ThreePunic Warslasted intermittently from 264 to 146 BC. e. Wars were fought betweenRomeand North African public education - Carthage. In the middle - endIII century BC e. Carthage and Rome sought to extend their power to the Mediterranean peoples and states. At the same time, the Second Punic War occupies an important place in the history of military art and diplomacy.
Every war is like the Patriotic War
Let's say a few words about the First Punic War, which lasted 23 years (264-241 BC). Its punes (a distorted name for the Phoenicians - the ancestors of the Carthaginians, who inherited this name) lost and paid huge indemnities to Rome, which, unlike the then already powerful Carthage, was only gaining strength in those days.
The cause of the war was the following circumstances. In the middle of the 3rd century BC. e. the possessions of the Roman Republic reached the south of the Apennine Peninsula. Then Rome turned its attention to a tasty piece of land in the Mediterranean Sea - the island of Sicily. The same island lay in the area of interest of Carthage. The latter had a powerful fleet, while the Roman fleet at that time was very meager. In record time, the Romans built a fairly serious fleet (by 260 BC). In addition, the Romans, known for their engineering, decided to use the fighting qualities of their infantry at sea. They came up with the so-called corvus(“raven”) - a transfer boarding bridge that could be rotated around an axis, hooked to the side of an enemy ship and turned naval battle to "land". Soon almost all enemy ships were captured. And during the remaining time of the First Punic War, the Carthaginians won only one naval battle. As a result, in addition to indemnities, Rome received Sicily.
A caveat is worth making here. In history, Rome fought each of its wars ideologically as a Patriotic War. Carthage perceived the wars with Rome as colonial, distant ones that could be won or lost, which, of course, was a shame, but the world would not have collapsed because of it.
Second Punic War
The first reason for the start of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) was diplomatic. Soon after the first war, an agreement was concluded on the division of spheres of influence between Carthage and Rome. In the southwest, the dividing line ran through Spain. One of the Spanish cities entered into an alliance with Rome, thereby breaking the agreement between Rome and Carthage. Carthage sent troops led by Hannibal, who besieged and took the city. Residents were killed. After unsuccessful negotiations, Rome declared war on Carthage. But in the meantime, Hannibal was already marching from Spain through the Alps towards Italy.
Hannibal made a big mistake - he did not explore the road through the Alps. As a result, out of a 60,000-strong army, only 26,000 soldiers survived the transition, and almost all of the war elephants were lost. Hannibal had to spend several weeks restoring the army and attracting the Gauls (aka the Celts, the old enemies of Rome) to his side.
Transition of the Carthaginians through the Alps. Drawing by Heinrich Leutemann
In the first period of the war, Hannibal was completely successful. In heavy, devastating battles, the Romans became convinced that they were fighting an excellent commander. Then the Senate appointed the aristocrat Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator for six months. He began to use scorched earth tactics and lead guerrilla warfare against Hannibal's troops. But this only made it possible to prolong the war to restore the strength lost in the first period of the Second Punic War.
In 216 BC. e. The fight against Hannibal was led by new consuls, Gaius Terence Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus. Was collected new army. But at the Battle of Cannae that same year, the outnumbered Romans were utterly defeated thanks to Hannibal's cunning and leadership talents. After this, many Italian cities began to switch to the side of the Carthaginian commander, and Carthage decided to send support to Hannibal. However, Hannibal did not dare to march on the Eternal City, making a fatal mistake. He invited Rome to make peace, but Rome refused and fielded a new army, mobilizing all its resources, because for him it was a patriotic war.
Meanwhile, evidence came from Spain that the Romans were defeated there too. The Senate sent Publius Scipio, the future Scipio Africanus, there. He quickly proved himself to be a commander worthy of his ancestors, as well as a noble man, by taking New Carthage. In Scipio, the Romans finally had a charismatic figure in this war. In 205 BC. e. he was elected consul.
F. Goya. Hannibal gazes at Italy from the heights of the Alps
Scipio proposed leaving Hannibal and his army in Italy, and throwing the Roman army against Carthage. The Roman authorities did not support Scipio financially, allowing him to wage war in Africa at his own peril and risk. Scipio landed in Africa and inflicted a number of serious defeats on Carthage. Hannibal was urgently recalled to Africa. At the Battle of Zama, his troops were defeated by the forces of Scipio. As a result, Carthage lost the war and was forced to pay huge sums of money to the Roman Republic and hand over hostages. Carthage was broken, but continued to live richer than the victors. Hannibal, in turn, became the first person in Carthage to engage political affairs in other countries, and the Romans were hunting for him, which ultimately led to Hannibal, wanting to avoid capture, poisoning himself.
Carthage must be destroyed
For many years, Carthage forgot about its great-power politics and switched to economics, and Rome temporarily forgot about the existence of its sworn rival, until one day a Senate commission, which included a veteran of the war with Hannibal, Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder, went to Carthage. He saw with pain that Carthage was prospering, as he announced in the Senate.
The years between the Second and Third Punic Wars were complicated for Carthage by relations with Numidia. King Massinissa, taking advantage of the ban on Carthage having an army, regularly made campaigns against it, plundered it, and Rome did not interfere with this. Things got to the point that Carthage could not stand it, gathered an army, but lost to Massinissa. For Rome, this became a signal: this situation was promoted and presented by the Roman authorities as if Carthage had actually raised an army not against the Numidians, but against the Romans. Cato constantly added fuel to the fire, ending each of his speeches in the Senate with the words: “And yet I believe that Carthage should be destroyed.” Although Cato had many opponents on this issue, including Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilian Africanus the Younger (the adopted grandson of the winner Hannibal), in 149 BC. e. war was declared.
A consular army of 80 thousand soldiers landed in North Africa. Carthage was presented with demands: to liquidate the army, pay indemnities, hand over 300 hostages from among the noblest Carthaginians and release all prisoners. This was the usual behavior for the Romans: first “undress” the enemy, then put the finishing touches. Carthage obeyed. After all this, there was another requirement: to move to other places where it would be impossible to conduct maritime trade. Carthage decided to respond to this with armed (!) resistance, but first asked for a month to think about the resettlement. The Roman consuls, deciding that Carthage had nothing to defend itself with, agreed to provide this time for preparations for the resettlement. This oversight allowed the Carthaginians to prepare: women cut their hair to weave ropes for throwing weapons; workshops worked around the clock preparing weapons; the population was training. Doomed and desperate, Carthage will remain in a state of siege for three long years.
Until 147 BC. e. The Romans were unable to get things moving. Everything changed when Scipio Aemilian Africanus the Younger was elected consul. He managed to restore order and establish discipline in the army; embankments and siege structures were erected. Famine reigned in Carthage. In the spring of 146 BC. e. the assault began. Street fighting lasted for a week, the Carthaginians fought for every house, but their fate was sealed. The city was razed to the ground, the territory was plowed up, flooded sea water so that nothing will ever grow here again and no one will settle. Rome rejoiced limitlessly, having become the master of the entire Mediterranean.
Hamilcar Barca(c. 270-228 BC) - military and political figure Carthage. Led an army in Sicily in 248 BC. and led the military operations against the Romans, inflicting painful and sometimes very unexpected blows on them. So, in 247-246. BC. A fleet under the command of Hamilcar raided Italy. The commander’s victories were reversed in 241 BC. the conclusion of a peace treaty with Rome, which meant the defeat of the Phoenicians in the first Punic War. Obsessed with the idea of revenge, Hamilcar made every effort to restore the power of Carthage. He authorized a number of military actions and campaigns of conquest, which increased the chances of the Phoenicians in the fight against Rome. Unfortunately, he did not have time to realize his plans, having fallen in one of the battles during the conquest of Spain. His father's work was continued by his sons: Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Magon.
Hasdrubal the Handsome(about 270-221 BC) - son-in-law of Hamilcar. He was his close ally, accompanying him on all military campaigns, including during the conquest of Spain. After the death of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal continued the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula and founded the city of New Carthage. Killed by a Celtic mercenary sent by him.
