The main issue of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was

Zemsky Sobors

Zemsky Sobors were convened in Russia repeatedly over a century and a half - from the middle of the 16th century to late XVII centuries (finally abolished by Peter I). However, in all other cases, they played the role of an advisory body under the current monarch and, in fact, did not limit his absolute power. The Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was convened in conditions of a dynastic crisis. His main task was to elect and legitimize a new dynasty on the Russian throne.

Background

The dynastic crisis in Russia erupted in 1598 after the death of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich. At the time of his death, Fedor remained the only son of Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Two other sons were killed: the eldest, Ivan Ioannovich, died in 1581, presumably at the hands of his father; the younger, Dmitry Ioannovich, in 1591 in Uglich under unclear circumstances. Fyodor did not have his own children. After his death, the throne passed to the Tsar's wife, Irina, then to her brother Boris Godunov. After the death of Boris in 1605, they ruled successively:

• Boris's son, Fyodor Godunov
• False Dmitry I (versions about the true origin of False Dmitry I - see the article)

After the overthrow of Vasily Shuisky from the throne as a result of the uprising on July 27, 1610, power in Moscow passed to the provisional boyar government (see Seven Boyars). In August 1610, part of the population of Moscow swore allegiance to Prince Vladislav, son of the Polish king Sigismund III. In September, the Polish army entered the Kremlin. The actual power of the Moscow government in 1610-1612 was minimal. Anarchy reigned in the country; the northwestern lands (including Novgorod) were occupied by Swedish troops. In Tushino, near Moscow, the Tushino camp of another impostor, False Dmitry II, continued to function (False Dmitry II himself was killed in Kaluga in December 1610). To liberate Moscow from the Polish army, the First People's Militia (under the leadership of Prokopiy Lyapunov, Ivan Zarutsky and Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy), and then the Second People's Militia under the leadership of Kuzma Minin and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, were successively assembled. In August 1612, the Second Militia, with part of the forces remaining near Moscow from the First Militia, defeated the Polish army, and in October completely liberated the capital.

Convocation of the Council

Versions about the motives for election

First version

According to the point of view officially recognized during the reign of the Romanovs (and later rooted in Soviet historiography), the council voluntarily, expressing the opinion of the majority of the inhabitants of Russia, decided to elect Romanov, in agreement with the opinion of the majority. This position is adhered to, in particular, by the largest Russian historians of the 18th - 20th centuries: N. M. Karamzin, S. M. Solovyov, N. I. Kostomarov, V. N. Tatishchev and others.

“At that time there was no one dearer to the Russian people than the Romanov family. He has long been in the people's love. There was a good memory of Ivan Vasilyevich’s first wife, Anastasia, whom the people revered almost as a saint for her virtues. They remembered and did not forget her good brother Nikita Romanovich and condoled for his children, whom Boris Godunov tortured and overworked. They respected Metropolitan Philaret, the former boyar Fyodor Nikitich, who was held captive in Poland and seemed to the Russians to be a true martyr for a just cause.”

N. I. Kostomarov

According to some opinions, this concept is characterized by a denial of the Romanovs’ desire for power and an obvious negative assessment of the three previous rulers. Boris Godunov, False Dmitry I, Vasily Shuisky in the minds of the “novelists” look like negative heroes.

Other versions

Some historians hold a different point of view [ source?] . The most radical of them believe that in February 1613 there was a coup, seizure, usurpation of power [ source?] . Others believe that we are talking about not completely fair elections, which brought victory not to the most worthy, but to the most cunning candidate [ source?] . Both parts of the “anti-romanists” are unanimous in the opinion that the Romanovs did everything to achieve the throne, and the events early XVII centuries are viewed not as a turmoil that ended with the advent of the Romanovs, but as a struggle for power that ended with the victory of one of the competitors. According to the “anti-novelists,” the council created only the appearance of a choice, but in fact this opinion was not the opinion of the majority; and that subsequently, as a result of deliberate distortions and falsifications, the Romanovs managed to create a “myth” about the election of Mikhail Romanov to the kingdom [ source?] .

“At first glance... the election... “to the kingdom” of young Mikhail Romanov looks like a true miracle, sent down to this family from above as a reward for integrity and piety... When we try to “turn this myth inside out”, the Romanovs are transformed from almost saintly “quiet” pious people again "quiet conservatives"

F. L. Grimberg

"Anti-novelists" point to the following factors that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the new king [ source?] :

Progress of the meetings

The cathedral opened on January 7. The opening was preceded by a three-day fast, the purpose of which was cleansing from the sins of the turmoil. Moscow was almost completely destroyed and devastated, so people settled, regardless of origin, wherever they could. Everyone gathered in the Assumption Cathedral day after day. The interests of the Romanovs at the cathedral were defended by the boyar Fyodor Sheremetev. Being a relative of the Romanovs, he himself, however, could not claim the throne, since, like some other candidates, he was part of the Seven Boyars.

One of the first decisions of the council was the refusal to consider the candidacies of Vladislav and Karl Philip, as well as Marina Mniszech:

“...And the King of Lithuania and Sweden and their children, for their many untruths, and no other people should be robbed of the Moscow state, and Marinka and her son are not wanted.”

S. F. Platonov

But even after such a decision, the Romanovs were still confronted by many strong candidates. Of course, they all had certain shortcomings (see above). However, the Romanovs also had an important drawback - in comparison with the ancient Russian families, they clearly did not shine in origin. The first historically reliable ancestor of the Romanovs is traditionally considered to be the Moscow boyar Andrei Kobyla, who came from a Prussian princely family.

First version

Mikhail Fedorovich after his election to the throne

According to the official version, the election of the Romanovs became possible due to the fact that the candidacy of Mikhail Romanov turned out to be a compromise in many respects:

• Having received a young, inexperienced monarch on the Moscow throne, the boyars could hope to put pressure on the tsar in resolving key issues.
• Mikhail's father, Patriarch Filaret, was for some time in the camp of False Dmitry II. This gave hope to the defectors from the Tushino camp that Mikhail would not settle scores with them.
• Patriarch Filaret, in addition, enjoyed undoubted authority in the ranks of the clergy.
• The Romanov family was less tainted by its collaboration with the “unpatriotic” Polish government in 1610-1612. Although Ivan Nikitich Romanov was a member of the Seven Boyars, he was in opposition to the rest of his relatives (in particular, Patriarch Filaret and Mikhail Fedorovich) and did not support them at the council.
• The most liberal period of his reign was associated with Anastasia Zakharyina-Yuryeva, the first wife of Tsar Ivan the Terrible.

“Let's choose Misha Romanov! - Boyar Fyodor Sheremetyev campaigned without hiding his plans. “He’s young and will be popular with us!” ...The desire to have a “behavioral” inexperienced monarch is the goal pursued by experienced and cunning Moscow politicians, supporters of Mikhail (A. Ya. Degtyarev)

Lev Gumilev lays out the reasons for the election of Mikhail Romanov to the kingdom more consistently:

“The Cossacks were in favor of Mikhail, since his father, who was friends with the Tushins, was not an enemy of the Cossacks. The boyars remembered that the applicant’s father was from a noble boyar family and, moreover, the cousin of Fyodor Ioannovich, the last tsar from the family of Ivan Kalita. The church hierarchs spoke out in support of Romanov, since his father was a monk, and in the rank of metropolitan, and for the nobles the Romanovs were good as opponents of the oprichnina.”

Other versions

According to a number of historians, the decision of the council was not entirely voluntary. The first vote on Mikhail’s candidacy took place on February 4 (7?) The voting result disappointed Sheremetev’s expectations:

“When the majority was sufficiently prepared by Sheremetyev’s concerns, a preliminary vote was scheduled for February 4. The result undoubtedly disappointed expectations, therefore, citing the absence of many voters, they decided to postpone the decisive vote for two weeks... The leaders themselves obviously needed a postponement in order to better prepare public opinion...” (K. Waliszewski)

Indeed, the decisive vote was scheduled for February 21 (March 3) of the year. The council, however, made another decision that Sheremetev did not like: it demanded that Mikhail Romanov, like all other candidates, immediately appear at the council. Sheremetev did his best to prevent the implementation of this decision, citing security reasons for his position. Indeed, some evidence indicates that the life of the pretender to the throne was at risk. According to legend, a special Polish detachment was sent to the village of Domnino, where Mikhail Fedorovich was hiding, to kill him, but the Domnino peasant Ivan Susanin led the Poles into impassable swamps and saved the life of the future tsar. Critics of the official version offer another explanation:

“Deprived of any upbringing amid the turbulent events that surrounded his childhood and early youth, probably unable to read or write, Mikhail could ruin everything by appearing in front of the Council” (K. Walishevsky)

The council continued to insist, but later (approximately February 17-18) changed its decision, allowing Mikhail Romanov to remain in Kostroma. And on February 21 (March 3) he elected Romanov to the throne.

