In the global community of irreconcilable Russian oppositionists, they are comprehending the new reality.
In general, the Russian irreconcilable opposition is perhaps the most international of all oppositions. It includes not only residents of Russia and citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad, but also former citizens of the Russian Federation who have long become subjects of other countries. In its ranks there are even citizens of one country that claims that it is at war with Russia (and try to kick them out of the ranks of the opposition guard).
…So. The question that this world community now has to resolve is harsh: why did the protest campaign launched on the RuNet not work at all?
The presence of irreconcilable anti-Putinists in online media and social networks was, if not overwhelming, then at least equal to “pro-Putin.” And the total output of the protest efforts of the “anti-system candidates” and the boycotting “politician whom Putin is afraid of” turned out to be somehow pathetic.
No, their result is pathetic not in the sense that the couple of million of our fellow citizens who voted for K. A. Sobchak and G. A. Yavlinsky are pathetic, insignificant individuals. And not in the sense that tens or maybe even hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens who really consciously obeyed the call to “boycott the farce” are pathetic. No, they are all full citizens of the country.
Their problem is different. Despite the fact that these people represent a minority, they are, so to speak, an informationally hyperactive minority. And therefore this minority usually considers itself not just full-fledged, but something more.
This is for an ordinary user and the Internet is normal. That is, for personal purposes - mainly for correspondence with loved ones, watching movies and storing music.
And an advanced anti-Putin user, even if he is an elderly Israeli housewife, is a daily factory of likes, comments and reposts, producing and distributing political content in kilotons. Not to mention the army of Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian and Central Asian armchair fighters against the empire. Not to mention the sofa corps of anti-imperial resistance in the Russian Federation itself - Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ural and Siberian.
But the main thing is that this minority is accustomed to considering itself not just active, but also informationally effective. Due to its near-intellectual diplomas and simple class traditions, it is accustomed to thinking that it has much greater skill in presenting its political position. Finds words much more convincingly and brightly. He knows how to “get through” much better.
And therefore the conclusion was drawn: each representative of this intellectual minority is certainly worth hundreds of ordinary passive users of the information space. Simply by the level of information noise it produces and the influence it exerts.
And it’s not that they had absolutely no reason to expect success. At least limited.
Firstly, on the side of the global international of Russian oppositionists there was a rather impressive media package. Starting from the British and American, who with desperate persistence repeated the mantra about “Putin’s main competitor, who called for a boycott of the elections,” to the Germans, who thoughtfully explained to the Russian reader how best to express their protest against the Kremlin: “Stay at home, as Navalny calls, or spoil the ballot ", as Khodorkovsky advises? How does a boycott differ from a protest vote and how will the decision affect the election process?"
(At this point it was necessary to ask rhetorically: do these people accuse Russia of trying to interfere in their elections? But this question has long been answered. Correct countries interfere in other people’s elections correctly, for the sake of good. Incorrect countries, like Russia, for the sake of evil).
Secondly, the informationally hyperactive minority is also mastering new media spaces at a faster pace. For example, of the popular political telegram channels, the clear majority are clearly oppositional in nature.
Thirdly, the audience of this minority is the Russian “media class” - including a fairly large layer of official media workers who are accustomed to walking around with figs in their pockets and considering themselves victims of circumstances. And therefore those who like and repost information that castigates modern Russia, with renewed enthusiasm.
…So.
As practice has shown, all this Internet self-esteem of a hyperactive anti-state minority turned out to be exaggerated. That is, it failed to convert into either a boycott or a protest vote. It read, liked and reposted itself a lot, but for some reason it remained in its three percent ghetto.
I have a version why this is so.
The whole point is that there is probably no society on the planet that would be more resistant to information pressure than Russian society.
Even before the massive advent of the Internet (and the onset of the established “Putin era”), the Russian voter/reader/TV viewer lived for a decade and a half under a natural information dictatorship. From morning to night, the Russian citizen was told from every source that his country was falling apart and that it was good, that his past was criminal, his pride was false and his best prospects were to go to a normal country. And if it doesn’t work out, sit and not twitch.
AND Russian citizen survived this information occupation.
