The entry of Warsaw Warfare troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 slowed down the disintegration processes that had clearly taken shape by the summer of 1968. It can be stated that, regardless of the will of the leadership of the Warsaw Warfare member countries, the events of August 1968 to a certain extent slowed down the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. “The constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation adopted on October 27, 1968 was based on the national principle, which could turn the Czechoslovak federation into a dualist one. Article 142 provided for the development and adoption of constitutions for each of the national republics” Valenta I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 /Trans. from Czech. M., 1991.-P.85.. However, in the coming era of normalization in the country, the formation of a federal state from above, the personal merger of federal and national executive authorities, political dirigisme, which modified the entire process of economic reforms and building a federation, meant a return to a unitary state governance scheme. For Czech society, the main thing was the implementation of the principles of democratization, and in Slovakia, issues of a federal state-legal structure came to the fore.
“It seems that there were two Prague Springs - the Czech and separately the Slovak. The Slovaks sought a state-legal structure, which was characterized by strong national government bodies and the delegation of certain powers to federal bodies, allowing them to represent the Czechoslovak state abroad. The Czechs did not want to make changes to the state-legal structure, since they completely identified themselves with the unitary Czechoslovak state.” Zadorozhnyuk E.G., Maryina V.V., Serapionova E.P., Musatov V.L. "Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 20th century." M., 2005.-P.64.. The Czechs, focusing on the implementation of democratic principles, put the task of liberation from the hegemony of the Soviet Union at the forefront. For the Slovaks, the most significant problem was the restoration of their statehood in full, which would inevitably lead to the collapse of a united Czechoslovakia.
The Prague Spring represented a different kind of protest than that which Soviet leaders faced in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the fundamentals of securing interests national security USSR, it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. The preservation of membership in the OVD and CMEA was not questioned.
As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, G. Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the CPC adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the CPC,” which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his circle.
In the early 60s. A contradictory situation developed in Czechoslovakia. We can talk about a certain liberalization of the political regime, due, first of all, to the “Khrushchev Thaw.” It opened up the opportunity for criticism of various aspects of the life of society, including the political elite, and representatives of the post-war generations put forward new ideas and did not want, as was already the case in the 50s, to follow the instructions of the official regime. When assessing historical processes, which took place in those days in Czechoslovakia, it should be borne in mind that initially the events had the character of an institutional crisis, which spread to the highest levels political structure Czechoslovakia. Along with the demands for democratization and economic reforms, the demand for a revision of the Constitution became significant.
The democratic movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had deep historical roots. The process of its formation was influenced by the humanistic traditions of the interwar period: the democratic ideas of T. Masaryk, as well as the concepts of “classless Czechoslovak society”, “Masaryk socialism”, “specific Czechoslovak path to socialism”, which were fundamentally different from the dogmas of Soviet-style socialism. As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, G. Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the CPC adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the CPC,” which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his circle.
On the night of August 21, 1968, troops from five Warsaw Pact countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland) were brought into Czechoslovakia. The operation, codenamed "Danube", was aimed at stopping the process of reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia, initiated by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek - the "Prague Spring".
From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of key countries of Eastern Europe. The prospect of Czechoslovakia withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in an inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system, was unacceptable for the USSR.
Within 36 hours, the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations took place in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communiqué, in which the withdrawal dates Soviet troops were made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” In accordance with the agreement, the Central Group of Forces (CGV) was created. The headquarters of the Central Military Command was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.
On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. In 1969, at the April plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,” which generally condemned the political course of Alexander Dubcek and his circle.
In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the “Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union” dated December 4, 1989 and in the “Statement of the Soviet Government” dated December 5, 1989, the decision to introduce Allied troops to Czechoslovakia was considered erroneous as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
On December 10, 1989, after the victory of the Velvet Revolution (the bloodless overthrow of the communist regime as a result of street protests in November-December 1989), Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak resigned and a new coalition government of national accord was formed, in which the communists and the opposition received the same number of places. A “reconstruction” of the parliament was carried out, where the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost its majority. On December 28-29, 1989, the reorganized parliament elected Alexander Dubcek as its chairman.
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Introduction
Chapter I. Causes of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia
Chapter II. "Prague Summer" 1968
A) Preparing for the invasion
B) Deployment of troops into Czechoslovakia
Chapter III. Results of the “Prague Spring” of 1968
Conclusion
Sources and literature
Introduction
Relevance of the problem. In the eventful Czech history of the 20th century, 1968 is one of the most difficult years to interpret. The process of political and economic liberalization of Czechoslovak society, called the “Prague Spring,” predetermined not only the nature of the political regime, but also the spiritual climate in the country for many years to come.
Early 60s A contradictory situation developed in Czechoslovakia. We can talk about a certain liberalization of the political regime, due, first of all, to the “Khrushchev Thaw.” It opened up the opportunity for criticism of various aspects of the life of society, including the political elite, and representatives of the post-war generations put forward new ideas and did not want, as was already the case in the 50s, to follow the instructions of the official regime.