Cossack intervention

Some evidence points to a possible reason for this change. On February 10, 1613, two merchants arrived in Novgorod, reporting the following:

“The Russian Cossacks, who were in Moscow, wished for a boyar named Prince Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to be the Grand Duke. But the boyars were completely against this and rejected it at the Council, which was recently convened in Moscow." (L.V. Cherepnin)

And here is the testimony of the peasant Fyodor Bobyrkin, who also arrived in Novgorod, dated July 16, 1613 - five days after the coronation:

“Moscow ordinary people and Cossacks, of their own free will and without the general consent of other zemstvo officials, chose Fedorov’s son, Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, who is now in Moscow, as Grand Duke. Zemstvo officials and boyars do not respect him.” (L.V. Cherepnin)

Literature

• Valishevsky K., " Time of Troubles", Moscow, "IKPA", 1989.
• Vasilevsky I. M. The Romanovs from Mikhail to Nikolai. - Rostov n/d: Maprekon, 1993.
• Grimberg F. L., “The Romanov Dynasty. Puzzles. Versions. Problems", Moscow, "Moscow Lyceum", 1996.
• Gumilyov L. N., “From Rus' to Russia”, St. Petersburg, “YUNA”, 1992.
• Degtyarev A. Ya. (scientific review by R. G. Skrynnikov), “ Hard Age Russian Tsardom", Leningrad, "Children's Literature", 1988.
• Karamzin N. M., “History of the Russian State,” in 12 volumes, in 3 books, Kaluga, “Golden Alley”, 1993.
• Klyuchevsky V. O., “Russian history. Full course lectures in 3 books", Moscow, "Mysl", 1993.
• Lurie F. M., “Russian and world history in tables", St. Petersburg, "Iskusstvo-SPb", 1997.
• Pashkov B. G., “Rus. Russia. Russian empire. Chronicle of reigns and events of 862-1917", Moscow, "TsentrKom", 1997.
• Platonov S. F., “Works on Russian history”, St. Petersburg, “Stroylespechat”, 1994.
• “The Romanovs. Historical portraits", edited by E. V. Leonova, Moscow, "Armada", 1997.
• “Tercentenary of the House of Romanov”, reprint of the anniversary edition of 1913, Moscow, Sovremennik, 1991.
• Cherepnin L.V., “Zemsky Councils of the Russian state in the 16th-17th centuries,” Moscow, “Science”, 1978.

Opinions of pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians rarely coincide, but with regard to the Zemsky Sobor of 1613, there is no disagreement: representatives of various classes and Russian lands in full agreement elected Mikhail Romanov to the kingdom. Alas, this blissful picture is far from reality.

In October 1612, the people's militia liberated Moscow from the Poles. The time has come to restore the country devastated by the turmoil, to recreate state institutions. A legitimate, legitimate sovereign, elected by the Zemsky Sobor, was supposed to ascend to the empty throne of the Rurikovichs. On January 16, 1613, a difficult debate began in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin that determined the fate of Russia.

There were many contenders for the Russian throne. The two most unpopular candidates - the Polish prince Vladislav and the son of False Dmitry II - were “weeded out” immediately. The Swedish prince Karl Philip had more supporters, among them the leader of the zemstvo army, Prince Pozharsky. Why did the patriot of the Russian land choose a foreign prince? Perhaps the antipathy of the “artistic” Pozharsky towards domestic contenders - high-born boyars, who during the Time of Troubles more than once betrayed those to whom they swore allegiance, was reflected. He feared that the “boyar tsar” would sow the seeds of new unrest in Russia, as happened during the short reign of Vasily Shuisky. Therefore, Prince Dmitry stood for the calling of “Varangian”.

But there is another version. In the fall of 1612, militia captured a Swedish spy. Until January 1613, he languished in captivity, but shortly before the start of the Zemsky Sobor, Pozharsky freed the spy and sent him to Novgorod, occupied by the Swedes, with a letter to the commander Jacob Delagardie. In it, Pozharsky reports that both he himself and the majority of noble boyars want to see Karl Philip on the Russian throne. But, as subsequent events showed, Pozharsky misinformed the Swede. One of the first decisions of the Zemsky Sobor was that a foreigner should not be on the Russian throne; the sovereign should be elected “from Moscow families, God willing.” Was Pozharsky really so naive that he did not know the mood of the majority? Of course not. Prince Dmitry deliberately fooled Delagardie with “universal support” for the candidacy of Karl Philip in order to prevent Swedish interference in the election of the Tsar. The Russians had difficulty repelling the Polish onslaught; a campaign against Moscow by the Swedish army could also prove fatal. Pozharsky’s “cover operation” was successful: the Swedes did not budge. That is why on February 20, Prince Dmitry, happily forgetting about the Swedish prince, suggested that the Zemsky Sobor elect a tsar from the Romanov family, and then put his signature on the conciliar document electing Mikhail Fedorovich. During the coronation of the new sovereign, Mikhail showed Pozharsky a high honor: the prince presented him with one of the symbols of power - the royal power. Modern political strategists can only envy such a competent PR move: the savior of the Fatherland hands over the power to the new tsar. Beautiful. Looking ahead, we note that until his death (1642) Pozharsky faithfully served Mikhail Fedorovich, taking advantage of his constant favor. It is unlikely that the tsar would have favored someone who wanted to see not him, but some Swedish prince on the Rurik throne.

But let’s go back to January 1613. Only Russian contenders—high-born princes—participate in the struggle for the royal throne. But the leader of the notorious “Seven Boyars” Fyodor Mstislavsky compromised himself by collaborating with the Poles, Ivan Vorotynsky renounced his claim to the throne, Vasily Golitsyn was in Polish captivity, and the militia leaders Dmitry Trubetskoy and Dmitry Pozharsky were not distinguished by nobility. But the new king must unite the country divided by the Troubles. How to give preference to one clan so that a new round of boyar feuds does not begin?

This is where the surname of the Romanovs, relatives of the extinguished Rurik dynasty, arose: Mikhail Romanov was the nephew of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich. Mikhail's father, Patriarch Filaret, was respected among the clergy and Cossacks. Boyar Fyodor Sheremetyev actively campaigned in favor of the candidacy of Mikhail Fedorovich. He assured the obstinate boyars that Mikhail “is young and will be liked by us.” In other words, he will become their puppet.

But the boyars did not allow themselves to be persuaded: in the preliminary voting, Mikhail Romanov’s candidacy did not receive the required number votes. Moreover, the Council demanded that the young candidate come to Moscow. The Romanov party could not allow this: an inexperienced, timid, unskilled young man in intrigue would make an unfavorable impression on the Council delegates. Sheremetyev and his supporters had to show miracles of eloquence, proving how dangerous the path from the Kostroma village of Domnino, where Mikhail was, to Moscow was. Was it not then that the legend about the feat of Ivan Susanin, who saved the life of the future tsar, arose? After heated debates, the Romanovites managed to convince the Council to cancel the decision on Mikhail’s arrival.

On February 7, 1613, the rather tired delegates announced a two-week break: “for a large strengthening, they postponed February from the 7th of February to the 21st.” Messengers were sent to the cities “to inquire into all sorts of people’s thoughts.” The voice of the people, of course, is the voice of God, but isn’t two weeks enough to monitor the public opinion of a large country? For example, it is not easy for a messenger to get to Siberia in two months. Most likely, the boyars were counting on the departure of Mikhail Romanov’s most active supporters – the Cossacks – from Moscow. The villagers, they say, will get bored of sitting idle in the city, and they will disperse. The Cossacks actually dispersed, so much so that the boyars didn’t think it was enough...