And then came the era of the mass Russian Internet. And although the “irreconcilables” certainly had a head start (the Internet first of all spread across megacities, where its founding fathers were the people who later went to Bolotnaya in almost full force) - the majority already in the 2010s began to inexorably catch up and overtake them . Simply because even very hyperactive minorities, asserting themselves at the expense of the majority, the latter, given the choice, will not read or listen.
And the majority now have a choice. Both in the form of “statist” media, and in the form of a self-made patriotic blogosphere.
And in the end it turned out that all the propaganda and propaganda powers of the opposition telegram and YouTube channels, and Facebook groups, and VK-publics, and the mighty Prague and Riga Russian-language publications with advanced design and cool gadgets, and everything like that - are closed actually on yourself. To the international Russian-language opposition media class.
In particular, this also happened because this closed community was never able to develop a normal, respectful language of communication with the majority. They couldn’t come up with anything more creative than “pathetic” stories about how “I met an old woman in a store who was trying to buy two oranges at a special offer.” Basically, all their political lyrics were based on mockery of the “obedient/gullible majority.” On tragic self-love, smart and beautiful. And on listing the differences between the smart and talented ourselves and the gray monochrome mass.
That is, these guys have mastered some new media, new formats and new networks.
But the main thing is that they never learned anything. For example, a simple truth: “If you are addressing people who, for the most part, have voted for V.V. Putin for ten years, then why the hell are you mocking his choice? Are you sure that this is how they win hearts?”
...As a result, today the information troops, defeated during the next assault on the Kremlin, are discussing the future.
Some, as after every election in Russia, gloomily prophesy that now the stupid majority will cry, and we won’t even feel sorry for them, it’s our own fault.
Others are trying to steer into a constructive direction and propose, instead of fighting an irresistible force, to join it and change from within: “We all need to learn to sacrifice. Our pride, our affections, our love, our destiny and our lives. We cannot defeat Putin. No processions, no boycotts.” and notes. The regime can only be changed from within. If you want to change Russia, love Putin. Love him and remain faithful to him. In order to ever give you power, he must be sure that you will not betray him. Go work for the government" and etc.
The call is, of course, frightening (from the point of view of us, the majority). But it is unlikely to be implemented - after all, to achieve it, the militant, irreconcilable minority will have to abandon their own nature. And this is hardly possible.
Russia has a truly heroic military history. No army in the world has fought so successfully. The heroism of Russian soldiers was often recognized by their opponents. But Russia also had defeats.
Livonian War (1558-1583)
The Livonian War was one of the longest wars in which Russia participated. It lasted almost thirty years. During this time, many domestic and foreign policy events occurred that seriously influenced the course and outcome of the war.
Its first stage was extremely successful for the Russian troops. From May to October 1558, 20 fortresses were taken, including Narva and Yuryev (Dorpat). However, Russia was unable to consolidate its military successes due to internal disagreements at court and the Crimean campaign.
The Livonian Order took advantage of the truce of 1559 in its own way. The master of the order, Gotthard Ketler, instead of coming to Moscow to conclude an agreement, transferred the lands of the order and the possessions of the Riga archbishop under the protectorate Principality of Lithuania. Revel ended up in the possession of Sweden, and the island of Ezel - the Danish prince Magnus.
A month before the end of the truce, the Livonian Order treacherously attacked Russian troops, but by 1560 its troops were completely defeated, and the Livonian Confederation ceased to exist. Russia faced a new problem: now the Livonian lands were legally claimed by Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and Sweden.
Now Russia was already at war with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Three years later, Lithuania proposed dividing Livonia, but Grozny followed the principle. In 1569, Lithuania united with Poland. At the end of the war, Sweden also decided to fight “for a piece of the Livonian pie”...
Russia lost the Livonian War due to many factors. Firstly, internal disagreements at the court of Ivan the Terrible and the betrayal of the governor; secondly, a forced war on two fronts (in 1572, the Russian army crushed the troops of Devlet-Girey at the Battle of Molodi); thirdly, “The Tsar created the oprichnina... And from this came the great desolation of the Russian land.”
The “English factor” also played a role in Russia’s defeat. Grozny believed in England's help until the last, but the British in every possible way delayed the conclusion of a defensive-offensive treaty with Russia. England was preparing to move its trading post to Revel, after the end of the seven-year war between Denmark and Sweden. The diplomatic efforts of Ivan the Terrible (and privileges for English merchants for transit trade with Persia) delayed the transfer of the trading post for almost 9 years, but the conclusion of an alliance treaty never took place.