Hannibal Barca(247-183 BC) - son of Hamilcar. From early childhood he took part in his father's military campaigns in Spain, and after his death - under the command of Hasdrubal the Handsome. He combined the skills of a commander, politician and reformer, which were especially clearly manifested in the Second Punic War, when Hannibal destroyed one Roman army after another with smaller forces: at Trebbia, at Lake Trasimus, at Cannae, etc. He used his talents not only on the battlefield, carefully studying the enemy and conducting reconnaissance. Even in Rome itself, Hannibal had spies who brought him information. The turning point in the war and the defeat of Carthage did not break the commander’s position. Immediately after the end of the Second Punic, he took a number of measures that allowed the Phoenicians to quickly recover from the humiliating peace imposed by the victors. He tried to create a new coalition against Rome, but after a series of failures he was forced to flee first to Syria and then to Armenia. He was betrayed and was about to be handed over to Rome, and in order to avoid capture, Hannibal took poison. In his own words: “It was not Rome, but the Carthaginian Senate that defeated Hannibal.”
Hasdrubal Barca(died in 207 BC) - brother of Hannibal. During the Second Punic War, commander of the Carthaginian troops in Spain. For several years he resisted superior enemy forces, pinning down the troops of Gnaeus and Publius Cornelius Scipio. During the military campaign he managed to fight in Africa and follow Hannibal with his army to Italy through the Alps. He fell in the battle of Metaurus. Hasdrubal's head was sent by the Romans to Hannibal.
Magon Barca(243-203 BC) - younger brother of Hannibal. After the victory of the Carthaginians at Cannae, he went to recruit a new army. Change political situation forced him to stay in Spain, defending it in 215-206. BC. from the Romans. To help his brother, in 205 BC. sailed with a small army to Italy, but was defeated and forced to return to his homeland. Died of wounds on the way to Carthage off the coast of Sardinia.
Scipioni
The glorious Roman family of Scipios was known long before the start of the Punic Wars. Representatives of this family were elected consuls more than once. And after the final defeat of Carthage, they continued to occupy various high positions both during the Roman Republic and in the Empire that replaced it. But we are interested in those representatives of the Scipios who contributed to the defeat of Carthage.
Lucius Cornelius Scipio(about 300 - about 250 BC) - successfully acting against the troops of Carthage, he completely cleared Corsica of them. In Sardinia he besieged the powerful fortress of Olbia. Due to the arrival of the Carthaginian fleet with troops on the island, he was forced to lift the siege of the city and retreat.
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio- brother of Lucius Cornelius Scipio. While commanding a fleet, he fell into the trap of the Carthaginian commander Hannibal (not the same commander, but another with a similar name) at Lipara, for which he received the nickname “Donkey.” In 254 BC. was able to rehabilitate himself in the battle during the capture of Panorma in Sicily.
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus- son of Lucius Cornelius Scipio. He distinguished himself in the battles for Spain during the Second Punic War. Began with victory at the Battle of Cissis in 218 BC. Died in 211 BC. in one of the battles.
Publius Cornelius Scipio- younger brother of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calva. He led one of the Roman armies during the Second Punic War and was defeated by the troops of Hannibal (the same one) in the Battle of Ticinus. For a long time he fought in Spain against the Carthaginians. Died along with his brother in 211 BC.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder(235-183 BC) - son of Publius Cornelius Scipio. As a military tribune, he fought with the Carthaginians at Cannae, where the Roman army suffered a crushing defeat. After the death of his father and uncle, he was sent to command the army in Spain. In 208 BC. Scipio's troops took New Carthage and defeated the armies of Mago and Hasdrubal. In Iberia, the Roman commander was able to win a number of more victories, freeing it from the Carthaginians. Further fighting spread to Africa. And here Scipio was able to win decisive victories over Hannibal and force Carthage to peace. After completing the Second Punic War, he received the nickname "African". After a military triumph, he fought with the Gauls in northern Italy, carried out diplomatic missions in Africa, and participated in Syrian war. The last years of the commander were overshadowed by persecution, because of which he was forced to flee to Syria (in the footsteps of Hannibal).
Lucius Cornelius Scipio(d. 183 BC) - younger brother of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder. He fought with his brother in Spain. He became famous for his military exploits in battles with Antiochus III. After the death of his older brother, Lucius's career went downhill. He was imprisoned, from which he was released at the request of Tiberius Gracchus. He tried to run for censor, but lost the election to Marcus Porcius Cato.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Korkul(d. 141 BC) - grandson of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calva. He did not have to show military talent on the battlefields against Carthage. Rather, on the contrary - he was the only one of the Scipios who defended the defeated enemy. In 159-149. BC. he was a political opponent of Marcus Porcius Cato, who said: “Carthage must be destroyed!” In contrast to the speaker, Publius said that Carthage should be preserved, since otherwise it would destabilize the situation in the region, and in addition, it would negatively affect the morality of the republic. His voice was not heard. Another Publius Cornelius Scipio helped in the destruction of Carthage.
Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (the Younger) of Numantius(185-129 BC) - stepson of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder. During the Third Punic War, he led the Roman army, captured and destroyed Carthage, for which he was awarded the title “African”. During the Numantine War, he took the city of Numantia and received a second nickname “Numantine”.
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Towards the middle III century BC e. The strongest states in the western Mediterranean were the Carthaginian power, which had dominated here for a long time, and the newly formed Roman slave-owning confederation.
Both Carthage and Rome carried out aggressive foreign policy, due to the nature of the slave economy, for which military expansion was a necessary condition for its development. Each of them aspired to become the hegemon of the Western Mediterranean world. In the middle III century BC e. contradictions between them led to the beginning of the first Punic War (the Romans called the Carthaginians Punics).
The cause of the first Punic War was the struggle between Rome and Carthage over Sicily, most of which (west) was in the hands of Carthage, and the smaller (eastern) part of the island was owned by the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles.
The reason for the war was the capture of the Sicilian city of Messana by mercenaries from the campaign. After the death of the tyrant of Syracuse, Agathocles, for whom they were in the service, the Mamertines took possession of Messana. The new ruler of Syracuse successfully opposed them Hieron II, who besieged Messana.
The twenty-three-year war exhausted the strength of the warring parties. Therefore, Carthage's proposal to begin peace negotiations was accepted by the Roman Senate. By peace treaty of 241 BC e. Carthage had to pay Rome an indemnity of 3,200 talents for 10 years, hand over tribal members, agree not to hire warriors from the tribes of the Apennine Peninsula into its army, and, most importantly, surrender its possessions in Sicily to Roman rule.
Syracuse remained an independent city. The Romans adhered to the principle of “divide and conquer” here too.
Second Punic War (218-210 BC) in its scale, scope and historical significance was one of the largest wars of antiquity. The reason for it was the events associated with the seaside city of Saguntum, which concluded an alliance treaty with Rome. IN 219 BC e. new commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian army Hannibal besieged Saguntum, captured and plundered it, and sold its inhabitants into slavery.
Defining the essence of the first two Punic wars, we can say that the reasons for Rome’s victories were due to the numerical superiority of its troops, distinguished by their high fighting qualities and the availability of material resources. Numerous Italian rural population, which made up the main parts of the Roman army, fought for their own lands.
The brilliant victories of the Carthaginian Hannibal were due to the talent of the commander, the surprise of the invasion of Italy, and the temporary weakening of the Roman Confederation. But Hannibal did not have the means to consolidate his successes. Hannibal's hopes for the rapid collapse of the Roman-Italian confederation were not justified.
IN 19 BC e. At the initiative of Rome, the third Punic War began.
The reason for the war was the conflict between Numidia and Carthage. The Numidian king, using the support of Rome, began to seize Carthaginian territory. Armed clashes occurred. Carthage had no right to begin military operations without the permission of Rome. Rome declared war on Carthage. The Carthaginians were ready to make peace on any terms. But the Romans invited the Carthaginians to leave the city and move to a distance of 15 km from the sea.
The Carthaginians decided to defend themselves to the end. The Romans eventually defeated the Carthaginian army. The Roman province of Africa was formed on lands that belonged to Carthage.
As a result of the wars of conquest, Rome became the strongest slave-holding power in the Mediterranean.