A curious story about this is contained in “The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.” It turns out that on February 21, the boyars decided to choose a tsar by casting lots, but the reliance on “maybe”, in which any forgery is possible, seriously angered the Cossacks. Cossack speakers tore to pieces the boyars’ “tricks” and solemnly proclaimed: “According to God’s will, in the reigning city of Moscow and all of Russia, let there be a tsar, sovereign and Grand Duke Mikhailo Fedorovich! This cry was immediately picked up by Romanov supporters, not only in the Cathedral, but also among the large crowd of people in the square. It was the Cossacks who cut the “Gordian knot”, achieving the election of Mikhail. The unknown author of the “Tale” (surely an eyewitness to what was happening) does not spare any color when describing the reaction of the boyars: “The boyars at that time were possessed by fear and trembling, shaking, and their faces were changing with blood, and not a single one could utter anything.” Only Mikhail’s uncle, Ivan Romanov, nicknamed Kasha, who for some reason did not want to see his nephew on the throne, tried to object: “Mikhailo Fedorovich is still young and not fully sane.” To which the Cossack wits objected: “But you, Ivan Nikitich, are old, full of reason... you will be a strong blow to him.” Mikhail did not forget his uncle’s assessment of his mental abilities and subsequently removed Ivan Kasha from all government affairs.

The Cossack demarche came as a complete surprise to Dmitry Trubetskoy: “His face turned black, and he fell into illness, and lay for many days, without leaving his yard from the steep hill that the Cossacks depleted the treasury and their knowledge was flattering in words and deceit.” The prince can be understood: it was he, the leader of the Cossack militia, who counted on the support of his comrades, generously gifted them with “treasury” gifts - and suddenly they found themselves on Mikhail’s side. Perhaps the Romanov party paid more?

Be that as it may, on February 21 (March 3), 1613, the Zemsky Sobor made a historic decision: to elect Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the kingdom. The first country to recognize the new sovereign was England: in the same year, 1613, the embassy of John Metrick arrived in Moscow. Thus began the history of the second and last royal dynasty of Russia.

The election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne today, from afar, seems to be the only right decision. There cannot be any other relation to the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, given its venerable age. But for contemporaries, the choice of one of the Romanovs for the throne did not seem the best. All the political passions that usually accompany elections were fully present in 1613.

Suffice it to say that among the contenders for the Russian throne was a representative of a foreign royal court and several of his own boyars, including the leaders of the Moscow Boyar Duma in 1610-1612. Prince Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky and Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynsky, as well as the main commanders of the militia that recently liberated Moscow - Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy and Prince. The Romanov circle, if anything stood out against this background, was the abundance of proposed candidates, which included Ivan Nikitich Romanov (uncle of Mikhail Romanov), Prince Ivan Borisovich Cherkassky and Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetev. Among these seven contenders, according to the “Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613,” there was also the “eighth lamenting” Prince Pyotr Ivanovich Pronsky, who became noticeable thanks to his service in the zemstvo militia. He was the same young and well-born steward as Mikhail Romanov, only of princely origin. During the discussions at and around the Electoral Council, the names of Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shuisky, Prince Ivan Vasilyevich Golitsyn, and Prince Dmitry Mamstrukovich Cherkassky, who was in Polish-Lithuanian captivity, were also heard.

The opening of the Council was postponed and postponed, because Moscow found itself in the power of the Cossacks, because a sufficient number of elected officials did not come, because there was no Kazan Metropolitan Ephraim and because there was no head of the Boyar Duma - the boyar Prince Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky, who retired to his estates after liberation of the capital. There were too many reasons why the Council was unwilling or unable to take full responsibility. Probably because of this, the election of the tsar at first resembled veche meetings, where recent heroes of the battles near Moscow, electors who came from the area, as well as ordinary residents of the capital crowding around the Kremlin could express their opinions. There was also pre-election campaigning, which, however, took the form of feasts, which were organized by the candidates, in accordance with their era.

The main pre-election intrigue was to reconcile the opposing positions of the boyar curia at the Council and the Cossacks in electing a new tsar. It would seem that the boyars, experienced in the intricacies of palace politics, had an advantage here, but the Cossacks also continued to represent a significant force that could not be ignored.

Back in the summer of 1612, when Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky negotiated the election of Duke Charles Philip to the Russian throne, he “confidantly” informed Jacob Delagardie that all the “most noble boyars” had united around this candidacy. Opponents of the election of a foreign sovereign were “part of the simple and unreasonable crowd, especially the desperate and restless Cossacks.” Jacob Delagardie conveyed to his king the words of Prince Dmitry Pozharsky about the Cossacks, who “do not want any specific government, but want to elect a ruler under whom they could continue to freely rob and attack, as they have done so far.” .

Boyar ideas about the Cossacks were unlikely to change quickly after the liberation of Moscow. In the fall of 1612, according to the testimony of Ivan Filosofov, there were four and a half thousand Cossacks in Moscow and “in everything, the Cossacks are strong among the boyars and nobles, they do what they want, and the nobles and the boyars’ children dispersed to their estates.” Novgorodian Bogdan Dubrovsky described the situation in the capital in November - early December 1612 in a similar way. According to his estimates, in Moscow there were 11 thousand “best and senior Cossacks” selected during the analysis. Despite the analysis carried out, designed to divide the Cossacks, they continued to act together and in the end were able not only to unite around one candidate, but also to insist on her election. They did not leave Moscow at all, as the boyars wanted, but waited until the moment when all the names of possible contenders were announced in order to propose their candidate. This is exactly the version of events contained in the “Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.”

The exact start time of the conciliar meetings remains unknown. Most likely, the official opening of the Council did not take place, otherwise the news about this should have been included in the “Approved Charter on the Election of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich.” After January 6, 1613, endless discussions began, as reported by contemporaries. “And we, elected people from all over the Council and all ranks, spent a lot of time talking and thinking about the sovereign’s fleecing...” - this is what they wrote in the first letters about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich, describing the course of the electoral Council. The first conclusion, which satisfied the majority, was the rejection of all foreign candidates: “... so that the Lithuanian and Swedish kings and their children, and other German faiths and some foreign-language states of the non-Christian faith of the Greek law do not defraud the Vladimir and Moscow states and Marinka and her son you don’t want it for the state.” This meant the collapse of many political hopes and passions. Those who were members of the Boyar Duma, which concluded an agreement on the calling of Prince Vladislav, lost; there were no more prospects for the claims of the former Tushins, especially the Cossacks of Ivan Zarutsky, who continued their war for the young pretender Tsarevich Ivan Dmitrievich. But the organizer of the zemstvo militia, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky, who consistently supported the candidacy of the Swedish prince Karl Philip, also suffered a sensitive defeat. At the Council, another point of view prevailed; the experience of the Time of Troubles taught not to trust anyone from the outside: “... because the Polish and German kings saw for themselves a lie and a crime on the cross and a peaceful violation, just as the Lithuanian king ruined the Moscow state, and the Swedish king Veliky Novgorod took Oman for with a kiss of the cross." Having agreed on who “the whole earth” did not want to see on the throne (there were no particular surprises here), the elected officials accepted another most important common decision: “And rob the Vladimir and Muscovite states and all the great Russian states from the kingdom of the sovereign from the Moscow clans, God willing.”

Everything returned “to normal”, the situation that arose at the time of the suppression of the Rurik dynasty in 1598 was repeated, but there was no such figure as Boris Godunov. Whatever candidates for kings were named, each of them lacked something for the urgently felt unification in the face of the external threat that continued to emanate from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. What needed to be invented so that the new tsar could cope with the establishment of internal governance and eliminate Cossack self-will and robberies? All the applicants belonged to noble princely and boyar families, but how to give preference to one of them without immediately causing internecine struggle and parochial disputes? All these intractable contradictions led the members of the Electoral Council to a dead end.

The closest to the “crown of Monomakh”, it seemed, was Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy; for some time, he was supported by the Cossacks of the Moscow region regiments, which he commanded. In January 1613, he was given a charter for Vaga, which was owned by Boris Godunov and the Shuisky princes before him, which meant the continuity of the power tradition coming from them. But the Romanovs turned out to be closer to the Cossacks: echoes of memories of the activities of Nikita Romanovich Yuryev, who hired Cossacks to serve in the construction of the southern border of the state even under Tsar Ivan the Terrible, played a role. The martyrdom of the Romanovs under Tsar Boris Godunov and the stay of Metropolitan Philaret (Romanov) in the Tushino camp as the named patriarch were also important. Due to the absence of the captive Filaret in Moscow, they remembered his only son, the steward Mikhail Romanov. He was barely 16 years old, that is, he entered the age at which the service of a nobleman usually began. During the reign of Vasily Shuisky, he was still small and did not receive any official appointments, and then, finding himself under siege in Moscow, he could no longer go to work, being always with his mother, nun Marfa Ivanovna. Thus, if Mikhail Romanov was elected, no one could say that they had once commanded the Tsar or performed the same service as him. But the main advantage of a candidate from the Romanov family was his relationship with the extinct dynasty. As you know, Mikhail Romanov was the nephew of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich (their fathers were cousins). This circumstance ultimately overpowered all other arguments for or against.

