The troops of Nazi Germany are crossing border river. Location unknown, June 22, 1941
The beginning of hostilities of Nazi Germany against the USSR. Lithuanian SSR, 1941
Units of the German army entered the territory of the USSR (from trophy photographs taken from captured and killed Wehrmacht soldiers). Location unknown, June 1941
Units of the German army on the territory of the USSR (from trophy photographs taken from captured and killed Wehrmacht soldiers). Location unknown, June 1941
German soldiers during the battle near Brest. Brest, 1941
Nazi troops fighting at the walls Brest Fortress. Brest, 1941
German General Kruger in the vicinity of Leningrad. Leningrad region, 1941
German units enter Vyazma. Smolensk region, 1941
Employees of the Ministry of Propaganda of the Third Reich inspect a captured Soviet light tank T-26 (photographing of the Ministry of Propaganda of the Third Reich). The location of the shooting has not been established, September 1941.
A camel captured as a trophy and used by German mountain rangers. Krasnodar region, 1941
Group German soldiers near a pile of Soviet canned food captured as a trophy. Location unknown, 1941
Part of the SS guards the vehicles with the population being driven away to Germany. Mogilev, June 1943
German soldiers among the ruins of Voronezh. Location unknown, July 1942
A group of Nazi soldiers on one of the streets of Krasnodar. Krasnodar, 1942
German soldiers in Taganrog. Taganrog, 1942
Raising the fascist flag by the Nazis in one of the occupied areas of the city. Stalingrad, 1942
A detachment of German soldiers on one of the streets of occupied Rostov. Rostov, 1942
German soldiers in captured locality. The location of the shooting has not been established, the year of shooting has not been established.
A column of advancing German troops near Novgorod. Novgorod the Great, August 19, 1941
A group of German soldiers in one of the occupied villages. The location of the shooting has not been established, the year of shooting has not been established.
Cavalry division in Gomel. Gomel, November 1941
Before retreating, the Germans destroy railway near Grodno; the soldier puts in the fuse for the explosion. Grodno, July 1944
German units retreat between Lake Ilmen and the Gulf of Finland. Leningrad Front, February 1944
Retreat of the Germans from the Novgorod region. Location unknown, January 27, 1944
For 1942, the map shows the maximum advance of fascist troops into the depths of the Soviet Union. On the scale of the Soviet Union, this is a small part, but what were the victims in the occupied territories.
If you look closely, in the north the Germans stopped in the area of the current Republic of Karelia, then Leningrad, Kalinin, Moscow, Voronezh, Stalingrad. In the south we reached the area of the city of Grozny. You can't describe it in a few words.
From the school history course we know that the Nazis in the USSR reached such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad (now Volgograd), Grozny, Kalinin, Voronezh. After 1942, when the Nazis advanced as far as possible across the territory of the USSR, they began to retreat. You can see their progress in more detail on the map:
The Germans advanced quite a lot deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. But they were never able to take strategically important cities: neither Moscow nor Leningrad submitted. In the Leningrad direction they were stopped near the city of Tikhvin. In the Kalinin direction - near the village of Mednoye. Near Stalingrad we reached the Volga, the last outpost was the village of Kuporosnoye. On western front in the area of the city of Rzhev, the Germans were knocked out at the cost of incredible efforts (remember Tvardovsky’s famous poem I was killed near Rzhev). They also fought furiously for the Caucasus, which had strategic importance- access to the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. They were stopped near the city of Maykop.
Where the fascists reached is already a well-known matter, and every historian can accurately tell everything in detail, about every point, about every city and village in which fierce battles took place, everything is especially well described and remains in the memory in books that can be read through For many years I just picked it up and read it.
And this is what the map looks like:
There are a lot of maps shown, but I will say in words: During the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis came close to Moscow, they were only 30 km away from Moscow, but they were stopped there. Naturally, I know everything about the blockade of Leningrad, the Battle of Kursk, and the Rzhev direction. Here is a map of the battle for Moscow.
http://dp60.narod.ru/image/maps/330.jpg
This is the line of maximum advance of the Germans &; Co deep into Soviet territory.
