The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation codenamed "Citadel" was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the German-fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command decided to temporarily go over to the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and in the course of a defensive battle to bleed the enemy's strike forces.
The enemy grouping numbered, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German forces was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the headquarters of the Supreme Command created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations (ACS), about 2, 9 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping that opposed them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1, artillery by 2.5, tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.8, aircraft - by 1.4 times.
On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an offensive against Kursk from the regions of Orel and Belgorod.
July 12 in the area railway station Prokhorovka, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank grouping (Operational Group Kempf) and the Soviet forces counterstriking.
On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy's defenses on the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol axes and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 kilometers. On July 15, the troops of the Central Front launched attacks from the south and south-east in the direction of the city of Kromy.
On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were brought into battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.
By August 23, 1943, the enemy was thrown back to the west by 140-150 kilometers, and Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.
The losses of the Soviet troops were: irrecoverable - 254 470 people, medical - 608 833 people.
ps Let's not forget, no, we will not.
August 23 - Day of Military Glory of Russia - Day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).
Armor piercers on the Kursk Bulge
© RIA Novosti. N. Bode | Buy illustration
On August 23, in accordance with Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 "On the Days of Military Glory (Victory Days) of Russia", the Day of Military Glory of Russia is celebrated - the Day of the defeat of Nazi German troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).
The Battle of Kursk (the Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this, a military operation codenamed "Citadel" was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the German fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go over to the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during a defensive battle, bleed the enemy's shock groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive. ...
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized.
The enemy grouping numbered, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German forces was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated in a sector that was only about 14% of its length.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK) created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts), which had more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations (ACS), about 2.9 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping that opposed them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1, artillery by 2.5, tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.8, aircraft - by 1.4 times.
The troops of the Central Front (commanded by General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern face of the Kursk salient, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) defended the southern face.
In their rear, strategic reserves were deployed, united in the Steppe Military District, from July 9 - the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel-General Ivan Konev), which was entrusted with the task of preventing a deep penetration of the enemy, and when the Soviet troops went into a counteroffensive, to increase the force of the blow from depths. The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters of the marshals Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, Colonel-General of Artillery Nikolai Voronov, and aviation - to Air Marshal Alexander Novikov.
On July 5, 1943, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, German strike groups launched an offensive against Kursk from the regions of Orel and Belgorod.
From the Oryol side, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a grouping under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf of Army Group South).
The task of repelling the offensive from the direction of Orel was assigned to the troops of the Central Front, from the side of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
On July 12, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank grouping (Operational Group Kempf) and the Soviet forces counterstriking. Up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle on both sides.
The fierce battle lasted all day, by evening the tank crews, along with the infantry, fought hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and over 360 tanks and was forced to go over to the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and Left Wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of crushing the enemy's Oryol grouping. On July 13, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy's defenses on the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol axes and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 kilometers. On July 15, the troops of the Central Front struck from the south and south-east in the direction of the city of Kroma.
On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, the troops of the Steppe Front were brought into battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.
Concentric strikes by the front forces broke through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense.
Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces, supported from the air by strikes from the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, threw the enemy back to the west by 140-150 kilometers, liberated Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov.
The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of the Second World War. On both sides, more than four million people were involved in it, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft.
According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, three thousand guns.
The losses of the Soviet troops were: irrecoverable - 254 470 people, sanitary - 608 833 people.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.
On the evening of August 5, 1943, an artillery salute in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod (12 volleys from 120 guns) thundered in Moscow for the first time.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the rank of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachaev.
After the defeat of the 6th Army of Army Group B at Stalingrad, the German military leadership tried to work out a campaign plan for the summer of 1943, which would again intercept the military initiative.
At the same time, there was no consensus among the leadership of the Wehrmacht: some believed that it was in the summer of 1943 that it was possible to deliver a decisive blow, after which it would be possible to make another attempt to attack Moscow, others suggested either starting an offensive not in the summer, but in the spring, or completely abandoning offensive.