On February 7, 1613, about a month after the start of the council meetings, a decision was made to take a two-week break. In the “Approved Charter” they wrote that the election of the king “for greater strengthening was postponed from February 7th to February 21st.” Secret envoys were sent to the cities to “inquire into all sorts of people’s thoughts about the state’s robbery.” The news of the “Approved Charter” gave reason to talk about the “pre-election” of the steward Mikhail Romanov to the Russian throne on February 7th. However, if by this date everyone had already agreed with the candidacy of Mikhail Romanov, then what other “strengthening” was expected? Most likely, behind the decision to take a break in the cathedral sessions was hidden the previous desire to wait for the presence at the cathedral of Kazan Metropolitan Ephraim, the head of the Boyar Duma, Prince Fyodor Ivanovich Mstislavsky, and uncertainty due to the incomplete representation of cities at the cathedral. Two weeks is a very short period of time to find out what the people of the Moscow state were thinking about, to different ends of which at that time one could travel for months, or even years (as, for example, to Siberia). To whom should the information collected in the country flow, who would summarize it, and were these “opinions” announced at the Council? All this should also have been taken care of when proper organization Cathedral. But the electoral Zemsky Sobor, which met under emergency conditions, itself established the rules of its work.

In mid-February 1613, some elected officials actually left the capital (to consult with their voters?). The news of this was preserved by chance, because several Toropets deputies were captured by Alexander Gosevsky, who by that time served as the Lithuanian referendar, but continued not only to closely monitor Moscow affairs, but even, as we see, to interfere in them. He informed Prince Christopher Radziwill that the “Toropets ambassadors” who went to the capital for the election of the tsar returned empty-handed and, being captured on the way back, told him that new elections were scheduled for February 21. There are also references to a trip to Kostroma before the final election of Mikhail Romanov by the brothers Boris Mikhailovich and Mikhail Mikhailovich Saltykov, relatives of the Tsar’s mother Marfa Ivanovna, who tried to find out their opinion on the conciliar decision. The question to what extent the election of Mikhail Romanov was a foregone conclusion on February 7 remains open. The most plausible explanation for the break is its coincidence with Maslenitsa and the Lent that followed. At the same time, 15 years ago, Tsar Boris Godunov was elected. The election of the new king was scheduled for the first Sunday of Lent - February 21.

The circumstances of the two-week break before the election of Mikhail Romanov were also written in a letter to Metropolitan Ephraim in Kazan on February 22-24, 1613, notifying about the election. It also spoke about the secret collection of information regarding the future candidacy of the king:

“... and before his state robbery, we sent the Moscow state in all cities and districts of those cities to secretly check on all kinds of faithful people, what the sovereign Tsar wanted for the Moscow state, and in all cities and districts, from small to large, the same idea , that Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov Yuryev would be the sovereign Tsar of the Moscow State.”

Nothing was said about the “pre-election” of Mikhail Romanov by the Council on February 7. Due to the “wound up” associated with the lack of elected people from the Kazan kingdom, and the ongoing ruin of the state at the Council, they decided to “simplify the period in the state’s robbery until the resurrection of the one hundred and twenty-first year of February until the twenty-first day.” In all the churches of the state, prayers were held for the granting of “a tsar from the Russian people to the Moscow state.” Most likely, this was the official decision reached by the Council on February 7, and the mood of the first, one of the strictest weeks of Lent, when worldly passions were inappropriate, should have helped to make the right choice from all the contenders for the throne.

Having reconvened at the scheduled date “on Assembly Sunday,” February 21, 1613, the Zemsky Sobor made the historic decision to elect Mikhail Fedorovich to the throne. In a letter to Metropolitan Ephraim in Kazan, they wrote how “for the requested period” on February 21, a prayer service was first held, and then the meetings of the Zemsky Sobor resumed:

“...we had in the reigning city of Moscow all kinds of ranks with elected people from all the cities and the reigning city of Moscow with all sorts of residents and they talked and advised everyone with a general council, what to turn the sovereign tsar to the Moscow state, and they talked about it for a long time, and sentenced and having advised everything with a single and irrevocable council and with the advice of their entire Moscow state, people of all ranks brought to us the metropolitan, and the archbishop, and the bishop, and to the entire Consecrated Cathedral, and to us, the boyars and okolniki and people of all ranks, their thoughts separately.”

This is the description of that very Council that changed Russian history. You can understand the essence of what was happening only by revealing what is behind each of them. etiquette formulas text of the certificate. It is only obvious that the Council lasted a long time, different ranks - Moscow and city nobles, guests, townspeople and Cossacks - had to formulate their single opinion, i.e. “thought”. This practice corresponded to the order of meetings of the Zemsky Sobors of later decades. An important, but not fully disclosed, reference is to the fact that the decision was made “with all sorts of local people” from Moscow. The separately mentioned participation of the Moscow “peace” in the events is by no means accidental and is additional evidence of its “invasion” in the affairs of the tsar’s election. Confirmation of this is contained in the questioning speeches of the steward Ivan Ivanovich Chepchugov (and two other Moscow nobles) in Novgorod in 1614. According to Ivan Chepchugov, who fought in the zemstvo militia and as a steward had to participate in the activities of the Zemsky Sobor, the Cossacks and mob “with great burst into the Kremlin noisily” and began to accuse the boyars that they “do not elect any of the local gentlemen as sovereigns in order to rule themselves and benefit from the country’s income alone.” Supporters of Mikhail Romanov never left the Kremlin until the “Duma and Zemstvo officials” swore allegiance to the new tsar.

Another story about the royal choice contains “The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.” According to this source, on February 21, the boyars came up with the idea of ​​choosing a tsar from several candidates by lot (a selection procedure borrowed from church law, according to which one of the Moscow patriarchs was elected in the 17th century). All plans were mixed up by the Cossack atamans invited to the Council, who accused the highest government officials of seeking to usurp power. The name of the new Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich at the Council was also pronounced that day by the Cossack atamans, who believed in the transfer of the royal staff by inheritance from Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich to the “prince” (sic!) Fyodor Nikitich Romanov: “And he is now full in Lithuania, and from the good good roots and branch, and his son is Prince Mikhailo Fedorovich. May it be fitting for him to rule according to God’s will.” The Cossack speakers very quickly moved from words to action and immediately proclaimed the name of the new tsar and “celebrated him for many years”: “By God’s will, in the reigning city of Moscow and all Russia, may there be a Tsar, Sovereign and Grand Duke Mikhailo Fedorovich and all Russia!” .

Although the name of Mikhail Romanov as a contender for the royal throne had been discussed for a long time, the call of the Cossack atamans at the Council, supported by ordinary Cossacks and the Moscow “peace” gathered in the Kremlin squares, took the boyars by surprise.

“The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613” provides very truthful details about the reaction of members of the Boyar Duma, who believed that the name of Mikhail Romanov would not be seriously considered at the Council. There is no doubt that the author of the Tale, if he was not an eyewitness himself, wrote everything down from the words of a very informed person. In any case, the reader of this story has a “presence effect”: “At that time, the boy was possessed by fear and trembling, and their faces were changing with blood, and not a single person could utter anything, but only one Ivan Nikitich Romanov said: “ That Prince Mikhailo Fedorovich is still young and not fully sane."

An awkward phrase that betrays the excitement of the boyar Ivan Romanov. In an effort to say that his nephew was not yet so experienced in business, he completely accused Mikhail of lack of intelligence. What followed was a remarkable response from the Cossack atamans, who turned this clause into a joke: “But you, Ivan Nikitich, are old, full of reason, and to him, the sovereign, you are a born uncle according to the flesh, and you will be a strong blow to him.” After this, “the boy was completely exhausted.”

But Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy received the main blow (accusations of striving for “autocracy” were largely directed at him as the head of the government of “the whole earth,” who still decided all matters in the country). “Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy,” the author of “The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613” writes about him, “his face was blackened, and he fell into illness, and lay for many days, without leaving his yard from the steep, that the Cossack had drained the treasury and their knowledge is flattering in words and deception.” Now it becomes clear why the signature of Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy is not on the letters notifying the cities about the election of a new tsar.

