Military expenditures are steadily growing. In 2013, they amounted to $ 355.5 million, in 2014 - $ 405.9 million and in 2015 - $ 440 million, or 0.71% of the country's GDP. At the same time, these funds are not enough to re-equip the national army for modern species weapons and military equipment (AME), conducting intensive combat training in the troops.
The Ethiopian army during the republic has a lot of combat experience. This is the war with Somalia (1977-1978), the war with the Eritrean rebels (1974-1991), the large-scale armed conflict with Eritrea (1998-2000), participation in the hostilities in Somalia (2006-2007, 2011 - present). In addition, the army is participating in military operations against illegal armed formations of the separatists.
The Ethiopian armed forces number 138,000 and are composed of ground forces and air force. During the period of threat and in wartime, irregular formations are transferred to the operational subordination of the army command. There are also territorial troops. The country's mobilization resources are estimated at about 15 million people, including 7.8 million fit for military service.
The military doctrinal guidelines of the Ethiopian leadership have a distinctly defensive orientation. The country's constitution states that Ethiopia must "seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes."
Article 87 of the Ethiopian Constitution, Principles of National Defense, states that “the armed forces defend the independence of the state and fulfill the duties that are entrusted to them in connection with emergency in a country declared in accordance with the Constitution. " Moreover, "the composition of the national armed forces should be proportionally represented by the nationalities, peoples and peoples of Ethiopia." It was especially emphasized that “the armed forces always obey and respect the Constitution” and “carry out their duties independently of any political organization (s)”. The Basic Law also specifies that the Minister of Defense “must be a member of the civil service”.
Supreme Commander The armed forces is the prime minister, who exercises overall leadership of the army through the Ministry of National Defense. The Minister of Defense is responsible for personnel policy, logistics, procurement of weapons and military equipment and various administrative issues. The direct command of the troops is carried out by the General Staff.
The Ethiopian Armed Forces are based on ground forces(135 thousand people, trained reserve - up to 350 thousand people). They are assigned a leading role in repelling possible external aggression and countering illegal armed groups. The Commander of the Ground Forces is the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
The ground forces have five regional commands- Northern (headquarters in the city of Mekele), Central (Ynda-Sellase), Western (Bahr-Dar), Eastern (Harar) and North-Eastern (Desse), as well as the command of the rear.
The main tactical compound is the division- mechanized (md), infantry (pd) and special forces (special forces) "Agazi". In total, there are 21 divisions (MD - 4, Infantry Division - 16, Special Forces - 1). In addition, there are six separate brigades - airborne, artillery, transport, and three security brigades (Ministry of Defense, government facilities, military facilities).
The ground forces are armed with 465 tanks (T-55 - 200, T-62 - 50, T-72 - 215); 877 artillery pieces, including 87 self-propelled guns, caliber 152, 130, 122 and 85 mm; up to 900 mortars of caliber 82, 107 and 120 mm; 75 MLRS, including 50 BM-21 Grad; 20 BMP-1 and 350 armored personnel carriers; over 400 ATGMs, including 87 Russian Kornet and 250 Ukrainian Kombat; up to 300 MANPADS "Strela-2M" and "Igla", SAM: S-75 (up to 10 divisions, up to 42 launchers) and C-125 (up to 7 divisions, up to 40 launchers), 36 short-range air defense systems "Strela-1" ", As well as the newest Chinese air defense system НQ-64 (6PU); anti-aircraft guns and installations of 23, 37 and 57 mm caliber (up to 560 in total, including up to 50 ZSU-23-4 "Shilka").
The main part of the S-75 air defense system is located at stationary positions around Addis Ababa, and the C-125 air defense system is deployed mainly near the border with Eritrea. It is reported that Ethiopia has purchased Russian Pantsir-S1E air defense missile systems.
The armament and equipment of the ground forces is represented by Soviet (Russian), Ukrainian, Chinese, American and French models. A significant part of weapons and military equipment is in a technically defective condition and requires different types repair. Many types of military equipment are outdated and require replacement.
Air Force(3 thousand people) are armed with 20 combat aircraft: multipurpose fighters Su-27SK - 12 and fighter-bombers MiG-23BN - 8; 9 combat training aircraft (Su-27UB - 5, MiG-23M - 4), up to 33 training aircraft and up to 22 military transport aircraft. Helicopter aviation numbers 26 combat (Mi-24 - 15, Mi-35 - 11) and up to 45 multipurpose and transport helicopters. The aircraft is represented by Soviet / Russian, American, Czech, Italian, French and Canadian models. The Air Force aviation is based at 11 airfields.
National War Industry v last years received noticeable development. Currently, its enterprises produce small arms (automatic rifles, machine guns), automatic grenade launchers, 82-mm mortars, ammunition for small arms, artillery and tanks. With the assistance of Israel, a small-scale assembly of light armored vehicles has been mastered. The repair of armored vehicles is in progress. Created self-propelled launchers for the S-75 air defense system based on the T-55 tank. According to experts, this is “the most hard work which has been carried out by the Ethiopian defense industry to date. " In general, the overall low level of economic, scientific and technical potential does not allow the creation of a full-fledged military-industrial complex in the country, which determines Ethiopia's long-term dependence on arms purchases abroad.
Ethiopia in the military-technical sphere cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, China, Israel, the USA, France and other countries. On the territory of Ethiopia, in the Arba Mink region, there is an American base on which reconnaissance and strike drones are located.
