By the time the empire entered the First World War, Mosin rifles were produced in dragoon, infantry and Cossack varieties. In addition, in May 1895, by decree of the emperor, the Nagant revolver under the 7.62-mm cartridge was adopted by the Russian army. By July 20, 1914, according to the report card, there were 424 434 units of the Nagant revolver of all modifications in the Russian troops (according to the state, 436 210 were supposed), that is, the army was almost completely provided with revolvers.

Also, the army was armed with a 7.62-mm machine gun "Maxim". Initially, the fleet purchased it, so in 1897-1904 about 300 machine guns were purchased. Machine guns were classified as artillery, they were placed on a heavy carriage with large wheels and a large armor shield (the weight of the entire structure was up to 250 kg). They were going to be used for the defense of fortresses and pre-equipped, defended positions. In 1904, their production began at the Tula Arms Plant. The Russo-Japanese War showed their high efficiency on the battlefield, machine guns in the troops began to be removed from heavy carriages, in order to increase maneuverability, they were put on machines that were lighter and more convenient to transport. It should be noted that machine-gun crews often threw out heavy armor shields, having established in practice that in defense, camouflaging a position is more important than a shield, and when attacking, mobility comes first. As a result of all the upgrades, the weight was reduced to 60 kg.

Maxim machine gun on a serf ("artillery") carriage. 1915.

It was no worse than foreign counterparts; in terms of saturation with machine guns, the Russian army was not inferior to the French and German armies. The Russian infantry regiment of the 4-battalion (16-company) composition was in service according to the state of May 6, 1910, a machine-gun team with 8 Maxim heavy machine guns. The Germans and the French had six machine guns per 12-company regiment. Russia met the war with good artillery of small and medium calibers, for example, the 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 (the basis of the field artillery of the Russian Empire) surpassed in its combat qualities the 75-mm rapid-fire French and 77-mm German guns and was highly appreciated by the Russian artillerymen. The Russian infantry division had 48 guns, the Germans - 72, the French - 36. But Russia lagged behind the Germans in heavy field artillery (like the French, British, Austrians). In Russia, they did not appreciate the importance of mortars, although there was experience of using them in the Russian-Japanese war.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an active development of military technology. In 1902, automobile troops appeared in the Russian armed forces. By the First World War, the army had more than 3 thousand cars (for example, the Germans had only 83). The Germans underestimated the role of vehicles, they believed that it was only necessary for the advanced, reconnaissance detachments. In 1911 the Imperial Air Force was established. By the beginning of the war Russia had the most airplanes - 263, Germany - 232, France - 156, England - 90, Austria-Hungary - 65. Russia was the world leader in the construction and use of seaplanes (Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich's planes). In 1913, the aviation department of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in St. Petersburg under the leadership of I.I. Sikorsky built a four-engine aircraft "Ilya Muromets" - the world's first passenger aircraft. After the outbreak of the war, from 4 aircraft "Ilya Muromets" created the world's first bomber formation.

Beginning in 1914, armored vehicles were actively introduced into the Russian army, and in 1915 the first samples of tanks began to be tested. The first field radio stations created by Popov and Troitsky appeared in the armed forces back in 1900. They were used in the Russo-Japanese War; by 1914, spark companies were created in all corps, telephone and telegraph communications were used.

Military science developed, the works of a number of military theorists were published: N.P. Mikhnevich - "Strategy", A.G. Elchaninov - "Conducting Modern Combat", V.A. Cheremisov - "Fundamentals of modern military art", AA Neznamov - "Modern War". In 1912, the "Field Service Charter", "Manual for Field Artillery Operations in Battle" were published, in 1914 - "Manual for Infantry Operations in Combat", "Manual for Firing a Rifle, Carbine and Revolver." Offensive was considered the main type of hostilities, but much attention was paid to defense. In the attack of the infantry, intervals of up to 5 steps were used (more rare battle formations than in other European armies). Crawling, running in dashes, moving by squads and individual soldiers from position to position under the cover of fire from their comrades is allowed. Soldiers were required to dig in, not only in defense, but also during offensive operations. The meeting was studied, actions at night, the Russian artillerymen showed a good level of training. The cavalrymen were taught to act not only on horseback, but also on foot. The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was at a high level. The highest level of knowledge was given by the Academy of the General Staff.

Of course, there were also drawbacks, so the issue of automatic weapons for the infantry was not resolved, although promising developments existed (Fedorov, Tokarev and others worked on them). Mortars were not introduced. The preparation of the reserve was very poor, only the Cossacks held training and exercises. Those who dropped out and did not get into combat service had no training at all. The situation with the officer reserve was bad. These were people who received higher education, they received the rank of ensign with a diploma, but they had no idea about active service. The reserve also included officers who had retired due to health, age, and misconduct.

In Russia, they underestimated the capabilities of heavy artillery, succumbed to the influence of French theories and German disinformation (the Germans actively scolded large-caliber guns in the pre-war period). They realized it late, before the war they adopted a new program, according to which they planned to seriously strengthen the artillery: 156 guns were supposed to fall on the corps, of which 24 were heavy. Russia's vulnerability was its focus on foreign manufacturers. War Minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1909-1915) was not distinguished by high abilities. He was a smart administrator, but he did not differ in excessive zeal, he tried to minimize efforts - instead of developing the domestic industry, he found an easier way. I chose, ordered, received a “thank you” from the manufacturer, accepted the product.

Russian strategic plan on the eve of World War I

The German Schlieffen plan was well known in Russia in general terms. The Germans planted a fake on the Russian intelligence, but the General Staff determined that it was a fake, and "by contradiction" recreated the enemy's true designs.

The Russian war plan envisaged two war scenarios. Plan "A" - the Germans strike the first blow at France, and plan "D", if not only Austria-Hungary will fight against the Russian Empire, but the Germans will strike the first and main blow against us. In this scenario, most of the Russian forces were supposed to oppose Germany.

According to the first scenario, which was implemented, 52% of all forces (4 armies) were concentrated against Austria-Hungary. By counter strikes from Poland and Ukraine, they were supposed to destroy the enemy grouping in Galicia (in the Lvov-Przemysl region) and then prepare an offensive in the direction of Vienna and Budapest. The successes against Austria-Hungary were supposed to keep the Kingdom of Poland from a possible uprising. 33% of all forces (2 armies) were to act against the German Empire. They were to deliver converging blows from Lithuania (from the east) and from Poland (from the south), defeat the Germans in East Prussia and threaten the central regions of Germany. Actions against Germany were supposed to draw off part of the forces of the German army that were operating against France. Another 15% of the forces were allocated to two separate armies. The 6th Army was supposed to defend the Baltic coast and Petersburg, and the 7th Army was supposed to defend the border with Romania and the Black Sea coast.

After mobilization against Germany, it was supposed to be exposed: 9 corps (2 armies), they had 19 infantry divisions, 11 second-order infantry divisions, 9 and a half cavalry divisions. Against Austria-Hungary: 17 corps, they had 33.5 infantry divisions, 13 second-order infantry divisions, 18 and a half cavalry divisions. Two separate armies consisted of 2 corps with 5 infantry divisions, 7 second-order infantry divisions, and 3 cavalry divisions. Another 9 army corps remained in the reserve of the Headquarters, in Siberia and Turkestan.

It should be noted that Russia was the first country to create such operational formations as the front - the Northwestern and Southwestern fronts. In other countries, all armies were confined to a single governing body - Headquarters.

Considering the fact that the mobilization terms of the Russian army were late in comparison with the German and Austro-Hungarian ones, in Russia they decided to remove the line of deployment of armies from the German and Austro-Hungarian borders. So that the German and Austro-Hungarian armies could not conduct a coordinated offensive against Bialystok or Brest-Litovsk and generally along the eastern bank of the Vistula in order to cut off the Russian armies from the center of the empire. Against German forces, Russian troops were concentrated on the Shavli, Kovno, Neman, Bobr, Narev and Western Bug rivers. This line was removed from Germany by almost five crossings and was a strong defensive line in its natural properties. Against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the troops were to be concentrated on the Ivangorod, Lublin, Holm, Dubno, Proskurov line. The Austro-Hungarian army was considered not so strong and dangerous.

The connecting factor was the fact that Russia assumed the obligation to oppose Germany simultaneously with France. The French pledged to deploy 1.3 million people by the 10th day of mobilization and immediately begin military operations. The Russian side pledged to deploy 800 thousand people by this date (one must take into account the fact that the Russian army was scattered over the vast territory of the country, as well as mobilization reserves) and on the 15th day of mobilization to begin an offensive against Germany. In 1912, it was agreed that if the Germans concentrate in East Prussia, then the Russian troops would advance from Narew to Allenstein. And in the event that German forces deployed in the Thorn area, Poznan, the Russians would strike directly at Berlin.

The emperor was supposed to become the supreme commander in chief, and the chief of staff, head of the Academy of the General Staff Nikolai Nikolayevich Yanushkevich, became the actual leadership. The post of quartermaster general, who was responsible for all operational work, was given to Yuri Nikiforovich Danilov. As a result, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was appointed the supreme commander in chief. The headquarters was established in Baranovichi.

The main weak points of the plan:

The need to launch an offensive before the completion of mobilization and concentration of forces. On the 15th day of mobilization, Russia could concentrate only about a third of its forces, this led to the fact that the Russian imperial army had to conduct an offensive in a state of partial readiness.

The need to conduct offensive operations against two strong opponents, it was impossible to concentrate the main forces against one of them.

After the end of the unsuccessful war for Russia with Japan, a set of measures was taken that were carried out from 1905-1912. and touched upon various aspects of the Russian armed forces. In particular, with the introduction of the territorial recruitment system, the centralization of military command was strengthened; the terms of service in the army and the navy were reduced, the officer corps was rejuvenated; new programs for military schools, new regulations and models of artillery pieces were adopted; heavy field artillery has been created, engineering troops have been reinforced and material support has been improved; reconstruction of fleets in the Pacific Ocean and in the Baltic, which suffered heavy losses in ships.

In 1912, under the leadership of General M.A. Belyaev in Russia, a "Large Program to Strengthen the Army" was developed. In March - October 1913, the provisions of the program were approved by NikolaiII, however, it was approved only on June 24, 1914, when before the startPworld War I was just over a month away.

“Two more years of peace, and Russia, with its 180 million souls, had such a powerful army in terms of quantity, education and supply that it would be able, in its own interests, to give direction to the solution of all political issues of the European continent.”

V. A. Sukhomlinov - Minister of War of Russia in 1909-1915.

On the eve of the war, Russia came with a peacetime army of 1 million 423 thousand people. After mobilization, it numbered about 6 million people. In total, during the years of the First World War, almost 16 million people were mobilized into the Russian army. All of the above figures exceeded those of any of the belligerent countries during the war years.

General Alexei Aleksevich Brusilov

In the historical and journalistic literature, one can find two polar points of view on the command staff of the Russian army during the First World War. The first represented the officers and generals as people endowed with outstanding qualities. According to the second point of view, the commanders of the first half of the 1910s. quite often they were mediocrity, if not mediocrity. Of course, in its entirety, the Russian command staff was neither the one nor the other. They were professional military men, graduates of specialized military institutions, for whom military science became a profession (it is difficult to blame L.G. Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I.Denikin, A.V. Samsonov, A.A. Brusilov for unprofessionalism. and etc.). It was they who would later form the backbone of the command staff during the civil war for both the "whites" and the "reds".

Huge losses among the personnel of the Russian army already in the first year of the war led to the fact that after mobilization in the army there was an increase in the proportion of the peasant population, half of which were illiterate. This did not prevent the Russian soldier from being brave and resilient on the battlefields, but at the same time the German soldier had to resist, who at that time was the product of one of the most technically trained nations in the world. And here such categories as endurance, patience, obedience, inherent in the communal psychology of the Russian warrior, turned out to be insufficient in the beginning war of technologies.

The main tactical unit of the Russian army was an infantry division, numbering 14.5 thousand people, which, as a rule, was reduced to four infantry regiments. The main weapon of the Russian army was the Mosin three-line rifle of the 1891 model, which was distinguished by its simplicity and reliability, and undemanding manufacturing technology. Unfortunately, especially in the early years of the war, due to various circumstances in the Russian army, there was not only an understaffing, but sometimes even a catastrophic shortage of rifles among the rank and file of the infantry. The more advanced rifles V.G. Fedorov and F.V. Tokarev were not accepted for mass production either before or during the war.

Mosin rifle model 1891

In addition, Japanese Arisaka rifles, captured Austro-Hungarian Mannlicher rifles, German Mauser, Winchester rifles were used to varying degrees, mainly modifications of the end of XIX century, but their use was secondary in relation to the Mosin rifle.