Thus, the conciliar meeting on February 21, 1613 ended with all the ranks agreeing on the candidacy of Mikhail Romanov and “they wrote a verdict on that and put their hands on it.” The decisive circumstance was, after all, the relationship of the future king with the previous dynasty. Notifying Metropolitan Ephraim about this, they could not resist “correcting” the genealogical arguments:

“And by the grace of God and the Most Pure Mother of God and the prayers of all the saints, our council and all ranks of people in one thought and in one agreement decided to be in the Moscow state the sovereign tsar and grand prince of all Russia, the blessed branch of the blessed memory of the great sovereign tsar and great Prince Ioann Vasilyevich, the autocrat of all Russia and the great empresses, the tsarina and the grand duchesses Anastasia Romanovna, to her grandson, and the great sovereign, the tsar and Grand Duke Fyodor Ivanovich of all Russia, to his nephew Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov Yuryev.”

A slight discrepancy with reality in the degree of kinship between Mikhail Romanov and Tsars Ivan the Terrible and Fyodor Ivanovich was no longer significant. What turned out to be more necessary was a unifying idea associated with a return to the names of former rulers. The young man Mikhail Romanov in 1613 could still only symbolically unite the past with the present in the minds of his contemporaries during the Time of Troubles. The main thing was to indicate something else, which was reported in the first letters about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the kingdom: “...at no one’s request or consent, God elected him, the sovereign, to such a great royal throne, over all people.”

One conciliar “sentence” adopted on February 21, 1613 was not yet enough to immediately transfer power to the new king, who, moreover, was absent from the capital and did not know about the election. The government of the “Council of the Whole Land” continued to act and make decisions and issue letters on behalf of the boyars Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy and Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky until February 25. Only from February 26, according to the observation of L. M. Sukhotin, the distribution of estates and the assignment of salaries to service people began to be made “by sovereign decree.” The basis for such a transfer of power was another conciliar decision on February 24 to send representatives of “the whole earth” to Mikhail Fedorovich “to Kostroma, the estate of his Tsar’s Majesty” and to take the oath to the new sovereign. A letter to Kazan Metropolitan Ephraim, prepared on February 22 and sent after February 25, spoke about this. Events in Moscow changed literally by the hour, and the decree on the oath was adopted at the moment when another embassy of members of the Council was being prepared “to the great lord, to Ephraim Metropolitan and to all the people of the Kazan state.” In the Kazan charter, written during the days of the Electoral Council, its composition is listed in the most complete way, in contrast to sources of later times, when “volost peasants” and other categories of elected officials were hidden under common name“people of all ranks”:

“And at that time, the boyars, and okolnichi, and chashniki, and stolniks, and solicitors, and great nobles, and Duma nobles, and clerks, and nobles from cities, and tenants, and children of boyars, and heads of streltsy, and merchant guests, and atamans, and Cossacks, and streltsy, and gunners, and zatinshchiki, and all sorts of servicemen and tenants, and of the entire Moscow state and people of all ranks from cities, and volost peasants from Lithuania, and from the Crimean, and from the German Ukraine, Zavolsk and Pomeranian and northern all the cities, Moscow residents, all sorts of black people with wives and children and real babies and beat them with their foreheads, so that we could send to him, the great sovereign, soon and pray to him, great sovereign, so that he, great sovereign, he accomplished his feat in the reigning city of Moscow on his royal throne given to him by God, and without it he, the great sovereign, would have kissed the cross.”

On February 24, the same thing happened again that happened three years ago, when the Cossacks and the Moscow “world” intervened in the course of the council meetings. A reflection of this is the mention in the “Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613” that the Cossacks almost by force forced the boyars to kiss the cross of Mikhail Fedorovich. It was the Cossacks who were most interested in ensuring that no turnaround happened and that Mikhail Romanov, whose choice they so insisted on, would become king:

“The Bolyar, as a Cossack, intended to kiss the cross for the sovereign, so they could leave Moscow, and not kiss the cross themselves in front of the Cossacks. The Cossacks knew their intention and forced them, the boyars, to kiss the cross. And kissed the boy's cross. Also, then the Cossacks brought six crosses to the Place of Execution, and the Cossacks kissed the cross, and glorified God all.”

In the official documents issued on behalf of the Council, of course, not a word was said about the forced oath of the boyars. On the contrary, in a letter to Kazan and other cities it was emphasized that kissing the cross was performed “according to the general world council” and “by the whole earth.” However, the acute rejection of the candidacy of Mikhail Romanov by some boyars and participants in the electoral Council (including the temporary rulers of the state, Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy and Prince Dmitry Pozharsky) was known to contemporaries. At the beginning of 1614, in Novgorod, the son of the boyar Nikita Kalitin spoke about the balance of power during the election of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich:

“Some princes, boyars and Cossacks, as well as ordinary people, the noblest of them - Prince Ivan Nikitievich Yuryev, uncle of the now elected Grand Duke, Prince Ivan Golitsyn, Prince Boris Lykov and Boris Saltykov, son of Mikhail Saltykov, cast their votes for Feodorov’s son and chose and installed him as their Grand Duke; they now hold on to him very much and have sworn allegiance; but Prince Dmitry Pozharsky, Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy, Prince Ivan Kurakin, Prince Fyodor Mstislavsky, as well as Prince Vasily Borisovich Cherkassky, stood firmly against and did not want to agree to anything that others did. Especially Prince Dmitry Pozharsky openly spoke to the boyars, Cossacks and zemstvo officials in Moscow and did not want to approve the choice of his son Theodore, arguing that as soon as they accepted him as their Grand Duke, order would not last long, but it would be better for them to stand on the fact that all of them decided earlier not to elect any of their fellow tribesmen as grand dukes.”

The position of Prince Dmitry Pozharsky was clear; he had to continue to adhere to the agreements of his zemstvo government on the calling of Prince Charles Philip. Now it is difficult to say definitely when the turn in the views of Prince Pozharsky came, but it is indisputable that the candidacy of Mikhail Romanov was confirmed in the most intense political struggle.

The oath to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich began on February 25, and from that time on there was a change of power. The first letters were sent to the cities, informing about the election of Mikhail Fedorovich, and kissing notes were attached to them. The text of the oath included a rejection of all other possible applicants, obliging everyone to serve “their sovereign, and to be straightforward and want good in everything without any cunning.”

The charter of the Moscow Zemsky Sobor was sent out on behalf of the Consecrated Council, headed by Metropolitan Kirill, which consisted of diocesan and monastic authorities and “the great monasteries of the honest monasteries of elders, who were gathered for the royal fleece to Moscow.”

All other ranks were only listed in order. And this is no coincidence. Strictly speaking, in those days only the Consecrated Council could be perceived as convened with sufficiently full representation (with the exception of Metropolitan Ephraim). All other deputies, as well as people who simply happened to be in Moscow, addressed precisely this church council, which consecrated similar general gatherings of people gathered for the election of the Tsar. Letters were sent to the cities, addressing first of all the local Consecrated Cathedral, and then to the governors, district nobles and boyar children, archers, Cossacks, guests, townspeople and district “all people of the great Moscow state.”

From Moscow they recalled the “suppression of the royal root” and the time that came after the deposition of Tsar Vasily Shuisky: “... due to the common zemstvo sin, and due to the envy of the devil, many people hated his sovereign and fell behind him; and discord broke out in the Moscow state." Further, briefly recalling the agreement with Hetman Zholkiewski, about the “cleansing” of Moscow from Polish and Lithuanian people, they came to the main thing - the royal choice. Here there could be nuances in the letters, since some cities, despite all the requests, did not send their representatives “for the state’s fleece.” Now they were reminded of this and informed everywhere that “elected people” from the cities outside Moscow, Pomerania and Ukraine had long since gathered and lived in Moscow.” for a long time" There was a general opinion that “without the sovereign the Moscow state can build nothing, and the factories are divided into many parts by thieves, and theft multiplies many things.” Describing the list of candidates discussed at the Zemsky Sobor, the electors explained why they abandoned “the Lithuanian and Swedish king and their children” and reported that “they did not want Marinka and her son for the state.” Thus, based on the principle of negation, the decision was born to choose “a sovereign from the Moscow clans, whomever God wills.” By all accounts, such a candidate was Mikhail Fedorovich, whose election to the Russian throne took place on February 21. They kissed the cross to the new Tsar, promising him “to serve and straighten both the enemies of his sovereign and the enemies of the Moscow state with the Polish and Lithuanian and German people, and with the Tatars, and with the traitors who will not serve his sovereign, fight to the death.” . At the end of the letter of election, Mikhail Fedorovich was called upon to sing many years and hold “prayer services with ringing bells” for the health of the new king and for peace in the country: “... and would establish a Christian state peacefully and in silence and prosperity.”