The Ethiopian military is actively involved in international peacekeeping operations through the UN and the African Union. Since 2006, a regional center for training peacekeepers has been operating in the country (in the city of Debre-Zeit). The largest contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers is deployed in neighboring Sudan.
The Ethiopian Armed Forces are recruited on a voluntary basis. Persons called for valid military service, take a course of basic military training, after which they take the military oath. The minimum service life for privates and sergeants is seven years, for officers - ten.
The training of officers is carried out at the Command and Staff College, the College for the Training of Junior Officers and the Military University. In addition, there are specialized training centers. Some of the officers are trained abroad, mainly in Western countries.
The military receives a fairly high salary. Given the massive unemployment and the low standard of living of the bulk of the population, the army has the ability to select candidates acceptable to it.
In general, the armed forces of Ethiopia in terms of their size, technical equipment and level of training are the largest and most powerful in the Horn of Africa region. At the same time, given the low level economic development countries, almost complete dependence of the republic on foreign military supplies, the national armed forces are not able to conduct large-scale hostilities for a long period.
Julia 2017 Godina
The state of the armed forces of Abyssinia
In Addis Ababa, they knew about the preparation of the Italian invasion. However, the "king of kings" postponed mobilization until the last moment, so as not to give a reason to accuse Ethiopia of aggression. Realizing that war was inevitable, the emperor in September 1935 announced a general mobilization. Mobilization and concentration, due to the peculiarities of the Ethiopian army, the existence of a feudal system and poor communication routes, proceeded extremely slowly. So, the concentration on the Northern Front ended only at the end of December 1935, in the midst of the war, up to 500 thousand people were mobilized in total.
By the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian army consisted of the following units:
The elite nucleus of the army was the Imperial Guard (Kebur Zabanga), or the First Division. The Guard was both the emperor's personal bodyguard and the elite infantry division, the operational reserve of the supreme commander. The guard consisted of about 10 thousand soldiers, including 4 cavalry squadrons. The guardsmen were trained by Swedish, Norwegian and Belgian officers. The battalions were commanded by officers who completed the French military academy Saint-Cyr. The guard had good weapons - rifles, machine guns and mortars, there was one company of heavy machine guns. Only the guardsmen wore khaki uniforms from the Belgian army. The rest of the soldiers wore white cotton uniforms and made good targets for the enemy.
The troops of the provinces and tribes - up to 100 thousand people. They were recruited from volunteers and kept by the races (princes). Of these, command cadres stood out during the formation of the state militia. There were also about 100 thousand settler soldiers (“teklenya”). Among them was a combat nucleus of 30 thousand "trip regiments", who previously served for hire in the British and Italian troops in Somalia, Sudan and Libya. "Tripolki" combat core of the Ethiopian army and served as a personnel base for the formation of new units. Also in the country there was no a large number of Belgian advisor officers.
The general militia could number up to 500 thousand people. It was the least trained part of the armed forces of Abyssinia. Many militia soldiers were armed only with bows and spears.
Abyssinian warriors
There was not enough equipment for the armament of the army. There were about 500 thousand rifles throughout the country, only 10% were modern store rifles, the rest were outdated systems. The army had 200-300 machine guns of various systems. The artillery was scanty: up to 50 different guns, several anti-aircraft guns of the Oerlikon system. Ammunition was limited - 150 rounds for a rifle, 10 thousand for a machine gun. There was practically no aviation - a few old passenger aircraft. From armored vehicles - several armored vehicles and obsolete tanks. The entire army had only 4 radios, wire communication was available in a limited amount. Therefore, communication was often carried out in an archaic way - with the help of messengers-"runners", tam-tams ("talking drums") and bonfires. For comparison, the Italian army had 6 thousand machine guns, 700 guns, 150 tankettes and 150 aircraft.
At the same time, the Abyssinian soldiers were traditionally distinguished by high fighting spirit, had developed military traditions. The soldiers were unpretentious, hardy, brave, they were good at the weapons that they had in their hands. They fought well in direct combat, in hand-to-hand combat. The Abyssinians knew the theater of military operations well, they could organize partisan and sabotage activities in mountainous, wooded and desert areas.
Thus, the Ethiopian army was still mainly of the feudal type, was not trained in modern combat tactics, and was poorly equipped with equipment. The Ethiopian troops, despite their large numbers, were inferior to the enemy in almost all respects - the unity of command, weapons and equipment, communications. There were almost no armored vehicles and aviation. The artillery was weak, there was no food and ammunition reserves for waging a long war. Some of the troops had only archaic weapons. However, the Abyssinians were high-quality combat material, distinguished by courage and resilience, excellent personal weapons, which made them a dangerous enemy in close combat.
At the beginning of the war, the Abyssinian army was divided into three main operational areas. On the Northern Front, an army group of 150-200 thousand men was stationed under the command of the races of Muluget, Seiyum, Kama, Imru, Aielu. The troops were supposed to cover the main communications leading from the north to the Ethiopian capital. Thus, in the north, the Abyssinians were seriously inferior to 250 thousand enemy strike forces, both in number and in weapons. The troops of the Desta and Nasibu races - 100-150 thousand soldiers - were stationed on the southern front. There were about 110 thousand Italians against them. In the central direction there were only about 10 thousand soldiers, against 17 thousand Italian soldiers. In reserve, the negus had 10 thousand guards, as well as various militias, numbering up to 100 thousand people.