I. Events that preceded and led to the war. – § 152. Mutual relations between Rome and Carthage; - Mercenary war. – § 153. Hamilcar’s plan; – Conquest of Spain by the Carthaginians (236–221). – § 154. Hannibal until 221 – § 155. – Hannibal from 221; - his plan. – § 156. Hannibal’s actions in Spain; – Siege, capture and destruction of Saguntum by him (221–219). – § 157. Declaration of war and preparations for it on both sides.
Ancient sources: Polybius (books I, II and III), – Diodorus (excerpts), – Titus Livy (books XX, XXI and XXVII), – Appian and Florus; – Latest historical manuals: military: Vaucloncourt, Kausler, Lossau, Liskenne et Snuvan: Bibliothuque histor. et milit. part 2, Bernewitz, pr.; – general: Montesquieu, Heeren, Becker, Vötticher, Lorenz, etc., indicated in Part I in the Introduction and in Part II of Chapter. XX.
I. Events that preceded and led to the war.
§ 152. Mutual relations between Rome and Carthage; - Mercenary war.
In order to formulate a proper concept of mutual relations Rome and Carthage during the 23 years between the 1st and 2nd Punic Wars, it is necessary: firstly, to take into account, in totality, everything that was stated in Part II. in §§ 119–120–123–129–130 and 140–151, - and in 2, enter into consideration of those circumstances and events that followed the 1st war, preceded the 2nd and produced it.
The political rivalry of Rome and Carthage - two neighboring and powerful, but significantly different from one another, republics of antiquity - already during the first war between them turned into mutual enmity, bitterness and hatred, which gradually intensified more and more, especially on the part of Carthage - and not without reason. Rome, following its usual policy (Part II Chapter XX § 129) - to weaken the defeated strong enemy to the last extreme, without any mercy, acted and continued to act in relation to Carthage not only harshly and cruelly, but also with obvious injustice, recognizing all means suitable and permissible to achieve their own goals. He showed the first example of this in the prescription of extremely difficult and humiliating peace terms to Carthage in 241, and the second - soon after that.
Upon the conclusion of peace, Hamilcar resigned his command over the Carthaginian army in Sicily and instructed the commander Giston to disband the mercenaries who were in this army. Since the salary they received amounted to a very significant amount of money, and Carthage’s finances were extremely depleted, Giston began to transport mercenaries to Africa in parts, so that the government could have time and the opportunity to find means to satisfy them also in parts.
But the self-interested mercenaries made demands that far exceeded the expectations and calculations of the Carthaginian government, namely, they demanded payment of a salary that followed not only them, but also their comrades killed in Sicily, and rewards for all their horses that died there, and in case of refusal threatened to take and plunder the rich, trading city of Carthage. When the government, frightened by this, agreed to their demands, then they, heeding the insidious suggestions of the Campanian Spendius and the African Maphos, that the government was only planning to deceive them, rebelled and decided to satisfy themselves by plundering the city of Carthage. In this terrible danger, the government could oppose only about 10 tons of national Carthaginian and African troops, but the command over them, due to the envy and intrigues of some of the noblest Carthaginian families, was entrusted not to Hamilcar, but to Hanno. Hanno acted so ineptly and unsuccessfully that the rebels soon besieged the city of Carthage and they were already joined by the Africans (Livio-Phoenicians) subject to the Carthaginians. Only then, when the danger has already reached highest degree, command of the Carthaginian army was entrusted to Hamilcar. He immediately demonstrated all his skill in that he knew how and managed to divide the united forces of the rebels and began to smash and destroy them piece by piece without mercy. Fortunately, Hero of Syracuse also helped him in this, understanding correctly; according to Polybius, Syracuse will maintain its independence only as long as there is a balance between Rome and Carthage. In 237, Hamilcar, by taking Tunisia, in which Maphos sought his last refuge and salvation, completely ended this dangerous war for Carthage and thereby gained the glory of the savior of his fatherland, the gratitude of his compatriots and significantly strengthened the influence of his family and his followers on state affairs .
Meanwhile, Rome unworthyly took advantage of the cramped and dangerous internal position Carthage. His mercenaries, who were on the island of Sardinia, also rebelled when the Carthaginians began. take measures to pacify them - they turned to Rome with a request to take them under its patronage and protection. And Rome was not ashamed to agree to this, just as in 264 it was not ashamed to accept the Mamertine robbers under its protection! He declared the armament of Carthage a violation of the peace, took possession of Sardinia forever, and Carthage, already exhausted, was forced to agree to pay Rome another 1,200 talents in order to reject a new war that was impossible for it! Then Carthage's enmity against Rome turned into irreconcilable hatred and a thirst for revenge against it, common to the entire Carthaginian nation and especially to Hamilcar, his family and his followers. These feelings grew to such an extent that all the basic rules of state policy were sacrificed to them, which for a long time became the expression of the policy of Hamilcar Barca and his family. The opposing party of Hanno and his family and followers, sharing these feelings, tried no less zealously to preserve peace with Rome. However, Hamilcar, no matter how much he wanted a new war with Rome, however, in his high statesmanship, wanted to undertake it only when he provided Carthage with the forces, means and methods necessary for it. To this end, he drew up and proposed to the Carthaginian government a wonderful plan - to reward Carthage for the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and other islands - by conquering Spain.
§ 153. Hamilcar's plan; - conquest of Spain by the Carthaginians
The conquest of Spain presented as many undoubted, obvious benefits as it was difficult. Its benefits lay in the fact that Spain was generously endowed by nature with all kinds of natural wealth: many large and navigable rivers, extensive and excellent forests useful for the construction of a fleet, and inexhaustible mineral wealth in the mountains, especially silver mines, famous for their abundance; it was inhabited by extremely warlike and brave tribes. The natural wealth of Spain could provide Carthage with abundant means and means, while its population provided excellent troops in its armies. But; on the other hand, the terrain - rivers, forests and mountains, and the population of Spain presented such difficulties for overcoming them, conquering this country and firmly establishing it in it, that no one in Carthage had ever dared to even think about this enterprise. Hamilcar was the first to conceive it, rightly recognizing himself as capable of fulfilling it and - secretly, unspokenly, only for himself - not only to reward Carthage for its losses, but also with a more distant and deeper goal - having conquered Spain and firmly established itself in it, to form from it an excellent basis for waging war against Rome on the dry route, in Italy itself, at the very center of its power, and at the same time to form in Spain an excellent army, seasoned in battles and completely loyal to him, Hamilcar, the main strength of which was would be warlike and brave Spaniards and terrible to the Romans, who hated them, the neighboring Gauls. The plan, apparently, is worthy of Hamilcar, as much as Hamilcar himself was worthy of such a plan. And the first, main benefits of this plan were so obvious, and Hamilcar’s influence and the government and people’s trust in him were so strong that, despite all the opposition of Hanno and his family and party, the government could not but agree to Hamilcar’s proposal and trusted him execution of this, convinced that, if successful, it would indeed bring Carthage much more benefits than if he had retained Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and all the other islands. And the Carthaginian people, filled with irreconcilable hatred of the Romans, for their part reinforced the agreement of the government with complete approval.