The democratic movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had deep historical roots. The process of its formation was influenced by the humanistic traditions of the interwar period: the democratic ideas of T. Masaryk, as well as the concepts of “classless Czechoslovak society”, “Masaryk socialism”, “specific Czechoslovak path to socialism”, which were fundamentally different from the dogmas of Soviet-style socialism.
The reform process, started by the communists, the ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the country and enthusiastically supported by the broad masses of the population, was soon suppressed military force also communists who were in power in the neighboring states allies of Czechoslovakia under the Warsaw Pact. The ideas of the “Prague Spring” were seemingly crushed by tanks and consigned to oblivion, but, as it turned out, they largely influenced the emergence, already at a new stage of history, of the ideas of anti-totalitarian mass movements and revolutions that led to a peaceful change in the late 80s social system in former socialist countries.
In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began.
In the “Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union” dated December 4, 1989 and in the “Statement of the Soviet Government” dated December 5, 1989, the decision to send allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state .
Relevance of the issue is that the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 is one of the most difficult events of the 20th century to interpret. More than 40 years later, this problem continues to excite the minds of Russian society, in connection with which it is of interest to analyze the content of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 and give a detailed description of positions and actions foreign countries and the USSR in the situation of 1968.
Purpose of the course work- analyze the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and determine their causes and consequences in international relations.
To achieve this goal, you need to solve the following tasks:
1. study the causes of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia;
2. determine the positions of other ATS countries on events in Czechoslovakia;
3. analyze the course of events in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968;
4. trace the consequences of the “Prague Spring” for the country itself.
Object of study- history of Czechoslovakia in the 60s of the XX century.
Subject of study- tragic events in the spring and summer of 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
Methodological basis of the study: The work is based on the principles of historicism and scientific objectivity. Analysis and interpretation of the factual base of research using historical-systemic, historical-comparative, historical-technological methods.
Sourcebasecourse work are information from collections of documents “On events in Czechoslovakia. Facts, documents, eyewitness accounts and the press,” On the events in Czechoslovakia. Facts, documents, press and eyewitness accounts. M., 1968. “Anthology on the history of the southern and western Slavs,” T. III. they contain facts, documents, eyewitness accounts and press reports. Reader on the history of the southern and western Slavs. T. III. Minsk, 1989-1991.
Memoirs of participants in the events were also used as sources - Barta M., Barta M. How the invasion of Czechoslovakia was prepared: New documents about the events of 1968. // News. 1991. 12 February. Mikhailova E., Mikhailov. Prague Autumn: Memoirs of an eyewitness to the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. // Wars of Russia. 2001. No. 11. - pp. 32-39. and Pavlova A. Pavlov A. Czechoslovakia, August 1968 // Military History Journal. 2007. No. 7. - pp. 17-20.
Historiography. There are a large number of works by foreign and Russian historians on the problem under study in historiography.
When writing the work, we turned to the following:
In the work of I. Valent “The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968”, the main attention is paid to the analysis of the process of developing and making decisions by the Soviet leadership in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The author examines in detail the dynamics of the balance of forces when making this decision in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU, showing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, Valenta reveals the motives and personal interests of the leaders of the USSR and Eastern European countries. Valenta I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968. M., 1991.
Milos Marko's work "Black and White" is dedicated to the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. Here is an in-depth analysis of these events, their causes and consequences. A special place in M. Marco’s book is given to showing the role and critical analysis of the means mass media and propaganda in the events of 1968 - early 1969. The book “Black and White” is not historical research, nor a chronicle of the event. These are multifaceted journalistic essays in which the main events of the period under review are highlighted in a sharp and lively form. Milos Marko. Black and white. M., 1974.
Of great interest is the article by Gordin A. A. “Czechoslovak events of 1968, Soviet propaganda and the mood of the Russian province,” published in magazine No. 6 “ National history"for 2008. The formation of ideas about the Czechoslovak events of 1968 in Soviet society is well studied here. Reactions detected Soviet people on the situation in Czechoslovakia. Gordin A. A. Czechoslovak events of 1968, Soviet propaganda and the mood of the Russian province. // National history. 2008. No. 6. - pp. 108-116.
In the article by Orlik I. “Prague Summer of 1968”, published in the magazine No. 7 “Free Thought” for 2008, the positions of foreign countries and the USSR in the situation of 1968 are covered in detail. The article provides an in-depth analysis of these events, their causes and consequences. Orlik I. Prague summer of 1968. // Free thought. 2008. No. 7. - pp. 125-137.
In addition to the above works, there is also a huge number of works revealing the causes and consequences of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968.
Chronologicalframework: The work describes the period from the resignation of the first secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Czechoslovakia A. Novotny in January 1968 until the election of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Czechoslovakia G. Husak in April 1969.
Work structure: the work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references.
ChapterI. Causes of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia
In the history of the second half of the 20th century, the “Prague Spring” occupies an exceptional place. This event caused a great resonance, having a significant impact both on the international situation as a whole and on the internal processes taking place in other countries.
In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic experienced a period of profound changes unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were a natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in political culture in which predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. “The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, went almost unnoticed for a number of years by most analysts and politicians West and East, including for Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal of the first secretary of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee A. Novotny in January 1968.” Valenta I. Uk. Op. - P. 138. A conspiracy of more progressive forces formed against him, all groups united in the Central Committee. Moscow knew about the situation, but decided to remain neutral, which meant, of course, a free hand for Novotny's critics.