As a result, at the beginning of the war, Ethiopia fielded 450-500 thousand people, and could increase the number of troops at the expense of the militia, but the problem was a serious shortage of modern weapons and ammunition. At the same time, the army had many slaves, porters, pack animals, servants of the rear, that is, a large number of non-combatants. As a result, the actual combat strength of the army was much less than the total number of troops. Therefore, the Abyssinian army was greatly inferior to the enemy and could not fight on equal terms with the Italians, due to a lack of weapons, supply problems and the general backwardness of the country (economic, military-technical, science, education, etc.).
The Negus was the supreme commander in chief, with various military advisers. The headquarters of the "king of kings" in different periods of the war was located in Addis Ababa, Dessier and Kuoram. The armies and army groupings were led by races.
War plans
Italy. The world and domestic political situation demanded a blitzkrieg. Dragging out the war could lead to external and internal problems, threatened with a financial crisis. Therefore, it was planned to end the war before the beginning of the period of large tropical rains (from June), which made it difficult to use aircraft, armored vehicles and transport.
The main target was the capital of Abyssinia - Addis Ababa. The military-political leadership expected that after the direct defeat of the Abyssinian army and the capture of the capital, most of the racial princes and feudal lords would betray the emperor, but this assumption turned out to be erroneous. Most of the races continued to resist and, after the fall of the capital, led the partisan movement.
Of the two operational directions from Eritrea to Addis Ababa, which led through Dessier and Gondar, the Italians chose Dessier, since it was easier to organize an offensive and rear here. There were caravan and partly wheeled routes, and the mountainous terrain did not have any formidable boundaries. This direction on the offensive of the main forces of the Italian Expeditionary Army was located farther than the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, outside the operational influence of the British. In addition, this most convenient route from the north to the center of Abyssinia led through the richest and most densely populated agricultural regions of the country. The invasion dealt a blow to the country's economy and facilitated the supply of food to the troops. The Abyssinians were forced to either abandon the richest regions of the country or engage in a decisive battle, which was what the Italians wanted. This made it possible to defeat the enemy with one powerful blow and complete the main hostilities. Also, the Italians remembered the defeat on March 1, 1896 in the area of Adua and wanted revenge. Thus, the Italian command concentrated on the Northern (Eritrean) Front the main strike group of the Expeditionary Army.
The southern (Somali) front was supposed to play a supporting role. The southern front was supposed to pin down as many Ethiopian troops as possible and support the offensive of the Northern Front with a blow to Harar, the second important center of Abyssinia. Also, the southern group was supposed to operate in the metropolitan area, seeking to connect with the main forces. Thus, the Southern Front diverted almost half of the Ethiopian army and developed an offensive against Harar and Addis Ababa.
The distance of 1200 km, separating the two fronts, made it difficult for the Italian troops to interact, so an auxiliary Central Front was created. Italian troops from the Assab area were to develop an offensive on Dessier. Thus, a small group of Italian troops in the central direction provided the flanks of the main fronts. As a result, the plan of the Ethiopian campaign consisted of a concentric offensive in the northern, southern and partly central directions of operations. The main blow was delivered in the north, from Eritrea in the direction of the capital of Abyssinia.
Source: Korsun N.G. Italo-Abyssinian war of 1935-1936.
Abyssinia. The Abyssinian command quite correctly identified the main operational directions and distributed troops along them. The main forces were located on the Northern Front, strong army was in the south. On the southern front, where the Abyssinians planned to defend themselves, they had some numerical superiority over the Italians. At the same time, the disunity of the Northern and Southern fronts, the lack of communications, the almost complete absence of vehicles, the weak organization of the rear did not allow the Abyssinian army to maneuver its forces, to carry out a quick transfer of reinforcements and reserves. As an operational reserve, the emperor placed the most elite forces - the guard - at the road junctions, in the Dessier and Diredua regions.
The Abyssinian high command also developed the correct strategy: dragging out the war by unleashing a wide partisan struggle and actions on enemy communications, as well as conducting mobile defense on mountain lines. Dragging out the war was supposed to stretch the enemy's forces, his communications, and during the beginning of the rainy season, reduce the enemy's mobility, reduce his advantage in aviation and technology to a minimum. Then, after the Italian army got bogged down, it was planned to launch a decisive counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat the main enemy forces. This was to force Italy to negotiate peace (the scenario of the First War with Italy).
Thus, Abyssinia had good plan war, which corresponded to the capabilities of her army, which could not compete with the Italian army, well armed and technically equipped, in a direct decisive battle. On the other hand, the fighting qualities of the Abyssinian soldiers made it possible to unleash an active partisan and sabotage war behind enemy lines, on its communications, to wage a small war in the mountains and forests.
However, the problem was that, under pressure from Britain and some princes, who dreamed of repeating the defeat of the Italian army in 1896, they adopted a different war plan, more decisive. Negus succumbed to pressure and changed his original plan. As a result, the Abyssinian command prepared for decisive battles with large masses of troops, after the completion of the concentration of the army, which was beneficial to the Italian army, which had complete superiority in a direct clash. It was a strategic mistake that led to fatal consequences for the army and the country.
"King of Kings" Haile Selassie
The beginning of the war
On October 3, 1935, without a declaration of war, the Italian army invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somalia. At the same time, Italian aircraft began bombing the city of Adua. Three Italian corps (1st, colonial and 2nd) under the command of de Beaune, which in Eritrea deployed in a narrow section of 10 km, forced border river Mareb and began to cautiously advance deep into Ethiopia to Axum and Adua, from one mountain line to another. At the same time, the Italians made extensive use of artillery, aviation and armored vehicles. The Italian command was cautious, and in order to ensure itself from a detour and encirclement, the troops echeloned deeply. Thus, at the beginning of the campaign, the Italians acted carefully, tried to suppress the enemy with technical power, organize the rear and prepare communications.