Meanwhile, even despite certain local successes of its armed forces, the situation for Germany was far from being the best: the crushing defeat at Stalingrad, where, among other things, Romanian, Croatian and Italian units were defeated, and the failed small blitzkrieg in the Caucasus, led to this that relations among the Axis countries were no longer the same as at the very beginning of the war.
That is why Germany needed an unconditional victory to restore its reputation.
At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters hoped to deliver a blow, after which the military initiative would finally pass to the USSR.
Already in the spring of 1943, both sides knew that the decisive battle would unfold in the very center of the Soviet-German front: even during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht, a protrusion stretching for 200 kilometers with a depth of up to 150 kilometers, facing the west, was formed - the Kursk Bulge.
Both sides perfectly understood the operational and strategic importance of the Kursk salient. And each of the parties tried to take advantage of the operational lull that had come back in the spring of 1943 with the maximum benefit for itself.
Back in March 1943, the Supreme Command of the German Ground Forces issued order No. 5, signed by Hitler: "to preempt Soviet troops after the end of the thaw in the offensive (....) to impose their will on the Red Army. "
It was planned that the shock and tank groups created near Kharkov and Orel would be able to destroy Soviet troops on the Kursk salient with converging strikes, and then continue their advance to Moscow and Leningrad.
Almost at the same time, he sent his vision of the spring-summer campaign to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and G.K. Zhukov. In his report, Zhukov spoke about the inexpediency of the offensive of the Red Army, the purpose of which was to forestall the enemy: "... it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses (...) and then, introducing fresh reserves (...) we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping ".
Strongly against Zhukov, and A.M., who supported him. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, R. Ya. Malinovsky and K.E. Voroshilov: they offered to strike a preemptive strike in the Donbass region.
Soon Soviet intelligence will provide irrefutable evidence of the imminent start of Operation Citadel: to achieve the success of its offensive, the Wehrmacht leadership planned the massive use of armored vehicles in the first operational echelon, which was supposed to be supported by aviation, including new aircraft - Focke-Wulf fighters "and attack aircraft" Henkel ". Therefore, Zhukov's point of view was no longer questioned. As a result, a rather unique decision was made: the Soviet side, which by the summer of 1943 had all the necessary forces to conduct a successful offensive operation, chose defense.
In the summer of 1943, Soviet commanders recalled the bitter experience of the first two years of the war, when the defense did not always withstand the enemy's blow: in the areas of operation of the Central and Voronezh fronts, namely, they were supposed to conduct a defensive operation, a deep defense line was urgently created. In the shortest possible time, anti-tank lines were built, tens of thousands of kilometers of trenches were dug, and minefields were equipped. By the beginning of the operation, the line of defense of the Soviet troops consisted of eight defensive zones and lines up to 300 kilometers deep.
At the end of June, the Soviet-German front froze in heavy anticipation - everyone knew perfectly well that the battle, on the outcome of which the further course of the war depends on, would begin in the near future.
On July 5, 1943, Soviet troops, having received intelligence about the imminent start of the enemy's offensive, conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation. And after it, the weakened shock groups of the Nazis began an offensive on the Kursk Bulge.
The advancing 900-thousand-strong group of the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge was opposed by almost 1.400 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army. The headquarters of the Supreme Command, realizing that the transition to defense, even if carefully planned, was a certain risk, managed to create a Reserve Front, which was supposed to prevent any sudden threat to the troops of the Central and Southern Fronts.
The offensive of the Wehrmacht began to choke from the first hours. The minefields, which were part of the system of defensive lines, significantly slowed down the advancement of the newest armored vehicles of the Nazis: the Tiger and Panther tanks.
However, by the end of the first day of the battle, German troops were able to break through the first lines of the Soviet defense by the end of the day on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk Bulge.