Hamilcar's excellent plan was and was carried out by him (although, on the occasion of his death, not completely) from the very beginning in a very remarkable way. Since Carthage no longer had a sufficient fleet to transport the army to Spain and, moreover, prudent caution itself required avoiding this, so as not to arouse the attention and opposition of Rome, Hamilcar decided to lead his army from the Carthaginian borders by dry route through the steppes of Africa to the Pillars of Hercules ( Now the Strait of Gibraltar) and cross it on transport ships to the city of Gades (now Cadiz) in Spain. To carry out this difficult campaign, having secured loyalty, devotion and obedience to him, Hamilcar, the Carthaginian army, partly with money, partly with booty, in 236 he successfully completed both the campaign across Africa and the crossing to Hades. Starting from here, he waged war in Spain for 9 years (236–227) with such skill and success that partly by gentle treatment and wise negotiations, but mostly by force of arms he was able and managed to conquer a significant part of southern Spain and already establish the power of Carthage in it on a solid foundation. In 227, according to Appian, he fell in battle with the Spaniards, and according to Diodorus, he drowned in the river, and his army was so devoted to him and his family that they proclaimed his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, as their leader, and the Carthaginian government could not help but approve this election. Gazdrubal skillfully and successfully continued what Hamilcar had begun and, acting more through meek and skillful negotiations than through force of arms, managed, according to Diodorus, to attract the Spanish tribes to such an extent that they voluntarily elected him as their strategist-autocrat or leader-king. According to the same historian, Gazdrubal’s forces in Spain already extended to 60 thousand people. infantry, 8 thousand people. cavalry and 200 elephants. He significantly increased Carthage's possessions in Spain and founded it on the eastern shore main city, which he called New Carthage (now Cartagena in Murcia). On the same coast there were many commercial and wealthy Greek settlements, which benefited greatly from trade with the Spaniards. The most significant and strongest of these settlements was the city of Saguntum or Zakynthos, a settlement of the island of Zakynthos in Greece, on the right side of the river. lower Iber (now Ebro), not far from its mouth. With the establishment of the Carthaginians in Spain, the Greek settlements there not only lost many of their previous benefits from trade with the Spaniards, but even began to fear for their independence, and therefore turned to Rome for patronage and protection. The latter, who had long been vigilantly and jealously following the successes of the Carthaginians in Spain, gladly took advantage of this opportunity to finally put a barrier to them, took Saguntum under his protection and demanded from Hasdrubal that R. Iber was designated the limit of Carthaginian possessions in Spain. Gazdrubal, not yet recognizing the rule of Carthage in this country as strong enough to start a war with Rome, was forced to conclude an agreement with him, according to which he recognized Saguntum under the patronage of Rome, and R. Iber is the border of the Carthaginian possessions, and any hostile action of the Carthaginians against the former and the passage of their troops through the latter had to correspond to a violation of the peace between Rome and Carthage - a new and violent intervention of the former in the affairs of the latter! Soon after, in 221, Gazdrubal was killed by a Spaniard out of personal revenge; and the entire Carthaginian army in Spain immediately and unanimously elected Hamilcar’s son, Hannibal, as their commander in his place, although he was then only 24 years old, and the Carthaginian government, despite the resistance of Hanno and his party, approved the choice of troops.
§ 154. Hannibal until 221.
Hannibal, one of the four sons of Hamilcar Barca, was born in 245 (His birth is incorrectly shown by others in 247, and by others in 246. According to his own words, spoken to Antiochus of Syria and cited by Polybius (Book III, Chapter III , see above), he was 9 years old when his father went to Spain in 236. Consequently, he was born in 245, and in 221 he was 24 years old, and during the 2nd Punic War from 218 to 202 - 27-43 years old) and from a very early age discovered extraordinary abilities of the mind and qualities of the soul and received the most thorough Greek education. His upbringing was supervised by his father himself, who recognized his great abilities and loved him madly. He based his upbringing on the same feelings that animated him himself - a fiery love for the fatherland and irreconcilable hostility towards Rome. This is confirmed by Hannibal’s own words, spoken by him to Antiochus of Syria and quoted by Polybius (Book III, Chapter III): “When my father was about to go with the army to Spain, I was only 9 years old; I was near the altar at the time when my father made a sacrifice to Jupiter. After libations and other prescribed rites; Hamilcar, having removed all the priests, ordered me to approach and, caressing me, asked: would I like to accompany him into the army? I answered him, with the liveliness characteristic of my age, that not only did I not wish for anything, but I even earnestly asked him to allow me this. Then he took me by the hand, led me to the altar and ordered me to swear over the victims that I would never be a friend of the Romans.” Then he took him with him to the army and to Spain, but, according to others, after some time he sent him back to Carthage to continue his upbringing and education by learned Greeks, and according to other sources, Hannibal returned to Carthage after the death of Hamilcar, in 227 year. But the former is more likely than the latter, 1st because Hannibal in Spain could not properly continue his upbringing and education, and 2ndly because, as you know, Gazdrubal, worthily appreciating Hannibal’s abilities, knowing how useful he could be him and wanting to contribute both to his acquisition of military experience and to his distinction and sublimely, he summoned him in 224 (when he was 21 years old and therefore his upbringing and education had already been completed) to Spain. Hanno's party tried in every possible way to prevent the departure of Hannibal; but the strongest Bartsinskaya party prevailed - and Hannibal arrived in Spain. Gazdrubal immediately entrusted him with command of the entire cavalry (perhaps because, among other things, Hannibal had great dexterity and skill in bodily exercises, possession of weapons and horse riding, and was an excellent horseman and horseman). Here we cite the words of a witness who can in no way be suspected of partiality towards Hannibal, namely Titus Livy. “From the very beginning,” he says, “Hannibal attracted the attention and love of the whole army. The old, honored warriors looked at him with special sympathy, finding in his features a striking resemblance to his father, their beloved commander. But soon his personal qualities even more tied the hearts of everyone to him. Indeed, no one has ever combined to such a degree, in his character, the ability to obey and command, and therefore it would be difficult to decide who loved him more, the commander or the army? He, preferably over others, was elected by Gazdrubal every time it was necessary to carry out any enterprise that required special determination and courage. The troops did not place such trust in anyone as they had in him when he led them. No one surpassed him in fearlessness when danger was imminent, nor in presence of mind in danger itself. No amount of work could overcome his bodily strength and the strength of his spirit. He endured both cold and heat equally. Unusually moderate and abstinent in food and drink, he ate and drank only to the extent required by the strictest necessity. He worked and rested day and night without distinction, devoting to sleep only the time free from work and not seeking either silence or a quiet bed for sleep. Often the troops saw him sleeping on the bare ground, in the cloak of a simple warrior, between the guards and sentries. He differed from his equals not in the luxury of his clothing, but in the kindness of his weapons and horses, and was at the same time the best foot and best mounted warrior in the army. Finally, he was always the first to go into battle and the last to return from it” (Then Titus Livius already betrays his impartiality and, in contrast to Hannibal’s military virtues, portrays his supposed vices: inhuman cruelty, deceit, lack of any respect for justice and justice everything that is most sacred to man, every fear of the gods, every respect for the sanctity of oaths, every religious feeling!But this depiction of the imaginary Hannibal's vices by the Roman historian, stemming only from the deep hatred of the Romans for Hannibal, is as false and unfair as on the contrary, the high qualities of his soul and his military virtues, which even his cruel enemies could not deny him, are true and undoubted.Neither Polybius nor Plutarch, who often had occasion to speak about Hannibal, attribute to him any of the vices mentioned by Titus Livy, yes and the very presentation of events by this latter clearly refutes the reality and even the possibility of these vices, as will be proven in its place below. ). “Hannibal served under the command of Hasdrubal in Spain for three years (224–221), during which he carefully tried to educate himself according to the example of the most skilled military men in the army and personally practice everything that makes a great commander.”
§ 155. Hannibal from 221; - his plan.