On January 5, 1968, A. Dubcek, who had previously headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia and advocated updating the party’s policy, was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. For the first time, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was headed by a Slovak. It was a sensation of sorts, but essentially it was due to a compromise between various forces within the Central Committee. A. Novotny remained the President of Czechoslovakia.
Moscow reacted calmly to this choice. A. Dubcek was a famous person who spent many years of his life in the USSR, and was a graduate of the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee. Apparently, they hoped that he would be a manageable figure because of his gentle character and easy-going nature.
In February - early March 1968, the situation in Czechoslovakia became significantly more complicated. political situation. Censorship has practically ceased to operate in the country. Famous figure“Prague Spring” Z. Mlynar noted: “Open criticism began... of the work methods of the Communist Party of Human Rights, trade unions, state security and justice agencies. And, as a result, a number of secretaries of the Central Committee, heads of the central council of trade unions, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General were removed from their posts.” To the events in Czechoslovakia. Uk. Op. - P. 67. The situation was further complicated by contradictions in the leadership of the Communist Party of Human Rights. Numerous opponents of Novotny have already sought his resignation from the post of President of Czechoslovakia. In this case, disparate political forces united against Novotny. His resignation has already been demanded at mass rallies.
At the end of March 1968, A. Novotny resigned as president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. General Louis Svoboda became the new president, which satisfied the Kremlin leadership.
Novotny's fall was not simply the result of a power struggle within the Czechoslovak leadership, but occurred for a number of reasons, including:
1. The economic crisis of 1962 - 1963, which awakened the desire for economic reforms.
2. The slow progress of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed.
3. Open dissent of writers and students.
4. Awakening of reformist-minded intellectual layers in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.
In January 1968, the party leadership decided to prepare a “Program of Action of the Communist Party of Human Rights”, and it was drawn up at the end of February, but its adoption was delayed until the beginning of April.
On April 4, 1968, the HRC approved the “Program of Action of the HRC”. This was the program of the so-called reform forces. It met the interests of broad sections of the Czechoslovak party and state elite.
The “Program of Action” received widespread support from all sectors of society.
The main provisions of the program included the following activities:
1. Elimination of the autocracy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, establishment of a real multi-party system and democratic freedoms. Relations between different parties should be built on the principles of equality and partnership;
2. Reduction of administrative staff;
3. Introduction of a federal structure of the state, ensuring real equality of Czechs and Slovaks;
4. Laying the foundations of a market economy;
5. Cooperation with all countries of the world.
It is no coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, V. Bilyak, who was not shy in his assessments, told his Soviet interlocutor: “Whoever is for the program of action is with us, and whoever does not agree with it is against us.” Pihoya R. G. Czechoslovakia 1968. A view from Moscow. // New and recent history. 1994. No. 6. - P. 13. The “Program of Action” in many respects only legalized and approved the processes that took place in Czechoslovak society. Here, the activities of the National Front parties, which previously existed only formally, began to be revived. The rehabilitation of many thousands of people who suffered during the years of Stalin's terror continued. Tens of thousands of new members, mostly young people, joined the party. Public opinion polls showed that the authority of the party as a whole and the renewed party leadership was growing rapidly. At the same time, the authority of the new head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, grew especially rapidly, and within a few months he turned into a national hero.
The Program proclaimed a course for the democratic renewal of socialism and provided for limited economic reforms. A. Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of political clubs and abolished censorship. New press organs and public associations appeared, including KAN - the Club of Non-Party People.
Representatives of other parties and movements began to be attracted to participate in government, and the right to exist of the opposition was recognized. More than 70 political organizations applied to register in June. A committee emerged to recreate the Social Democratic Party. The former bourgeois parties became more active and their numbers grew. The non-party opposition put forward a demand for the creation of a multi-party parliamentary system.
At the end of June, the famous manifesto “Two Thousand Words” was published, compiled by the writer Ludwik Vaculik and signed by many famous public figures, including communists. This document, liberal in spirit, criticized the totalitarian system, the conservative activities of the Communist Party of Human Rights and proclaimed the ideas of democratization political system, introduction of political pluralism. Milos Marko. Uk. Op. - P. 132.
On April 4, 1968, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected a new composition of the presidium and secretariat of the Central Committee, O. Chernik became the chairman of the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and J. Smrkovsky was elected chairman of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Seriously concerned about the developments in Czechoslovakia, the CPSU and other communist parties of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR spoke out in favor of discussing the current situation at a collective meeting with the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia. In accordance with the agreement reached, such a meeting took place in Dresden on May 23, 1968. During this meeting, the Soviet delegation and the delegation of Western European countries pointed out the real danger that was fraught with the current situation in Czechoslovakia. From the totality of the facts, they concluded that there was a development of events that could lead to a counter-revolutionary coup in the country. History of diplomacy. T. V. - pp. 58-59.
The fears expressed at the meeting in Dresden were soon confirmed at a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which took place in Moscow on May 4. At it, the Soviet side sharply criticized the development of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the weakening of the influence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the anti-Soviet attacks of the Czechoslovak press.