There are many types of cards.
To be honest, I don’t really trust the Internet, I trust history textbooks more.
I live in Belarus myself and therefore the map may not be much different.
But here’s the photo I took, just for you!
The Nazis went far, but, as you know, they failed to capture Moscow. I was interested in information not long ago when the Nazis began to retreat. It was possible to find only some facts about events near Moscow. You can quote:
The map shows the territory of the USSR, which the Germans managed to pass through until November 15, 1942 (after which they went a little deeper and began to retreat):
The German offensive against the USSR was in 1941, they almost achieved their goal, and the Nazis had only about thirty kilometers left to reach Moscow, but they still failed, but here is a map where everything is described in detail
They were near Moscow - 30 km, and were defeated there, it’s better to read on Wikipedia, everything is described there in detail and there are dates with a video, look here. But here is the map in the photos below, everything is marked with black arrows.
During the Great Patriotic War, Nazi Germany captured significant territory of the former USSR.
The troops of the Third Reich occupied many republics of the then union. Among them are part of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and the Baltic republics.
Below on the map you can see the border (thick red line) where the Nazis entered during the hostilities:
Destroyed cities were rebuilt by prisoners of war
We know that victory over Hitler's Germany came to our people at an incredibly high price. In 1945, a significant part of the European part of the USSR lay in ruins. It was necessary to restore the destroyed economy, and in the shortest possible time. But the country at that time was experiencing an acute shortage of workers and smart heads, because millions of our fellow citizens, including a huge number of highly qualified specialists, died on the war fronts and in the rear.
After the Potsdam Conference, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a closed resolution. According to him, when restoring the industry of the USSR and its destroyed cities and villages, it was intended to use the labor of German prisoners of war to the maximum extent possible. At the same time, it was decided to remove all qualified German engineers and workers from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany to USSR enterprises.
According to the official Soviet history, in March 1946, the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the second convocation adopted the fourth five-year plan for restoration and development National economy countries. In the first post-war five-year plan, it was necessary to completely restore the areas of the country that had suffered from the occupation and hostilities, and in industry and agriculture to reach the pre-war level, and then surpass it.
About three billion rubles were allocated from the national budget for the development of the economy of the Kuibyshev region in prices of that time. In the vicinity of post-war Kuibyshev, several camps were organized for former soldiers of the defeated Nazi armies. The Germans who survived the Stalingrad cauldron were then widely used at various Kuibyshev construction sites.
Labor at that time was also needed for the development of industry. After all, according to official Soviet plans, in the last war years and immediately after the war, it was planned to build several new plants in Kuibyshev, including an oil refinery, a bit, a ship repair plant and a metal structures plant. It also turned out to be urgently necessary to reconstruct the 4th GPP, KATEK (later the plant named after A.M. Tarasov), the Avtotractorodetal plant (later the valve plant), the Srednevolzhsky Machine Tool Plant and some others. It was here that German prisoners of war were sent to work. But as it turned out later, they were not the only ones.
Six hours to get ready
Before the war, both the USSR and Germany were actively developing fundamentally new aircraft engines - gas turbines. However, German specialists were then noticeably ahead of their Soviet colleagues. The lag increased after in 1937, all the leading Soviet scientists working on the problems of jet propulsion fell under the Yezhov-Beri skating rink of repression. Meanwhile, in Germany, at the BMW and Junkers factories, the first samples of gas turbine engines were already being prepared for launch into mass production.
In the spring of 1945, the factories and design bureaus of Junkers and BMW found themselves in the Soviet occupation zone. And in the fall of 1946, a significant part of the qualified personnel of Junkers, BMW and some other German aircraft factories, in the strictest secrecy, on specially equipped trains, was transported to the territory of the USSR, or rather to Kuibyshev, to the village of Upravlencheskiy. In the shortest possible time, 405 German engineers and technicians, 258 highly qualified workers, 37 employees, as well as a small group of service personnel were delivered here. Family members of these specialists came with them. As a result, at the end of October 1946, in the village of Upravlencheskiy there were more Germans than Russians.