As soon as Hannibal was proclaimed and confirmed in the rank of chief leader of the Carthaginian army in Spain, he immediately decided, openly and publicly, to complete the conquest of Spain, but secretly, behind the scenes, then to carry out the plan that he inherited from Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, which they, after their untimely death , did not have time to carry it out, namely, having firmly established itself in Spain and relying on it, cross the river with the army. Iber, Pyrenees, r. Rodan (now Rhone) and the Alps, and through the lands of the Transalpine and Cisalpine Gauls, bring an offensive war to Italy and attack Rome at the very center of its dominion and power! A plan that rightly always amazed everyone with its immense enormity, greatness, genius, but also with its difficulty and courage! That this plan was originally drawn up by Hamilcar and inherited from him by both Hasdrubal and Hannibal, but was carried out only by the latter, there is evidence from history and ancient historians, especially Polybius. The latter, analyzing the true reasons for Hannibal’s (i.e., 2nd Punic) warriors (Book III, Chapters II and III), first refutes the opinion of some historians of Hannibal that the first cause of the war was Anpibal’s siege of Saguntum, and the second was its transition from army across the river Iber, contrary to the treaty of Hasdrubal with Rome. Polybius rightly says that, in his opinion, both only served as the beginning of the war, but were not at all the cause of it. In the same way, he refutes the opinion of the Roman historian Fabius that the causes of the war were the stinginess and unlimited ambition of Hasdrubal, the insult inflicted on Saguntum, the secret intention of Hasdrubal, and then Hannibal, to form a monarchy (!) from the Carthaginian possessions in Africa and Spain in their own favor, in opposition to the desires and intentions of the Carthaginian government and people, of whom, allegedly, no one approved of either the destruction of Saguntum or the war undertaken against Rome by Hannibal! Fairly and correctly refuting the absurdity of this opinion of Fabius, the source of which was Rome’s hatred of Carthage and Hannibal, Polybius, for his part, believes that there were three reasons for the war: the first was Hamilcar’s hatred of Rome and his firm intention to take revenge on the latter, the second was a new one, unjust and unworthy act of Rome against Carthage, i.e. the capture of Sardinia and forcing Carthage to pay another 1200 talents, in 237, and finally the third - the conquest of Spain by Hamilcar (continued by Hasdrubal and completed by Hannibal). To this Polybius adds that although Hamilcar died in 10 years (more correctly in 9 years - 227-218). ) before the war, however, it can be easily proven that he was the main culprit of it and cites Hannibal’s words to Antiochus of Syria mentioned above (§ 154) as proof. “It is impossible not to admit,” adds Polybius, “that this evidence of Hamilcar’s hatred of Rome and all the plans he formed against the Romans is accurate, true and not subject to objection. But this hatred of him is revealed even more in what he did subsequently” (i.e. after his death), “for he restored two enemies against the Romans: his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, and his son, Hannibal, moreover, such that then he could no longer do anything more to reveal his hatred of the Romans in all its strength. Gazdrubal died before he could carry out his plan, but Hannibal subsequently found an opportunity to clearly indulge in the hostility against the Romans that his father had bequeathed to him.”
Polybius' judgment is undeniably true and cannot be doubted. Comparing his condensed and concise narrative with the more detailed, thorough presentation of Titus Livy and supplementing one with the other, with the assistance of careful and strict criticism and careful research, historical writers of modern and recent times came to the unanimous conclusion that the plan of the second Punic War (as it was called Romans) or Hannibal's (as Polybius and other Greeks called her), carried out by Hannibal, was compiled by Hamilcar and, after his death, transferred to Hasdrubal. At present, this is already a truth that is beyond doubt and does not require proof.
The enormity, difficulty and boldness of this plan are as obvious as its benefits and advantages if successful. Before bringing the war into the very middle of Italy, it was necessary to complete the conquest of Spain, to establish a firm and reliable foothold in it, to make all the necessary military preparations for the march from it by land to Italy and then to overcome enormous obstacles from nature - the two greatest mountain ranges, the Pyrenees and especially the Alps, and on the part of the inhabitants - the warlike and brave Gauls between the Pyrenees, the Alps and northern Italy, obstacles that in those days were rightly considered and indeed were insurmountable for the army with all its accessories - cavalry, pack animals and heavy loads, and for the Carthaginian army, which usually included elephants - and even more so. But even after successfully overcoming all these obstacles, it was still necessary to establish strong and reliable communications between the offensive army, across the vast expanse of the region, with the main basis of action - Spain, for only from there Carthaginian army could receive reinforcements, means and methods necessary to wage war in Italy. There was no hope of receiving them from Carthage, both because the main source of forces, means and methods for waging war in Italy was already located in the Carthaginian possessions not in Africa, but in Spain, and because; that Carthage was exhausted by the 1st Punic War and deprived of most of its fleet, and supremacy at sea already completely belonged to Rome.
For all these reasons, bringing war from Spain through Gaul to Italy undoubtedly and unconditionally required preliminary, deep considerations, correct calculations, careful preparation and reliable support for a strong establishment in Spain, leaving part of the army in it and exploring the routes to Gaul and Italy, properties and ways of the region and the location of the inhabitants on these paths, and then - the execution itself with special: willpower, courage, firmness, energy, determination and art, so that it is crowned with complete success. But in this last case, it could promise enormous benefits and advantages in an offensive war against Rome; stand on the side from which he could not have expected and indeed did not expect it - in Italy itself and in the very center of his power, without a doubt - and with those necessary conditions moral strength and high art which are mentioned above. To what extent Hannibal met this great but difficult task and how he accomplished it from beginning to end will be outlined below.
§ 156. Hannibal's actions in Spain; - siege, capture and destruction of Saguntum by him. (221–219).
First of all, Hannibal decided, as was said, to complete the conquest of Spain and a strong establishment in it. He accomplished this in two campaigns (221–220), although with great effort. First of all, he turned against the Olkad tribe on the river. Togo (near the present city of Toledo). He besieged their main city Althea (according to others Carteia, near the present city of Occana) with such energy and force that he soon took it. Intimidating the other cities of the Olcads voluntarily submitted to him. Having taken a significant ransom from them (or, as Polybius says, resold them to the inhabitants) and thereby acquired large amounts of money, he returned with the army to New Carthage for the winter. Being generous to his troops, rewarding them with money, promising them further rewards and carefully taking care of supplying them with everything they needed, he even more attracted their love and devotion. The following year (220) in the summer, he turned against the tribe of the Baccaeans, who lived near the river. Duro (now Duero), and immediately took their cities Ermantica or Salmantica (now Salamanca) and Arbocala (now Tordesillas on the Duero River), of which the latter put up stubborn resistance. During the siege of Arbokala, the inhabitants who fled from Salmantika united with the fleeing Olcads and with the Carpesians or Carpetans who lived to the west of the latter, numbering up to 100 thousand people. attacked Hannibal while he was walking from Arbokala to the river. Tagu. In this case, Hannibal showed himself to be a perspicacious, courageous and decisive commander. Having recognized it as unreasonable and dangerous - either in view of the enemy to cross the river. Tag, or the very first to attack an enemy with superior numbers who could suppress him, he took a position with strong terrain, showing the appearance that he wanted to stay and defend on it. But the next night he crossed the river. Tag took up another strong position at some distance from her. The enemy took this as a sign of fear on the part of Hannibal and began to cross the river piece by piece. Tag to the ford. But at that very time Hannibal attacked him with his main forces from the front, and part of the cavalry transported across the river. Tag - from the rear, and inflicted complete and complete defeat and enormous damage on the allied Spaniards. This victory gave him the opportunity to continue and achieve further success. He conquered not only the Carpetans and Turditans (in present-day Andalusia and Extremadura, between the mouths of Guadiana and Guadalquivir), but also all the tribes on the right side of the river. Ibera. Then for the winter he returned to New Carthage.
Finally, in 219, Hannibal recognized that the time and opportunity had already arrived to make a clear break with Rome. The opportunity was not long in presenting itself. On the eastern coast of Spain, only the Greek settlements remained independent, and the main one between them was Saguntum. They were under the protection of Rome from the time of its treaty with Hasdrubal, although not approved by the Roman Senate. Anticipating the danger threatening them from Hannibal, they sent to Rome to ask for help. In Rome, instead of immediately sending an army to help them, the Senate deliberated for a long time and finally decided to send ambassadors to Spain to verify the state of affairs and convince Hannibal to strictly fulfill the terms of the agreement that was concluded with Gazdrubal. Polybius says (Book III, Chapter IV) that “Hannibal received the Roman ambassadors in New Carthage and told them that there had recently been a rebellion among the Saguntians, that they had called the Romans as mediators, and that the Romans had unjustly sentenced some of the city rulers of Saguntum to death; that he, Hannibal, will not leave this injustice unpunished and that the Carthaginians have always had the custom of defending the innocently oppressed.” “Meanwhile,” Polybius adds, “Hannibal sent to Carthage to tell the Senate what he intended to do with the Saguntians, who, proud of their alliance with the Romans, had treated badly some of the subjects of the Carthaginian republic.” “In a word,” Polybius concludes, “Hannibal did not reason, but only obeyed the anger and irritation that blinded him. Instead of the true motivating reasons for his actions, he referred to empty pretexts - the usual delusion of those who, caring little about justice, obey only the voice of the passions that overwhelmed them, which is why it happened that, having hidden the true reason for their actions and citing another, on nothing unfounded, he was recognized as the instigator of a war that was contrary not only to common sense, but also to all the laws of justice.”