On May 8, a closed meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, People's Republic of Belarus and Hungary was held in Moscow, during which a frank exchange of views took place on measures in connection with the situation in Czechoslovakia. Thus, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, V. Gomulka, believed that “It would be good if Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia for a long time.” The first secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, T. Zhivikov, proposed creating a “revolutionary government in Czechoslovakia and occupying all key positions.” The first secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP, J. Kadar, called for solving the problems of Czechoslovakia through political means, “but if this does not happen, then the use of other measures is not excluded.” Orlik I. Uk. Op. - pp. 126-127.
There is every reason to believe that the leaders of Eastern European countries sometimes adopted a more aggressive policy towards the Prague reformers than their Moscow colleagues. They even pushed Soviet leaders to take faster and harsher measures against Czechoslovakia. The exception was Romanian President N. Ceausescu, who immediately refused any joint action regarding Prague. Yugoslav leader J. Tito also did not support the pressure on Czechoslovak reformers. But Yugoslavia was not a member of the OVD, although it collaborated with them.
The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to station Soviet military contingents on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
However, it should be noted that the option of a military invasion of the territory of Czechoslovakia was considered only as the most extreme step, in case all other means of influence - political and economic pressure, covert operations and military maneuvers - did not give the desired result.
Thus, we can conclude that the Prague Spring reforms were attempts by A. Dubcek to provide additional rights to citizens in an act of partial decentralization of the economy and democratization of the country. Democratic freedoms were also granted, including the easing of restrictions on the media, freedom of speech and freedom of movement.
ChapterII. “Prague Summer” 1968, the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia
A) Preparing for the invasion
In the spring of 1968, the Soviet leadership decided on the need to take measures to prepare its armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
April 8, 1968 commanding airborne troops General V.F. Margelov received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive stated: " Soviet Union and other socialist countries, faithful to their international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak people's army in protecting the Motherland from the danger looming over it.” Latysh M.V. “Prague Spring” of 1968 and the Kremlin’s reaction. M., 1998. - P. 56. The document also emphasized: “... if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army react with understanding to the appearance of Soviet troops, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the ChNA troops are hostile to the paratroopers and support conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them and liberalize them within the country.” Right there. - P.57.
On the eve of the deployment of troops, airborne and military transport aviation officers arrived in Prague and Brno, dressed in the uniform of civilian pilots of the USSR. They quickly carried out reconnaissance of the objects and returned safely. By the end of the day, intelligence data had been transmitted to Moscow. Under the cover of night from July 29 to July 30, airborne formations on the territory of the USSR, under the guise of exercises, unexpectedly left their barracks and concentrated in the so-called “waiting places.” Until August 18, they were actually engaged in combat training: they practiced combat in urban conditions, running in tanks and throwing combat grenades.
There were also some peculiarities in the mechanism for creating a group of troops. Along with Soviet formations, it included formations of the Warsaw Pact countries - the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the People's Republic of Belarus. Since the end of May 1968, formations and units have been concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, primarily in Poland, East Germany and the USSR. The concentration of troops on the borders of Czechoslovakia was carried out secretly. To this end, a number of exercises were conducted. In mid-May, the troops received an order that in the near future a joint exercise of troops of the Warsaw Pact member states would take place on the territory of Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Initially it was planned as a military operation with the involvement of significant military contingents, but at the insistence of the Czechoslovak side it was carried out as a command and staff operation. Field commands of the armies, communications units and service units were involved in it. The armies included new formations, some of them were replenished with personnel called up from the reserves.
On the night of June 23, Soviet troops concentrated in training center Libau, 400 km from the state border with the USSR. Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.I. Jakubovsky and his headquarters were located in Milovice. The army commander, General A.M., who was summoned here. Mayorov received an assignment for a command post exercise (code name "Shumava"). The headquarters and troops of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland, East Germany and Hungary acted together with the army during the exercise. In total, 16 thousand people were brought into Czechoslovakia to conduct the exercise. personnel of the allied armies. The command post exercise "Sumava" ended on July 1.
From July 23 to August 10, rear-area exercises - "Neman" - were held, covering the entire western territory of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. On August 11, major exercises of air defense forces began, codenamed “Heavenly Shield,” and exercises of communications troops on the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. Barta M. Uk. Op.
In general, the exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, held from May to mid-August on the territory of Czechoslovakia and along its borders, were used as political and psychological impact on the leaders of Czechoslovakia. In addition, they made it possible to hide the signs of the impending entry into the territory of Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously with these exercises and under their cover, issues of logistics and logistics support the created group of troops.
The final decision to send troops was made at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18.
The official reason for intensifying actions was a letter of appeal from a group of party and government officials of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries with a request for international assistance. A change in the country's political leadership was expected.
Direct training of troops began on August 17-18. First of all, equipment was prepared for long marches, supplies were replenished, work maps were worked out, and other activities were carried out. Thus, by August 20, a group of troops was ready, the first echelon of which numbered up to 250 thousand, and the total number - up to 500 thousand people, about 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers.