At the same time, the transience of the offensive of the 9th Army of Model on the northern face led to the fact that the exhausted troops were deeply stuck in the Soviet defense by the end of the second day. At the same time, the situation remained unchanged until July 12 - the Nazis fought endless battles near Olkhovatka and at the Ponyri station. At the same time, the Soviet command transferred tank reserves to the southern front to defeat the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Prokhorovka area. On July 10, fierce battles began in the Prokhorovka direction.
On July 12, 1943, Soviet troops begin the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk - Operation Kutuzov. In just a day, the Red Army breaks through the enemy's defenses, and by the end of July 15 is restoring all the positions lost during the previous days on the northern face. On the southern face, the situation was more complicated: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps were eliminating a small ledge in the Rzhavets-Gostishchevo area.
Literally a week later, a turning point in the battle comes: on July 19, the troops of the Central Front go over to the offensive in the Kursk-Krom direction, and on the southern face, the Wehrmacht units that have exhausted their capabilities go into a defensive defense. Realizing that there would be no more suitable time for a counteroffensive, the command gave the order to the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts to push the Nazis back to their original lines.
By July 26, the Nazis leave the Oryol bridgehead and hastily transfer the surviving units to the east - to the Hagen defensive line. On the southern face, the Red Army fought offensive battles until August 1.
And then the situation developed much more rapidly. On August 3, Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" begins, two days later Red Army units liberate Oryol and Belgorod. On August 11, the Nazis attempted to launch a counterstrike in the Bogodukhov area, which ended in failure. On August 13, the troops of the Steppe Front break through the Kharkov defensive circuit and four days later begin fighting for the liberation of Kharkov, which will end on August 23, 1943 ...
On August 23, Soviet troops will liberate not only Kharkov. They will complete the Battle of Kursk - one of the major battles in the history of mankind.
50 days of the hardest, exhausting battles led to the fact that the initiative completely passed to the Red Army. Now Soviet troops along the entire front line were shifting from defense to offensive - it is generally believed that the fighting of the Red Army during the winter of 1942 - summer of 1943 marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.
The main forces of the Panzerwaffe, the armored forces of the Wehrmacht, were incapacitated. All Hitler's military leaders were unanimous: the Battle of Kursk was a complete failure of the Hitlerite army.
There was no longer the question of whether German troops would be able to reach Moscow.
The question was already different: how long will German troops be able to hold off the growing offensive of the Red Army ...
The Battle of Kursk takes place in the Great Patriotic War special place. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. In its ferocity and stubbornness of the struggle, this battle is unmatched.
The general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region. If successful, it was planned to expand the front of the offensive and return the strategic initiative. To implement their plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike groups, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. Great hopes were pinned on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter planes and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.
The Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy strike forces in defensive battles, and then go over to the counteroffensive. The battle that began immediately took on a grand scale and was extremely tense. Our troops did not flinch. They met the avalanches of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented fortitude and courage. The offensive of the enemy strike groups was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to break into our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - by 10-12 km, on the Voronezh - up to 35 km. Finally, Hitler's operation "Citadel" was buried, the largest in the entire second world war oncoming tank battle near Pro-khorovka. It happened on July 12th. 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated in it from both sides at the same time. This battle was won by the Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks in a day of battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.
On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the Soviet counteroffensive. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of war. Since that time, artillery salutes have constantly announced the glorious victories of the Soviet. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated. So the battle on the Kursk fiery arc ended victoriously. During it, 30 elite enemy divisions were defeated. The Nazi troops lost about 500 thousand people, 1500 tanks, 3 thousand guns and 3700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers - participants in the Battle of the Arc of Fire, were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended with a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War.
Tanks. Battle of Kursk
The Battle of Kursk, or Operation Citadel, became a turning point, and occupies a special place in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. In terms of its ferocity and stubbornness of the struggle, this battle is unmatched. The battle, which took place more than sixty years ago, still attracts attention today as the most grandiose clash of tank armada in the entire war. The defeat of Hitler's troops at the Kursk Bulge and the subsequent exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.