With all the conscientiousness of Polybius; one cannot help but recognize in these words a friend of the Scipios and the Romans and not a shadow of justice. Polybius repeated what the Romans, who hated both the Carthaginians and Hannibal, said. According to other information, which deserves much more confidence and is consistent with the character, motives and views of Hannibal, the latter, already firmly resolved to start a war against Rome, took advantage of the opportunity that presented itself to him, namely: the strife that arose between the Saguntians and the border with them a Spanish tribe that was subject to Carthage - which occurred at the same time and probably due to the same reason; the rebellion in Saguntum and the insult of the Carthaginians by the Saguntians, in a word - not with empty pretexts, but with fairly fair reasons. It would be too absurd on his part to announce to the Roman ambassadors the true motives for his actions. Moreover, it must also be said that, according to other sources, the Roman ambassadors came to Hannibal not in New Carthage, but already near Saguntum, during the siege, and Hannibal did not accept them at all, which is why they went to Carthage, where the Carthaginians with the intention They delayed negotiations with them, told them that the Saguntians themselves had given the reason for hostile actions against them, but however, they gave them an evasive answer, so that they returned to Rome with nothing.
Meanwhile, Hannibal entered with strong army into the possession of Saguntum and besieged this vast and populous city, located on an elevated seashore, on three sides, of which on one, with the main forces - against that part of the city that was located in a deep ravine. But here the city walls were much higher than in other places, and the siege engines operated without much success. The besieged defended extremely stubbornly and made frequent and strong sorties, during one of which Hannibal was seriously wounded in battle and was forced, for this reason and due to the great loss of his troops, to turn the siege into a taxation for a time. Having received some relief from the wound, he resumed the siege even more actively and stronger than before and placed battering rams and turtles in many places to cover the workers. Despite the stubborn resistance of the besieged, part of their wall and three towers were destroyed, and the besiegers launched an attack. But the besieged stubbornly defended themselves in the breaches, using phalarics or incendiary arrows with particular success. After a long and bloody battle in the breaches, the Carthaginians were forced to retreat with great damage, and the besieged hastily repaired the breaches. At this very time, two ambassadors of the Roman Senate arrived, but Hannibal did not receive them and they went to Carthage, and from there, without receiving a satisfactory answer, they returned to Rome. Then the Roman Senate, in any case, should have immediately sent an army to help Saguntum, which Rome took under its protection; but the Senate did not do this, but continued to deliberate uselessly about what to do in this case. Meanwhile, Hannibal persistently and actively continued the siege, built a high movable tower, armed it with arrows and throwing weapons, moved it to the city wall, drove away those who defended it, dug under the wall and brought down a significant part of it. Then the Carthaginian troops burst into the city, but were stopped there by new fortifications. Having decided to hold on to this place, Hannibal ordered to surround it with a rampart, and began to severely destroy the city with throwing weapons. But the besieged continued to stubbornly defend themselves and immediately erected a new one behind each destroyed barrier. However, the Carthaginians moved forward and pushed them more and more towards the citadel, but no help came from the Romans, and the weakened, tired inhabitants of Saguntum were already suffering greatly from hunger, disease and mortality. Saguntum was already close to its fall when the uprising of the Oretani and Carpetanians (in present-day Castile) forced Hannibal with part of the army to move against them to pacify them, leaving Magarbal, the son of Hamilcon, with another part of the army, to continue the siege of Saguntum. Having pacified the rebels and soon returned to Saguntum, he found that the besiegers had made a new breach in the last wall, launched a general attack and threw the besieged back into the citadel. One of the besieged left the citadel and on his own behalf offered to surrender it, but did not dare to accept Hannibal’s difficult conditions. Then Hannibal made a second general attack on the citadel and captured it, despite the stubborn resistance of the besieged, who never wanted to surrender and rejected all of Hannibal’s proposals. Seeing no means of saving themselves, the noblest of them put the entire public treasury and all their valuables on the fire and burned themselves along with them. At the same time, the long-destroyed large tower collapsed and the Carthaginian troops burst through the resulting gap, in the heat of bitterness, spreading death and destruction all around. The inhabitants locked themselves in their houses, set them on fire, burned in them - and Saguntum, after an 8-month siege, was taken and completely burned and destroyed.
The siege and its defense bring great honor to Hannibal with his army and to the besieged, but very little honor to the Romans, who, having accepted the Saguntians, as they accepted the Mamertines and many others, under their protection, did not send Sagunta help with an army and thereby became guilty of cruel his fate and covered themselves with great shame. But the fall of Saguntum had, in addition, even greater significance for them, serving as a clear reason for the break with Carthage and the beginning of the 2nd Punic War, which was very unfavorable for them,
§ 157. Declaration of war and preparations for it on both sides.
According to the meaning of the agreement between Rome and Gazdrubal, the siege, capture and destruction of Saguntum by Hannibal was already a clear break in the peace between Rome and Carthage. It was already explained above that Hannibal secretly had exactly this in mind, therefore he was the first and main instigator of the war. But it is impossible to blame him for this for all the reasons already sufficiently explained above. From his point of view, he was absolutely right. But a formal declaration of war did not come from his side. As soon as the news of the capture and destruction of Saguntum reached Rome; then and only then did the Roman Senate stop deliberating about the possibility of war, and, seeing that it was already inevitable, nevertheless, in order to comply with the established formalities, sent 5 noble ambassadors to Carthage to ask the Carthaginian Senate whether with its consent or not, Hannibal destroyed Saguntum , and in the first case declare war, and in the second demand the extradition of Hannibal. Heated debates took place in the Carthaginian Senate on this occasion: Hanno and his party, of course, supported the demands of the Roman ambassadors and warned against an unjust war; but the much stronger Bartsinskaya party, relying on the feelings and opinions of the majority of the nation, declared itself decisively in favor of war. The Roman ambassadors were not told this clearly and publicly, but were given the same evasive answers as the first embassy. Then one of the ambassadors, Quintus Fabius Verrucose, driven out of patience by lengthy mutual debates, announced to the Carthaginian Senate (according to Polybius) that he had brought them on his chest under his toga two lots: war or peace; and asked: which of them would he like to take out? “As you wish,” the Senate answered unanimously. Fabius objected that he would take out the war, and the entire Senate answered with one voice: “We accept it”! “So - war”! answered Fabius - and with this word the Roman ambassadors left the Senate and went to Spain, where they first managed to arm the Bergusian tribe (near present-day Balaguer in Catalonia) and some other tribes on the left side of the river against the Carthaginians. Ibera. But the Volcians or Volci (near present-day Ainsa to the north of Lleida) did not even want to listen to them and drove them away from themselves, and, following their example, other tribes of Spain, after the fall of Saguntum, even more hostile to Rome, resolutely stood against him side of Carthage - a circumstance extremely favorable for Hannibal at the very beginning of his difficult enterprise. In order to bind them even more to himself, Hannibal, who positioned his army for the winter of 219–18. in New Carthage, to allow the Spanish auxiliaries to spend the winter in their homeland.
And so the peace was interrupted by Hannibal, and war was formally declared by the Romans or, if you prefer, by them and the Carthaginians at the same time. Let us now consider the political and military goals: forces, means, methods, preparations and plans on both sides, starting with Rome.