By July 1914, the Russian army had 4157 machine guns (mainly machine guns "Maxim", "Vickers", "Colt-Browning", "Shosha", etc.), which was clearly not enough to meet the needs of the army - this the problem will persist throughout the entire period of the war, even despite the influx of captured weapons and allied supplies from France and the United States.

Artillery was perhaps one of the problematic types of troops in Russia on the eve of the First World War. The roots of these problems lie in outdated pre-war ideas about the nature of war. The prevailing fascination with theories about the omnipotence of the Russian bayonet strike, the belief that not a single enemy was able to withstand it, therefore, the fate of the war would be decided by quick, sudden strikes in a field battle. Artillery was in the stage of formation, especially heavy. In addition, the problem of the lack of shells arose very quickly. Already at the end of 1914, the need was determined at 1.5 million shells per month. It was not possible to provide this need with the forces of the domestic military industry. In the future, they will partly try to compensate for the problem with the lack of ammunition through increased production and allied arms supplies, but it will not be possible to fully resolve it.

By the beginning of the twentieth century. lost its former significance such a branch of the army as the cavalry. During the First World War, although the cavalry was the only mobile combat arm, numerically, it amounted to no more than 10% of the armies of the belligerent countries. The peculiarities of military operations during the war years (the active use of artillery, machine guns, aviation) led to large losses of personnel and horses, which made this branch of the military ineffective. Numerous Russian cavalry (36 cavalry divisions, 200 thousand people) as a result, in fact, was sometimes forced to turn into infantrymen, conducting hostilities from the trenches. It should be noted that two-thirds of the total Russian cavalry were Cossack cavalry. Given the high percentage of equestrian units among them and the traditions of horse breeding, the Cossacks found it most difficult to reorganize in the changing nature of the war. Often, the Cossacks were not psychologically ready to "get off the horse", perceiving this as a kind of betrayal of the age-old foundations.

Don Cossack Kozma (Kuzma) Firsovich Kryuchkov - the first Knight of St. George among the lower ranks of the Russian army

The First World War actually only marked the use of vehicles in war conditions. Only on the eve of the war was the "Regulations on military-automobile conscription" approved, which provided for the transfer of all privately owned vehicles to the army by the civilian population when the mobilization was announced, with compensation to the owners of their value. After the outbreak of the war, in accordance with this provision, 3.5 thousand cars and 475 trucks were seized from the population. Under wartime conditions, cars began to be created equipped with guns, including anti-aircraft guns. Medical auto detachments also provided great assistance in the field army.

Ambulance car during the First World War

One of the problems that permanently existed during the First World War was the organization of the supply of the Russian army. Difficulties with transport support can be explained by the huge distances over which it was necessary to carry out transportation in Russia - they were 3-4 times higher than the German ones. Unfortunately, corruption and mercantile factors were common in matters of supply. It has long been no secret that war is one of the ways to get rich (this is clearly seen in the example of the United States, which, as a result of the First World War, turned from debtors into the largest creditors on a global scale). The normal operation of railway transport (it was the main transport for transportation) and the state of the tracks and steam locomotives did not contribute to the normal operation of the railway (in 1914 in East Prussia, the Russian army faced the problem of the inconsistency of the railroad tracks in Russia and Germany, which actually several times reduced the efficiency of transport troops and supplies on enemy territory). To this should be added the climatic features of Russia - the long duration of the winter period and the lower winter temperature regime, which means the need for more use of fuel (coal, first of all). All this naturally increased costs, both time and financial. Multiple attempts to establish normal supplies between the rear and the front were unsuccessful.

Sworn soldier tries to stop deserters

February revolution of 1917, abdication of NicholasIIand later his brother Mikhail from the Russian throne led to significant changes in the Russian army. Order No. 1, which effectively removed the soldiers from the authority of the commanders, contributed to a sharp drop in discipline and the army's combat capability. The army was negatively affected by the incessant propaganda from various parties, which had an anti-government, anti-militaristic character. Since the spring of 1917, desertions have intensified even more (by November 1917 there were about 1.5 million registered deserters), the facts of "fraternization at the front" and voluntary surrender have become frequent. The Russian army was close to collapse.

ph.D. Vladimir Gizhov,

Alexander Gizhov.

Especially for the magazine "Russian Horizon"

The imperialist states intensively developed their armed forces as the most important means for the forcible implementation of the tasks of domestic and foreign policy. The number of ground forces and navies grew every year. Armies and fleets were rearmed with the latest weapons and military equipment.

The ground forces were the most buildup by Germany and France. The introduction in France in 1872 of a new law on universal military service allowed France to accelerate the accumulation of trained reserves. This provided an opportunity in the event of war to more than 2.5 times increase the size of the peacetime army. So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. France was able to deploy an active army of 647 thousand people, then by 1880 this army could already have more than one million people. In addition, 638 thousand were the territorial army.

The German militarists could not allow the strengthening of France, which would threaten them with the loss of the military superiority achieved in the war of 1870-1871. Therefore, they more and more increased their army.

So, if by the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war the North German Union, led by Prussia, had a peacetime army of 315.6 thousand people (the army of Prussia was 283 thousand people) (2), then according to the law of May 2, 1874, the number of German peacetime army was defined as 401,659 people of lower ranks (privates and non-commissioned ones), by the law of May 6, 1880, its number was increased to 427,274 people, and in 1890 it was brought to 510.3 thousand people (including 486 983 privates and non-commissioned and 23 349 generals and) (4). So, in just 20 years, the size of the German peacetime army was increased by almost 62%. Meanwhile, the population of Germany during the same time increased by only 25% (5). Germany's rival is France by the end of the 19th century. put under arms over 625 thousand people (6), while on the eve of the war of 1870-1871. its peacetime army was 434.3 thousand people.

Describing the situation in Europe in the early 90s of the XIX century, F. Engels in the article "Can Europe Disarm?" (1893) pointed out that "between France and Germany began that feverish competition in armament, in which Russia, Austria, Italy were gradually drawn as well."
The arms race took on a particularly large scale just before the war. On July 5, 1913, the German Reichstag approved a law to increase the peacetime army by 136 thousand people. At the same time, the amount of one-time military expenditures was expressed in the amount of 898 million marks. By the beginning of the war, the number of the German ground army was increased to 808,280 people. This number included 30 459, 107 794 non-commissioned officers, 647 793 privates, 2480 doctors, 865 veterinarians, 2889 military officials, 16 thousand volunteers.

It was difficult for France to compete in the size of the armed forces with Germany due to the smaller population and much slower growth rates. In addition, the annual population growth in France has been declining all the time, while in Germany it has increased. As a result, the annual recruitment of recruits could not be increased. In order to keep up with Germany in the number of ground forces, the French government by law of August 7, 1913 increased the length of service from two to three years and reduced the draft age from 21 to 20 years (11). This made it possible to bring the staffing of the lower ranks to 720 thousand (12), and to increase the total number of the standing army of France by 50% (13). By August 1, 1914, the French peacetime army numbered 882,907 people (including the colonial troops) (14).

In increasing the size of the army, Russia did not lag behind France and Germany. The peacetime Russian regular army from 1871 to 1904 was increased from 761,602 people (15) to 1,094,061 people (16). According to the states of 1912, the army was supposed to have 1,384,905 people (17). At the end of 1913, the so-called "Big Program for Strengthening the Army" was approved in Russia, which provided for an increase in the ground forces of Russia in peacetime by 1917 by another 480 thousand people (18). Artillery was strengthened considerably. The implementation of the program required a one-time expenditure of 500 million rubles.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire also expanded its army. At the beginning of 1911, she increased the conscription contingent by 40%, allocating an additional 100 million kroons for the needs of the army (20). On July 5, 1912, a new military law was adopted in Austria-Hungary, providing for a further increase in recruitment (from 181,677 to 205,902 people) and additional appropriations for weapons. Italy also projected an increase in contingents from 153 thousand to 173 thousand people.
Along with the great powers, the arms race also embraced small countries, even such as Belgium and Switzerland, which proclaimed eternal neutrality guaranteed by the great powers. In Belgium, for example, until 1909 the size of the army required for the defense of the country in wartime was set at 180 thousand. In peacetime, it numbered about 42 thousand people. Due to the aggravation of international relations, the Belgian government in December 1912 established the size of the wartime army at 340 thousand people, and in peacetime 54 thousand people (22). On December 15, 1913, a new military law was passed in Belgium and compulsory military service was introduced. According to this law, the composition of the peacetime army was supposed to be brought to 150 thousand by 1918.

Army manning system

The recruitment of armies with privates and non-commissioned officers in most European states was carried out on the basis of universal conscription, according to which military service was formally considered compulsory for all citizens. In reality, however, it fell with all its weight on the shoulders of the working masses. The rank and file of the armies were recruited mainly from the working people. The exploiting classes enjoyed all sorts of privileges and avoided heavy military service. In the army, their representatives occupied mainly command positions. Characterizing the general military service in Russia, VI Lenin pointed out: “In essence, we did not and do not have general military service, because the privileges of noble birth and wealth create a lot of exceptions. In essence, we did not have and there is nothing similar to the equality of citizens in military service ”(24).
The recruiting system based on compulsory military service made it possible to cover the largest number of the country's male population with military training and education. By the beginning of the First World War 1914-1918. the number of military personnel reached the following values: in Russia - 5650 thousand, in France - 5067 thousand, in England - 1203 thousand, in Germany - 4900 thousand, in Austria-Hungary - 3 million people. This made it possible to mobilize multimillion-dollar armies that exceeded the number of peacetime armies by 4-5 times.

Persons aged 20-21 were drafted into the army. Persons liable for military service were considered in military service until the age of 40-45. From 2 to 4 years they served in the cadres (2-3 years in the infantry, 3-4 years in cavalry and horse artillery), after which they were enlisted for 13-17 years in the reserve (reserve in France and other countries, reserve and landwehr in Germany) and were periodically involved in training camps. After the expiration of the period of stay in the reserve, the conscripts were included in the militia (the territorial army in France and Japan, the Landsturm in Germany). The militia also included persons who were not drafted into the army for any reason, but who were capable of carrying weapons.

Reserves (reservists) were drafted into the army in case of war and were intended to replenish units to the states of war. During wartime, militias were also called up and carried out various rear and garrison services.
In England and the USA, unlike other states, the armies were hired. They were recruited by recruiting persons aged 18 - 25 years in England and 21 - 30 years old in the United States. Volunteers served in the United States for 3 years, and in England for 12 years, of which from 3 to 8 years in active service, the rest of the time in reserve, with the involvement of a 20-day training camp annually.

The recruitment of non-commissioned officers in all countries was carried out by selecting from among the recruits persons belonging to the wealthy strata of society (wealthy peasants, small shopkeepers and employees), who, after training for a certain period (1-2 years) in special training units, were assigned to non-commissioned officer positions. Since the main role in the training and education of privates, especially a single soldier, and in maintaining internal order in subunits belonged to non-commissioned officers (27), in all armies they sought to consolidate these cadres in the ranks of the army, for which they proved to be loyal and loyal the non-commissioned service - after the expiration of the terms of active service, they were left on long-term service. At the same time, they received some benefits and privileges (service, household, material), up to the opportunity to become officers, especially in wartime. In the German army, non-commissioned officers were only from super-conscripts (28). Non-commissioned officers who had served the established terms of active and long-term service were credited to the reserve.

Officer cadres were trained mainly through special military educational institutions (by type of service), where young people, mainly from among the ruling classes (nobles and the bourgeoisie), were admitted to training on a voluntary basis. So, for example, in Russia by 1911 there were 28 cadet corps and 20 military schools, in Germany - 8 preparatory cadet schools and 11 military schools, in Austria-Hungary - 18 cadet schools and 2 academies. Since there was almost always a shortage in the armies, a certain number of people from the midst of the petty bourgeoisie, clergy, bureaucracy, and the intelligentsia were admitted to military schools. Officer personnel for wartime were recruited through the production of non-commissioned-super-conscripts as officers, as well as through short-term training of persons with secondary and higher education (volunteers).
To improve the qualifications of command personnel intended for higher positions, there were various short-term courses and schools (rifle, cavalry, etc.) with a duration of training about a year. Higher military education was given by military academies.