If the Moscow battle was an example of heroism and dedication, when there really was nowhere to retreat, and the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mourning tones for the first time, the Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. No more piece of native land will be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree that the Battle of the Kursk Bulge finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it, the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.
Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, let us make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians attribute the victory in World War II to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes of the Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who saved the world from a terrible disease - fascism!
1943rd year. The war is entering a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as at the beginning of the war. The allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, all positions in North Africa are lost. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is being rounded up under arms. The notorious Aryan type German soldier diluted by all nationalities. The Eastern Front is a nightmare for any German. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to broadcast about the invincibility of German weapons. Only now, does anyone else believe in this, except for himself and the Fuehrer?
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 in the vast area from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined the military power of Germany. To prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the bloc of aggressors, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they pinned their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.
It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go over to the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Supreme Command Headquarters revised the method of planned actions. The reason for this was the data from Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go over to a counteroffensive and defeat his strike forces. There was a rare case in the history of war when the strongest side, possessing a strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not by attack, but by defense. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.
(...) Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the Hitlerite army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy's transition to the offensive.
Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected blow of the enemy by large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defending, then how? (...)
Analyzing the numerous intelligence data on the nature of the enemy's upcoming actions and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and Headquarters were increasingly inclined towards the idea of going over to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov in late March - early April. The most specific conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place on the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk salient, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations about a plan of action in the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: “I consider it inexpedient for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. it will be, if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, by introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main grouping of the enemy. "
I had to be with I.V. Stalin when he received the report of G.K. Zhukov. I well remember how the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the General Staff an order to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan of the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked to submit his views by April 12 on the actions of the fronts (...)
At a meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by J.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)
After making a preliminary decision on deliberate defense and the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, a comprehensive and thorough preparation for the upcoming actions was unfolded. At the same time, reconnaissance of the enemy's actions continued. The Soviet command knew exactly the timing of the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy's plan was quite outlined to inflict a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groupings equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision on deliberate defense was made.
Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the supreme bodies of strategic leadership, and not other command instances, played a decisive role in the development of this plan (...)
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk salient, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and during the transition to a counteroffensive, build up the force of the blow from the depths.
The German side brought in 50 divisions, including 16 armored and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient, which amounted to about 70% tank divisions Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plans was assigned to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Focke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.
Fuehrer's Address to the German Soldiers on the Eve of Operation Citadel, no later than July 4, 1943
Today you are embarking on a great offensive battle that can have a decisive impact on the overall outcome of the war.
With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, the new brutal defeat of the Russians will shake even more the belief in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their belief in victory will disappear in spite of everything.
The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.
My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.
Their seemingly inexhaustible masses of people have so thinned out in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is as much superior to the Russian as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our aircrafts and, of course, our aviation.
The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.
And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.
As a soldier, I clearly understand what I require of you. Ultimately, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that particular battle may be.
German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they gaze with fervent hope at you, my sol-dates.
ADOLF GITLER
Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.
PROCESS OF BATTLE. Eve
From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses along the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of data from army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the Wehrmacht command itself was planning to carry out an attack under the foundations of the Kursk salient in order to encircle our troops located there.
The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command, there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, adhered to the point of view that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces ... The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, should have become exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of the expenditure of manpower and resources.
However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive designs. The date of the operation, code-named "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops were given big number new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the start of Operation Citadel, the German forces of Army Groups Center and South had up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers at their disposal. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the combat qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and installing an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. By the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the region of the Kursk salient. On the southern wing of the salient, the strike forces of Army Group South, commanded by Manstein, were concentrated, which included General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Group. Troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here were the forces of General Model's 9th Army. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemf had about twice as many tanks as Model.
The Supreme Command headquarters decided not to go over first in the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The plan of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, bringing in fresh reserves, launch a counteroffensive. I must say that this was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the high Soviet command remembered well that never since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize its defense in such a way that the German offensive prepared in advance was exhausted at the stage of breaking through the Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 on the Stalingrad direction).