And here, first of all, one should express involuntary amazement at the actions of the Roman Senate in last years before the declaration of war. It seems that the usual wisdom of this, hitherto so wise, Roman Senate was, by some fate, subjected to complete darkness and blindness, and it made only incomprehensible and unforgivable mistakes after mistakes. With his keen, jealous observation of everything that concerned Carthage and its relationship to Rome, the Roman Senate inexplicably could not penetrate true goal motives and actions of Hamilcar, Gazdrubal and Hannibal in Spain, could not guess why they needed Spain - to block their further successes in it, he took half-measures unworthy of him by concluding an agreement with Gazdrubal, and, convinced of the inevitability of a new war, did nothing to avert it, or at least to prepare for himself the guarantees of the greatest and surest successes in it, but on the contrary, he did everything to accelerate it and further irritate and embitter Carthage, by unjustly taking Sardinia from him in the midst of the world and imposing on him a new indemnity of 1200 talents. Having taken Saguntum and other Greek settlements in Spain under his patronage and protection, he did not provide them with either one or the other in time, and, as if not wanting and even fearing a new war, instead of sending troops, he sent them to Hannibal twice completely uselessly and their ambassadors to Carthage wasted time in empty and fruitless negotiations. Finally - and most importantly - when war was already inevitable and even declared, he had no idea from which side he would be in dire danger. In his strange blindness, he was convinced. that the theater of the new war will continue to be Sicily and again Spain. This is evident from his first military orders upon declaring war. In 218, 6 Roman legions were recruited, each consisting of 4,000 people. infantry and 300 people. cavalry, a total of 24,000 infantry and 1,800 people. cavalry; the allies fielded 44,000 people. infantry and 4,000 people. cavalry, which amounted to only 68,000 people. infantry, 5,800 people. cavalry and 73,800 people. all troops in general. In addition, a fleet of 220 quinqueremes (5 rows of oars) and 20 light sea vessels was equipped. These forces were distributed and assigned the following kind: one of the consuls, Tibes. Sempronius Longus, with 2 Roman legions, 17,800 people. Allied troops (16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry), 160 quinqueremes and 12 light ships, were assigned to cross to Sicily and from there to Africa. Another consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, with 2 Roman legions, 14,000 people. infantry and 1,200 people. Allied cavalry, 60 quinqueremes and 8 light ships, was assigned to cross to Spain and oppose Hannibal there. Finally, the praetor L. Manlius, with the same forces as Scipio, but only with 1,000 people. cavalry, was sent to Cisalpine Gaul. to keep it in obedience and order. And so out of 73,800 people. troops, 26,400 with Sempronius were sent to Sicily and Africa, 23,800 with Scipio to Spain and 23,600 with Manlius to Cisalpine Gaul. “This distribution of forces shows,” says General Vaudoncourt, “how mistaken the Romans were about Hannibal and how little they knew of his means. They did not doubt his intention to attack them themselves in Italy; (Hardly, as will be discussed below.) and did nothing that was necessary to keep him. Enriched by their triumph over Carthage in the 1st war with it and after it, despising the Carthaginians they defeated, they did not consider it necessary to make extraordinary efforts for a new war with them. They did not even suspect that Hannibal had both the strength and fortitude necessary to carry out the enterprise he had conceived. They planned to carry out sabotage in Africa, but this sabotage could only be valid if Italy was calm. They sent Scipio to attack Hannibal in Spain, but gave him only 22,000 men. infantry and 1,800 people. Cavalry." (At the same time, Voloncur notes that the full composition of all Roman armies did not agree with the rules generally accepted by the Romans (one legion of allies for one Roman legion and therefore only 6 first for 6 last), and therefore believes that there must be some kind of mistake in the text of ancient historians, which is confirmed by subsequent events.) In a word - in the number, composition, and distribution of the military forces of Rome before the start of the war, no special wisdom is visible, and subsequent events will even prove that it was extremely erroneous. Meanwhile, according to the calculations of Polybius (already given in Part II in Chapter XX § 123), the Romans at that very time could have armed forces in Italy that extended to 700,000 people. infantry and 70,000 people. cavalry. And they exposed only 1/10 of them, which proves once again that in their blindness they did not even suspect what was threatening them.
Let us now turn to Hannibal and see what orders he made on his part. As early as 219, having stationed his army for the winter in New Carthage, he began to take all measures for the success of his enterprise in 218. First of all, he sent trusted people along the route that he intended to follow from New Carthage to the Pyrenees and the Alps through the lands of the Trans-Alpine Gauls, with orders to scout out the paths through the mountains and the location of the Gallic tribes and their leaders. The people he sent returned and told him that the Gauls were suspicious, the mountains were unusually high, and the paths through them were extremely difficult. But this did not in the least frighten Hannibal and did not deviate him from his firm intention. He took measures to provide not only Spain, but also Africa, and wisely assigned part of the African troops for the first purpose, and part of the Spanish for the second, namely: he sent 13,850 people to Africa. infantry and 1,200 people. cavalry of Spanish troops and 900 Balearic riflemen; in Spain he left his brother, Gazdrubal, with 12,650 people. infantry (11,850 Africans, 300 Ligurians and 500 Balearic riflemen), with 2,550 people. cavalry (450 Livio-Phoenicians and Africans, 300 Ilergeti Spaniards and 1,800 Numidians or Mauritanians), and a total of 15,200 people. troops, 21 elephants and 50 naval vessels, for the most part in 5 rows of oars. Finally, for a campaign in Italy, under his personal leadership, he appointed an army of about 90,000 people. infantry and 12,000 people. cavalry, both African and Spanish and other European troops. The army also had 37 elephants, pack animals and heavy loads. By the end of winter, this entire army was assembled at New Carthage and ready for the campaign.
By comparing the mutual distribution of forces on both sides, one can be even more convinced of the error of the Romans. While a larger number of their troops - 26,400 - were assigned to Sicily and Africa, 23,800 were assigned to cross to Spain, where Gazdrubal was supposed to remain with 15,200 people. troops, and only 23,600 were sent to Cisalpine Gaul, where Hannibal was supposed to go with the main part of his troops, more than 100,000 people. Consequently, the Romans, dividing their forces into three parts, sent the larger one to Africa, and the smaller one to Cisalpine Gaul! The following presentation will show what consequences were to follow from this.
(218-201 BC)
What is the Second Punic War? These are military actions between the Roman Republic and Carthage for dominance in the Western Mediterranean. They became a logical continuation of the First Punic War (264-241 BC). In it, Carthage was defeated and lost Sicily. Immediately after the end of this war, an uprising of mercenaries began (240-238 BC), who formed the basis of the Carthaginian army.
With great difficulty, the Phoenician state managed to suppress these unrest. But Rome took advantage of them and took Sardinia and Corsica from Carthage in 237 BC. e. Weakened by the 23-year war and the uprising of mercenaries, the Punes (Carthaginians) were unable to repel the Romans. They acknowledged the loss of these islands and even paid an indemnity to Rome to reimburse military expenses.
The loss of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia had the most deplorable effect on the finances of Carthage. Being a commercial state, he began to look for new trade markets and turned his attention to the Iberian Peninsula. The Carthaginian Council 104 vested the powers of commander-in-chief Hamilcar Barca, who had proven himself positively in the First Punic War and in suppressing the mercenary uprising. Now he was charged with starting a policy of conquest on the Iberian Peninsula.
After this, for 9 years, Hamilcar and his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Handsome significantly expanded Carthage's possessions in Spain. But in 228 BC. e. Hamilcar Barca drowned in the river during the fighting. After this, Hasdrubal assumed full power. It was he who founded the city of New Carthage. It quickly became one of the main trading ports of the Western Mediterranean.
Hasdrubal brought Hannibal, who was the son of Hamilcar Barca, closer to him. In 221 BC. e. Hasdrubal was stabbed to death by a slave, a Celt by birth. He stabbed to death in New Carthage, avenging the execution of his master. After that armed forces 25-year-old Hannibal took command in Spain.
From his father, he adopted hatred of the Romans and vowed to devote his life to fighting them. Hannibal settled thoroughly on the Iberian Peninsula and even married an Iberian woman. He dreamed of a war with Rome and looked for any reason to start it and defeat the Roman Republic.
The reason for the war was the city of Saguntum. Iberians and Greeks lived there. The city was independent and maintained friendly relations with Rome. Hannibal and his army besieged Saguntum and, after a 7-month siege, took it by storm in 219 BC. e. The Romans did not intervene in this conflict, as they were busy with the war with the Gauls.
However, after the fall of Saguntum, Rome declared that Carthage had violated the non-aggression treaty against the allies of the Roman Republic. In 218 BC. e. The Romans officially declared war on the Punics. Thus began the Second Punic War, which lasted from 218 to 201 BC. e.
The initial stage of the Second Punic War
One of the largest armies of the Hellenistic world was stationed in Spain (Iberia). It consisted of 90 thousand infantry, 12 thousand cavalry and 37 war elephants. This information derived from the ancient Greek historian Polybius.