The decisive command positions in the armies of all capitalist countries were occupied by representatives of the ruling classes. So, in the German army in 1913, nobles occupied 87% of staff positions in the cavalry, 48% in the infantry and 41% in field artillery (30). In the Russian army, the class composition of officers in 1912 was expressed in the following form (in%, on average): nobles - 69.76; honorary citizens - 10.89; clergy - 3.07; "Merchant rank" - 2.22; “Taxable estate” (peasants, burghers, etc.) - 14.05. Among the generals, hereditary nobles accounted for 87.45%, among the headquarters (lieutenant colonel - colonel) - 71.46%, and among the rest of the officers - 50.36%. Of the “taxable estate”, the largest share of the population was - 27.99%, while among the generals representatives of this social group occupied only 2.69%.
The armies of the capitalist states were the loyal armed support of the ruling classes in domestic politics and a reliable weapon for waging an aggressive war. However, the fundamental interests of the masses, who constituted the main force of the army, were in contradiction with the predatory goals of the capitalist states.

Organization and armament

On the eve of the First World War, the ground forces of all states consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, which were considered the main branches of the military. Engineering troops (sapper, railroad, pontoon, communications, telegraph and radiotelegraph), aviation and aeronautics were considered auxiliary. The infantry was the main combat arm and its share in the system of ground forces averaged 70%, artillery - 15, cavalry - 8 and auxiliary troops - 7%.
The organizational structure of the armies of the main European states, future adversaries in the impending war, had much in common. The troops were divided into units and formations. In all countries, the army was the highest association, intended to solve strategic and operational tasks during the war. Only in Russia, even in peacetime, was it planned to create front-line formations (two to four armies) in case of war. The army consisted of three to six army corps, cavalry units (formations), engineering units (in Germany also army artillery).
The army corps had an established staff and included all the necessary combat and auxiliary forces and means, as well as rear units, sufficient for the corps to be able to fight independently even in isolation from other formations. The corps consisted of two or three infantry divisions, cavalry, corps artillery, sapper units, ferry means (engineering fleet), communications, an aviation unit (air link, air squadron), logistics agencies and transport units (the numerical strength of the corps is given in Table. 5).

Table 5. The composition of the wartime army corps in 1914*

Housing	Infantry battalions	Squadrons	Machine guns			Sapper companies	Total people
French
German

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, p. 133.

(1 *) 2 batteries with 8 guns, 2 batteries with 4 guns.
(2 *) Including 4 battalions of the reserve brigade.
(3 *) Including machine guns of the reserve brigade.
(4 *) All batteries are 4-gun.
(5 *) 24 batteries with 6 guns, 4 batteries with 4 guns.

The infantry was brought together in divisions, which consisted of two infantry brigades (2 infantry regiments in each). The division also included an artillery brigade (regiment), 2-3 cavalry squadrons and special units. The number of divisions in various armies ranged from 16 to 21 thousand people. The division was a tactical formation. In terms of its composition and armament, it could perform independent missions on the battlefield, using fire from all types of infantry and artillery (see Table 6 for the numerical strength of the division).

Table 6. The composition of a wartime infantry division in 1914*

* S. N. Krasilnikov. Organization of large combined arms formations, pp. 94-95, 133.

Infantry regiments consisted of 3-4 battalions, each of which had 4 companies. The strength of the battalion was almost everywhere a little over 1000 people.
In England and the United States in peacetime, large military formations did not exist. In wartime, brigades, divisions, corps were formed from separate regiments and battalions.
The main weapon of the infantry was a magazine rifle with a bayonet caliber from 7.62 to 8 mm with a range of sighting up to 3200 steps, it was distinguished by good ballistic qualities. Reducing the caliber made it possible to significantly reduce the weight of cartridges and increase their wearable stock by 1.5 times. The use of magazine loading together with smokeless powder increased the practical rate of fire almost 3 times (instead of 5 - 6 rounds to 15 rounds per minute). The Russian army adopted a three-line (7.62 mm) infantry rifle of the 1891 model, invented by the officer of the Russian army S. I. Mosin (Table 7). In 1908, a new cartridge with a pointed bullet and an initial speed of 860 m / s was designed for it. The sighting range of this rifle was 3200 steps (2400-2500 m). Before the war, the armies of almost all countries also introduced pointed bullets into service.

With a relatively small difference in ballistic properties with the rifles of other armies, the Russian rifle was the best. She was distinguished by the simplicity of the device, had high strength, was extremely tenacious, reliable and trouble-free in combat conditions.
Along with the main infantry weapon - the rifle - automatic weapons are spreading. In the early 80s of the XIX century. machine guns of the modern type appear (the easel machine gun of the American inventor Maxim in 1883), then automatic pistols and automatic (self-loading) rifles. At the beginning of the XX century. light machine guns appeared. They were first used in the Russo-Japanese War (34).

Table 7. Small arms of the armies of the main European states

System	Caliber, mm	Maximum range of fire, m
Russia
Shop rifle model 1891 of the Mosin system
France
Rifle model 1896 of the Swan
Hotchkiss machine gun
England
Rifle model 1903 by Lee - Enfield
Maxim machine gun
Germany
Mauser model 1898 rifle
Maxim machine gun
Austro-hungary
Rifle model 1895 by Mannlicher
Schwarzlose heavy machine gun

Machine guns were in the army at first in very small numbers. Before the war, the armies of the largest states relied on 24-28 heavy machine guns for the infantry division. In the Russian army, as in most other armies, an easel machine gun of the "Maxim" system was adopted. The infantry division of the Russian army in 1914 had 32 such machine guns (8 machine guns per regiment). The Russian troops did not have light machine guns.
The cavalry in all armies was divided into military and strategic. In Russia, cavalry was subdivided into divisional cavalry, attached to infantry formations, and army cavalry, at the disposal of the high command. In peacetime, the cavalry divisions were organizationally part of the army corps, and during the war, together with two cavalry corps, they made up the army cavalry. In the infantry divisions, small cavalry units remained, constituting divisional cavalry.

The highest unit of cavalry in all armies (except for the British) was a cavalry corps consisting of 2-3 cavalry divisions. The cavalry division consisted of 4-6 cavalry regiments (in the British cavalry division there are 12 regiments). As part of the division, there were regiments of various types of cavalry - lancers, hussars, cuirassiers, dragoons (and in Russia and Cossacks). Each cavalry division had in its composition a division of horse artillery of 2-3 batteries, machine-gun and sapper units, and communications units. Machine guns and technical troops (sappers and signalmen) in some armies were also part of brigades and regiments. The cavalry division consisted of 3500-4200 men, 12 guns and from 6 to 12 machine guns (the British cavalry division - 9 thousand people and 24 machine guns). The cavalry regiment in all armies consisted of 4-6 squadrons (there were 3 squadrons in the English cavalry regiment). The main weapon of cavalry before the war was considered cold (checker, pike), firearms - machine gun, carbine (shortened rifle), revolver.

The artillery was primarily a divisional weapon and was at the disposal of the divisional commanders. The infantry division had one or two artillery regiments (brigade) with 36 - 48 guns (in the German division - 72 guns). The artillery regiment consisted of 2-3 artillery battalions, which consisted of batteries. The battery was the main firing unit and had 4 to 8 guns. There was little artillery in the corps' subordination (one howitzer division in the Russian and German corps and a light artillery regiment in the French corps).

The use of smokeless powder, breech loading, piston locks and recoil devices led at the end of the 19th century. to the appearance of rapid-fire guns, which significantly increased the combat power of artillery. The range and rate of fire in comparison with the period of the Franco-Prussian war increased 2 or more times (range - from 3.8 to 7 km, rate of fire - from 3-5 rounds per minute to 5 - 10 rounds per minute) (35).
Along with an increase in the rate of fire and range of artillery, military-technical thought also solved such a problem as firing from closed positions, which sharply increased the survivability of artillery in battle. For the first time in combat conditions, shooting from closed positions was used by Russian artillerymen during the Russian-Japanese war.

At the same time, Russian artillerymen, midshipman S.N. Vlasyev and engineer-captain L.N. Gobyato, designed a mortar, which was successfully used in the defense of Port Arthur in 1904. way along the trenches). However, only the German army was armed with mortars by the beginning of the First World War.
Divisional artillery consisted mainly of light guns of 75 - 77 mm caliber. It was intended to conduct flat fire and hit open targets with shrapnel. The firing range reached 6 - 8 km. The Russian troops were armed with a field 76.2 mm cannon of the 1902 model, which was the best in the world in terms of its ballistic properties.
In addition to this artillery, the armies of the European states had cannons with a caliber of 100 to 150 mm, and for conducting hinged fire, howitzers (light and heavy) with a caliber of 100 to 220 mm. The main samples of artillery pieces and their tactical and technical data are given in table. 8.

Table 8. Field artillery of the army of the main European states *

State and system of instruments	Caliber, mm	Projectile weight, kg	Grenade firing range, km
Russia
Field gun mod. 1902 g.
Field howitzer mod. 1909 g.
Rapid-fire cannon mod. 1910 g.
Field howitzer mod. 1910 g.
France
Field rapid-fire gun mod. 1897 g.
Banja short cannon mod. 1890 g.
Heavy howitzer Rimayo mod. 1904 g.
Germany
Field light gun mod. 1896 g.
Field light howitzer mod. 1909 g.
Field heavy cannon mod. 1904 g.
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1902 g.
Austro-hungary
Field light gun mod. 1905 g.
Field light howitzer mod. 1899 g.
Field Heavy Cannon
Field heavy howitzer mod. 1899 g.

* E. 3. Barsukov. Artillery of the Russian army, vol. 1, pp. 210-211, 229.

However, heavy field artillery was still very poorly developed. The German army was better provided with howitzer and heavy artillery than others, since the German high command attached great importance to artillery. Each German infantry division had a division of 105mm howitzers (18 guns), and the corps included a division of 150mm howitzers (16 guns). The armies could be assigned separate divisions of heavy artillery, which consisted of 210-mm mortars, 150-mm howitzers, 105- and 130-mm guns (36). In terms of the number of artillery, the German army was in first place on the eve of the war. The rest of the states were significantly inferior to her. The weaker than others was the Austrian army equipped with artillery. The field howitzers with which the Austrian army entered the war are very outdated. The mining tools also left a lot to be desired (37).
In addition to heavy field artillery, there was also siege artillery of larger calibers, intended for the siege of fortresses or for operations against strong enemy field fortifications. A significant amount of artillery of various calibers was available in the fortresses. During the war years it was used in the field troops.

New technical means of struggle

On the eve of the First World War, the armies of the European states were, to varying degrees, equipped with military equipment that ensured the combat operations of the troops. Armor means were represented by armored (armored) trains. Such trains were used by the British during the Boer War to guard rear railroad communications.

Armored vehicles were just being developed. Their technical properties did not yet meet the requirements and by the beginning of the war they were not accepted for service (39), began to be used only at the beginning of the war and were armed with a machine gun or small-caliber gun. They moved at high speed and were intended to be used as a means of reconnaissance and for a surprise attack on the rear units of the enemy, but they did not have a significant effect on the course of hostilities.

Before the war, projects of self-propelled armored vehicles of high cross-country ability (later called tanks) appeared, and during the war the vehicles themselves (tanks) appeared. In 1911, the son of the famous Russian chemist D.I.Mendeleev, engineer V.D.Mendeleev, proposed the first project of the tank (40). Already during the war, the Russian inventor, military engineer A. A. Porokhovshchikov presented his project of a light armored vehicle armed with a machine gun on tracks, called an "all-terrain vehicle" (41). The car was manufactured in Riga and was assembled in May 1915. The all-terrain vehicle, as noted in the test report, “passed through the ground and terrain impassable for ordinary cars” (42), its speed reached 25 km per hour. The tsarist government, adoring foreign models, did not dare to introduce a domestic tank into service with the army.

Aviation as a new means of warfare has been rapidly developing since the beginning of the 20th century. Russia is rightfully the birthplace of aviation. The first aircraft in the world was built by the Russian designer and inventor A.F. Mozhaisky (43). On July 20 (August 1), 1882, in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, Mozhaisky's plane, controlled by mechanic Golubev, took off and flew over the field (44). In other states, since the 90s, flight attempts have also been made.

The year 1910 is considered the year of the appearance of military aviation, from that time aircraft began to be used in military maneuvers. In France, 4 airships and 12 aircraft took part in maneuvers in 1910 (45). The aircraft were used for maneuvers in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In Germany, for example, there were 24 aircraft, three airships and a tethered balloon on maneuvers (46). The aircraft were used for reconnaissance and fully justified the hopes placed on them.