The Abyssinian army, led by the Seiyuma races, due to the fact that it had not yet completed mobilization and concentration, evaded the defense of strong mountain positions in the Atssum, Adua and Adigrat regions.
As a result, the Italian army, meeting only weak resistance from scattered enemy detachments, reached the Axum, Adua, Adigrat line by October 8. Then the Italians stopped to organize the rear, prepare roads for the passage of vehicles, strengthen their positions and prepare a bridgehead for further movement. At this time, some feudal lords betrayed the country, and went over to the side of the Italians. But, most of the soldiers did not follow their example, remaining faithful to their homeland.
The Italian high command, dissatisfied with de Bono's cautious actions, demanded an accelerated pace of the offensive. Commander de Bono obeyed the demand of Rome and decided to make the next move, occupying the area of the city of Makalle (Makale). The 1st and Eritrean (former colonial) corps, advancing in the area of the Eritrean ridge and interacting with the flanking detachment of General Mariotti, occupied the Makelle area on November 8-11, 1935. The 2nd corps was advancing cautiously on the right ledge, which faced opposition from the local partisans. After this success, the Italian army, having significantly advanced its left wing to the south, again stopped. The Italian front was stretched forward in the direction of a single road that linked Macalle and Adigrat, and the interaction of individual groups was difficult due to the mountainous terrain. Again, there was a long break in hostilities. The Italians pulled up the rear, redeployed their forces and reinforced the Northern Front with the arriving infantry divisions. On the Southern Front at this time, the battle was limited to skirmishes in the border zone.
The Abyssinian military-political leadership, ending the concentration of troops, was waiting for the delivery of weapons and ammunition purchased abroad (via Sudan and British and French Somalia). Also, the Abyssinians hoped to hold out until the rainy season, when the roads would become impassable, and mountain rivers in many areas would become impassable. In addition, Addis Ababa hoped that the protraction of hostilities would lead to a worsening international situation Italy and the renunciation of aggression. On October 7, 1935, the League of Nations recognized Italy as the aggressor. On November 11, 1935, the Council of the League of Nations decided to impose economic sanctions against Italy: the supply of weapons was prohibited, certain types strategic raw materials. The League of Nations called for limiting the import of Italian goods and refraining from providing loans and borrowings to Rome. However, a number of leading countries of the world and Europe refused to set restrictions on trade and economic relations with Italy - among them the USA, Germany, Austria and Hungary. The embargo on the supply of oil and oil products to Italy was not introduced. Thus, Ethiopia's hopes for the world community were ephemeral.
The Italian high command, enraged by the lack of high-profile victories and blitzkrieg, decided to change the command of the expeditionary forces. De Bono was replaced by the head of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. In the First Italo-Ethiopian War, he fought as a lieutenant and was badly wounded at the Battle of Adua. Badoglio ordered his troops to prepare for a further offensive. He also limited the bombing of enemy troop concentrations in order to allow the Abyssinians to complete the concentration in certain areas (agents reported about this) so that the enemy could be defeated with several decisive strikes. The marshal feared that the Ethiopian command, worried about air strikes, would divide the troops into small detachments and go on to a small, guerrilla war. The Italian army did not have the strength and capacity to ensure full control over such a large country as Ethiopia. Badoglio also regrouped the troops of the Northern Front and formed the 3rd corps at the expense of the arriving reinforcements, which took up positions between the 1st and the Eritrean corps. Then the 4th Army Corps was formed, which strengthened the right wing of the Northern Front.
Major P. Goncharenko
The Armed Forces (AF) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) perform the functions assigned to them in the context of overcoming the consequences of the conflict with the state of Eritrea and the difficult military-political situation in the East African region, being the main guarantor of the country's security. Given the special role of the Armed Forces in political system states, the leadership of the republic is taking all the necessary measures to increase their combat potential.
In accordance with the FDRE constitution, Prime Minister M. Zenawi is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and exercises overall leadership through the Ministry of National Defense (MHO). The competence of the Minister of Defense (K. Demeksa - a civilian) includes issues of general personnel policy, material and technical support, procurement of weapons and military equipment and a number of others. Direct command and control of the troops is entrusted to the Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant General S. Ienus).
The armed forces of the FDRE have a two-service structure and consist of ground forces (ground forces), air forces and troops air defense(Air Force and Air Defense). During the threatened period and in wartime, irregular formations are transferred to the operational subordination of the command of the Armed Forces. In addition, at present, territorial troops are being created (the headquarters was formed in 2003), for the recruitment of which servicemen who were dismissed from the ranks of the Armed Forces are sent.
Despite the fact that the Armed Forces of Ethiopia are the most combat-ready and technically equipped in the region, the military leadership still believes that their combat capabilities do not fully meet the requirements of ensuring the country's territorial integrity and internal political stability. With the long-term planning of the development of the armed forces, its leadership is forced to rely on foreign military assistance.
In 2004, in accordance with a contract with the FDRE Department of Defense, British military experts conducted a comprehensive assessment of the combat potential of the Ethiopian armed forces. According to the findings of the study, the country's military command and control system does not ensure the rational use of funds allocated for defense needs.