However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to rush to launch the offensive. A deep echeloned defense was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as an anti-tank one. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, respectively, another was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went over to the counteroffensive.
The country's military factories worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".
The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of deep echeloning of the combat formations of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive lines were erected. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and on the left bank of the river. Don prepared state defense line. The total depth of the terrain engineering equipment reached 250-300 km.
In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in men and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts numbered about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.
PROCESS OF BATTLE. DEFENSE
The closer the start date of Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counterpreparations on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of the artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of the enemy's strike groups, the German troops suffered losses and began their offensive 2.5-3 hours later than the planned time. Only after a while the German troops were able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.
The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops with a ram attack and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the troops of the 13th Army took the main blow of the enemy. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterstrike against the advancing grouping with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Panzer Armies and the 19th Panzer Corps. The German offensive was delayed here, and on July 10, it was finally thwarted. For six days of fighting, the enemy wedged into the defense of the Central Front by only 10-12 km.
The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of the new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and tank guns buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them in some areas to break through the Soviet defenses and wedge into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation was able to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft - the famous Il-2 - appeared over the battlefield.
During the first day of fighting alone, Model's group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk salient lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also great: only two companies of German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period from 5 to 6 July. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle began between the shock units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with the formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike group was forced to stop. Having moved forward only 10-15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of its tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, shock units of the German motorized formations "Great Germany", "Reich", "Death's Head", the Leibstandard "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the "Kempf" group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and more km. The offensive was initially in the direction settlement Oboyan, but then, due to strong opposition from the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike eastward - in the direction of Prokhorovka. It was at this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO THOUSAND TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.
The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was decided not in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Battle of Kursk, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.
On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked to deliver a counterattack on the wedged enemy tank units and force them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to enter into close combat with German tanks in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.
Concentrating in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved into the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of about 3: 2, but the fighting qualities of German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-fours" on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that had broken through forward met the German ones practically armor to armor. But this was exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army was trying to achieve. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents were mixed so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal armor, under the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside by the end of July 13, it was time to count the casualties. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army practically lost its combat striking power. But the German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorov direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles in service.
The Soviet command hastily deployed new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy gradually began to fizzle out. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Stavka decided to introduce the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk salient - the 27th and 53rd armies with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks in a hurry they were concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?
Back on July 13, Hitler invited him to his headquarters for a meeting of field marshals von Manstein and von Kluge. On that day, he ordered to continue Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success at Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans collapsed. On July 12, the troops of Bryansk went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and left wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (operation "Kutuzov"). The German defense broke down here and creaked at the seams. Moreover, some of the territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were canceled out after the battle at Prokhorovka.
At a meeting at the Fuehrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuehrer did not object to the continuation of attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although this was no longer possible on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of Manstein's grouping did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command ground forces Germany ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.
PROCESS OF BATTLE. The offensive
In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12 - 15, Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts threw the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). The fighting in all sectors continued to be extremely difficult and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were delivered not against the weak, but against the strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten as much as possible the preparation time for offensive actions, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, at the very moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The forward breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sectors of the front using a large number tanks, artillery and aviation.
The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Oryol and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army, who won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army threw the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 elite divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 armored ones; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops were even greater: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater amount of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.
The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. In the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This old Russian city, which has been considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on 25 September. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper near Kiev. Having seized several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the Soviet capital. On November 6, a red flag flew over Kiev.
It would be wrong to assert that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more complicated. So, after the liberation of Kiev, the enemy managed to inflict a powerful counterattack in the area of Fastov and Zhitomir against the forward formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, halting the advance of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation was even more tense in Eastern Belarus. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, Soviet troops left by November 1943 in the regions east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had occupied a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. It took time to concentrate additional forces on the Minsk direction, to give rest to the formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.
And in 1943 the victories at Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The disintegration of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldier and commander's awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order "Victory", as well as as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.