The military aviation received its first combat experience in 1911-1912. during the war between Italy and Turkey. In this war, at the beginning, nine Italian aircraft took part, used for reconnaissance, as well as for bombing (47). In the first Balkan war 1912-1913. a Russian volunteer aviation detachment operated as part of the Bulgarian army (48). In total, the countries of the Balkan Union had at their disposal about 40 aircraft. The aircraft were used mainly for reconnaissance, adjusting artillery fire, aerial photography, but sometimes for bombing enemy troops, mostly cavalry. In Russia, aerial bombs of a large caliber for that time (about 10 kg) were used (51), in Italy - one-kilogram bombs.

The planes were unarmed. For example, the German reconnaissance monoplane "Taube" was equipped with a camera and raised several bombs, which the pilot dropped by hand over the side of the cockpit. The pilot was armed with a pistol or a carbine for self-defense in the event of a forced landing in enemy territory. Although the work on arming the aircraft was carried out, by the beginning of the war they were incomplete. Russian officer Poplavko was the first in the world to create a machine gun mount on an airplane, but it was misjudged and was not put into service.

The most important event in the development of aircraft construction in Russia is the construction in 1913 at the Russian-Baltic Plant in St. Petersburg of a heavy multi-engine aircraft "Russian Knight" (four motors of 100 hp each). When tested, he held out in the air for 1 hour 54 minutes. with seven passengers (54), setting a world record. In 1914, the multi-engine Ilya Muromets aircraft was built, which was an improved design of the Russian Knight. "Ilya Muromets" had 4 engines of 150 hp. from. (or two 220 hp motors). During tests, the device developed a speed of up to 90-100 km per hour (55). The plane could stay in the air for 4 hours. Crew - 6 people, flight load - 750-850 kg (56). In one of the flights, this plane with ten passengers reached an altitude of 2000 m (it stayed in the air much longer),
On July 5, 1914, the plane with passengers was in the air for 6 hours. 33 minutes (57) “Russian Knight” and “Ilya Muromets” are the ancestors of modern heavy bombers. "Ilya Muromets" had special installations for suspension of bombs, mechanical bomb release devices and sights (58).
In Russia, earlier than anywhere else, there appeared seaplanes, designed by D.P. Grigorovich in 1912-1913. In terms of their flying qualities, they significantly surpassed the subsequently created similar types of foreign machines (59).

The aircraft had the following flight and tactical data: engine power 60-80 liters. from. (for certain types of aircraft - up to 120 hp), the speed rarely exceeded 100 km per hour, the ceiling was 2500-3000 m, the ascent time to 2000 m was 30-60 minutes, the flight duration was 2-3 hours, the combat load - 120-170 kg, including bomb load - 20-30 kg, crew - 2 people (pilot and observer).

There were few aircraft in the military aviation. Russia had 263 aircraft, France - 156 aircraft, Germany - 232, Austria-Hungary - 65, England sent 30 aircraft out of 258 aircraft to France with its expeditionary corps (60).
Organizationally, aviation in units (detachments) was part of the army corps (in Russia there were 39 air detachments)
Aeronautics was already widely developed before the First World War. The charters contained instructions on the use of balloons for reconnaissance (61). Even in the Russo-Japanese War, they rendered significant benefits to the troops.

They made observations even with winds up to 15 m / s. In the war of 1904-1905. used were tethered kite balloons designed in Russia, which had great stability in the air, were convenient for observing the battlefield and for accurate correction of artillery firing from closed positions. Balloons were also used in the war of 1914-1918.
At the end of the XIX century. in Russia, France, Germany and other countries, airship building appears, which, like aviation, has been developing especially intensively in the last five years before the war. In 1911, in the Italo-Turkish war, the Italians used three airships (soft) for bombing and reconnaissance. However, due to their great vulnerability, airships could not be used on the battlefields, and they did not justify themselves as a means of bombing settlements. The airship has shown its usefulness as a means of naval warfare - in the fight against submarines, in the conduct of naval reconnaissance, patrolling the anchorage of ships and their escort at sea. By the beginning of the First World War, Germany had 15 airships, France - 5, Russia - 14 (62).
Several years before the war, work was underway on the creation of an aviation knapsack parachute. In Russia, the original design of such a parachute was developed and proposed to the military department in 1911 by G.E. Kotelnikov (63). But Kotelnikov's parachute was used in 1914 only to equip pilots flying on heavy Ilya Muromets aircraft.

Automobile transport began to be used for military purposes several years before the war. For example, at the great imperial maneuvers in Germany in 1912, cars were used for communication, transporting troops, for various loads, such as mobile workshops, radio stations. Cars were also used in the maneuvers of the Austro-Hungarian army (64). The French army had 170 cars of all brands, the British army had 80 trucks and several tractors, and the Russian army also had few cars (65). Replenishment of the army with cars according to the mobilization plan provided only for the replacement of horse-drawn traction in the bulky corps rear. When mobilizing, the army received the following number of cars: the French - about 5500 trucks and about 4000 cars (66); English - 1141 trucks and tractors, 213 cars and semi-trucks and 131 motorcycles; German - 4000 cars (of which 3500 trucks) (67); Russian - 475 trucks and 3562 cars.

Military engineering means before the First World War in all armies were very limited. Sapper units were available only in the corps. In all armies, the mobilized corps had a sapper battalion, which included 3-4 sapper companies at the rate of one company per division and 1-2 companies in the corps reserve. Before the war, this norm of sapper units in the corps was recognized as quite sufficient for maneuvering actions for which all armies were preparing. Sapper companies included specialists from almost all military engineering specialties of that time (sappers, miners, demolition men, bridge builders). In addition, the sapper battalion included a searchlight unit for illuminating the terrain ahead (a searchlight company in the Russian corps and a searchlight platoon in the German one). The corps had a bridge fleet of ferry facilities. In the German corps, the richest equipped with crossing means, it was possible to build a bridge with a length of 122 m, and using divisional bridge means, the corps could build a light bridge of 200 m, and a heavy one, suitable for the passage of artillery, at 100-130 m.

The Russian corps had bridge means in the sapper companies on only 64 m of the bridge (69). All the sapper work was done by hand, the main tools were a shovel, pickaxe, ax.
From the means of communication, the mobilized corps of all armies had telegraph units in the form of a telegraph department or company, both for communication downward with divisions and for communication upward with the army. The division did not have its own means of communication. Communication went to the division headquarters from below - from the regiments and from above - from the corps headquarters.
The means of technical communication in the corps of all armies were extremely insufficient. The German corps had 12 vehicles, 77 km of field cable and 80 km of thin wire. The telegraph company of the Russian corps had 16 telegraph stations, 40 field telephones, 106 km of telegraph and 110 km of telephone wires, lighting means (heliograph, Mangen lamps, etc.). By the beginning of the war, the Russian corps was the most equipped with communication facilities. The radiotelegraph was considered an army means and at the beginning there were no soldiers in the corps (70).
In general, it should be noted that the nature of the armament of the armies of the largest European states, their structure, technical equipment by the beginning of the war did not correspond to the capabilities that the industry of these countries had for the production of technical means of war. The main burden of the struggle was laid on the infantry armed with a rifle.

Control

In different countries, the organization of command and control in peacetime and wartime differed in details, but the fundamentals were approximately the same. In peacetime, the head of the armed forces was the head of state (president, monarch). The practical leadership of military construction, armament and supplies, combat training, and the daily life of the troops was carried out by the Ministry of War, in the system of which there were special bodies (departments, directorates, departments) for various types of activities and support of troops and general staffs, which were responsible for preparing for war (71).
In the German army, the preparation of the armed forces for war, especially in terms of the development of plans for mobilization, concentration, deployment and the first operational tasks, was in charge of a large general staff, independent of the War Ministry. In Russia, these functions were performed by the main directorate of the General Staff, which was part of the War Ministry.

During the war, the head of all the armed forces was nominally the head of state, but almost always direct command in the theater of operations was entrusted to a specially appointed person - the commander-in-chief. For practical work on the management of the combat activities of the troops and their support, a field headquarters (Headquarters, Headquarters) with special departments for various types of combat activities and support was created under the commander-in-chief. The supreme power belonged to the commander-in-chief within the boundaries of the theater of military operations (72). In the rest of the country, the usual authorities operated, and the War Ministry continued its work, which was now entirely aimed at meeting the needs and requirements of the front.

The strategic leadership of troops in all states (except Russia) was organized in such a way that each army was directly subordinate to the supreme command. Only in the Russian army since 1900 a new control system was developed. Even in peacetime in Russia, it was planned to create front-line directorates, which would unite 2-4 armies. It was recognized that, provided that they were simultaneously fighting against several opponents over a considerable length of the western border, the commander-in-chief would not be able to direct the operations of all armies subordinate to him, especially if they went on the offensive, when they would operate in diverging directions. Therefore, it was decided to create an intermediate instance, namely front commanders.

It was assumed that the Russian main command would control the actions of the fronts, and the fronts - the armies. True, the French "Manual for senior military commanders" 1914. also provided for the unification of armies in groups. However, these associations were not permanent. Their organization was provided only for a certain time to conduct operations according to the commander-in-chief's plan.
Due to the increase in the scope of hostilities, the importance of the headquarters has increased significantly. The headquarters played an important role in the management and control of troops.

The headquarters collects all the information necessary for organizing the operation, it also develops directives and orders to the troops, receives reports from them and prepares reports to the senior chief. The headquarters should take care of establishing and maintaining communication with subordinate troops and higher headquarters.

Combat and operational training

In all armies, the system of training and education of personnel was aimed primarily at making the army an obedient instrument of the ruling classes, a reliable tool for fulfilling their political goals in domestic and foreign policy.
They tried to instill in the soldiers faith in the inviolability of the existing social system, the state system and the social order, they brought up obedience and diligence in them. Along with this, the troop training system provided for the combat training necessary for the army to carry out its direct purpose, that is, to use it in battle.

Combat training of the troops was carried out according to a specific plan. To ensure the uniformity of training, uniform programs were developed and special instructions were published. In Russia, for example, there was a "Plan for the distribution of annual classes in the infantry", "Regulations on the training of lower ranks", "Manual for officer training", "Manual for training in the cavalry", etc. In other armies, instructions on organizing training for recruits and some methodological advice was contained in the infantry drill regulations.

During his stay in active military service, the training of soldiers was carried out in several stages. The upbringing of professional skills began with single training, which included drill and physical training, training in the use of weapons (fire training, bayonet and hand-to-hand combat), training in performing the duties of a single soldier in peacetime (carrying out internal and guard duty) and in battle (service in patrol, field guard, observer, messenger, etc.). The importance of this period of training is emphasized by the 1906 German army's infantry drill regulations: "Only careful individual training provides a reliable basis for a good combat activity of troops."

Fire training occupied a significant place in the system of training troops, since they attached great importance to infantry fire. It was believed that the infantry with the fire of their hand weapons should prepare their own attack, therefore, a good shooter was brought up from each soldier. Shooting training was carried out at different distances and for different targets: single and group, stationary, appearing and moving. The targets were designated by targets of various sizes and imitated lying soldiers, artillery guns in an open firing position, attacking infantry and cavalry, etc.

They were trained to perform fire missions in various conditions of the situation, single, salvo and group fire. In Russia, shooting training was conducted on the basis of the "Manual for shooting from rifles, carbines and revolvers." Russian soldiers were trained to shoot at all distances up to 1400 steps, and up to 600 steps soldiers were trained to hit any target with one or two shots. Since it was believed that victory in battle is achieved by a bayonet attack, the soldiers were persistently trained in the use of a bayonet and other hand-to-hand combat techniques.

When training in cavalry, artillery and technical troops, the emphasis was on the specifics of the actions of the type of weapon. In the cavalry, for example, great attention was paid to horse riding, equestrian sports, vaulting, and wheelhouse.
After completing the training period for a single soldier, training followed as part of subunits in various conditions of combat service and in various types of combat. The training of subunits and units was carried out mainly in the summer during the period of camp gatherings. Joint exercises were conducted to teach the interaction of various combat arms and to familiarize them with each other. The course of combat training ended with military maneuvers (79), which also pursued the goal of giving the practice of actions to senior and higher command personnel in a combat situation, self-assessment of the situation, decision-making, and combat control of subordinate troops.

With the officer corps of military units, classes were also conducted in specialty and tactics - on maps and plans, through field trips, on which officers trained in studying and assessing the terrain, choosing positions, assessing the situation and issuing orders and orders. Practiced and such a form of advanced training as reports and messages at a meeting on military history and various issues of combat training.
Field trips of the General Staff and military games of the highest command personnel were carried out to check operational developments and war plans, as well as to prepare senior command personnel for the performance of duties in the positions for which they were assigned in wartime (82). In Russia, for example, such a game was played on the eve of the war in April 1914.