In order to optimize the expenses of the military department, British specialists have developed a plan for reforming the FDRE armed forces for the period until 2010. Its key point is a change in the organizational and staff structure of the Armed Forces, which will reduce the number of their personnel by 15-20%. The released funds are planned to be used to modernize existing weapons and purchase new weapons and equipment, which will increase the mobility and equipment of the army. The restructuring of the military education system will make it possible to raise the level of training of servicemen and save funds allocated for the training of national military personnel abroad. The state began directly to reform the armed forces in 2005.
The main type of the country's Armed Forces is ground forces. They are assigned the leading role in repelling possible external aggression and ensuring internal political stability. The SV is led by the chief of the general staff, who is also the commander of this type of the Armed Forces. The number of personnel of the ground forces is 180 thousand people (according to The Military Balance 2005-2006), the trained reserve of ground forces (citizens fit for military service) is up to 350 thousand.
| Table 1 | |
| Name of weapons and military equipment | Qty |
| Battle tanks: | 300 |
| T-55 and T-54 | 250 |
| T-62 | 50 |
| Artillery: | 1 400 |
| 152-mm SG "Msta" | 10 |
| 122-mm SG "Carnation" | 10 |
| 130 mm M-46 cannon | 10 |
| 122 mm howitzer D-30 | 400 |
| 85-mm cannon D-44 | 20 |
| MLRS BM-21 | 50 |
| Mortars | 900 |
| Anti-tank weapons: | 450 |
| ATGM ("Fagot" and T0U) | 250 |
| recoilless guns (82 mm B-10 and 107 mm B-11) | 200 |
| Anti-aircraft weapons: | 970 |
| guns for (57- and 37-mm) | 120 |
| ZSU-23-4 | 60 |
| ZU-23 | 350 |
| 14.5 mm ZPU | 130 |
| SAM "Strela-1" | 35 |
| MANPADS ("Strela-2M and -3") | 275 |
| Armored combat vehicles: | 400 |
| BMP-1 | 100 |
| BTR-60 | 150 |
| BTR-152 | 100 |
| BRDM-2 and-1 | 50 |
In the course of the implementation of the program for reforming the ground forces, their administrative-territorial structure has changed. Five operational commands (OK) were created - Western (headquarters in Bahr-Dar), Central (in Ynda-Sillas), Northern (in Mekel), North-Eastern (in Dess) and Eastern ( in the city of Harar). Infantry and mechanized divisions were subordinated to them (the brigades included in them were reorganized into regiments), which were stationed in the OK zone of responsibility. It is planned that during the reorganization it will be possible to reduce the number of ground forces to 150 thousand.
V combat strength of the SV 21 divisions (16 infantry, four mechanized and special purpose"Aghazi"), six separate brigades (airborne, artillery, motor transport, protection of MHO facilities, government agencies and military facilities).
The ground forces are armed with: battle tanks T-54, T-55 and T-62, armored combat vehicles BMP-1, BTR-60 and BTR-152, BRDM-1 and BRDM-2, MLRS BM-21, 85- , 122- and 130-mm guns, 81-, 82- and 120-mm mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons (Table 1).
The main tactical formation of the Army of Ethiopia is the division (the number of personnel is 7-8 thousand people). The mechanized division includes: headquarters, four regiments (tank, mechanized, infantry and artillery), an anti-tank battalion, separate companies (communications, reconnaissance, engineer-sapper) and rear units. The infantry division has a similar structure, which includes a headquarters, three infantry and artillery regiments, a combat support battalion and rear units.
Recruiting ground forces is based on the principles of voluntary recruitment and proportional representation of all peoples inhabiting the country. Citizens called up for active military service undergo a course of basic military training (included in the term of service), after which they take the oath and are sent to the unit. The minimum service life for privates and non-commissioned officers is seven years, for officers - ten. The age limit for military service for privates and sergeants is 45 years, junior officers - 48, seniors - 52 years, generals - 55 years.
In Ethiopia, where more than half of the population remains below the absolute poverty line ($ 1 a day per person), military service is a prestigious activity that provides stable income and high social status. In the Armed Forces, in particular, there is a fairly high salary for officers (Table 2).
| table 2 | ||
| Military rank | Monthly Salary (USD Equivalent) | Length of service |
| Lieutenant | 46 | Every two years, officers are assigned a monthly salary supplement (in dollars): in the rank from lieutenant to captain - 3.5; major - 4.5; lieutenant colonel - 6; colonel - 11.5; from brigadier general and above - 17. |
| Senior lieutenant | 58 | |
| Captain | 70 | |
| Major | 87 | |
| Lieutenant colonel | 108 | |
| Colonel | 140 | |
| Brigadier General | 175 | |
| Major general | 210 | |
Payment of allowances(for the impeccable performance of duties, service on weekends and holidays, as well as compensation for renting a dwelling) in the aircraft is not made. At the same time, servicemen receive a monthly food ration worth about $ 35, twice a year they receive clothing allowance (daily and field uniforms), and enjoy free medical care in the hospitals of the Ministry of Defense. Living quarters are provided to officers and privates and sergeants with families (upon dismissal, the service living space is vacated).
The amount of pension benefits depends on military rank and service life. So, the pension of a colonel who has served under a contract for 25 years is about $ 70 a month. In the event of a reduction in position and dismissal for health reasons, a soldier receives severance pay in the amount of about 50% of the official salary. In addition, he continues to benefit from free health care upon retirement.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Defense is not engaged in the employment of military personnel dismissed from military service. At the same time, local authorities at their level are gradually beginning to establish a system of their retraining in civilian professions, for which the government annually allocates funds.