However, there were still many places in the Moscow state where the decision of the electoral Zemsky Sobor on the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the kingdom was not recognized. The greatest danger continued to come from another Cossack contender - the son of Marina Mnishek, Tsarevich Ivan Dmitrievich. At this time, he and his mother were in the hands of Ivan Zarutsky, who settled in Epifani, in the upper reaches of the Don. Immediately after the election of Mikhail, the “Zemsky Council” sent there with letters of approval three Cossacks from the regiment of Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy - Vaska Medved, Timoshka Ivanov and Bogdashka Tverdikov. What came of this, they told themselves in their petition:

“As, sir, the whole earth and all the military men kissed the cross in Moscow to you the sovereign, we were sent from Moscow from your sovereign boyars and from the whole earth to Zarutsky. And how we, your servants, came to Epifan to Zarutsky with boyar and zemstvo charters, and Zarutsky sold us your servants for strong bailiffs and robbed us naked, horses and guns and clothes and money, robbed everything. And because of the bailiffs, sir, we, your servants who were plundered in body and soul, released us with letters to Moscow to your sovereign boyars and to the whole land.”

One can only guess about the content and style of correspondence between the “Council of the Whole Land” and the rebellious Cossack ataman; apparently, he was asked (as would be done again in 1614, when Zarutsky was in Astrakhan) to refuse to support Marina Mnishek’s claims to royal regalia for his son. However, Ivan Zarutsky has already crossed the line separating a fighter for the “correct” candidate from an ordinary robber, which he will soon prove with his campaign against the Tula and Oryol cities - Krapivna, Chern, Mtsensk, Novosil, Livny - burning fortresses, “flogging” people and with particular cruelty, ruining the estates of the elected representatives who were in Moscow during the election of Mikhail Fedorovich.

The oath to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich began at a time when his consent to take the throne had not yet been received. How should the young man Mikhail Romanov, who was in Kostroma, in the Ipatiev Monastery, feel when this fate fell?

Razheva Arina

This work was presented at the IX city scientific and practical conference of schoolchildren “First Steps into Science” by a 6th grade student

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IX city scientific and practical conference for schoolchildren

"First steps into science"

Section: history

Job title:

« Mikhail Romanov and other candidates

to the royal throne in 1613»

g.o. Togliatti, MBU secondary school No. 47, 6 “A” class

Scientific supervisor: Kozyreva Svetlana Nikolaevna,

History teacher, MBU Secondary School No. 47

Tolyatti

2013

1. Introduction 3

2. Main part 4

2.1. About candidates for the throne in 1613 5

2.2. About Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov 6

2.3. On the role of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 7

3. Conclusion 9

4. References 10

Introduction

On March 1, 2012, an Appeal to compatriots was published on the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the overcoming of the Time of Troubles and the restoration of Russian statehood by the Head of the House of Romanov, E.I.V. Sovereign Grand Duchess Maria Vladimirovna. It says, in part: “400 years ago, our Motherland was tormented by a terrible, unprecedented Troubles. Everything collected over the centuries at the cost of incredible labors and sacrificial deeds of the people found itself on the verge of complete destruction. The decapitated country was perishing from civil war and external invasion, from the confusion and betrayal of the ruling layer, from indifference, bitterness, suspicion, mutual hatred, cowardice, lies, meanness and self-interest, which engulfed all classes without exception... We need to be deeply imbued with the idea that we are celebrating the 400th anniversary of the feat of our great long-suffering People. First and foremost, this is not a celebration of the dynasty, hierarchs, military leaders, diplomats and aristocrats, no matter how significant their contribution to the national struggle, but a glorification of courage, self-sacrifice and love ordinary people who liberated and revived our country... Without in any way diminishing the significance of symbolic state, church and public acts, we are obliged to highlight and prioritize the social and educational content of the anniversary..."

What so significant happened 400 years ago? Why was the election of Mikhail Romanov so important for the life of all of Russia? Were there other candidates for the throne and why were they not chosen? What role did the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 play in solving these problems?

Fundamental question:what role did the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 play in the choice of a new ruling dynasty in Russia?

Goal of the work: compare different contenders for the royal throne and find out the reasons for the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to reign

Research objectives:

1. Study the historical background for the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the royal throne.

2. Get acquainted with the contenders for the reign and compare their chances in the election struggle.

3. Find out the reasons for the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to reign

4. Determine the role of the Zemsky Sobor in the selection of a new ruling dynasty in Russia.

Main content

The history of Russia at the turn of the 16th - 17th centuries is replete with events. The state entered a period of economic decline, internal strife and military failures. It was on the verge of collapse. The enemies - the Swedes and Poles - captured the country's largest border fortresses - Smolensk and Novgorod, and then occupied Moscow. Internal conflict undermined the strength of a huge power. Disasters have given rise to widespread popular movement. The state was experiencing a protracted and complex moral, political and socio-economic crisis. The result of which was a change of royal dynasties in Russia - the Rurik dynasty was replaced by the Romanov dynasty.

On October 26, 1612, in Moscow, deprived of support from the main forces of Hetman Chodkiewicz, the Polish garrison capitulated. After the liberation of the capital, the need arose to choose a new sovereign. Letters were sent from Moscow to many cities of Rus' on behalf of the liberators of Moscow - D. Pozharsky and D. Trubetskoy, which ordered representatives of each city to arrive in Moscow before December 6. However, the elected officials took a long time to come from the distant ends of still seething Russia. Some lands (for example, Tverskaya) were devastated and completely burned. Some sent 10-15 people, others only one representative. The opening date for meetings of the Zemsky Sobor was postponed from December 6 to January 6, 1613. In dilapidated Moscow, there was only one building left that could accommodate all the elected officials - the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. The number of those gathered varies, according to various estimates, from 700 to 1,500 people. The Zemsky Sobor, held in Moscow in January - February 1613, “was the most representative of all the Zemsky Sobors.” This was truly the “Russian National Assembly,” whose representatives were especially concerned that their decision would express the will of “the whole earth.” Although the elected officials had broad powers, they still sent out their decisions to a survey of cities. Having gathered after many years of violent events and civil strife, people were divided by their recent past.

About candidates for the throne

A sharp struggle broke out around the candidacy of the future tsar at the Council. They suggested calling a “prince’s son” from Poland or Sweden; they remembered that the tsar could only be elected from among the “natural Moscow boyars” and nominated candidates from the old Russian princely families; They even offered the son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek. On Russian throne, in addition to Mikhail Romanov, both representatives of the local nobility and representatives of the ruling dynasties of neighboring countries applied. Among the latest candidates for the throne were:

Polish prince Wladyslaw, son of Sigismund III

Swedish prince Carl Philip, son of Charles IX

Among the representatives of the local nobility, the following names stood out. As can be seen from the above list, they all had serious shortcomings in the eyes of voters.

Golitsyn. This family descended from Gediminas of Lithuania, but the absence of V.V. Golitsyn (he was in Polish captivity) deprived this family of strong candidates.

Mstislavsky and Kurakin. Representatives of these noble Russian families undermined their reputation by collaborating with the Poles. According to the official version, the most influential representative of this family, I.M. Vorotynsky, recused himself.

Godunovs and Shuiskys. Both were relatives of previously reigning monarchs. The Shuisky family, in addition, descended from Rurik. However, kinship with the overthrown rulers was fraught with a certain danger: having ascended the throne, the chosen ones could get carried away with settling political scores with their opponents.

Dmitry Pozharsky and Dmitry Trubetskoy. They undoubtedly glorified their names during the storming of Moscow, but were not distinguished by nobility.

In addition, the candidacy of Marina Mnishek and her son from her marriage to False Dmitry II, nicknamed “Vorenko,” was considered.

Of the eight candidates for tsar nominated on behalf of the boyars, four (F. Mstislavsky, I. Vorotynsky, F. Sheremetev, I. Romanov) as members of the notorious seven-boyars were with the Poles in Moscow in 1611-1612. during the assaults by the first and second militias. That is, they were persons obviously unacceptable to the liberators of the capital. The fifth, steward I. Cherkassky, fought on the side of the Poles against the first militia, was taken prisoner by the Russians, but was forgiven due to the nobility of the family. Prince Pronsky on this list is the only nobleman not associated with Moscow. He came from the family of the great princes of Ryazan. He was one of the few representatives of the nobility in the second militia, but was completely unknown to most members of the cathedral.