Russia lost its strategic advantage. England, skillfully using military actions between other countries, pushed back Hanseatic League in the Baltic, finally seized the trade initiative, and turned into the strongest maritime power.
Russo-Swedish War (1610-1617)
In 1611, a new king, Gustav II Adolf, ascended the Swedish throne. On the throne he continued the line foreign policy his father, Charles IX, from whom he was left with three wars, including Russia, where Novgorod had already been captured by the Swedes. Karl, anticipating a future confrontation with Poland, wanted to “untie the Russian knot” as quickly as possible. He understood that the chances of Novgorod becoming a Swedish outpost were extremely small.
“This proud people,” Gustav II Adolf himself wrote about the Russians, “has an inveterate hatred of all alien peoples.” Therefore, the young king was increasingly inclined to the idea of leaving all his conquests in Russia and concluding peace with Mikhail Romanov on the most favorable terms.
However, in order to take large military spoils from Russia and ensure a strong position in negotiations, the Swedish king began military operations in North-West Russia. In 1614 he captured Gdov, and the next year he besieged Pskov, approaching the city with 16,000 troops. But Pskov did not give up, even despite the fact that in three days “700 fiery cannonballs, and countless cast iron ones,” were fired at it.
A lengthy negotiation process in 1617 in the village of Stolbovo near Tikhvinomp was carried out through the mediation of the English diplomat John Merrick. He persuaded the Swedes to stay several times when negotiations reached a dead end and they were about to leave.
The Swedes wanted to get all the lands captured during the Time of Troubles - along with Novgorod. The Russians demanded that everything be returned. As a result, a compromise was reached, acceptable for both sides at that time: Sweden received the Baltic cities, cutting off Moscow from access to the sea, and in addition almost a ton of silver; Russia returned Novgorod and focused on the war with Poland.
John Merrick was generously rewarded by the king: among other things, he was given a fur coat from the royal shoulder: a rare honor, exclusive for a foreigner. But he did not participate in the negotiations, of course, for the sake of a fur coat: he needed to obtain preferential rights for the British to travel through Russia to Persia and trade there.
Despite all the Englishman’s merits, his main request was gently refused: trade with Persia after the Time of Troubles became one of the main sources of profit for Russian merchants, and therefore it was unprofitable to allow foreigners to the Caspian Sea. Nevertheless, Merrick managed to negotiate the consent of the Russian Tsar for the British to search for a route to China, to investigate iron ore deposits in the Vologda region, to sow flax and export alabaster.
Crimean War (1853-1856)
According to their own on a grandiose scale, the width of the theater of operations and the number of mobilized troops, the Crimean War was quite comparable to the World War. Russia defended itself on several fronts - in Crimea, Georgia, the Caucasus, Sveaborg, Kronstadt, Solovki and Kamchatka. In fact, Russia fought alone, with minors acting on our side. Bulgarian forces(3000 soldiers) and the Greek legion (800 people). We were opposed by an international coalition consisting of Great Britain, France, Ottoman Empire and Sardinia, with a total population of more than 750 thousand.
The peace treaty was signed on March 30, 1856 in Paris at an international congress with the participation of all the warring powers, as well as Austria and Prussia. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia returned Kars to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol, Balaklava and other cities in Crimea captured by the Allies; ceded to the Moldavian principality the mouth of the Danube and part of southern Bessarabia. The Black Sea was declared neutral; Russia and Turkey could not maintain a navy there.
Russia and Turkey could only maintain 6 steam ships of 800 tons each and 4 ships of 200 tons each for patrol duty. The autonomy of Serbia and the Danube principalities was confirmed, but the supreme power of the Turkish Sultan over them was preserved. The previously adopted provisions of the London Convention of 1841 on the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to military vessels of all countries except Turkey were confirmed. Russia pledged not to build military fortifications on the Åland Islands and in the Baltic Sea.
The patronage of Turkish Christians was transferred to the hands of the “concern” of all the great powers, that is, England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. The treaty deprived Russia of the right to protect the interests of the Orthodox population on the territory of the Ottoman Empire.