The training of troops and staffs was based on the official views set forth in the regulations and instructions.
The organization and conduct of an operation by large military formations were set forth in special manuals, regulations and instructions. In Germany it was the instruction "The German Basic Principles of High Command of Troops" (1910) (84), in France it was the "Manual for Senior Military Commanders" (1914) (85).

The operational structure of armies in the system of armed forces at the beginning of the war was envisaged by the plans for the strategic deployment of the sides. Armies were usually formed in one echelon and had a reserve. The necessary strike grouping was created by assigning narrower zones of action to some armies and strengthening their combat strength. Spaces remained between the armies to maintain freedom of maneuver. It was believed that each army would conduct its own private operation independently. The armies had open flanks and took care of their own supply.

The operational formation of the troops of each army was also one-echelon - the corps were located in a line. In all formations, general reserves of up to 1/3 of the forces and more were created. The reserves were intended to fend off accidents or to strengthen parts of the first line. It was believed that the reserves should be spent carefully and part of the reserve should be kept until the end of the battle.

The statutes recognized the offensive as the main type of action in the operation. Achievement of success in the offensive in all armies was conceived only as a swift enveloping maneuver on the flanks with the aim of encircling the enemy. H. Ritter, for example, noted that “the essence of German tactics and strategy was the idea of \u200b\u200bcompletely encircling the enemy” (86). At the same time, the troops were required to take special care of their own flanks and take all possible measures to protect them. For this, cavalry was located on the flanks, special units were assigned to cover the flanks, reserves were located closer to the open flank. The troops tried in every possible way to avoid encirclement. Combat in encirclement was not provided for by the statutes and was not developed. A frontal strike and a frontal offensive with the aim of breaking through were considered inexpedient due to the difficulty of their implementation in conditions when the enemy armies had greatly increased their firepower. True, this form of operation was also allowed in Russia.
Reconnaissance of the enemy was of great importance. For this, cavalry, tethered balloons, aircraft, ground surveillance, eavesdropping and agents were intended.

The main European states had large cavalry forces, which at that time were the only mobile combat arms. However, before the First World War there was no agreement on the role of cavalry in the war. It was recognized that due to the widespread introduction of more advanced weapons into the troops, cavalry attacks against infantry in a mounted formation could not be, as before, the main method of action.

In this regard, the idea arose that the cavalry had lost its role on the battlefield. The more widespread opinion was that the importance of the cavalry not only did not fall, but even increased, but it should use different methods in battle than before. The cavalry was intended primarily for strategic reconnaissance, which it must conduct in large formations.

In the course of reconnaissance, it was required to "overturn", "knock out from the field" the enemy's cavalry, break through the enemy's protection to the location of his main forces. An important type of cavalry activity was also the implementation of the cover of their troops with a "curtain" that prohibits reconnaissance of the enemy cavalry. As for the use of cavalry for independent actions in deep raids (raids) on the rear and communications of the enemy, such actions were allowed, but were considered secondary and could be used only under exceptional circumstances and under conditions if there were enough forces so as not to weaken reconnaissance and cover their own troops.

Regarding the method of action of the cavalry in battle, it was recognized that in the conditions of the European theater, where the terrain is replete with obstacles in the form of ditches, hedges, buildings, it is difficult to find a sufficiently large space for an attack in a close mounted formation of masses of cavalry. Such an attack is possible with limited forces only against enemy cavalry. Against the infantry, it could only be successful if the infantry was already shaken and demoralized. Therefore, it was assumed that the cavalry should also operate on foot, using their own firepower and even a bayonet.

The tactics covered the issues of using troops directly in battle: the formation of a battle formation, the method of operations of troops, the interaction of units and elements of the battle order, the use of combat arms in battle, reconnaissance, security, etc. Tactical views were set forth in manuals and regulations.
The offensive was considered the main type of battle. The idea of \u200b\u200ban offensive, which prevailed in strategic and operational views, was also reflected in tactics, which was directly indicated in the regulations and manuals. Here, too, it was considered necessary to act only in an offensive spirit. In Germany, for example, all actions from the army to a separate patrol provided for an offensive at any cost.

German regulations, manuals and tactical textbooks emphasized that only an offensive can bring a quick and decisive victory over the enemy. Thus, in the German combat infantry regulations of 1906, the need was noted for developing the skills of a non-stop offensive under the slogan "forward to the enemy, whatever the cost" (93). Austrian tactical views largely followed the German. The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911, on the basis of which the Austrian army was preparing for war, indicated that victory could only be achieved by attack (94). The French infantry drill of 1904 noted that only one offensive was decisive and insurmountable (95). Russian "Charter of the field service 1912" on this issue he gave the following general instructions: “Offensive actions are the best way to achieve the set goal. Only these actions make it possible to seize the initiative and force the enemy to do what we want ”(96).

For a successful offensive, according to German views, it was recommended to pull all forces to the battlefield to the last battalion and immediately bring them into battle (97). Such tactics, as noted in Russian military literature, were based on risk. It ensured the defeat of the enemy in case of success, but in case of failure it could lead to the defeat of its own army (98). In the German charter, it was believed that starting a battle with insufficient forces and then constantly strengthening them is one of the most gross mistakes. Under the cover of the vanguard, one must strive to immediately deploy the main forces and only at the moment of infantry deployment open artillery fire so that the enemy does not guess the attacker's intentions for as long as possible (99).
The French regulations, on the other hand, believed that insufficient intelligence information forced a small part of the forces to be deployed at the beginning of the battle, while the main forces were echeloned in depth behind the front lines until the situation was clarified (100). Therefore, in the French regulations, great importance was attached to the actions of the vanguards and forward detachments.

In the opinion of Russian military theorists, the main forces were to be deployed in battle formation under the cover of the vanguards and to launch an offensive from a distance of actual rifle fire. The main forces were concentrated on the direction of the main attack. "Field Service Charter 1912" obliged senior commanders before the attack to concentrate the general reserve in the selected sector and direct the fire of as many guns as possible to the object of the attack.

The principles of tactical actions in the offensive of the armies of different states had much in common. Troops in marching columns made a march towards the enemy towards the upcoming battlefield with security and reconnaissance measures. In the zone of enemy artillery fire, the units were dismembered into smaller columns (battalion, company). In the zone of rifle fire, they deployed in battle formation.

According to German regulations, during the period of approaching the battlefield, the troops had to concentrate, deploy and form in battle formation (102). The French divided the course of the offensive into a "preparatory period," during which the troops were positioned against the points of attack, and a "decisive period", during which it was necessary to "advance the infantry's firing line, which was incessantly reinforced, before the bayonet strike." According to French regulations, the battle consisted of his outset, main attack and secondary attacks. The troops moved towards the enemy in columns, trying to reach his flank and rear. The start of the battle was entrusted to strong vanguards. Their task was to capture strong points convenient for the deployment of the main forces, and hold them (103). The deployment of the main forces took place under the cover of the vanguards.

The procedure for conducting an offensive battle was better and more fully developed in the Russian "Charter of the field service of 1912" This charter determined such periods of an offensive battle: rapprochement, offensive, and pursuit. The offensive was carried out under the cover of vanguards, which seized advantageous positions, ensuring the deployment of the main forces in a battle formation and their further actions. Before the deployment of the main forces, the commanders were required to assign tasks to their units and subunits. The artillery of the main forces, without waiting for the deployment of the infantry, moved to the vanguard in order to "quickly achieve an advantage over the enemy in artillery fire."

For the offensive, the troops were deployed in a battle formation, which consisted of combat sectors and reserves. Each combat area, in turn, was divided into smaller combat areas with their private reserves and supports (the division's combat area consisted of brigade combat areas, brigades from regiment combat areas, etc.). According to the views of the French theorists, the order of battle consisted of forces leading the outset of the battle, forces that were not put into battle (reserve), and of security. In combat formation, units were to be located either next to each other or in the back of the head, and the latter location was considered convenient for maneuvering during the battle.

It was recommended to make the battle formations in the direction of the main attack more dense than in the auxiliary directions. If there were gaps between adjacent combat areas, they were to be kept under the crossfire of artillery and infantry.
The length of the combat sectors along the front depended on the situation and terrain. The main requirement in this case was that the rifle chain should give rifle fire of sufficient density. In the Russian army, the following length of combat areas was adopted: for a battalion - about 0.5 km, for a regiment - 1 km, for a brigade - 2 km, for a division - 3 km, for a corps - 5-6 km (105). The length of the front of the company's offensive was taken at 250-300 steps (106). In the German army, the brigade was assigned a section of 1,500 m, a company - 150 m (107). The reserves, as a rule, were located behind the center of their unit or on the open flanks. According to Russian regulations, the general reserve was intended to assist the troops of the combat sector, which were delivering the main blow; private reserves - to strengthen the units of their combat area, conducting battle (108). The distance of the reserve from the battle line was established in such a way as not to incur unnecessary losses from enemy fire and at the same time to quickly bring the reserve into action.

In general, in an offensive battle, the echeloning of forces was as follows: the regiment (brigade) sent two or three battalions to the battle line, which occupied their combat areas, the remaining 1-2 battalions formed a reserve and were located in reserve columns hidden from enemy fire. The battalion sent 2-3 companies into the battle line, having the rest in reserve. The company deployed several of its platoons in a chain, the rest of the platoons formed the support of the company chain. The platoons deployed all their squads in a chain. With such a formation of the battle formation, only one third of all forces took direct part in the battle. The remaining two-thirds were in the reserves of all higher echelons and were actually inactive. The reserves of companies (support), battalions and regiments were intended mainly to replenish the loss of the chain and reinforce it with fire. At the moment of the attack, the supports were poured into the chain to increase its striking power. So, the German charter, without defining the exact composition of the supports, considered their main purpose "timely reinforcement of the line of fire" (109), therefore, the support during the offensive had to be as close to the rifle chain as possible.

The infantry was supposed to conduct an offensive battle in dense rifle lines at intervals of 1-3 steps between soldiers. "Any offensive begins with the deployment of rifle chains," demanded the German regulations (110). “If the terrain allows the secret movement of the shooters to the distance of actual fire,” the charter said, “then strong, dense rifle lines must be deployed without delay” (111). They scattered into a chain with the approach to the enemy at a range of actual rifle fire. The chains were followed in columns of support and reserves. The movement of the chain was carried out at a step with firing on the move, and in the zone of actual rifle fire - in dashes. From a distance of 50 m, the chain ran into the attack. The German regulations required an offensive to be carried out at a very high rate, in dashes. The troops made stops at the rifle positions. The last shooting position was outlined 150 m from the enemy.

She also served as the starting line for the bayonet attack. Artillery during the offensive was supposed to fire at the targets of the attack. In the Russian army, the infantry in the offensive moved in dashes in platoons, squads, units and one by one, with short stops between rifle positions. From the very beginning of the battle, the artillery was located as close to the enemy as possible, but outside the sphere of his rifle fire, occupying closed, half-closed or open positions. The infantry rushed with bayonets, shooting the enemy from close range with rifle and machine-gun fire and throwing hand grenades at him. The offensive should have been completed by energetic pursuit of the enemy.

In the pre-war regulations of all armies, the need to shelter manpower from enemy fire during an offensive was noted. The infantry drill of the German army, for example, indicated that the head of the squad should be able to move forward the riflemen of his squad, perhaps hiddenly (112). In a number of armies, it was believed that self-entrenching should not be abused, since it would be difficult to raise the entrenched infantry for further movement forward (113). The regulations of the Russian army provided for the covert movement of soldiers during an offensive in order to incur fewer losses from enemy fire.
In the offensive in all armies, small arms fire was given great importance as one of the battle factors. According to the German regulations, even the very essence of the offensive consisted in "transferring fire to the enemy, if necessary, at the nearest distance" (114). How much importance the Germans attached to fire can be seen from the words of the charter: "To attack means to push fire forward." According to the Russian regulations, the infantry offensive consisted of a combination of movement with fire from rifle positions.

Machine guns were supposed to assist the infantry offensive with their fire. Depending on the situation, they were either attached to the battalions or remained at the disposal of the regiment commander, for example, in the Russian army. According to the Austrians, machine-gun fire at close range could replace artillery.
Still, it was believed that only a bayonet strike could force the enemy to leave his position. Thus, the German statute asserted that "an attack with a melee weapon crowns the defeat of the enemy" (115). The Austrian Infantry Regulations of 1911 also indicated that, using their fire to the full, the infantry would finish off the enemy with a bayonet.