Thus, only two figures on the boyar list - active participants in the fight against the Poles in the ranks of the first and second militias, princes D. Trubetskoy and D. Pozharsky - could really lay claim to the Russian throne.

At the insistence of representatives of the nobility, townspeople and peasants, it was decided: “Neither a Polish prince, nor a Swedish one, nor any other German faith, nor from any non-Orthodox states should be chosen for the Moscow state and Marinka’s son would not be wanted.”

In preparing for the council, the zemstvo authorities seemed to have foreseen everything. They tried to insure against the nomination of new candidates. The Shuisky princes were defeated back in 1610, and, apparently, they were not taken into account. The head of another princely clan and a contender for the throne in 1610, boyar Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, was in Polish captivity, so the chances of his nephew Ivan Andreevich Golitsyn ascending the royal throne, according to the parochial order, were illusory. In a similar manner, the authorities apparently attempted to neutralize another possible 1610 candidate, Mikhail Romanov. His uncle, Ivan Nikitich Romanov, was included in the list of applicants. The inclusion of Prince Ivan Borisovich Cherkassky in this list closed the path to the throne for Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Cherkassky, who had compromised himself by betraying the “zemstvo cause.”

About Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov

All candidates were distinguished by the antiquities of the family, but none of them had clear advantages for the throne. Why did the choice fall on Mikhail Romanov?
Researchers argue that, apparently, three circumstances played a decisive role in Mikhail’s choice. He was not involved in any of the adventures of the Time of Troubles, his reputation was clean. Therefore, his candidacy suited everyone. Moreover, Mikhail was young, inexperienced, quiet and modest. Many of the boyars and nobles close to the court hoped that the tsar would be obedient to their will. Finally, the family ties of the Romanovs with the Rurikovichs were also taken into account; Mikhail was the cousin of the last tsar from the Rurikovich dynasty, Fyodor Ivanovich. In the eyes of contemporaries, these family ties meant a lot. They emphasized the “godliness of the sovereign” and the legality of his accession to the throne. According to V. O. Kyuchevsky: “They wanted to choose not the most capable, but the most convenient. Thus appeared the founder of a new dynasty, putting an end to the Troubles.”

For the first time, the name of the boyar’s son, as the only person worthy of the tsar’s rank, was named after the fall of Tsar Vasily Shuisky in the summer of 1610 by Patriarch Hermogenes. But then the words of the Holy Shepherd were not heard. Now they have acquired the character of a great historical political action. The decision in favor of Mikhail Romanov turned out to be universal.

On March 14 (24 new style), 1613, 16-year-old Mikhail Romanov agreed to accept the Russian kingdom, and was solemnly named sovereign. On July 11, 1613, his royal crowning took place in the Assumption Cathedral. Mikhail Romanov became the first tsar of the new dynasty, occupying the royal throne from 1613 to 1645. Under him, an amazing union developed between the Priesthood and the Kingdom, which had no analogues either before or since. Under Mikhail Fedorovich, the functions of the “kingdom” and “priesthood” were, as it were, harmonized in favor of the Church, when the spiritual shepherd played a decisive role in worldly affairs. The Romanov dynasty will rule Russia for more than three hundred years, until it ends tragically.

Naturally, over the 300 years of the reign of the Romanov dynasty, a lot of “reliable” justifications for the nationwide election of Mikhail and his outstanding role in ending the unrest in Rus' appeared. How did it all really happen? Unfortunately, many documentary evidence of Romanov’s election to the throne were either destroyed or thoroughly edited. But, as they say, “manuscripts don’t burn,” some evidence has been preserved, and some things can be read between the lines of official documents, for example, “The Tale of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.”

About the role of the Zemsky Sobor

In the minds of the Russian people of that time, the ideal Orthodox tsar was supposed to have three qualities: “love of God,” “reason in ruling,” and military prowess. Mikhail Romanov, unlike his father, did not possess all the virtues of an Orthodox sovereign. He had no experience in government or military affairs. A lethargic, sickly young man grew up in conditions constant fear for your life and the lives of your loved ones. He was distinguished by his extraordinary piety and this strongly reminded him of his uncle, the last “born tsar” Fyodor Ioannovich. The election organizers led voters to the idea that it was enough to elect the “pious” nephew of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich to the Russian throne, and God would grant Russia peace, and the boyars would handle military and administrative affairs.

During the Time of Troubles, twice before, the Russian land, at the Zemstvo Councils of 1598 and 1606, proclaimed a tsar and was twice mistaken. These failures were too costly, and everyone knew it. In 1613, it was not a question of “selection,” as some kind of mechanical procedure for one candidate or another to obtain the maximum number of votes, but of establishing “worthiness.” The debates at the Zemsky Sobor focused not on the question of “who to elect”, but on the question “who can be king in Rus'”, in accordance with the concepts of power that existed at that time among the Russian people of “the whole earth”... Zemsky people of 1613, Having gathered to “rob” the Sovereign, they left it to the Lord God to “elect” the Tsar, expecting the manifestation of this election in the fact that He would put into the hearts of “all men a single thought and affirmation” about His Anointed One. The Lord sends the king to people, and sends them when they are worthy to deserve His mercy. And it is the destiny of the earthly to discern this providential gift and accept it with a prayer of gratitude.

Mikhail Fedorovich, accepting the royal crown, seemed to be doing a favor to the zemstvo. The council, which begged him to take responsibility for the fate of the state, for its part took upon itself the obligation to restore order in the country: to stop civil strife, robberies and robberies, to create acceptable conditions for the exercise of sovereign functions, to fill the royal treasury with everything necessary for the dignified “everyday” of the royal yard and maintenance of troops. Exactlythe active position of the zemstvo compensated for the shortcomings of the government of Mikhail Fedorovich, staffed at the expense of his relatives and friends, who are of little use for governing the state in conditions of devastation and general anarchy. It must be said that the popularly elected Zemsky Sobor began to fulfill its obligations immediately.

Subsequent events showed that the choice was not the worst. And it’s even good that for many years Mikhail was only a nominal ruler, and real power was in the hands of people with great life experience- first his mother, and then his father, Patriarch Filaret, who, upon returning from captivity, was officially proclaimed co-ruler of the king.

The gradual overcoming of the consequences of the Time of Troubles, the marriage of Mikhail and the birth of the heir to the throne created the belief in the country that the new dynasty was here to stay.

Conclusions and Conclusion

Tired of the great disasters during the Time of Troubles, Russia needed stability in all spheres of life, especially the restoration of statehood. To do this, it was necessary to elect a sovereign who would suit all classes and groups. The participants in the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 understood this and managed to find a compromise option for the throne in the person of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov.

The President of our country, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, believes that instilling patriotism is one of the priority tasks of the state. Here is his statement: “We must build our future on a solid foundation. And such a foundation is patriotism. No matter how long we discuss what could be the foundation, a solid moral foundation for our country, we still can’t come up with anything else. This is respect for one’s history and traditions...”

The Zemsky Sobor of 1613 is a shining example that the ability to negotiate and make the right decision is the first step that helps restore the country, raise it from its knees. This is true proof of the patriotism of our ancestors. In my opinion, this is precisely the quality that many politicians and influential people in modern Russia lack.

Bibliography

1. A. A. Danilov, L. G. Kosulina. History of Russia (late XVI - XVIII). 7th grade. M.: Education, 2005.
2. T. V. Perevezentseva. History of Russia (book for teachers). 7th grade. M.: Russian word, 2012.
3. IN AND. Buganov. The world of history (Russia in the 17th century). M.: Young Guard, 1989.
4. S. Perevezentsev. Russia. Great Destiny. M.: White City, 2006.
5. IN. Klyuchevsky. Russian history course. Media book, 2006.

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Report at the first Tsar's readings of "Autocratic Russia"

The Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was assembled by the decision of the head of the administrative department of the Moscow state created in Moscow after the expulsion of the Poles by Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky together with Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy. A charter dated November 15, 1612, signed by Pozharsky, called on all cities of the Moscow State to elect ten elected people from each city to elect the Tsar. According to indirect data, the Zemsky Sobor was attended by representatives of 50 cities liberated from the Polish occupation and the gangs of thieves of Ataman Zarutsky, an ardent supporter of the elevation of the son of Marina Mnishek and False Dmitry II to the Moscow Royal throne.