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)
Large-scale military operations Russo-Japanese War began on January 26, 1904 with a treacherous attack by Japanese destroyers on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur on the Russian squadron.
The Japanese torpedoed and temporarily disabled the best Russian battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan, as well as the cruiser Pallada. Measures to protect ships in the outer roadstead turned out to be clearly insufficient. It must be admitted that none of the Russian ships received fatal damage, and after an artillery battle on the morning of January 27, the Japanese fleet was forced to retreat. The moral factor played a fatal role - the Japanese fleet managed to seize the initiative. In the following days, our squadron began to suffer ridiculous and unjustified losses due to poor interaction and control. So, just two days after the start of the war, the minelayer "Yenisei" and the cruiser "Boyarin" were killed by their own mines.
The war proceeded with varying degrees of success and was marked by the heroism of Russian sailors and soldiers, who amazed even the enemy with their fighting spirit. Like, for example, Private Vasily Ryabov, who was detained by the Japanese during a reconnaissance mission. Dressed as a Chinese peasant and wearing a wig with a pigtail, Ryabov ran into a Japanese patrol behind enemy lines. The interrogation did not break Ryabov, he kept the military secret and, being sentenced to death, behaved with dignity. Everything happened strictly according to the ritual. They shot from rifles from fifteen paces. The Japanese were delighted with the Russian's courageous behavior and considered it their duty to bring this to the attention of his superiors.
The note from the Japanese officer sounds like a presentation for an award: “Our army cannot help but express our sincere wishes to the respected army, so that the latter would educate more such truly wonderful warriors, worthy of full respect.”
The peace treaty, signed on August 23, 1905, is still a very controversial document; some historians consider it a big mistake of Russian diplomacy. Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel played not the least negative role in resolving the negotiation issue. In literature he is often called the commandant of the fortress, although this is not so. Stessel was the head of the Kwantung fortified region; after the abolition of the latter in June 1904, he, contrary to orders, remained in Port Arthur. He did not show himself as a military leader, sending reports with exaggerated data about Russian losses and the number of Japanese troops.
Stoessel is also known for a number of very shady financial affairs in the besieged fortress. On January 2, 1905, contrary to the opinion of the military council, he began negotiations with the Japanese on the surrender of Port Arthur. After the war, under pressure from public opinion, he was put on trial and sentenced to 10 years in a fortress, but six months later he was released by decision of the emperor and hastened to go abroad.
First World War (1914-1918)
Despite the fact that the first World War It is considered a war lost by Russia; our troops showed considerable heroism in it. Russian victories in the First World War include the capture of Przemysl, the Battle of Galicia, the Sarykamysh operation, the Erzemrum and Trebizond operations.
The Brusilov breakthrough gained great fame. Troops of the South Western Front under the command of A. A. Brusilov, having broken into the Austrian defenses, they again occupied almost all of Galicia and Bukovina. The enemy lost up to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured. But like many other Russian victories, the Brusilov breakthrough, with all its military success, turned out to be more beneficial for Russia’s allies: German pressure on Verdun was weakened, and in the Alps the Italians managed to put themselves in order after the defeat at Trentino. A direct consequence of the Brusilov breakthrough was Romania’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente, which forced Russia to extend the front by another 500 kilometers.
Only towards the end of 1916 did both England and France feel their strength. Germany's defeat was just around the corner. War is an economic funnel, at the end of which you can get good dividends, and the war itself brings good profits. The United States also planned to enter the war. Woodrow Wilson, initially neutral, matured. Participation in the division of territories and indemnities of Russia was extremely undesirable.
Sharpened from the inside (not without English influence) Russia was morally prepared for the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. If not for the confluence of circumstances that led to unrest and the weakening of power in the country, Russia would definitely have emerged from the war as a winner. Thanks to the “allies” - I didn’t come out.
England and France presented the war as a struggle for freedom against the power of autocracy. Presence Tsarist Russia in the democratic camp of the Allies was a serious obstacle in this ideological war. The London Times welcomed February revolution as “a victory in the military movement,” and the editorial commentary explained that “the army and the people united to overthrow the forces of reaction that were stifling popular aspirations and binding the national forces.”
Bismarck believed that the Russians could not be defeated. Attempts at military expansion of our country were made more than once, but ended in the same thing - the defeat of the aggressor.