The issue of training personnel for the ground forces is being addressed in the following areas: development of a system of national military educational institutions; inviting foreign instructors to the country, including on a private basis; sending military personnel to study abroad.
In 2005, there were changes in the country's military education system. In the capital of the state, Addis Ababa, a command and staff college for command personnel (a three-year program) and a college for training junior officers (a period of one year) have begun to work. A cadet school has been transferred from the Urso training center (330 km east of Addis Ababa) to a similar center Holetta (45 km west of the capital). The Military University in Debre Zeit (50 km south of Addis Ababa), which includes the military engineering and military medical colleges, as well as the military management school, form the backbone of the national military education system. In addition, in a number training centers ground forces are training junior commanders (the program is designed for three to six months).
The leadership of Ethiopia pays great attention to the participation of units of the republic's armed forces in UN peacekeeping operations. In February 2006, training began at the US-sponsored regional peacekeeping training center in Debre Zeit. They are taught by Ethiopian teachers. At the same time, the command staff of the units being formed is trained by a group of American specialists. In addition, the United States supplied office and computer equipment at no cost. FDRE soldiers and officers trained at the center will be deployed on a rotational basis to UN contingent units deployed in Burundi and Liberia. Subsequently, it is planned to form a battalion from Ethiopian military personnel with experience of participation in peacekeeping operations, which will become part of the East African regional peacekeeping brigade of constant readiness.
It should be emphasized that the solution to the issue training military specialists remains one of the priority tasks for the Ethiopian military-political leadership. In the near future, most of the qualified personnel who studied at the military educational institutions of the USSR will quit upon reaching age limit... Already, the deficit in junior officers (the "lieutenant-captain" link) in the Armed Forces of Ethiopia is estimated at about 2 thousand people. Under these conditions, the practice of sending military personnel for training abroad is widespread.
Currently, Ethiopian military personnel are trained in military educational institutions in China, the United States, Germany, Russia and the UK. In addition, American instructors on the territory of the republic train fighters of the anti-terrorist units of the country's Armed Forces. It is noteworthy that all the costs associated with organizing the training process and creating a training and material base were borne by the US Department of Defense. In parallel, classes were organized with Ethiopian instructors, who in the future will themselves train the military personnel of the national armed forces.
In FDRE there is no system of mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces as such. In the future, it is planned to create mobilization bodies, primarily within the framework of the formation of territorial troops. To this end, it is planned to form departments in local administrations for the registration of enrolled personnel and persons of draft age.
Recently, there have been some positive changes in matters of increasing the level of training of troops. The Main Directorate of Operational and Combat Training of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the country developed training programs for units. In 2005, combat training sessions were regularly held at the platoon-company link. The increased activity on this issue is largely due to the continuing military-political tension in relations with Eritrea. In the units of the ground forces stationed in the border zone, events are regularly organized to coordinate the units.
In 2004, a center for the professional selection of military personnel was formed in the structure of the main directorate of operational and combat training of the General Staff. A computerized system has been installed here, with the help of which cadets and officers, as well as privates and non-commissioned officers for technical units of the ground forces, are tested. Modern software makes it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy the professional suitability of servicemen and their suitability for the positions they hold.
The plans for the development of the armed forces provide for the creation of rapid reaction units to conduct counter-guerrilla and special operations on the territory of the country. Along with this, it was decided to radically improve the intelligence and information support of the Armed Forces. In particular, it is planned to expand the staff of the special services, to increase their level of technical equipment, to establish personnel training, to create intelligence centers, as well as stationary points and mobile groups of radio and radio technical intelligence.
Thus, the main component of the Armed Forces of Ethiopia - the ground forces - has reached a level of development to date that ensures at this stage the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as well as the implementation of the republic's foreign policy interests in the region.
Good relations with Ethiopia are very useful for Russia both in and of themselves and for expanding its positions on the Black Continent.
In the 70s and 80s, the USSR confidently dominated Africa, although it cost it extremely dearly in the literal, economic sense. Moscow, guided by ideological motives, at its own expense built the economies of post-colonial African countries of "socialist orientation", making little use of the huge reserves of natural resources of these states.
Theater for pragmatists
Now Africa is dominated by China, which also actively uses socialist slogans, but its real motives are purely pragmatic. Beijing, openly buying local elites, is pumping out of Africa Natural resources in the best traditions of Western colonialists, while also pouring surplus of their labor into the Black Continent, which only increases the already high unemployment among the Africans themselves. China practically ousted the former Western colonialists from Africa. The only exception is France, which is still trying to restore order in the former colonies. However, for all military operations in Africa, Paris now uses almost exclusively the armies of the African countries themselves as ground forces, since the French, like all other Europeans, simply cannot fight on land.
“ If in the early 90s Addis Ababa had not agreed to grant independence to Eritrea, then in just five years it could have completely returned it under its control.”
China's dominance in Africa is very annoying for Washington, which even created the African Command to counter this threat. Africa formally began to operate on October 1, 2008. Prior to this, the northeastern corner of Africa (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia) belonged to the Sentcom (Central Command) of the US Armed Forces, and everything else to the European Command, which, thus, its area of responsibility extended to Antarctica. After the reform of the entire system of American territorial commands, Africa appeared, in whose area of responsibility was all of Africa, except Egypt.