The pre-war regulations noted the power of artillery, but its tasks were very vaguely outlined. The artillery had to prepare the infantry attack with its fire (116). However, by the beginning of the war, artillery preparation was understood in a very simplified way. Until the moment the infantry approached the enemy at a distance of actual rifle fire (400-500 m), the artillery fired at the enemy batteries. With the throw of the infantry into the attack, the artillery was supposed to hit the enemy's firepower from open positions with fire, which interfered with the advance of the infantry. The duties of the artillery were thus very limited. The role of artillery in the offensive was actually underestimated. The issues of interaction between artillery and infantry, in particular the call for artillery fire, target designation were not clearly worked out.

The French infantry drill regulations stated that the command “prepares and supports the infantry movement with artillery” (117). However, the preparation of an infantry attack with artillery could be carried out without connection with the actions of the infantry. Due to the fact that the fire of the French 75-mm cannon was invalid against shelters, it was believed that when the infantry attacked, even sacrificing itself, it must knock out the enemy from the trenches, which was then shot with shrapnel by artillery.

The Russian "Charter of the Field Service" emphasized that artillery with its fire paves the way for the infantry and, for this purpose, strikes those targets that prevent the infantry from performing combat missions, and when the infantry attacks, specially designated batteries move towards the attacking troops at distances closest to the enemy to support the attack infantry (118). Here the term "pave the way for the infantry" draws attention. By this, the 1912 charter aimed at close interaction of the infantry with the artillery, which was supposed to help the infantry, accompanying it with fire and wheels. In the Russian "Charter of the field service of 1912" The idea of \u200b\u200bmassing artillery in battle was expressed, though not yet clearly and consistently enough, and, which was not in any of the foreign regulations, the need to support the attack of the infantry before throwing it into bayonets was emphasized. According to the regulations, light field artillery was included in the combat sectors of the infantry by battalions and batteries (119). The howitzer divisions and heavy field artillery that were part of the corps were either assigned to those sectors where their assistance was most useful and thus became subordinate to the lower commanders, or remained at the disposal of the corps commander and received tasks from him.

The conduct of defensive combat before the First World War was insufficiently developed in almost all countries. Defense was so neglected that in some armies the very word “defense” was avoided. Thus, in the French army, according to Luc's testimony, the word "defense" cut the ear so much that they did not dare to use it in exercises on maps and in tasks for field exercises. Those who were very interested in defense issues risked ruining their official reputation (120). Nevertheless, the charters of the various armies contained special articles and sections devoted to the conduct of a defensive battle. The methods of conducting defense were considered by the German regulations, although in Germany defense was generally underestimated. The essence of defense was seen in "not only repelling the attack, but also gaining a decisive victory," and for this, as the regulations demanded, defense must be combined with offensive actions (121).
Despite the negative attitude of the French command to defensive actions, the French manuals still provided for defense in certain areas to save forces, upset the enemy in order to enable the main forces to act offensively in the best conditions (122).
Russian regulations paid considerable attention to defensive actions. The transition to the defense was allowed in the case “when the set goal could not be achieved by the offensive” (123). But even while taking up defensive positions, the troops had to upset the enemy's forces with all kinds of fire, in order to then go on the offensive and break it.
In defense, the troops were deployed in a battle formation, which, as in the offensive, consisted of combat sectors and reserves. During the transition to the defense, the companies deployed in a chain, leaving one platoon behind as company support. The battalions deployed three companies in a chain, and one company was located behind in the battalion reserve. The regiments were deployed according to the same scheme (three battalions in the first echelon and one in reserve). According to the views of the Russian commanders, and in defense, it was required to make the strongest that sector that was most important.
Machine guns were usually distributed two at a time between the battalions of the first echelon, evenly strengthening them in terms of fire. The Austrian infantry regulations of 1911 recommended keeping machine guns in defense as a fire reserve.

The width of the defensive sections differed little from the width of the offensive sections. The width of the division's defense sectors was 4-5 km. The depth of defense was created by placing reserves and artillery and reached 1.5-2 km for the division. According to German views, the width of the sections had to be determined depending on the nature of the terrain. A precinct reserve was provided for in each section. Great importance was attached to the creation of a strong general reserve, the purpose of which was to counterattack the enemy. In the German army, the general reserve was located in a ledge behind the open flanks. Artillery firing positions were assigned on average at a distance of up to 600 m from the infantry.
The methods of strengthening field positions and views on their organization that existed before the First World War in the armies of future opponents were, in general, the same. The main line of defense consisted of strong points (centers of resistance), which were either open trenches or local objects adapted for defense (buildings, forests, heights, etc.). The gaps between the strongpoints were covered with fire. To delay the offensive of the enemy and to give time to the troops of the main position to prepare for battle, forward strong points were set up. Rear positions were created in the depths of the defense. German statutes required the creation of only one defensive position (124). Field fortifications were to be built not in a continuous line, but in groups, the intervals between them were to be shot through. The creation of any obstacles on the approaches to the positions was not envisaged (125). The defensive position, according to the Russian field service regulations, consisted of separate strong points in fire communications. Strongholds included trenches and local items, put in a defensive state. There were also "forward points" (outposts). Before the start of the battle, the infantry did not occupy the trenches, but was located near them (126).

After repelling the enemy's attack, according to the regulations, the defending troops must go over to a counterattack and into a general offensive (127).
Although the decisive role in combat in all armies was assigned to the infantry (128), its actions were directly dependent on the assistance of artillery and cavalry. Thus, the organization of interaction between the branches of the armed forces acquired particular importance. Russian "Charter of the field service 1912" clearly put forward the need for interaction in battle. The desire to achieve a common goal requires the interaction of all units and branches of the armed forces, - said in the charter, - the selfless fulfillment by all of their duty and mutual benefit ”(129). The cavalry was required to assist in the offensive and defense by energetic attacks "on the flanks and rear of the enemy" in cavalry and foot formation.
If the enemy was overturned, the cavalry proceeded to relentless pursuit (130). The German charter also emphasized the need for interaction, especially infantry and artillery (131). However, as H. Ritter later noted, the importance of interaction between the branches of the army in the German army “was not fully realized” (132). In reality, individual combat arms did not interact, but only acted next to each other. In the French statute, it was written that "the assistance of various types of weapons allows the infantry to perform the task under the best conditions" (133).
Russian "Charter of the field service 1912" correctly solved the main issues of offensive and defensive battles. Unlike similar regulations of other armies, it detailed the features of battles in special conditions (at night, in the mountains, etc.). The experience of these battles was gained during the Russo-Japanese War. Thus, this Russian charter, undoubtedly, stood higher than the regulations of other armies of that time, and was the best manual on the eve of the First World War.
The most prepared was the German army. Its officers and non-commissioned officers were carefully selected in terms of class, its training was at a high level. The army was well disciplined, knew how to maneuver on the battlefield and quickly march. The great advantage of the German army over other armies was that its military units had field howitzer and heavy artillery in their composition. But in terms of their preparation, the German artillery was significantly inferior to the Russian and French. The German gunners were not trained to shoot from closed positions. All attention was paid to the speed of fire, and not to its accuracy. The preparation of the German cavalry was good. Only training on foot in large formations was not given enough attention everywhere.

The French army was also well prepared, and the German generals saw in it a dangerous enemy. Two-thirds of the non-commissioned officer's regular posts were filled with trained over-conscripts. The officer corps of the French army stood quite high in general development, education and theoretical training, which could not be said about the highest command personnel. The French soldiers were fully prepared for the war, in the field they acted actively and proactively. Much attention in the French army was paid to training the marching movement of large military formations. The French army had an independent, well-defined military doctrine that differed from the German by excessive caution. The great disadvantage of the French army was the almost complete absence of field heavy artillery and light field howitzers in the troops.
The Russian army was not inferior to the armies of Western European countries in combat training. The soldiers were well trained, enduring and brave. The non-commissioned officers were well trained.

The troops paid much attention to the skillful conduct of rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire. Russian artillery in its training, of course, stood in first place in comparison with all other armies.
The regular Russian cavalry was well trained in combat both in horse formation and in the combination of horse and foot combat. The cavalry conducted good reconnaissance, but little attention was paid to the actions of the cavalry in large masses. Cossack regiments in tactical training were inferior to regular regiments.
The officer corps of the Russian army in the middle and junior echelon had a fairly good training. The great advantage of the Russian army was that its commanding staff had recent combat experience in the Russo-Japanese war. Other armies did not have such experience (the German and French armies did not fight for 44 years, the Austro-Hungarian armies for 48 years, England generally waged only colonial wars against the unarmed population of enslaved countries).
The generals of the Russian army, senior and senior command personnel, whose training in peacetime was not given due attention, did not always correspond to the positions they occupied.

The British troops were excellent fighting material. The training of the English soldiers and juniors was good. Soldiers and officers skillfully used personal weapons. However, in operational and tactical training, the British army lagged far behind other armies. Its senior and senior commanders had no experience of a big war and showed their ignorance of modern military affairs already in the first battles.
The Austro-Hungarian army was worse prepared for war than other armies. The training of the rank and file did not meet modern requirements. The junior officers were better prepared tactically. The senior command staff of the Austro-Hungarian army was not sufficiently trained in the management of combined arms formations in the field. The level of training did not meet modern requirements. Fire control and massing of artillery fire were poorly carried out.

D. V. Verzhkhovsky

World War I (1914 - 1918)

The Russian Empire collapsed. One of the goals of the war has been accomplished.

Chamberlain

The First World War lasted from August 1, 1914 to November 11, 1918. 38 states with a population of 62% of the world took part in it. This war was quite ambiguous and extremely contradictory described in modern history. I specially cited Chamberlain's words in the epigraph to once again emphasize this inconsistency. A prominent politician in England (Russia's ally in the war) says that one of the goals of the war has been achieved by the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia!

The Balkan countries played an important role at the beginning of the war. They were not independent. Their policies (both foreign and domestic) were greatly influenced by England. Germany by that time had lost its influence in this region, although it controlled Bulgaria for a long time.

• Entente. Russian Empire, France, Great Britain. The USA, Italy, Romania, Canada, Australia, New Zealand were allies.
• Triple Alliance. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire. Later they were joined by the Bulgarian kingdom, and the coalition became known as the "Quadruple Alliance".

The following large countries took part in the war: Austria-Hungary (July 27, 1914 - November 3, 1918), Germany (August 1, 1914 - November 11, 1918), Turkey (October 29, 1914 - October 30, 1918), Bulgaria (October 14, 1915 - 29 September 1918). Entente countries and allies: Russia (August 1, 1914 - March 3, 1918), France (August 3, 1914), Belgium (August 3, 1914), Great Britain (August 4, 1914), Italy (May 23, 1915), Romania (August 27, 1916) ...

One more important point. Italy was originally a member of the Triple Alliance. But after the outbreak of World War I, Italians declared neutrality.

Causes of the First World War

The main reason for the outbreak of the First World War is the desire of the leading powers, primarily England, France and Austria-Hungary, to redistribute the world. The fact is that the colonial system collapsed by the beginning of the 20th century. The leading European countries, which for years prospered through the exploitation of colonies, now could not get resources just like that, taking them away from the Indians, Africans and South Americans. Now resources could only be won from each other. Therefore, contradictions grew:

• Between England and Germany. England sought to prevent the strengthening of Germany's influence in the Balkans. Germany sought to gain a foothold in the Balkans and the Middle East, and also sought to deprive England of naval domination.
• Between Germany and France. France dreamed of regaining the lands of Alsace and Lorraine, which she had lost in the war of 1870-71. France also sought to capture the German Saar coal basin.
• Between Germany and Russia. Germany sought to take away from Russia Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states.
• Between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Contradictions arose because of the desire of both countries to influence the Balkans, as well as the desire of Russia to subjugate the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The reason for the start of the war

The events in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) triggered the start of the First World War. On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Black Hand of the Young Bosnia movement, assassinated Archduke Frans Ferdinand. Ferdinand was the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, so the murder had a huge resonance. This was the reason for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia.

The behavior of England is very important here, since Austria-Hungary on its own could not start a war, because this practically guaranteed a war throughout Europe. The British at the embassy level convinced Nicholas II that Russia should not leave Serbia without help in case of aggression. But then the entire (I emphasize this) the English press wrote that the Serbs are barbarians and Austria-Hungary should not leave unpunished the murder of the Archduke. That is, England did everything to prevent Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia from evading the war.