Theater of war
There has not been an enemy in the history of wars with Russia who did not complain about its vast expanses, frosts and impassability. For wars before the beginning of the 20th century, when losses from disease, as a rule, exceeded combat losses several times, this was an important factor. Frost became one of the reasons for the death of the first-class for its time, but small-numbered Swedish army in Russia during the Northern War. By the time of the Battle of Poltava, Charles XII did not have 30 thousand people in the ranks; The Swedes also abandoned the use of artillery due to a lack of gunpowder. In fact, Poltava became the logical final point of action for the Swedish troops, who found themselves hundreds of kilometers from supply bases, deprived of reinforcements, food and equipment. Any long-term campaign is a war of attrition, and prolongation of hostilities leads to inevitable non-combat losses. Events are indicative here Patriotic War 1812. Thus, the number of French troops that invaded Russia is estimated differently by different experts, but no less than 500 thousand people. A month and a half later, Napoleon had about 135 thousand people on the Borodino field. The army was reduced by more than two-thirds without the general battle that the French commander so desired. Some troops were left as garrisons and to guard communications. Losses from disease were also enormous - typhus decimated the French units and the troops of their allies. The French mounted cavalry suffered heavy losses, where a third of the cavalrymen had already turned into infantry by the Battle of Smolensk. Off-road and the likelihood of encountering a powerful guerrilla warfare stopped Russia's opponents during the period Crimean War from incursions into the internal provinces of Russia, and were forced to limit themselves to actions in the coastal zone. Although here, too, epidemics, primarily cholera, wiped out much more in the ranks of the French and British than the Allies lost in all the bloody deeds on the bastions of Sevastopol. Thus, for 22 thousand French soldiers who died in battle and died from wounds, more than 75 thousand people died from disease. During the First World War German troops, having occupied Poland, part of the Baltic states and Belarus were in no hurry to carry out serious offensive operations on Russian territory, for fear of leaving dense network railways and lose mobility, which in a war on two fronts threatened to turn into a disaster.
Unification of weapons
Any major war leads to a restructuring of the economy and its subordination to military needs. This was the case during the protracted Northern War, when the emphasis was placed on the development of production necessary for the needs of the army and navy: from cloth and canvas factories to weapons factories. An important factor in the conditions of the great war was the unification of production. When it was necessary to dress and arm the largest army in Europe, the emphasis was placed on mass production, simplicity in production and development of weapons. In order not to overload the material with a mass of statistical data, we will limit ourselves to a few examples. Shortly before the Patriotic War of 1812, the calibers of Russian artillery were unified, which made it possible to simplify and reduce the cost of production. During the First World War, unification affected, first of all, the production of small arms, when out of three samples of the famous “three-line” they focused on one - the dragoon. It is often said that this happened in Soviet time(and officially this is true) - and in fact even during the First World War. The factor of unification of weapons models manifested itself even more during the Great Patriotic War - in conditions when millions of armies with a high saturation of equipment acted against each other. At the same time, priority, as before, was given to a mass model, perhaps not ideal, but easy to produce and master. In Germany, everything was just the opposite and the emphasis was on creating superweapons - tanks, aircraft and small arms. Yes, the German Panthers were superior to the Soviet T-34 - but how many were there? Just under 6 thousand against several tens of thousands of Soviet medium tanks. And at the same time, having created a good medium tank, the enemy did not stop producing the same “fours” - and this is a large investment of time and resources. The same applies to small arms - the Germans managed to create the "Sturmgever" - essentially an assault rifle, only they used it en masse already near Konigsberg and Berlin in 1945 - late, and this weapon did not play a serious role.
Allies of Russia?