In accordance with the plan of the command, the Carpathian and Central fronts were formed. The Carpathian Front was created on the basis of the command and control of the Carpathian Military District and several Polish divisions. The Central Front was formed on the basis of the control of the Baltic Military District with the inclusion of troops of the Baltic Military District, the GSVG and the SGV, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the GDR and Poland. One front (Southern) was also deployed in Hungary to cover the active group. In addition to this front, the Balaton task force was deployed on its territory to enter Czechoslovakia. It consisted of two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units. The date for the entry of troops was set for the evening of August 20, when a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held.
B) Deployment of troops into Czechoslovakia
On the night of August 21, troops of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions at twenty points from Zvikov to Nemeck in radio silence. A Soviet-Polish contingent of troops was brought in from the southern part of Poland in the following directions: Jablonec-Kralove, Olomouc and Zilina. A Soviet-East German contingent of troops was brought in from the southern part of the GDR in the following directions: Prague, Chomutov, Pilsen, Karlovy Vary. From the northern regions of Hungary there was a Soviet-Hungarian-Bulgarian group in the following directions: Bratislava, Trencin, Banska Bystrica, etc. The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously with the introduction of ground forces, airborne contingents were transferred from the territory of the USSR to the airfields of Vodochody (Czech Republic), Turokani and Namesti (Slovakia), as well as to airfields near Prague. Bukharkin. I.V. It was August 1968 // Pravda. 1991. February 18.
Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the government, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, as well as radio and television buildings. According to a pre-developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Special attention was paid to protecting the western borders of Czechoslovakia. Mikhailov E. Uk. Op. - P. 36.
The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army offered virtually no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of events in the country. Among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. Public protest was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of the advance of tank columns, the operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. IN in some cases There were armed attacks on military personnel of the contingent of troops introduced into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, throwing petrol bombs at tanks and other armored vehicles, attempts to disable communications and transport, and destruction of monuments Soviet soldiers in the cities and villages of Czechoslovakia. Pavlov A. Uk op. - pp. 18-19.
The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and after them the XIV Extraordinary Party Congress, already on August 21, condemned the entry of allied troops. Representatives of the conservative group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the Communist Party of Human Rights.
On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. “Prague Spring” and the position of Western European communist parties. // Questions of history. 2008. No. 11. - P. 18. The governments of socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, China - condemned the military intervention of five states.
The entry of troops of five socialist states into Czechoslovakia caused a flood of analytical developments and recommendations for adjusting foreign policy strategy. US experts assessed the actions in Czechoslovakia as “an expressive indicator of profound changes in the policy of the USSR.” Peaceful coexistence, in their opinion, became dangerous for the USSR, as it weakened the unity of the socialist camp and led “toward pluralism.” Orlik I. Uk. Op. - P. 134.
In the USSR itself there were protests directed against the activities carried out by the Soviet government and the governments of fraternal countries. Individuals adopted unhealthy and sometimes hostile attitudes towards the Soviet government. Gordin A. A. Uk. Op. - P. 109.
Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of this situation. Negotiations began in Moscow (August 23-26) between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation emerged. The result was the withdrawal of troops of the participating countries from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Aviation concentrated on designated airfields.
The reason for extending the stay of the contingent of troops on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was not only the persisting internal political instability, but also the increased activity of NATO near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in close proximity to the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in the conduct of various types of exercises .
On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department. On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
Despite the fact that there were no military operations during the deployment of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries, there were losses. Thus, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), 11 military personnel, including one officer, were killed as a result of the actions of hostile persons; 87 Soviet military personnel were wounded and injured, including 19 officers. In addition, 87 people died in disasters, accidents, careless handling of weapons and military equipment, as a result of other incidents, and also died from illnesses.
Czechoslovak political liberalization
ChapterIII. Results"Prague Spring" 1968
As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. The entry of Warsaw Warfare troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 slowed down the disintegration processes that had clearly taken shape by the summer of 1968. It can be stated that, regardless of the will of the leadership of the Warsaw Warfare member countries, the events of August 1968 to a certain extent slowed down the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.
An important political role in overcoming the crisis was played by the adoption by the National Assembly of the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation on October 27, 1968, which came into force on January 1, 1969. According to the law, Czechoslovakia became a state of two equal republics: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. Each of the republics received its own legislative (National Council) and executive bodies (government). The highest state body in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was the Federal Assembly, consisting of two chambers - the People's Chamber and the Chamber of Nationalities, and the federal government. The significance of the law was that it contributed to eliminating tensions in the relationship between the Czech and Slovak peoples, resolving state and legal issues that had worried Slovak society for a long time, and strengthening the Czechoslovak socialist statehood. To the events in Czechoslovakia. Uk op. - P. 167.
The federal structure, which required a structural restructuring of state bodies, contributed to the weakening of the position of right-wing and anti-socialist forces in representative and executive bodies, and to the strengthening of the position of left-wing forces in the state apparatus in general.
To achieve a decisive turning point in the normalization process, it was necessary to reconsider the issue of party leadership. At the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1969, G. Husak was elected instead of A. Dubcek. The plenum marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the consolidation of the party and society; serious prerequisites were created for overcoming the protracted crisis and the offensive against right-wing and anti-Soviet forces.