At the same time, however, the headquarters of Africanom is still located in German Stuttgart, where almost the entire personnel of the command is stationed - 2,000 people, another 1,500 - in Florida. In the Italian Vicenza, the headquarters of the African land forces is located, its task is considered to be the organization of interaction with the African armies. Formally, he is subordinate to the 2nd Brigade of the 1st US Infantry Division, which, however, is stationed in Kansas. Africa is formally included in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Air Force of the US Air Force, but all parts of the 3rd Air Force are stationed in Europe, the headquarters is in German Ramstein. In Africa itself, Africa's only military facility is a base in Djibouti, where there are one to two thousand servicemen of all types of the US Armed Forces, including the 449th Air Force Expeditionary Group with transport C-130s. Sending several hundred Marines to West Africa to fight Ebola in the fall of 2014 was a temporary measure, now all the Marines have left there.
In fact, Africa is almost entirely in Europe, and not in Africa, thanks to the Chinese. Even 10 years ago, African countries would have fought for the right to host its headquarters and contingents. Now no one is ready to accept it, although the Americans imposed such a proposal on almost everyone.
In the early 90s Russia itself surrendered all its positions in Africa, if only because at that moment it could not objectively keep them. However, "the old love does not rust," Moscow's ties with some African countries turned out to be so strong that they were restored without entering into direct confrontation with either Beijing, Paris or Washington. Moreover, today Russia has especially close relations with the militarily strongest states in three main parts of the continent - in North (Arab) Africa, in tropical Africa and in the Horn of Africa "in between".
In the latter case, we are talking about Ethiopia, for which we (first together with Cuba, then alone) fought, as for ourselves, for almost 20 years, but could not prevent its disintegration. Yet the effort cannot be said to have been wasted.
Exclusive ally
The Armed Forces of Ethiopia as a whole are the traditional army of tropical Africa with an extremely low level of combat training of personnel and outdated equipment. Nevertheless, in comparison with other countries of the continent, the Ethiopian army is one of the strongest. It suffered two very difficult wars with Eritrea (first as with its own rebellious province, then as an independent state) and two wars with Somalia (first as a full-fledged state, then as a disintegrated country that turned into a source of Islamic terrorism). With the exception of the first war with Eritrea, Ethiopia won the rest of the wars (although victory in the second war with Somalia was almost useless). The country was one of the most important allies of the USSR and managed to maintain exclusive ties with Russia, from where it receives a significant amount of military equipment, including quite modern (especially by African standards). A number of weapons are purchased in China and Ukraine. But the size of the fleet is known purely by estimates due to significant losses in wars, physical wear and tear and poor operation.
After the separation of Eritrea in 1993, Ethiopia lost access to the sea and, accordingly, lost its navy, so now there are only two types of its armed forces.
The ground forces are divided into five operational commands (OC). The Northern OK (headquarters in Mekele) includes the 4th mechanized (Mekele), 25th and 32nd infantry (Adua) divisions. The central OK (Ynda-Sillas) includes the 35th mechanized, 31st and 33rd infantry divisions (all in Ynda-Sillas). Western OK (Bahr Dar) includes the 27th mechanized (Bahr Dar), 22nd (Dangla), 24th (Baker), 26th (Gondar), 43rd (Gambela) infantry divisions. The Eastern OK (Harar) includes the 13th (Hole-Daua), 14th (Asbe-Tefari), 15th (Auasa), 17th (Dzhijiga), 44th (Negele) infantry divisions. The northeastern OK (Desse) includes the 19th mechanized (Mando), 11th (Dacheto), 12th (Desse), 20th (Bati) infantry divisions. In addition, the ground forces have a special forces division "Aghazi" (Addis Ababa) and six brigades: airborne, artillery, transport and three - security (Ministry of Defense, government and military facilities).
The tank park includes up to 200 T-55, from 36 to 50 T-62, 211 T-72. Perhaps up to 150 T-34/85, T-54, T-55 and American M-47s remain in storage. There are about 50 BRDM, 20 BMP-1, 350 armored personnel carriers (up to 70 BTR-152, up to 150 BTR-60, 10 Chinese Ture 63 and Ture 89 each, 20 Ture 05, up to 80 American M113).
Artillery: up to 87 self-propelled guns (about 10 2S1, 11-55 Chinese "Ture 85", 10 2S5, 12 2S19), about 700 towed guns (20 D-44, up to 450 D-30, up to 100 M-30, up to 120 M-46, up to 20 D-20, 18 Chinese WA-021), up to 900 mortars, as well as from 30 to 50 MLRS BM-21 and up to 25 Chinese "Ture 63". In service there are more than 400 ATGMs (22 American Tou, 50 Soviet Fagot, 10 Shturm, 80 Kornet, 250 Ukrainian Kombat), up to 50 T-12 anti-tank systems.
Ground-based air defense includes up to 36 short-range air defense systems "Strela-1", up to 10 divisions (25-40 launchers) of C-125 air defense systems, up to 7 divisions (18-42 launchers) C-75 air defense systems, 1 battery of the latest Chinese air defense system HQ-64 (6 launchers), up to 500 MANPADS (up to 300 "Strela-2M", 200 "Igla"), up to 60 ZSU (up to 50 "Shilka", up to 10 ZSU-57-2), about 500 anti-aircraft guns (up to 350 ZU -23, 120 61-K and C-60).
Of all the equipment of the ground forces, T-72 tanks, Ture 05 infantry fighting vehicles, 2S19 self-propelled guns, WA-021 guns, Kornet and Kombat anti-tank systems, Igla MANPADS can be considered quite modern. The rest of the equipment is very outdated, its combat effectiveness is questionable, respectively, the real number in the ranks may be much less than the above.