Often Russia, and later Soviet Union fought a war in coalition against a common enemy. True, there is still a debate as to whether these allies brought more harm or benefit. The first great experience was gained during the Great Northern War, when Denmark and Poland were Russia's allies. The Swedes finished off the Danes before the Russian troops had time to complete their concentration, and although Poland and Saxony shackled the Swedes for a while, giving Peter the Great the opportunity to reorganize the army, in the military aspect Russia still had to fight one-on-one, albeit with a small , but was considered an exemplary Swedish army. The next big war, where Russia acted in alliance with European countries, was the Seven Years' War, where France and Austria were Russia's allies. However, for two years, Russian troops, essentially acting in the interests of the Austrians, suffered heavy losses without a clear military-political result. And only when Saltykov, who showed enviable independence, was placed at the head of the army, the Prussian troops suffered a devastating defeat near Kunersdorf. After him, the Prussian army for some time ceased to exist as an organized force. The road to Berlin was open for the allied Russian and Austrian troops. But then the Austrian allies refused to take the Prussian capital, fearing the strengthening of Russia’s position. And Saltykov, with his troops drained of blood by a heavy battle, had to abandon the campaign to Berlin alone. Similar trends can be noted in a series of Russian-Turkish and, above all, Napoleonic wars, when the interests of the allies were placed above their own political goals and military expediency. In 1799, this almost ended in disaster for Suvorov’s army in Switzerland, where only the commander’s talent and tireless energy saved Russian troops from captivity or destruction. Such is the fourth coalition war, during which Russian troops entered the fight at the moment when main ally, Prussia, was defeated by the French, and after the bloody battles of Pultusk, Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland, the Peace of Tilsit, unfavorable for Russia, was concluded. After the victorious campaign of 1812, during foreign campaigns, there was absolutely no place for a single Russian military leader in the high command of the troops of the anti-Napoleonic coalition, which greatly affected the course of the struggle. The apogee of political independence in military operations for Russia was the First World War. It is no coincidence that a gloomy saying has developed that Marshal Foch ready to fight to the last drop of Russian blood. And many Russian victories, be it Gumbinnen, the Battle of Galicia or the Brusilov breakthrough, were rather in the hands of the Entente allies, and the Russian army was promised the emergence of new ones German divisions, urgently transferred by the enemy from the Western Front. Russian troops had greater independence on the Caucasian front, where the Russian army achieved truly outstanding successes. Separate is the participation of the Soviet Union in anti-Hitler coalition. Here the picture was different, but similar to previous wars- until June 1944, the Soviet Union fought virtually one-on-one with Germany and its satellites in the most important land theater of military operations. Neither El Alamein nor the landing on Sicily are comparable in scale to the Battle of Moscow, Stalingrad or the Kursk Bulge. Apparently, there was a great deal of truth in the words of Alexander the Third, who said that Russia’s only allies were its army and navy.
On June 12, our country celebrates Russia Day. However. There is another country in the world - Paraguay, which celebrates the holiday on this day. And the Russian contribution to this holiday is very significant. 80 years ago, on June 12, 1935, the war between Paraguay and Bolivia, the so-called Chaca War, ended victoriously. An invaluable contribution to this victory was made by Russian officers, for whom, after the civil war in Russia, Paraguay became their new homeland.
The war was named after the territory of the Chaco - semi-desert, hilly in the northwest and swampy in the southeast, with impenetrable jungle, on the border of Bolivia and Paraguay. She considered this land her own, but no one seriously drew a border there, since these wastelands and impenetrable thorny bushes intertwined with vines did not really bother anyone. Everything changed dramatically when in 1928, in the foothills of the Andes, in the western part of the Chaco region, geologists discovered signs of oil. This event radically changed the situation. Armed skirmishes began over possession of the territory, and in June 1932 a real war broke out.
Economics is inseparable from politics. And from this point of view, the Chaco War was caused solely by the rivalry between the American oil corporation Standard Oil, led by the Rockefeller family, and the British-Dutch Shell Oil, each of which sought to monopolize the “future” oil of Chaco. Standard Oil, putting pressure on President Roosevelt, secured American military aid to the friendly Bolivian regime, sending it through Peru and Chile. In turn, Shell Oil, using Argentina, then allied with London, intensively armed Paraguay.
The Bolivian army used the services of German and Czech military advisers. Since 1923, Bolivia's Minister of War was General Hans Kundt, a World War I veteran. From 1928 to 1931, Ernst Röhm, then the famous head of the assault troops of the Nazi Party, served in the Bolivian army as an instructor. In total, there were 120 German officers in the Bolivian army. German military advisers created from Bolivian armed forces an exact replica of the German army of the First World War. Seeing his troops at the parade, marching in typical Prussian style, where officers wore shiny helmets with “bumps” from the time of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the President of Bolivia proudly declared: “Yes, now we can quickly resolve our territorial disagreements with the Paraguayans!”