Gradually, it was possible to eliminate the consequences of the activities of the right in such mass organizations as trade unions and the youth movement. The previously undermined unity of the Revolutionary trade union movement. In 1970, instead of the Czechoslovak Youth League, which ceased its activities, a single youth organization arose again - the Socialist Youth League.
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China considered the issue of the main directions of development National economy and the principles of its consolidation in the coming years. A number of measures were taken to eliminate inflation, stabilize the domestic market, and increase the purchasing power of the population. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the CPC adopted the document “Lessons of crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the CPC,” which revealed the causes of the socio-political crisis, its maturation and development, and indicated ways to normalize the situation. Short story Czechoslovakia. M., 1988. - P. 490.
At the end of 1970, it could be stated that the process of consolidation was successfully taking place in most areas of society - political life. This made it possible to begin preparations for the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which took place in May 1971. His work took place during the period when the country celebrated the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The congress not only drew a line under one of the most difficult and difficult periods in the history of the party, but assessed the entire period of socialist construction in the country, and also adopted a specific program for the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the further development of Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia achieved important successes in the field of foreign policy. In December 1968, negotiations took place in Prague between representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR, at which the main focus was on issues of further expansion and deepening of mutually beneficial cooperation.
An event of great importance was the signing on May 6, 1970 of a new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The agreement contributed to the strengthening and further development of relations between the two countries and strengthened the foreign policy position of Czechoslovakia.
On December 11, 1973, an agreement was signed on the normalization of relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The treaty represents the legal basis for expanding bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany. It also opened the way to the successful completion of the process of normalizing relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia is making great efforts to develop interstate relations with its western neighbor, Austria. In 1974, an agreement was signed between them to resolve financial, property and legal issues, which led to a radical change for the better in relations between both countries.
Serious progress has also been observed in relations between Czechoslovakia and France, where the Chairman of the Government of Czechoslovakia L. Strougal visited in the fall of 1975. During this visit, a Czechoslovak-French agreement on economic cooperation for a period of 10 years was signed. Mutually beneficial relations and cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Finland are being strengthened, with which it has concluded a long-term trade agreement for 1975-1980.
Czechoslovakia develops relations with other countries on a solid, negotiated basis. By the end of 1977, the signatures of representatives of Czechoslovakia were on almost 2,000 international treaties and agreements, which, as noted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia B. Hneupek, serves as one of the clear indicators of the active role of Czechoslovakia in international life.
Thus, we can conclude that as a result of the “Prague Spring” there was a complete change in political course, the Czechoslovak reform movement of communists who proclaimed the renewal of socialism ceased to exist, a constitutional law was adopted, according to which Czechoslovakia turned into a state of two equal republics: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic.
Conclusion
The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, known as the “Prague Spring,” without exaggeration, became fateful not only for Czechoslovakia and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, but also for all socialist countries and the world left movement. During the “Prague Spring”, such key issues as the possibility of reforming socialism, the relationship between the principles of national independence and the “limited sovereignty” of countries participating in military-political blocs, and finally, the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the two systems and the rule of non-interference of Western powers in the processes, were tested by life. occurring in a “foreign zone of influence.”
Serious damage was caused to the positions of the USSR on the world stage and world politics. Its relations with the West became complicated. Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has stalled. The start of negotiations on strategic arms limitation was delayed for more than a year. The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia strengthened the significance, authority and position of NATO in Europe and contributed to the unity of the members of this bloc. The military budgets of NATO countries have increased.
Much has been written about the consequences of the entry of ATS troops into Czechoslovakia. But, perhaps, A. Dubcek expressed this most fully and at the same time succinctly: “From the Czechoslovak point of view, the intervention was treacherous, and from the world point of view, it undermined confidence in Soviet politics. Aggression left a deep mark on the Soviet Union. Intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia extinguished the flame of hope for the reform of the then socialism - a flame that flickered within Soviet society. A dogmatic, detached from life approach to society and its problems took hold. The decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia exacerbated internal divisions in both Soviet and Eastern European society as a whole. For 20 long years, politics dominated, as a result of which the lag behind global development began to grow.” Orlik I. Uk. Op. - P. 136.
The entry of Warsaw Internal Affairs troops into Czechoslovakia aggravated the deep crisis of the world communist movement and gave rise to acute contradictions in the social system. Regardless of the attitude towards this process, this was the result of the tragic events of August 1968. The collapse of the socialist system in the East European region, the collapse of the “socialist system”, the collapse of the Warsaw Warsaw and CMEA, the cessation of the influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and then the collapse of the USSR itself - the first symptoms of these processes were evident in the suppression of “socialism with a human face”.
Sources and literature
Sources
1. Barta M. How the invasion of Czechoslovakia was prepared: new documents about the events of 1968. // News. 1991. 12 February.
2. Mikhailov E. Prague Autumn: Memoirs of an eyewitness to the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. // Wars of Russia. 2001. No. 11. - pp. 32-39.