With this force, Hannibal left New Carthage in the spring of 218 BC. e. and moved along the coast to the east. He crossed the Pyrenees, crossed Gaul, fighting small battles with the local population. Along the way, Hannibal divided the army into 3 parts. He left two of them in the newly conquered territories, and with the remaining forces in the fall he approached the Alps.
Rome and Carthage during the Second Punic War on the map
At the same time, the Roman fleet sailed to the shores of Iberia. The Romans believed that since Hannibal had gone east, they would not meet worthy resistance. But the Roman legionaries faced strong Carthaginian units. The Romans tried to pursue the main forces of the Punics, but were unable to overtake them and enter into battle.
With the help of guides from local tribes, Hannibal crossed the Alps. But it turned out to be extremely difficult, and many people died. 28 thousand infantrymen, 6 thousand cavalrymen and 30 war elephants set foot on Italian soil. Local Gallic tribes supported the Punics and recognized the power of Carthage.
For Rome, such a quick and successful crossing of the Alps was a complete surprise. He abandoned the upcoming campaign in Africa and sent Roman legions under the command of Publius Scipio against the Carthaginians who invaded his lands. In November 218 BC. e. The historical battle of Ticinus took place. In this battle, the Romans were defeated, and Scipio himself was seriously wounded.
After this, all the Gauls and Ligurians went over to Hannibal’s side. His army increased by 40 thousand people. Panic began in Rome. The Senate urgently recalled the army under the command of Sempronius Longus from Sicily. He united his legions with the remnants of the defeated army of Publius Scipio and tried to provide worthy opposition to Hannibal.
A big battle took place in December 218 BC. e., which went down in history as the Battle of Trebia. Hannibal again won, and the Romans suffered heavy losses. They left Northern Italy, and the Punics settled in the lands of the Gauls to wait out the winter.
Hannibal's army crossing the Alps
The Roman Senate, meanwhile, did not sit idly by. The Second Punic War was heating up and a new army was formed, led by the newly elected consuls Gaius Flaminius and Gnaeus Servilius Geminus. Each of them had his own army, and they tried to block Hannibal’s path to the south. But that early spring of 217 BC. e. crossed the Apennines and thereby bypassed the Roman positions.
The Punes tried to cut off the Roman legions from Rome, and they began to hastily pursue the enemy, which precluded thorough reconnaissance. As a result, the army of Gaius Flaminius was ambushed and defeated near Lake Trasimene in June 217 BC. e. Most of the Romans died; Gaius Flaminius was also killed. A week later, the cavalry detachment of Gnaeus Servilius was also destroyed.
As a result of these victories, the road to Rome was opened. But Hannibal did not storm the “eternal city.” He went south with his army to gain allies among the Greek and Italian populations. To do this, he announced that Carthage was fighting for freedom against the Romans. By order of Hannibal, even those prisoners who were not citizens of Rome were released so that these people could conduct appropriate propaganda.
The victory over the consuls plunged the Romans into a state of panic. The Senate decided to appoint a dictator, a temporary commander-in-chief, who would take sole control of military power. Before this, it was shared by 2 consuls, which was common practice. But in this situation, one consul was killed, the second was demoralized, and therefore the command was entrusted to Quintus Fabius Maximus. He was appointed dictator, and the chief of the cavalry, Marcus Minucius, was appointed as his deputy.
Fabius developed his strategy. He fully recognized Hannibal's leadership talent, and therefore refused large-scale open battle. Instead, he began to fight small battles with small enemy units. This tactic caused discontent among many, since Hannibal’s army was plundering Italy, and everyone expected decisive action from the dictator.
The chief of the cavalry, Marcus Minucius, was especially indignant. On his own initiative, he attacked large forces of the Carthaginians and found himself on the verge of defeat. Only the timely approach of the main forces led by Fabius saved Marcus Minucius from shame and complete defeat. After this, Minucius ceased to be indignant at the dictator’s tactics.
Fabius's indecisiveness disappointed the Romans and the following year 216 BC. e. More determined people were chosen as consuls. They were Gaius Terence Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus. Under their command was an impressive army of 90 thousand people. At the beginning of August 216 BC. e. The Battle of Cannes took place. In this battle the Romans were surrounded and defeated. Up to 70 thousand Roman soldiers were killed or captured.
Hannibal
After this, Rome stopped waging major battles with Hannibal’s army, believing in his talent as a commander. Instead, Fabius' tactics continued, and the Romans began to destroy those nations that sided with the Phoenicians. And Hannibal needed reinforcements. His main forces were exhausted and battered, despite the victories.
In this regard, Rome began to pull the forces of Carthage away from Italy, organizing military operations in Spain, Sicily, and North Africa. Carthage sent a large army to Sicily, where it fought with the Roman legions. The Punes also became involved in the defense of Syracuse; the siege of this city by the Romans continued until 212 BC. e.
In Spain, Carthage suffered a number of serious defeats, but until 210 BC. e. continued to maintain control over Iberia. In 213 BC. e. The Romans landed a military detachment in North Africa and entered into an alliance with the king of the Western Numidians, Syphax. The Punias managed to defeat the Numidians, led by Roman commanders, but as a result of all these events, Carthage did not send help to Hannibal.
The final stage of the Second Punic War
Hannibal continued to hold the south of Italy all these years. The Second Punic War was in full swing, and the talented commander won a number of serious victories. He even wanted to march on Rome. But the city was well fortified, and Hannibal did not dare to implement his idea. And the Roman Republic carried out total mobilization, and the size of its army reached 230 thousand people.
While Hannibal was fighting local battles in southern Italy, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who commanded the Roman troops in Spain, in 209 BC. e. captured New Carthage. At the same time, the Romans stormed the large city of Torent in southern Italy. All this had a negative impact on Hannibal's position.
His younger brother Hasdrubal commanded the troops in Spain. In 208 BC. e. he lost the battle of Bercula to Scipio. After that, I decided to go to the aid of my older brother. In 207 BC. e. Hasdrubal crossed the Alps and ended up in northern Italy. There he was met by Roman legions, and in June 207 BC. e. The battle took place on the Metaurus River. Hasdrubal's army was destroyed, and he himself died.
Meeting of Hannibal with Scipio Africanus
After this defeat, Hannibal lost all hope of waging a successful war in Italy. We can say that the Romans slowly but surely outmaneuvered the talented commander. They constantly pulled the military forces of Carthage away from Italy, and Hannibal, with a small army, wasted his time conducting ineffective military operations in the south of the Apennine Peninsula.
Since 206 BC. e., there was a total turning point in the Second Punic War in favor of Rome. In Spain, the Punes suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Ilipa, and after that the Roman Republic completely captured the Iberian Peninsula. Developing the victory, Publius Cornelius Scipio, nicknamed Africanus, in 204 BC. e. crossed to Africa with a 30,000-strong army. He entered into an alliance with one of the Numidian tribes and inflicted a number of serious defeats on the Carthaginians.
The victories of the Romans forced Carthage to urgently summon Hannibal from Italy. In 203 BC. e. he arrived in the Phoenician capital after almost 16 years of hostilities on Apennine Peninsula. It was decided to hold peace negotiations with the Romans. As a result of this, Hannibal met with Scipio Africanus. The commanders treated each other with respect, but the negotiations themselves ended in nothing.
After this, in 202 BC. e. took place famous battle at Zama's. The Roman army was well armed and trained. But the army of Carthage for the most part consisted of recruits without military experience. Hannibal initially refused to lead such an army into battle. A heated argument arose between him and the elders. But, in the end, the famous commander gave in. The battle took place, and the invincible Hannibal was defeated. After this defeat, the Second Punic War, which lasted 17 years, ended.
Territories of Rome and Carthage after the Second Punic War
Under the terms of the peace treaty concluded in 201 BC. e., Carthage lost Spain, as well as other overseas possessions. The navy was limited to 10 ships to repel pirates. Carthage was forbidden to conduct any military operations without the permission of Rome. A huge monetary indemnity was imposed on him for a period of 50 years.
The Numidians took advantage of the harsh peace treaty and plundered and captured most of the Carthaginian territories in North Africa with impunity. And Rome, thanks to the victory, became the most powerful state in the Mediterranean and took a serious step towards future great conquests.