By that time, a large colony of Russian White Guard emigrant officers had settled in Paraguay. After wandering the world, they were unpretentious, homeless and poor. The Paraguayan government offered them not only citizenship, but also officer positions. In August 1932, almost all the Russians who were at that time in the Paraguayan capital Asuncion gathered in the house of Nikolai Korsakov. The time was very alarming: the war had begun and they, immigrants, had to decide what to do in this situation. Korsakov expressed his opinion: “Twelve years ago we lost our beloved Russia, which is now in the hands of the Bolsheviks. You all see how warmly we were received in Paraguay. Now that this country is going through a difficult moment, we must help it. What should we expect? After all, Paraguay has become a second homeland for us, and we, officers, are obliged to fulfill our duty to it.”
Russians began to arrive at recruiting stations and sign up as volunteers for the Paraguayan army. They all retained the ranks with which they graduated civil war in Russia. There was only one peculiarity: after mentioning the rank of each Russian volunteer, two Latin letters “NS” were always added. This abbreviation meant "Honoris Causa" and distinguished them from regular Paraguayan officers. Eventually. There were about 80 Russian officers in the Paraguayan army: 8 colonels, 4 lieutenant colonels, 13 majors and 23 captains. And 2 generals - I.T. Belyaev and N.F. Ern = headed the General Staff of the Paraguayan Army, commanded by General José Felix Estigarribia.
Russian officers at one time participated in the First World War and actively used their experience in battles against the Bolivian army. Bolivia used the German experience. Bolivia had a significant superiority in numbers and weapons. At the first stage of the war, the Bolivian army began an active advance deep into the territory of Paraguay and captured several strategically important forts: Boqueron, Corrales, Toledo. However, largely thanks to Russian officers, it was possible to create a combat-ready, organized army from tens of thousands of mobilized illiterate peasants. Also, generals Ern and Belyaev managed to prepare defensive structures, and in order to confuse the Bolivian aviation, which had air superiority, they planned and skillfully made false artillery positions, so that the aircraft bombed palm tree trunks disguised as guns.
The merit of Belyaev, who knew well the straightforward tactics of the German general and had well studied the techniques of the German army on the fields of the First World War, should be recognized in determining the direction and timing of the offensive of the Bolivian troops. Kundt later stated that in Bolivia he wanted to try out a new method of attack that he had used on the Eastern Front. However, this tactic failed against the defenses built by the Russians for the Paraguayans.
Russian officers also behaved heroically in battle. Yesaul Vasily Orefyev-Serebryakov in the battle near Boqueron, led a chain of troops into a bayonet attack, himself in front, with a drawn saber. Defeated, he managed to say the words that became popular: “I carried out the order. A wonderful day to die!” (“lindo dia para morir”). The cavalry squadron of Captain Boris Kasyanov attacked the fortified point of Puesto Navidad. The attack was successful, but at the decisive moment two machine guns hit the Paraguayans. The attack began to “choke.” Then Boris rushed to one of the machine guns and covered the embrasure of the machine gun nest with his body. Russian officers died heroically, but their courage is not forgotten, their names are immortalized in the names of the streets, bridges and forts of Paraguay.
Using the tactics of fortified points and sabotage raids developed by Russian generals, the Paraguayan army neutralized the superiority of the Bolivian troops. And in July 1933, the Paraguayans, together with the Russians, went on the offensive. In 1934, fighting took place on the territory of Bolivia. By the spring of 1935, both warring sides were extremely exhausted financially, but the morale of the Paraguayans was high. In April, after fierce fighting, the Bolivian defense was broken along the entire front. The Bolivian government turned to the League of Nations with a request for mediation in concluding a truce with Paraguay.
After the defeat of the Bolivian army near the city of Ingawi, on June 12, 1935, a truce was concluded between Bolivia and Paraguay. Thus ended the Chak War. The war turned out to be very bloody. 89,000 Bolivians and almost 40,000 Paraguayans died, according to other sources - 60,000 and 31,500 people. 150,000 people were injured. Almost the entire Bolivian army was captured by the Paraguayans - 300,000 people
But the thing that caused all the fuss to flare up is that oil was never found in Chaco. However, the Russian diaspora received a privileged position after this war. Dead heroes they honor, and any Russian in Paraguay is treated with respect.