Important nuances of the reason for war

In all textbooks we are told that the main and only reason for the outbreak of the First World War is the assassination of the Austrian Archduke. At the same time, they forget to say that the next day, June 29, another landmark murder took place. The French politician Jean Jaures, who actively opposed the war and had great influence in France, was killed. A few weeks before the assassination of the Archduke, there was an attempt on the life of Rasputin, who, like Jaures, was an opponent of the war and had a great influence on Nicholas 2. I also want to note some facts from the fate of the main characters of those days:

• Gavrilo Principin. He died in prison in 1918 from tuberculosis.
• Russian Ambassador to Serbia - Hartley. In 1914 he died at the Austrian Embassy in Serbia, where he attended a reception.
• Colonel Apis, leader of the Black Hand. He was shot in 1917.
• In 1917, Hartley's correspondence with Sozonov (the next Russian ambassador to Serbia) disappeared.

All this indicates that in the events of the days there were a lot of black spots that have not been revealed until now. And this is very important to understand.

England's role in starting the war

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were 2 great powers in continental Europe: Germany and Russia. They did not want to openly fight against each other, since the forces were approximately equal. Therefore, in the "July crisis" of 1914, both sides took a wait and see attitude. English diplomacy came to the fore. She, through the press and secret diplomacy, conveyed to Germany the position - in the event of war, England would remain neutral or take the side of Germany. By open diplomacy, Nicholas II received the opposite idea that in the event of a war, England would side with Russia.

It should be clearly understood that one open statement by England that she will not allow war in Europe would be enough for neither Germany nor Russia to think about anything like that. Naturally, in such conditions, Austria-Hungary would hesitate to attack Serbia. But England with all her diplomacy pushed European countries to war.

Russia before the war

Before the First World War, Russia undertook an army reform. In 1907, the fleet was reformed, and in 1910 the land forces were reformed. The country has multiplied military spending, and the total army in peacetime was now 2 million people. In 1912, Russia adopts a new Charter for Field Service. Today it is rightfully called the most perfect charter of its time, since it motivated soldiers and commanders to show personal initiative. An important point! The doctrine of the army of the Russian Empire was offensive.

Despite the fact that there were many positive changes, there were also very serious mistakes. The main one is the underestimation of the role of artillery in the war. As the course of events of the First World War showed, it was a terrible mistake, which clearly showed that at the beginning of the 20th century, Russian generals were seriously behind the times. They lived in the past, when the role of the cavalry was important. As a result, 75% of all losses of the First World War were inflicted by artillery! This is a sentence to the imperial generals.

It is important to note that Russia never completed preparations for war (at the proper level), and Germany completed it in 1914.

The ratio of forces and means before the war and after it

Artillery

	Number of guns	Of these, heavy weapons
Austro-hungary
Germany

According to the data from the table, it can be seen that Germany and Austria-Hungary were many times superior to Russia and France in heavy guns. Therefore, the balance of forces was in favor of the first two countries. Moreover, the Germans, as usual, created an excellent war industry before the war, producing 250,000 rounds daily. By comparison, Britain was producing 10,000 shells a month! As they say, feel the difference ...

Another example showing the importance of artillery is the fighting on the Dunajec Gorlice line (May 1915). In 4 hours, the German army fired 700,000 shells. For comparison, during the entire Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) Germany fired just over 800,000 shells. That is, in 4 hours a little less than in the entire war. The Germans clearly understood that heavy artillery would play a decisive role in the war.

Armament and military equipment

Production of weapons and equipment during the First World War (thousand units).

	Shooting	Artillery
Great Britain
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
Germany
Austro-hungary

This table clearly shows the weakness of the Russian Empire in terms of equipping the army. In all the main indicators, Russia is much inferior to Germany, but also inferior to France and Great Britain. Largely because of this, the war turned out to be so difficult for our country.

Number of people (infantry)

The number of fighting infantry (millions).

	At the start of the war	By the end of the war	Casualties
Great Britain
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
Germany
Austro-hungary

The table shows that Great Britain made the smallest contribution, both in terms of belligerents and in terms of deaths, to the war. This is logical, since the British did not really participate in major battles. Another example from this table is indicative. We are told in all textbooks that Austria-Hungary, due to heavy losses, could not fight on its own, and she always needed the help of Germany. But pay attention to Austria-Hungary and France in the table. The numbers are identical! Just as Germany had to fight for Austria-Hungary, so Russia had to fight for France (it was no coincidence that the Russian army three times during the First World War saved Paris from surrender by its actions).

The table also shows that in fact the war was between Russia and Germany. Both countries lost 4.3 million people killed, while Britain, France and Austria-Hungary together lost 3.5 million. The numbers are eloquent. But it turned out that the countries that fought the most and made efforts in the war ended up with nothing. First, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, shameful for itself, having lost many lands. Then Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, essentially losing its independence.

The course of the war

Military events of 1914

On July 28, Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. This entailed the involvement in the war of the countries of the Troitsvenny Alliance, on the one hand, and the Entente, on the other.

Russia entered the First World War on August 1, 1914. Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov (Nicholas 2's uncle) was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In the first days of the outbreak of the war, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd. Since the war with Germany began, and the capital could not have the name of German origin - "burg".

History reference

German "Schlieffen Plan"

Germany was under the threat of war on two fronts: the East with Russia, the West with France. Then the German command developed the "Schlieffen plan", according to which Germany must defeat France in 40 days and then fight with Russia. Why 40 days? The Germans believed that that was exactly how much Russia would need to mobilize. Therefore, when Russia is mobilized, France will already be out of the game.

On August 2, 1914, Germany captured Luxembourg, on August 4, they invaded Belgium (a neutral country at that time), and by August 20, Germany reached the borders of France. The implementation of the Schlieffen plan began. Germany advanced deep into France, but on September 5 was stopped by the Marne River, where a battle took place, in which about 2 million people from both sides participated.

Northwestern Front of Russia in 1914

At the beginning of the war, Russia did a stupid thing that Germany could not possibly calculate. Nicholas 2 decided to enter the war without fully mobilizing the army. On August 4, Russian troops, under the command of Rennenkampf, launched an offensive in East Prussia (present-day Kaliningrad). Samsonov's army was equipped to help her. Initially, the troops acted successfully, and Germany was forced to retreat. As a result, part of the forces of the Western Front was transferred to the Eastern. As a result, Germany repulsed the Russian offensive in East Prussia (the troops were acting disorganized and lacked resources), but as a result, the Schlieffen plan failed, and France was not captured. So, Russia saved Paris, though by defeating its 1st and 2nd armies. After that, trench warfare began.

Southwestern Front of Russia

On the southwestern front, in August-September, Russia launched an offensive operation against Galicia, which was occupied by the troops of Austria-Hungary. The Galician operation was more successful than the offensive in East Prussia. In this battle, Austria-Hungary suffered a catastrophic defeat. 400 thousand people killed, 100 thousand captured. For comparison, the Russian army lost 150 thousand people killed. After that, Austria-Hungary actually withdrew from the war, since it lost the ability to conduct independent actions. Austria was saved from complete defeat only by the help of Germany, which was forced to transfer additional divisions to Galicia.

The main results of the military campaign in 1914

• Germany failed to implement Schlieffen's plan for lightning war.
• No one has won a decisive advantage. The war turned into a trench war.

Map of military events 1914-15

Military events of 1915

In 1915, Germany decided to shift the main blow to the eastern front, directing all its forces to the war with Russia, which was the weakest country of the Entente, according to the Germans. It was a strategic plan developed by the commander of the Eastern Front, General von Hindenburg. Russia managed to thwart this plan only at the cost of colossal losses, but at the same time 1915 turned out to be simply terrible for the empire of Nicholas II.

Position on the northwestern front

From January to October, Germany led an active offensive, as a result of which Russia lost Poland, western Ukraine, part of the Baltic states, and western Belarus. Russia went into deep defense. The losses of the Russians were gigantic:

• Killed and wounded - 850 thousand people
• Captured - 900 thousand people

Russia did not capitulate, but the countries of the "Triple Alliance" were convinced that Russia would no longer be able to recover from the losses it received.

The successes of Germany in this sector of the front led to the fact that on October 14, 1915, Bulgaria entered the First World War (on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary).

Position on the southwestern front

The Germans, together with Austria-Hungary, organized the Gorlitsky Breakthrough in the spring of 1915, forcing the entire southwestern front of Russia to retreat. Galicia, which was captured in 1914, was completely lost. Germany was able to achieve this advantage thanks to the terrible mistakes of the Russian command, as well as a significant technical advantage. German superiority in technology reached:

• 2.5 times with machine guns.
• 4.5 times in light artillery.
• 40 times with heavy artillery.

It was not possible to withdraw Russia from the war, but the losses in this sector of the front were gigantic: 150 thousand killed, 700 thousand wounded, 900 thousand prisoners and 4 million refugees.

Position on the western front

"Everything is calm on the western front." This phrase can be used to describe how the war between Germany and France proceeded in 1915. There was a sluggish military action in which no one strove for the initiative. Germany was implementing plans in eastern Europe, while England and France calmly mobilized the economy and army, preparing for further war. Nobody provided any assistance to Russia, although Nicholas II repeatedly appealed to France, first of all, to initiate active operations on the Western Front. As usual, no one heard him ... By the way, this sluggish war on the western front for Germany is perfectly described by Hemingway in his novel A Farewell to Arms.

The main result of 1915 was that Germany was unable to withdraw Russia from the war, although all forces were thrown into this. It became obvious that the First World War would drag on for a long time, since during the 1.5 years of the war no one managed to gain an advantage or strategic initiative.

Military events of 1916

"Verdun meat grinder"

In February 1916, Germany launched a general offensive against France, with the aim of capturing Paris. For this, a campaign was carried out to Verdun, which covered the approaches to the French capital. The battle lasted until the end of 1916. During this time, 2 million people died, for which the battle was named "Verdun meat grinder". France resisted, but again thanks to the fact that Russia came to its rescue, which became more active on the southwestern front.

Events on the southwestern front in 1916

In May 1916, Russian troops launched an offensive that lasted 2 months. This offensive went down in history under the name "Brusilov Breakthrough". This name is due to the fact that the Russian army was commanded by General Brusilov. The breakthrough of the defense in Bukovina (from Lutsk to Chernivtsi) happened on June 5. The Russian army managed not only to break through the defenses, but also to advance into its depths in places up to 120 kilometers. The losses of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were catastrophic. 1.5 million dead, wounded and prisoners. The offensive was stopped only by additional German divisions, which were hastily transferred here from Verdun (France) and from Italy.

This offensive of the Russian army was not without a fly in the ointment. The allies threw her up, as usual. On August 27, 1916, Romania entered the First World War on the side of the Entente. Germany very quickly defeated her. As a result, Romania lost the army, and Russia received an additional 2 thousand kilometers of front.

Events on the Caucasian and Northwestern Fronts

Positional battles continued on the North-Western Front during the spring-autumn period. As for the Caucasian Front, here the main events lasted from the beginning of 1916 to April. During this time, 2 operations were carried out: Erzurmur and Trebizond. According to their results, Erzurum and Trebizond were conquered, respectively.

Outcome of 1916 in the First World War

• The strategic initiative went over to the side of the Entente.
• The French fortress of Verdun survived thanks to the offensive of the Russian army.
• Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente.
• Russia launched a powerful offensive - the Brusilov Breakthrough.

Military and political events 1917

The year 1917 in the First World War was marked by the fact that the war continued against the background of the revolutionary situation in Russia and Germany, as well as the deterioration of the economic situation of the countries. Let me give you an example of Russia. Over the 3 years of the war, prices for basic products have increased by an average of 4-4.5 times. Naturally, this caused discontent among the people. Add to this the heavy losses and the exhausting war - it is an excellent ground for revolutionaries. The situation is similar in Germany.

In 1917, the United States entered the First World War. The positions of the "Triple Alliance" are deteriorating. Germany with its allies cannot effectively fight on 2 fronts, as a result of which it goes on the defensive.

The end of the war for Russia

In the spring of 1917, Germany launched another offensive on the Western Front. Despite the events in Russia, Western countries demanded that the Provisional Government implement the agreements signed by the Empire and send troops on the offensive. As a result, on June 16, the Russian army launched an offensive in the Lvov region. Again, we saved the allies from major battles, but we ourselves were completely substituted.

The Russian army, exhausted by the war and losses, did not want to fight. The issues of provisions, uniforms and provision of supplies during the war years were not resolved. The army fought reluctantly, but moved forward. The Germans were forced to redeploy troops here, and Russia's allies in the Entente again isolated themselves, watching what would happen next. On July 6, Germany launched a counteroffensive. As a result, 150,000 Russian soldiers were killed. The army actually ceased to exist. The front fell apart. Russia could no longer fight, and this catastrophe was inevitable.