Thus, ten people from one city had to be present at the Zemsky Sobor, subject to the norms of representation determined by the head of the Moscow government. If we proceed from this norm, then five hundred elected members from cities only should have participated in the Zemsky Sobor, not counting the ex-officio members of the Zemsky Sobor (the Boyar Duma in its entirety, court officials and the highest clergy). According to the calculations of the most prominent specialist in the history of troubled times, Academician Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, more than seven hundred people should have participated in the Zemsky Sobor of 1613, which amounted to five hundred elected and about two hundred courtiers, boyars and church hierarchs. The large number of people and representativeness of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 are confirmed by evidence from various independent chronicle sources, such as the New Chronicler, the Tale of the Zemsky Sobor, the Pskov Chronicler and some others. However, with the representation of the boyar duma and court officials, everything was not as simple as with the ordinary elected members of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613. There is direct evidence from both Russian chroniclers and foreign observers that a significant part of the boyar aristocracy, which made up the absolute majority of the members of the Boyar Duma and court officials, who were supporters of the invitation to the Moscow throne of the Polish prince Vladislav and who had stained herself by close cooperation with the Polish occupiers, both in Moscow and in other cities and regions of the Moscow state, was expelled by January 1613 - the time of the beginning of the Zemsky Sobor from Moscow to their estates.

Thus, the boyar aristocracy, traditionally present and usually actively influencing the decisions of the Zemsky Councils, was sharply weakened at the Zemsky Council of 1613. It can be said that these decisions of princes Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky and Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy became the last blow in the final defeat of the once influential Moscow boyar aristocracy “Polish party” (supporters of Prince Vladislav). It is no coincidence that the first resolution of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was the refusal to consider any foreign candidates for the Moscow throne and the refusal to recognize the rights of the vorenok (son of False Dmitry II and Marina Mnishek) to it. The majority of participants in the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 were committed to the speedy election of a Tsar from the natural Russian boyar family. However, there were very few boyar families that were not stained by the turmoil, or were stained comparatively less than others.

In addition to the candidacy of Prince Pozharsky himself, who, as a likely candidate for the throne, due to his lack of nobility, was not taken seriously even by the patriotic part of the Moscow aristocracy (despite the fact that Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky was a hereditary natural Rurikovich, neither he nor his father and grandfather were not only Moscow boyars, but even okolnichy). At the time of the overthrow of the last relatively legitimate tsar, Vasily Shuisky, Prince Pozharsky bore the modest title of steward. Another influential leader of the patriotic movement, Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy, despite his undoubted nobility (he was a descendant of the Gediminovich dynasty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), was greatly discredited by his collaboration with former supporters of the so-called Tushino thief, False Dmitry II, led by Ataman Zarutsky. This past of Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy repelled him not only from the boyar aristocracy, but also from wide circles of the hereditary service nobility. The hereditary nobleman Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy was not perceived by the Moscow aristocracy and many nobles as one of their own. They saw in him an unreliable adventurer, ready for any action, any ingratiation with the mob, just to achieve full power in the Moscow state and seize the royal throne. As for the social lower classes and, in particular, the Cossacks, to whom Prince Dmitry Timofeevich Trubetskoy constantly curried favor, hoping with their help to take the royal throne, the Cossacks quickly became disillusioned with his candidacy, as they saw that he did not have support in wide circles of others estates. This caused an intensive search for other candidates at the Zemsky Sobor in 1613, among whom the figure of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov began to acquire the greatest weight. Mikhail Fedorovich, a sixteen-year-old youth, untainted in the affairs of the Troubles, was the son of the head of the noble boyar family of the Romanovs, in the world Fedor, and in monasticism Filaret, who was in Polish captivity, who became metropolitan in the Tushino camp, but took a consistently patriotic position in the embassy of 1610, subtly and wisely negotiated with the Polish king Sigismund, under Smolensk besieged by the Poles, about the calling of Prince Vladislav to the Moscow throne, but in such a way that this calling did not take place. In fact, Metropolitan Philaret surrounded this calling with such religious and political conditions that made election almost impossible, both for Sigismund and for Prince Vladislav.

This anti-Polish, anti-Vladislav and anti-Sigismund position of Metropolitan Philaret was widely known and highly appreciated in wide circles of various classes of the Moscow state. But due to the fact that Metropolitan Filaret was a clergyman, and, moreover, was in Polish captivity, that is, he was actually cut off from political life Moscow Rus', the real candidate for the Moscow throne was his sixteen-year-old son Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov.

The most active supporter of Mikhail Fedorovich's candidacy for the Moscow royal throne was a distant relative of the Zakhariin-Romanov family, Fyodor Ivanovich Sheremetyev. It was with his help and support that the idea of ​​electing Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov to the throne of the Muscovite kingdom took hold of both the members of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 and wide circles of representatives of various classes of the Moscow state.

However, the greatest success of Sheremetyev’s mission, in his struggle for the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the royal throne, was the support of his candidacy by the governor of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, Archimandrite Dionysius.

This authoritative support greatly strengthened Mikhail Fedorovich’s position in the public opinion of representatives of various classes of the Moscow state and, above all, the two of them that most opposed each other: the service nobility and the Cossacks.

It was the Cossacks, under the influence of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, who were the first to actively support Michael’s candidacy for the royal throne. The influence of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra also contributed to the fact that most of The serving nobility, who for a long time greatly fluctuated in their sympathies for possible contenders, ultimately came out on the side of Mikhail Fedorovich.

As for the townspeople - urban artisans and traders, this one is very influential in liberation movement 1612-1613 layer of the urban population, whose representatives actively supported the candidacy of Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky before the convening of the Zemsky Sobor, after he withdrew his candidacy and with active support Orthodox Church Mikhail Romanov also began to lean towards his support. Thus, the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, and, in his person, the new royal Romanov dynasty, was the result of the consent of all the main classes of the Moscow state that participated in the liberation movement of 1612 and were represented at the Zemsky Sobor of 1613.

Undoubtedly, the election of the Romanov dynasty in the person of Mikhail Fedorovich to the Moscow royal throne was facilitated by the relationship of the Zakhariin-Romanov family with the last representatives of the extinct dynasty of the Moscow Rurikovichs, the descendants of the founder of the Moscow principality of the Holy Blessed Prince Daniel and his son Ivan Kalita, the Daniilovich-Kalitichs, who occupied the Moscow grand duke, and, later, the royal throne for almost 300 years.

However, the history of the Time of Troubles shows us that nobility itself, without public support and the real authority of one or another boyar family in church circles of representatives of various secular classes, could not contribute to their victory in the struggle for the throne that was taking place at that time.

The sad fate of Tsar Vasily Shuisky and the entire Shuisky family showed this clearly.

It was the support of the Church and zemstvo forces from various classes of Moscow Rus' that contributed to the victory of Mikhail Fedorovich, who took the royal throne of the Moscow state.

As evidenced by the largest specialist in the history of the Time of Troubles, the outstanding Russian historian, Professor Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, after the representatives of the main estates participating in the Zemsky Council on February 7, 1613, agreed on the candidacy of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov for the royal throne, some of the deputies - members of the Council was sent to various cities of the Moscow state in order to find out opinions about this decision.

Deputies sent by Yamsk mail in an expedited manner reached southern Russian cities, as well as Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl and other cities in two weeks. The cities unanimously supported the election of Mikhail Fedorovich.

After this, a decisive vote was held on February 21, 1613, which became historic, in which, in addition to the deputies who returned from regional lands and cities, for the first time since the beginning of the work of the Zemsky Sobor, the boyars who were removed by Prince Dmitry Pozharsky from his work at the first stage - former supporters of Vladislav - took part and cooperation with Poland, led by the former head of the pro-Polish government of the era of Polish occupation - the Seven Boyars - boyar Fyodor Mstislavsky.

This was done in order to demonstrate the unity of the Moscow state and all its social forces in supporting the new Tsar in the face of the continuing powerful Polish threat.

Thus, the decision to elect Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as Tsar of the Moscow State, which took place on February 21, 1613, became an actual declaration of independence of Muscovite Rus' from foreign intrigues and those foreign centers ( Papal Vatican, Habsburg Vienna, Sigismund Krakow), where these intrigues matured and were hatched.

But the most important result of the work of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was that this decision was made not by the aristocracy in a narrow boyar circle, but by broad layers of different classes of Russian society in the conditions of a public discussion at the Zemsky Sobor.

L.N.Afonsky

Member of the Presidium of the Central Council of "Autocratic Russia"