Not long ago, former German electrical engineer Helmut Breuninger came to Samara, who was part of the very group of German technical specialists who were secretly taken to the village of Upravlencheskiy more than 60 years ago. In the late autumn of 1946, when the train carrying the Germans arrived in the city on the Volga, Mr. Breuninger was only 30 years old. Although by the time of his visit to Samara he had already turned 90 years old, he still decided on such a trip, albeit in the company of his daughter and grandson. 
Helmut Breuninger with his grandson
In 1946, I worked as an engineer at the Ascania state enterprise,” recalled Mr. Breuninger. “Back then, in defeated Germany, it was very difficult for even a qualified specialist to find a job. Therefore, when at the beginning of 1946, several large factories were launched under the control of the Soviet administration, there were a lot of people wanting to get a job there. And in the early morning of October 22, the doorbell rang at my apartment. A Soviet lieutenant and two soldiers stood on the threshold. The lieutenant said that my family and I were given six hours to get ready for subsequent departure to Soviet Union. He didn’t tell us any details, we only learned that we would be working in our specialty at one of the Soviet defense enterprises.
Under heavy security in the evening of the same day, the train with technical specialists departed from the Berlin station. While loading onto the train, I saw many familiar faces. These were experienced engineers from our enterprise, as well as some of my colleagues from the Junkers and BMW factories. The train traveled for a whole week to Moscow, where several engineers and their families disembarked. But we moved on. I knew a little about the geography of Russia, but I had never heard of a city called Kuibyshev before. Only when they explained to me that it used to be called Samara, I remembered that there really is such a city on the Volga.
Worked for the USSR
Most of the Germans taken to Kuibyshev worked at Experimental Plant No. 2 (later - the Engine Plant]. At the same time, OKB-1 was 85 percent staffed by Junkers specialists; in OKB-2, up to 80 percent of the staff was former staff"BMW", and 62 percent of OKB-3 personnel were specialists from the Ascania plant.
At first, the secret factory where the Germans worked was run exclusively by military personnel. In particular, from 1946 to 1949 it was headed by Colonel Olekhnovich. However, in May 1949, an engineer unknown to anyone at that time arrived here to replace the military, and was almost immediately appointed the responsible manager of the enterprise. For many decades, this man was classified in much the same way as Igor Kurchatov, Sergei Korolev, Mikhail Yangel, Dmitry Kozlov. That unknown engineer was Nikolai Dmitrievich Kuznetsov, later an academician and twice Hero of Socialist Labor.
Kuznetsov immediately directed all the creative forces of the design bureaus subordinate to him to develop a new turboprop engine, based on the German model YuMO-022. This engine was designed back in Dessau and developed power up to 4000 horsepower. It was modernized, its power was further increased and it was put into production. In subsequent years, the Kuznetsov Design Bureau produced not only turboprops, but also turbojet engines for bomber aircraft. German specialists took a direct part in the creation of almost each of them. Their work at the motor plant in the village of Upravlencheskiy continued until the mid-50s.
As for Helmut Breuninger, he was included in the first wave of moves from Kuibyshev, when some German specialists, along with their families, began to be transferred to Moscow factories. The last such group left the banks of the Volga in 1954, but the surviving German specialists returned home to Germany only in 1958. Since that time, the graves of many of these visiting engineers and technicians have remained in the old cemetery in the village of Upravlencheskiy. In those years when Kuibyshev was closed city, no one looked after the cemetery. But now these graves are always well-groomed, the paths between them are sprinkled with sand, and the names in German are written on the monuments.
After Nazi Germany captured the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and a number of western regions of the RSFSR, tens of millions Soviet citizens found themselves in the occupation zone. From that moment on, they had to live in fact in a new state.
In the occupation zone
On July 17, 1941, on the basis of Hitler’s order “On civil administration in the occupied eastern regions”, under the leadership of Alfred Rosenberg, the “Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories” was created, which subordinates two administrative units: the Reichskommissariat Ostland with its center in Riga and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine with its center in Rivne.
Later it was planned to create the Reichskommissariat Muscovy, which was supposed to include the entire European part of Russia.