3. To the events in Czechoslovakia. Facts, documents, press and eyewitness accounts. M., 1968.
4. Pavlov A. Czechoslovakia, August 1968 // Military History Journal. 2007. No. 7. - pp. 17-20.
5. Reader on the history of the southern and western Slavs. T. III. Minsk, 1989-1991.
Literature
1. Agranovsky A. April in Prague. 1968 // Banner. 1991. No. 1. - P. 167-191.
2. Vorontsov A.N. Prague autumn: myths and reality. // Our contemporary. 2003. No. 8. - P. 64-75.
4. Valenta I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968. M., 1991.
5. Gordin A. A. Czechoslovak events of 1968, Soviet propaganda and the mood of the Russian province. // National history. 2008. No. 6. - pp. 108-116.
6. History of diplomacy. T.V.
7. Brief history of Czechoslovakia. M., 1988.
8. Latysh M.V. “Prague Spring” of 1968 and the Kremlin’s reaction. M., 1998.
9. Milos Marko. Black and white. M., 1974.
10. Musatov V. About the “Prague Spring” of 1968. // Spiritual heritage. 1998. No. 2. http://sd-inform.org/biblioteka/politicheskaja-istorija/1968-prazhskaja-vesna/musatov-v-o-prazhskoi-vesne-1968-g.html.
11. Pihoya R. G. Czechoslovakia 1968. A view from Moscow // New and recent history. 1994. No. 6. - P. 3-21.
12. “Prague Spring” and the position of Western European communist parties. // Questions of history. 2008. No. 11. - P. 3-24.
13. Orlik I. Prague summer of 1968. // Free thought. 2008. No. 7. - pp. 125-137.
14. 1968 A revolution that didn't happen or a revolution that didn't stop? // Emergency ration. 2008. No. 4.
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Exactly 40 years ago, troops of the Soviet Union and some other Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia.
Our post is dedicated to the anniversary of these controversial events.
The main events of the Prague Spring of 1968:
12th of April. The commander of the 38th Army, General Alexander Mayorov, receives an invasion plan marked “Open by order of “VLTAVA 666”.
27th of June. Publication of the “2000 words” appeal in the Czechoslovak press. A sharp rebuke from Pravda.
July 14-15. Warsaw. Meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland regarding the “threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia.”
July 29 - August 1. Cierna nad Tisou (a town on the Soviet-Czechoslovak border). Inconclusive negotiations between members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
August 3rd. Budapest. Meeting of leaders of six European socialist countries. Representatives of the conservative wing of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Communist Party conveyed to Brezhnev an appeal asking for “support for the gains of socialism.”
August 21. Alexander Dubchek and his comrades were arrested and transported by Soviet paratroopers to Moscow.
August 22. The extraordinary XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia opened at the ChDK plant - a symbol of resistance to the invasion.
August, 26th. Czechoslovakia President Ludwig Svoboda flies to Moscow and seeks the release of the leaders of the Prague Spring.
August 27. Return of Dubcek and his associates to Prague. Dubcek addresses the nation and announces the introduction of "temporary measures" limiting civil liberties to a normal communist state.
"...In the spring of 1968, an acute political crisis broke out in seemingly prosperous Czechoslovakia. It was caused by the rise to power, as they said then, of right-wing opportunist forces, the mouthpiece of which was Alexander Dubcek, who was elected at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as its first secretary. /.../
In Prague, Bratislava, and other cities of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968, riots, pogroms, and attacks on the police began. That spring was seething Prague University, students took to the streets with anti-Soviet slogans, demanding democratic freedoms, since neighboring prosperous Germany and Austria served as an example. Some of the workers joined the students. /.../
On the eve of the deployment of troops, airborne and military transport aviation officers arrived in Prague and Brno, dressed in the uniform of civilian pilots of the USSR. They quickly carried out reconnaissance of the objects and returned safely. By the end of the day, intelligence data had been transmitted to Moscow.
Under the cover of night from July 29 to July 30, airborne formations on the territory of the USSR, under the guise of exercises, unexpectedly left their barracks and concentrated in the so-called “waiting places.” Until August 18, they were actually engaged in combat training: they practiced combat in urban conditions, running in tanks and throwing combat grenades.
There were also some peculiarities in the mechanism for creating a group of troops. Along with Soviet formations, it included formations of the Warsaw Pact countries - the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the People's Republic of Belarus. Since the end of May 1968, formations and units have been concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, primarily in Poland, East Germany and the USSR. /.../
On the night of August 21, troops of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions at twenty points from Zvikov to Nemeck in radio silence.
A Soviet-Polish contingent of troops was brought in from the southern part of Poland in the following directions: Jablonec-Kralove, Ostrava, Olomouc and Zilina. A Soviet-East German contingent of troops was brought in from the southern part of the GDR in the following directions: Prague, Chomutov, Pilsen, Karlovy Vary. From the northern regions of Hungary there was a Soviet-Hungarian-Bulgarian group in the following directions: Bratislava, Trencin, Banska Bystrica, etc. The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously with entering ground forces Airborne contingents were transferred to the airfields of Vodochody (Czech Republic), Turokani and Namesti (Slovakia), as well as to airfields near Prague from the territory of the USSR. /.../
The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army (about ten divisions) offered virtually no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of events in the country. Among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. Public protest was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of the advance of tank columns, the operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. /.../
The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory.