The Air Force has up to 15 MiG-21 fighters, 17 Su-27 fighters, and up to 12 MiG-23 fighters. Four Su-25 attack aircraft are in storage. Of these aircraft, the Su-27 can be considered modern, the rest are outdated and mostly depleted. All MiGs, apparently, have already been withdrawn from the Air Force, so at the moment Ethiopia's combat aviation consists only of the Su-27.
Transport aviation is also outdated. It includes 1 American C-130E (another 1-2 C-130V in storage) and 2-3 L-100-30, 1 Boeing-757, 1 Cessna-340, 3-8 Soviet An-12 , 1 An-32, 3-7 Canadian DHC-6s and, possibly, 1 An-26 and Yak-40 each. 1 Tu-154 and up to 9 American S-119Ks are in storage.
Training aircraft - from 9 to 26 Czech L-39s, 7 Italian SF-260s (up to 20 more, possibly in storage).
The Air Force is armed with up to 26 combat helicopters (up to 15 Mi-24, from 5 to 11 Mi-35) and up to 45 multipurpose and transport helicopters (2 European AW139, up to 6 French SA316 and similar Romanian IAR316, from 4 to 26 Soviet Mi -8, from 5 to 10 Mi-17).
A future without Eritrea
Ethiopia is located in a highly volatile region and has threats along the entire perimeter of its borders. At the same time, the country's armed forces have a sufficiently high combat capability by local standards and, in general, are able to fend off threats and even provide the country with the status of a regional hegemon.
Russia continues to play a crucial role in this. In particular, not only with the help of our weapons, but also under the de facto leadership of Russian military advisers, the Ethiopian army inflicted a heavy defeat on Eritrea in the 1998-2000 war. If in the early 90s Addis Ababa had not agreed to grant independence to Asmara, then in just five years it could have completely returned it under its control. But it is no longer possible to play back.
,
Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis
Ethiopia is one of the ancient states(formed in the XIII century), which defended its independence in the centuries-old struggle. At the end of the last century, it withstood the onslaught of European colonialists, but in 1935 it was occupied by Italian troops and included in the Italian East Africa (colony). A partisan movement developed in the country. The heroic liberation struggle of the Ethiopian people led to the expulsion of the occupiers and the liberation of the country in 1941. In 1942, decrees were issued to abolish slavery. However, the existing feudal-monarchical regime was characterized by absolutism, and the living conditions of the bulk of the population were difficult, which led to increased discontent with the authorities.
In February 1974, an anti-monarchist and anti-feudal revolution began in Ethiopia, led by the Armed Forces Movement. On September 12, the emperor was deposed, and all power passed to the Provisional Military Administrative Council (VVAS) and the Provisional Military Government. Seeking to undermine the revolutionary regime in the country, external forces launched a hostile campaign in the summer of 1977. Ethiopia has become a victim of aggression from Somalia, which has attempted to seize the Ogaden region from it.
In anticipation of these events, the Ethiopian government, given the growing tensions in relations with neighboring countries, decided to form regular armed forces and parts of the people's militia. The army, created on the basis of a progressive section of regular officers and soldiers, as well as paramilitary formations of workers and peasants, became an important force that defended the country's independence and moved it along the path of social progress. The leadership of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, which came to power in 1991, developed a program that identified the main tasks for reforming the armed forces, which were based on the armed formations of the front.
At present, the general leadership of the armed forces is carried out by the commander-in-chief (who is also the prime minister of the country), and the direct one is the minister of defense. Organizationally, the Armed Forces of Ethiopia (total number of about 80 thousand people) consist of ground forces, air force and air defense forces. Combat vehicles, which is in their arsenal, predominantly of Soviet production.
The ground forces are the backbone of the country's armed forces (over 78 thousand people). According to the foreign press, their combat strength includes up to 350 T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, about 200 BRDM, BMP, BTR-60 and BTR-152, there are also field artillery guns ZIS-3, D-30 and -44, M-46 (calibers 76, 85, 122 and 130 mm), mortars M-1 M-1937 and M-1938 (81, 82 and 122 mm), anti-aircraft artillery mounts ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 -SP, M-1939, S-60 (23, 37 and 57 mm).
The strength of the Ethiopian Air Force is about 2 thousand people. The basis of strike aviation is made up of over 80 combat aircraft of the MiG-21, -23, -27 and F-5 types, as well as about 20 Mi-24 helicopters.
The naval forces (about 200 people), which are in the stage of formation, have one missile and two patrol boats, two minesweepers, one landing ship and one auxiliary ship (based in Djibouti). After the secession of the coastal province of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the country lost its access to the sea. Therefore, its military-political leadership decided to liquidate the military fleet.
The recruitment of the armed forces is carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia of 1994 and the Decree of the Council of People's Representatives (Parliament) of 1996, which provide for the voluntary principle of recruitment for military service. At the same time, proportional representation from all ethnic groups living in the territory of this country is respected. Those drafted into the army undergo a six-month training, after which they are sent to military unit... Upon returning from the army, the demobilized enjoy various benefits, have an advantage when entering national and foreign schools, when applying for a job. Some of them are sent to the national development service (an organized reserve of the armed forces).
In addition to the armed forces, Ethiopia has territorial militia units (over 65 thousand people) and national service development (about 25 thousand).
"Foreign Military Review" No. 5 1997