Not all residents of the German-occupied regions of the USSR were able to move to the rear. By various reasons About 70 million Soviet citizens remained behind the front line and suffered severe trials.
The occupied territories of the USSR were primarily supposed to serve as a raw material and food base for Germany, and the population as a cheap labor force. Therefore, Hitler, if possible, demanded to keep here Agriculture and industry, which were of great interest to the German war economy.
"Draconian measures"
One of the primary tasks of the German authorities in the occupied territories of the USSR was to ensure order. Wilhelm Keitel's order stated that, due to the vastness of the areas controlled by Germany, it was necessary to suppress the resistance of the civilian population through intimidation.
“To maintain order, commanders should not demand reinforcements, but use the most draconian measures.”
The occupation authorities maintained strict control over the local population: all residents were subject to registration with the police, moreover, they were prohibited from leaving their places of permanent residence without permission. Violation of any regulation, for example, the use of a well from which the Germans took water, could entail severe punishment up to death penalty by hanging.
The German command, fearing protest and disobedience of the civilian population, gave increasingly intimidating orders. So on July 10, 1941, the commander of the 6th Army, Walter von Reichenau, demanded that “soldiers in civilian clothes, who are easily recognized by their short haircut, be shot,” and on December 2, 1941, a directive was issued calling for “shooting without warning at any civilian of any age and floor that approaches the front line,” and also “immediately shoot anyone suspected of espionage.”
The German authorities expressed every interest in reducing the local population. Martin Bormann sent a directive to Alfred Rosenberg, in which he recommended welcoming abortions of girls and women of the “non-German population” in the occupied eastern territories, as well as supporting the intensive trade in contraceptives.
The most popular method used by the Nazis to reduce the civilian population remained execution. Liquidations were carried out everywhere. Entire villages of people were exterminated, often based solely on suspicion of an illegal act. So in the Latvian village of Borki, out of 809 residents, 705 were shot, of which 130 were children - the rest were released as “politically reliable”.
Disabled and sick citizens were subject to regular destruction. So, already during the retreat in the Belarusian village of Gurki, the Germans poisoned two trains with soup with local residents who were not to be transported to Germany, and in Minsk in just two days - November 18 and 19, 1944, the Germans poisoned 1,500 disabled old people, women and children.
The occupation authorities responded to the killings of German soldiers with mass executions. For example, after the murder in Taganrog German officer and five soldiers in the courtyard of plant No. 31, 300 innocent civilians were shot. And for damaging a telegraph station in Taganrog, 153 people were shot.
Russian historian Alexander Dyukov, describing the cruelty of the occupation regime, noted that “according to the most conservative estimates, one in five of the seventy million Soviet citizens who found themselves under occupation did not live to see Victory.”
Speaking at the Nuremberg trials, a representative of the American side noted that “the atrocities committed armed forces and other organizations of the Third Reich in the East, were so stunningly monstrous that the human mind can hardly comprehend them." According to the American prosecutor, these atrocities were not spontaneous, but represented a consistent logical system.
"The Hunger Plan"
Another terrible means that led to a massive reduction in the civilian population was the “Famine Plan” developed by Herbert Bakke. The “Hunger Plan” was part of the economic strategy of the Third Reich, according to which no more than 30 million people were supposed to remain from the previous number of inhabitants of the USSR. The food reserves thus freed were to be used to meet the needs of the German army.
One of the notes from a high-ranking German official reported the following: “The war will continue if the Wehrmacht in the third year of the war is fully supplied with food from Russia.” It was noted as an inevitable fact that “tens of millions of people will die of hunger if we take everything we need from the country.”
The “hunger plan” primarily affected Soviet prisoners of war, who received virtually no food. During the entire period of the war, almost 2 million people died of hunger among Soviet prisoners of war, according to historians.
The famine hit no less painfully on those whom the Germans hoped to destroy first - the Jews and Gypsies. For example, Jews were prohibited from purchasing milk, butter, eggs, meat and vegetables.
The food “portion” for Minsk Jews, who were under the jurisdiction of Army Group Center, did not exceed 420 kilocalories per day - this led to the death of tens of thousands of people in the winter of 1941-1942.