However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and after them the XIV Extraordinary Party Congress, already on August 21, condemned the entry of allied troops. Representatives of the conservative group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the Communist Party of Human Rights.
On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. Representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The governments of socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China - condemned the military intervention of five states.
Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of this situation. Negotiations began in Moscow (August 23-26) between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation emerged. The result was the withdrawal of troops from participating countries from many cities and settlements Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Aviation concentrated on designated airfields. /.../
On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.
On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November. /.../
As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, G. Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the CPC adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the CPC,” which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his circle.
In the second half of the 80s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the “Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union” of December 4, 1989 and in the “Statement of the Soviet Government” of December 5, 1989, the decision the entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In February 1990, an agreement was signed on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, which was completed at the end of June 1991." (
http://www.volganet.ru; http://www.rustrana.ru/article.php?nid=20416&sq=19,27,63,78,2391&crypt =)
Alexander Dubcek - first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (January-August 1968)
In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) experienced a period of profound changes unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were a natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, went almost unnoticed for a number of years by most analysts and political figures in the West and East, including Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee A. Novotny. A. Dubcek, a graduate of the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee, who spoke excellent Russian, was elected instead.
At the end of March, A. Novotny resigned from the post of President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Instead, on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the hero of the Second World War, General Ludwik Svoboda, was elected to this post, to whom the Soviet leaders also had no objections.
The fall of Novotny was not just the result of a struggle for power within the Czechoslovak leadership, but occurred for a number of reasons, including: the economic crisis of 1962 - 1963, which awakened the desire for economic reforms, the slow progress of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed, the open dissent of writers and students, the awakening reformist-minded intellectual layers in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.
The protracted nature of the political crisis, the stubborn opposition of Novotny and his supporters to Dubcek, a number of scandalous incidents in 1968 (for example, the sensational escape to the United States of General Ian Cheyna, accompanied by rumors of a failed attempt at a military coup in favor of Novotny’s restoration), the weakening of censorship - all this contributed to the mobilization public support for the new leadership. Interested in reform, the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia included their pluralistic concept of socialism “with a human face” in the “Program of Action” adopted in April 1968 as the “Magna Carta” of the new Dubcek leadership. In addition, Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs, and also abolished censorship; in area foreign policy it was decided to pursue a more independent course that would, however, meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact in general and the policies of the USSR in particular.
The amazing speed of events in Czechoslovakia in January - April 1968 created a dilemma for the Soviet leadership. The resignation of Novotny's Moscow-oriented supporters, and especially the reformist programs of the Dubcek leadership and the revival of press freedom, led, from the Soviet point of view, to a dangerous situation in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the leadership of a number of countries participating in the Warsaw Pact thought about the increased, in their opinion, vulnerability of the borders and territory of Czechoslovakia, the prospect of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in the inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system.
Potentially, the situation in Czechoslovakia could affect neighboring Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak slogan “socialism with a human face” questioned humanity Soviet socialism. "Magna Carta liberties" meant a much greater degree of internal party democracy, granting greater autonomy to the state apparatus, other political parties and parliament, restoration of civil rights (freedom of assembly and association) and a more decisive continuation of political rehabilitation, restoration of national rights of ethnic minorities within the federation, economic reform, etc.
Prague. August 1968
Opportunity " chain reaction"in neighboring socialist countries, where the social upheavals of the recent past were still fresh in memory (GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956), led to hostility towards the Czechoslovak "experiment" not only of the Soviet, but also of East Germany (W. Ulbricht), Polish ( V. Gomulka) and the Bulgarian (T. Zhivkov) leadership. A more restrained position was taken by J. Kadar (Hungary).
However, the Prague Spring represented a different kind of protest than that which Soviet leaders faced in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the fundamentals of ensuring the national security interests of the USSR; it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. The preservation of membership in the OVD and CMEA was not questioned. Limited pluralism also did not mean a loss of overall control on the part of the Communist Party: power, although somewhat dispersed, would remain in the hands of the reformist party leadership.
From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, events in Czechoslovakia created problems and were potentially dangerous. Having burned themselves in Hungary, Soviet leaders for a long time could not determine their course in relation to what was happening in Czechoslovakia. Should the changes that have taken place there since January be eliminated or simply limited? What means should be used to influence Czechoslovakia? Should we limit ourselves to political and economic actions or resort to armed intervention?
Despite the fact that the Kremlin was united in its negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, for a long time they were not inclined towards a military invasion. Some members of the Soviet leadership began an intensive search for a peaceful solution to the problem. This became evident after March 1968, when the Soviet government began to use a range of political and psychological pressure to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the impending changes.
The Soviet side exerted political pressure on Dubcek’s leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Moscow in May, at unprecedented negotiations at top level between the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Cierna nad Tisou in July, in Bratislava in August 1968. The Czechoslovak delegation refused to attend the meeting of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR in Warsaw (July 1968).
The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to station Soviet military contingents on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: large-scale exercises of the Internal Affairs Troops with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland were held near the borders of Czechoslovakia. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July 1968.
In addition, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of using economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia as a form of pressure. However, despite reports that appeared at the end of April 1968 about the cessation of Soviet grain supplies, there was no real evidence of the use of economic leverage.