People demanded that Russia withdraw from the war. And this was one of their main demands on the Bolsheviks, who seized power in October 1917. Initially, at the 2nd party congress, the Bolsheviks signed the decree "On Peace", in fact proclaiming Russia's withdrawal from the war, and on March 3, 1918, they signed the Brest Peace. The conditions of this world were as follows:

• Russia makes peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
• Russia loses Poland, Ukraine, Finland, part of Belarus and the Baltic states.
• Russia yields to Turkey Batum, Kars and Ardahan.

As a result of its participation in the First World War, Russia lost: about 1 million square meters of territory, about 1/4 of the population, 1/4 of arable land and 3/4 of the coal and metallurgical industries were lost.

History reference

Events in the war in 1918

Germany got rid of the Eastern Front and the need to wage a war in two directions. As a result, in the spring and summer of 1918, she attempted an offensive on the Western Front, but this offensive had no success. Moreover, as it went on, it became obvious that Germany was squeezing the maximum out of herself, and that she needed a break in the war.

Autumn 1918

Decisive events in the First World War took place in the fall. The Entente countries, together with the United States, went on the offensive. The German army was completely driven out of France and Belgium. In October, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria concluded a truce with the Entente, and Germany was left to fight alone. Her position was hopeless after the German allies in the "Triple Alliance" essentially capitulated. This resulted in the same thing that happened in Russia - the revolution. On November 9, 1918, Emperor Wilhelm II was overthrown.

End of World War I

On November 11, 1918, the First World War of 1914-1918 ended. Germany signed a complete surrender. It happened near Paris, in the Compiegne forest, at the Retonde station. The capitulation was accepted by the French Marshal Foch. The terms of the signed peace were as follows:

• Germany admits complete defeat in the war.
• The return of France to the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the borders of 1870, as well as the transfer of the Saar coal basin.
• Germany lost all of its colonial possessions, and also pledged to transfer 1/8 of its territory to its geographical neighbors.
• For 15 years, the Entente troops are on the left bank of the Rhine.
• By May 1, 1921, Germany had to pay the members of the Entente (Russia was not entitled to anything) 20 billion marks in gold, goods, securities, etc.
• For 30 years Germany has to pay reparations, and the amount of these reparations is set by the winners and can increase them at any time during these 30 years.
• Germany was forbidden to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, and the army was obliged to be exclusively voluntary.

The terms of the "peace" were so humiliating for Germany that the country actually became a puppet. Therefore, many people of that time said that although the First World War ended, it ended not in peace, but in a truce for 30 years. So it ultimately happened ...

Results of the first world war

The First World War was fought on the territory of 14 states. It was attended by countries with a total population of over 1 billion people (this is about 62% of the total world population at that time). In total, 74 million people were mobilized by the participating countries, of which 10 million were killed and another 20 million were injured.

As a result of the war, the political map of Europe has changed significantly. Such independent states as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Albania appeared. Auto-Hungary split into Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Romania, Greece, France, Italy have increased their borders. Losers and losers in the territory were 5 countries: Germany, Auto-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

World War I 1914-1918 map

Forgotten pages of the Great War

Russian army during the first world war

Russian infantry

On the eve of the First World War, the Russian imperial army numbered 1,350,000 people, after mobilization the number reached 5,338,000 people, in service there were 6,848 light and 240 heavy guns, 4,157 machine guns, 263 aircraft, over 4,000 cars. For the first time in history, Russia had to maintain a continuous front 900 kilometers long and up to 750 kilometers deep and deploy an army of more than five million people. The war showed many innovations: aerial combat, chemical weapons, the first tanks, and "trench warfare" that rendered the Russian cavalry useless. However, the most important thing was that the war clearly demonstrated all the advantages of the industrially developed powers. The Russian Empire, with its relatively undeveloped industry in comparison with Western Europe, experienced a shortage of weapons, primarily the so-called "shell hunger".

In 1914, only 7 million 5 thousand shells were prepared for the entire war. Their stocks in warehouses ran out after 4-5 months of hostilities, while the Russian industry produced only 656 thousand shells for the entire 1914 (that is, covering the needs of the army in one month). Already on the 53rd day of mobilization, on September 8, 1914, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich addressed the emperor directly: “For about two weeks now there has been a shortage of artillery cartridges, which I stated with a request to speed up the delivery. Now Adjutant General Ivanov informs that he must suspend operations in Przemysl and on the entire front until the cartridges are brought in local parks to at least a hundred for the gun. Now there are only twenty-five each. This forces me to ask Your Majesty to order to speed up the delivery of cartridges. " Characteristic were the responses of the Ministry of War, headed by Sukhomlinov, that "the troops are shooting too much."

During 1915-1916, the severity of the shell crisis was reduced due to an increase in domestic production and imports; in 1915, Russia produced 11,238 million shells, and imported 1,317 million. In July 1915, the empire moved to mobilize the rear, forming a Special Conference on the Defense of the Country. Until that time, the government has traditionally tried to place military orders at military factories whenever possible, not trusting private ones. At the beginning of 1916, the Conference nationalizes the two largest factories in Petrograd - Putilovsky and Obukhovsky. At the beginning of 1917, the shell crisis was completely overcome, and the artillery even had an excessive number of shells (3,000 for a light gun and 3,500 for a heavy one, with 1,000 at the beginning of the war).

Fedorov automatic rifle

At the time of the end of mobilization in 1914, there were only 4.6 million rifles in the army, while the army itself was 5.3 million.The needs of the front amounted to 100-150 thousand rifles per month, while production in 1914 was only 27 thousand. The situation was corrected thanks to mobilization of civilian enterprises and imports. The armament received modernized machine guns of the Maxim system and Mosin rifles of the 1910 model, new guns of 76-152 mm calibers, Fedorov assault rifles.

The relative underdevelopment of railways (in 1913 the total length of railways in Russia was six times lower than the United States) greatly hampered the rapid transfer of troops, the organization of supplies for the army and large cities. The use of railways primarily for the needs of the front significantly worsened the supply of bread to Petrograd, and became one of the reasons for the February Revolution of 1917 (with the outbreak of the war, the army took a third of all rolling stock).

Due to the long distances, according to German experts at the beginning of the war, the Russian conscript had to cover an average of 900-1000 km to his destination, while in Western Europe this figure averaged 200-300 km. At the same time, in Germany there were 10.1 km of railways per 100 km² of territory, in France - 8.8, in Russia - 1.1; in addition, three-quarters of Russian railways were single-track.

According to the calculations of the German Schlieffen plan, Russia will carry out the mobilization taking into account these difficulties in 110 days, while Germany - in just 15 days. These calculations were well known to Russia itself and the French allies; France agreed to finance the modernization of Russian rail links with the front. In addition, in 1912 Russia adopted the Great Military Program, which was supposed to reduce the period of mobilization to 18 days. By the beginning of the war, much of this had not yet been realized.

Murmansk railway

With the outbreak of the war, Germany blocked the Baltic Sea, and Turkey - the Black Sea straits. The main ports for the import of ammunition and strategic raw materials were Arkhangelsk, which freezes from November to March, and the non-freezing Murmansk, which in 1914 did not yet have a railway connection with the central regions. The third most important port, Vladivostok, was too remote. The result was that a significant amount of military imports were stuck in the warehouses of these three ports by 1917. One of the measures taken by the Conference on Defense of the Country was the conversion of the narrow-gauge railway Arkhangelsk-Vologda to the usual one, which made it possible to triple traffic. The construction of a railway to Murmansk was also started, but it was completed only by January 1917.

With the outbreak of the war, the government drafted a significant number of reservists into the army, who were kept in the rear during the training. A serious mistake was the fact that, in order to save money, three-quarters of the reservists were stationed in the cities, in the location of the units of which they were supposed to become. In 1916, a call was made for the older age group, who had long considered themselves not subject to mobilization, and took it extremely painfully. In Petrograd and the suburbs alone, up to 340 thousand soldiers of spare parts and subunits were deployed. They were located in overcrowded barracks, next to the civilian population, embittered by the hardships of war. In Petrograd, 160 thousand soldiers lived in barracks designed for 20 thousand. At the same time, in Petrograd there were only 3.5 thousand policemen and several companies of Cossacks.

Already in February 1914, the former Minister of Internal Affairs P.N.Durnovo submitted to the emperor an analytical note, in which he stated, “in case of failure, the possibility of which, when fighting such an enemy as Germany, cannot be foreseen, a social revolution in its most extreme manifestations we have inevitable. As already indicated, it will start with the fact that all the failures will be attributed to the government. A violent campaign against him will begin in the legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary uprisings will begin in the country. These latter immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can raise and group broad strata of the population: first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values \u200b\u200band property. The defeated army, having lost, moreover, during the war the most reliable cadre of its composition, seized in most of it by a spontaneously common peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intellectual parties, deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people, will be unable to restrain the diverging waves of the people, which they themselves raised, and Russia will be plunged into a hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen. "

Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Adjutant General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov (sitting) with his son and officers of the front headquarters

By the winter of 1916-1917, the supply paralysis of Moscow and Petrograd reached its climax: they received only a third of the bread they needed, and Petrograd, in addition, only half of the fuel required. In 1916, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Sturmer proposed a project for the evacuation of 80 thousand soldiers and 20 thousand refugees from Petrograd, but this project was never implemented.

By the beginning of the First World War, the composition of the corps had changed. Instead of three, it began to include only two infantry divisions, and a mounted Cossack regiment began to be created in wartime, not with every infantry division, but with a corps.

In the winter of 1915/16, General Gurko reorganized the armed forces on the same principle as Germany and then France the year before. Only the Germans and the French had 3 regiments in their divisions, and the Russians had 4 each, but the regiments themselves were transferred from 4 to 3 battalions, and the cavalry from 6 to 4 squadrons. This made it possible to reduce the accumulation of fighters on the front line, to reduce their losses. And the striking power of the divisions remained, since they had the same amount of artillery, and the number of machine-gun companies and their composition increased, the number of machine guns in the formations became 3 times more.

From the memoirs of A. Brusilov: “This time my front was given relatively significant means to attack the enemy: the so-called TAON - the main artillery reserve of the Supreme Commander, which consisted of heavy artillery of different calibers, and two army corps of the same reserve were to arrive in early spring ... I was quite sure that with the same careful preparation that had been carried out in the previous year, and the significant funds that were released, we could not fail to have good success in 1917. The troops, as I said above, were in a strong mood of spirit, and one could rely on them, with the exception of the 7th Siberian Corps, which arrived at my front in the autumn from the Riga region and was in a wavering mood. Some disorganization was introduced by the unsuccessful measure of the formation of third divisions in corps without artillery and the difficulty of forming carts for these divisions due to the lack of horses, and partly of fodder. The condition of the horse train in general was also doubtful, since oats and hay were delivered from the rear extremely little, and there was no way to get anything on the spot, since everything had already been eaten. Of course, we could break through the first fortified enemy zone, but further advance to the west, with a shortage and weakness of horse personnel, made it doubtful, about which I reported and urgently asked for accelerated help in this disaster. But at Headquarters, where Alekseev had already returned (Gurko again received the Special Army), as well as in Petersburg, it was obviously not up to the front. Great events were being prepared that overturned the entire way of Russian life and destroyed the army that was at the front. During the February Revolution, the day before the abdication of the last Russian emperor Nicholas II, the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1, abolishing the principle of one-man command in the army and establishing soldiers' committees in military units and on courts. This accelerated the moral decay of the army, reduced its fighting efficiency and contributed to the growth of desertion. "

Russian infantry on the march

Ammunition for the upcoming offensive was prepared so much that even with a complete stop of all Russian factories, it would have been enough for 3 months of continuous battle. However, one can recall that the weapons and ammunition accumulated for this campaign were then enough for the entire civilian campaign, and there were still surpluses that in 1921 the Bolsheviks gave to Turkey to Kemal Pasha.

In 1917, preparations were being made to introduce a new uniform in the army, more comfortable and at the same time made in the Russian national spirit, which was supposed to further raise patriotic sentiments. This uniform was made according to the sketches of the famous artist Vasnetsov - instead of caps for soldiers, peaked cloth hats - "heroes" (the same ones that would later be called "budenovka"), beautiful overcoats with "conversations" reminiscent of Strelets' caftans were provided. For officers, light and practical leather jackets were sewn (those in which commissars and security officers will soon flaunt).

By October 1917, the size of the army reached 10 million people, although only about 20% of its total strength was at the front. During the war, 19 million people were mobilized - almost half of the men of military age. The war became the hardest test for the army. By the time of the withdrawal from the war, Russia's losses in killed exceeded three million people.

Literature:

Military history "Voyenizdat" M .: 2006.

Russian Army in the First World War M .: 1974.