The most severe conditions were in the “evacuated zone” with a depth of 30-50 km, which was directly adjacent to the front line. The entire civilian population of this line was forcibly sent to the rear: the settlers were placed in houses local residents or in camps, but in the absence of places they could also be placed in non-residential premises - barns, pigsties. IDPs living in camps for the most part they did not receive any food - at best, “liquid gruel” once a day.
The height of cynicism are the so-called “12 commandments” of Bakke, one of which says that “Russian people have become accustomed for hundreds of years to poverty, hunger and unpretentiousness. His stomach is stretchable, so [don’t allow] any fake pity.”
The school year 1941-1942 for many schoolchildren in the occupied territories never began. Germany counted on a lightning victory, and therefore did not plan long-term programs. However, by the next school year, a decree of the German authorities was promulgated, which declared that all children aged 8 to 12 years (born 1930-1934) were required to regularly attend 4-grade school from the beginning school year, scheduled for October 1, 1942.
If for some reason the children could not attend school, parents or persons replacing them were required to submit an application to the head of the school within 3 days. For each violation of school attendance, the administration charged a fine of 100 rubles.
The main task " German schools“was not about teaching, but about instilling obedience and discipline. Much attention was paid to hygiene and health issues.
According to Hitler, soviet man he had to be able to write and read, and he didn’t need more. Now the walls of school classrooms, instead of portraits of Stalin, were decorated with images of the Fuhrer, and children, standing in front of German generals, were forced to recite: “Glory to you, German eagles, glory to the wise leader! I bow my peasant head very low.”
It is curious that the Law of God appeared among school subjects, but history in its traditional sense disappeared. Pupils in grades 6-7 were required to study books promoting anti-Semitism - “At the Origins of the Great Hatred” or “Jewish Dominance in modern world" From foreign languages Only German remained.
At first, classes were conducted using Soviet textbooks, but any mention of the party and the works of Jewish authors was removed. The schoolchildren themselves were forced to do this, and during lessons, on command, they covered “unnecessary places” with paper. Returning to the work of the Smolensk administration, it should be noted that its employees took care of the refugees to the best of their ability: they were given bread, free food stamps, and sent to social hostels. In December 1942, 17 thousand 307 rubles were spent on disabled people alone.
Here is an example of the menu of Smolensk social canteens. Lunches consisted of two courses. The first course was served with barley or potato soups, borscht and fresh cabbage; for the second course there was barley porridge, mashed potatoes, stewed cabbage, potato cutlets and rye pies with porridge and carrots; meat cutlets and goulash were also sometimes served.
The Germans mainly used the civilian population for heavy work - building bridges, clearing roads, peat mining or logging. They worked from 6 o'clock in the morning until late in the evening. Those who worked slowly could be shot as a warning to others. In some cities, for example, Bryansk, Orel and Smolensk, Soviet workers were assigned identification numbers. The German authorities motivated this by their reluctance to “pronounce Russian names and surnames incorrectly.”
It is curious that at first the occupation authorities announced that taxes would be lower than under the Soviet regime, but in reality they added taxes on doors, windows, dogs, excess furniture and even beards. According to one of the women who survived the occupation, many then existed according to the principle “we lived one day - and thank God.”
The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon
Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.
Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.
Number of troops to implement the plan
Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.
The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.
Direction of the main attack
Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:
- Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
- Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
- Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.
| SOUTH | CENTER | NORTH | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus | Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow | Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk |
| Number | 57 divisions and 13 brigades | 50 divisions and 2 brigades | 29th Division + Army "Norway" |
| Commanding | Field Marshal von Rundstedt | Field Marshal von Bock | Field Marshal von Leeb |
| common goal | Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina) |
||
Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.
Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.
Implementation of the plan
The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:
- 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
- 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
- 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).
Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.
By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.
Germany's failures in the North
Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.
Army Failures Center
Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.
Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.
Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement Belarus.
Failures of the Army South
Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.
Map of the German advance plan
Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.
General state of affairs
- In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
- It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
- In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.
Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed
Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.
The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that everything Soviet troops located on the border, then this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.
In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.
Did Barbarossa's plan fail?
I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - Velikaya Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.
Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.