The population of Sri Lanka is ethnically heterogeneous: about 70% are Sinhalese who arrived on the island in the 5th century BC, 20% are Tamils, whose active penetration into the northern and eastern regions of the country is associated with the 5th century AD, up to 7 % are Muslims - descendants of Tamils \u200b\u200band Sinhalese professing Islam. The Tamil settlement area covers the districts (areas) of Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullativu, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. The most densely populated is the Jaffna Peninsula, on which the city of the same name is located - the historical capital of Tamils. The peninsula is separated from the main part of the island by the Jaffna lagoon, and in turn consists of three sectors, practically separated by small winding bays: Walikamam (in which the city of Jaffna is located), Tenmaracchi ( main city - Kodikamam) and Vadamaracchi (a narrow strip of land in the northeast of the peninsula from Point Pedro to Caddaikadu). A vast area with an underdeveloped road network, often covered with jungle, south of the Jaffna Peninsula to the Vavuniya region is called Vani. The settlements mentioned later in the description of the hostilities are highlighted in bold on the attached maps of the Northern Front and the Vavuniya-Mankulam region.
Relations between the main ethnic groups have always been characterized by tension, often resulting in ethnic clashes. In the early 1980s, the Tamil militant organization "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam", headed by V. Pirapaharan, began to operate in the northern regions of the country. The date of the beginning of the "hot" phase of the conflict is considered to be July 23, 1983, when 13 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed near Palali (not far from Jaffna) as a result of a Tamil attack. In response, Tamil pogroms broke out in the capital of the country Colombo and a number of other regions, the victims of which were up to 3 thousand people. Under these conditions, not only radical-minded but also many "moderate" Tamils \u200b\u200bsupported the armed struggle. Within a few months, the uprising swept vast areas of the north and east of Sri Lanka.
By the start of the conflict, Sri Lanka's armed forces were in decline. The absence of external enemies and a weak economy did not contribute to the creation of a well-equipped and trained army. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government immediately began to acquire military equipment, mostly outdated and used, but quite suitable for fighting the rebels. Without going into a detailed chronological list, we will describe the main range of weapons purchased by Sri Lanka to date. In China, tanks T-59, BMP T-86 (a copy of the Soviet BMP-1) and wheeled BMP T-92, tracked armored personnel carriers T-63 and T-85, 122-mm and 130-mm artillery pieces, 152-mm were purchased howitzers. The Czech Republic supplied T-55 tanks and 122mm MLRS. In Russia, they purchased BMP-1, BMP-3 and BTR-80. Armored vehicles "Saladin" and armored personnel carriers "Saracen" arrived from Great Britain, and armored personnel carriers "Buffel" from South Africa. A shortage of qualified personnel forced the first to hire military specialists from the UK, Pakistan and Israel.
It was not only the technical equipment of the army that was improving - it also grew in number: in the several years since the beginning of the uprising, the armed forces increased from 15 to more than 100 thousand servicemen. Numerous police units have also joined in the fight against the Tamils. At the same time, the number of "tiger" formations (including various auxiliary units, including women and youth) usually did not exceed 10-15 thousand people, which is primarily due to difficulties in providing a large number of soldiers with weapons and ammunition. Like the government, Tamils \u200b\u200bhad a long way to go to form truly combat-ready units. We also note that the rebels do not enjoy the support of any country in the world, and the financial base of the uprising is primarily provided by numerous Tamil communities in developed countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Canada (for example, Tamils \u200b\u200bmake up about 30% of the population of Singapore).
At the first stage of the conflict, in addition to conducting actual hostilities, both sides widely practiced terror against the civilian population, which claimed the lives of thousands of Tamils \u200b\u200band Sinhalese. There were also cases of "cleansing" of some areas from the Tamil population by government troops, followed by their colonization by "trustworthy" citizens. Thus, as a result of such an action, the Tamil region of Manal Aru (to the north-east of Vavuniya) was inhabited by the Sinhalese and received the name Veli Oya. As a result, the Sri Lankan authorities "drove a wedge" between the northern and eastern Tamil regions.
In 1985, the Tigers took control of almost the entire Jaffna Peninsula, including their capital. Government forces were trapped in the garrisons of Palali and Point Pedro.
In May 1987, the greatly strengthened Sri Lankan army launched its first major offensive, code-named "Liberation". In heavy fighting, the Tigers were driven out of much of the Vadamaracchi sector, thus establishing a ground link between Palali and Point Pedro. In these battles, artillery and improvised Avro and Y-12 bombers were widely used, striking not so much at the enemy as at populated areas controlled by the Tamils.
Worried about numerous civilian casualties and an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, neighboring India in July 1987 forced the Sri Lankan government to agree to a cessation of hostilities and the granting of limited autonomy to the Tamil regions. In exchange, the Indians pledged to disarm the Tamils, i.e. actually carry out a military operation to defeat them, since the Tigers categorically refused to lay down their arms.
The Indian attack on Jaffna began on October 11, 1987. On the night of October 12, 4 Mi-8s landed in the area of \u200b\u200bJaffna University to seize the leadership of the Tigers, but this special operation failed. Several helicopters were damaged by small arms fire, only 120 paratroopers were able to land (they were tasked with protecting the stadium where the helicopters were landing) and 30 Sikh commandos, who were supposed to capture the Tamil leaders. In the ensuing battle, 29 commandos and 6 paratroopers were killed. The rest of the landing was rescued the next day by three T-72s that made their way to the rescue.
The fierce battle for Jaffna, which claimed the lives of over 400 Indian soldiers, lasted 17 days. Strong air and artillery strikes were inflicted on the city, resulting in heavy casualties among the civilian population. Towards the end of the defense, the Tigers, whose losses were comparable to those of the Indian, managed to evacuate the main forces in the Vanni.
The capture of Jaffna, contrary to the hopes of the Indian command, did not lead to the defeat of the Tamil detachments, which went over to the guerrilla war. The Indian "peacekeeping" contingent was gradually increased to 100 thousand people, but this did not give the expected effect. The constant attacks of the guerrillas angered the "peacekeepers", who began to act in the same way as the Sri Lankan army had previously. Indian involvement in the massacre, the high cost of the operation, and growing casualties have caused discontent within India itself. As a result, by March 1990 the Indian army had left Sri Lanka, having lost by this time only about 1,150 soldiers killed. After the withdrawal of troops, in 1992, the Tamils \u200b\u200bexecuted the Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, who organized the invasion: during a pre-election rally, a kamikaze woman approached him and blew herself up along with those around her. Two and a half years of struggle with a strong enemy tempered the formations of the Tigers, whose forces were not only not undermined, but even strengthened.
The fragile peace that remained after the withdrawal of the "peacekeepers" collapsed on June 11, 1990. On that day, Tamils \u200b\u200battacked numerous police stations in the Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee districts and captured more than 1,000 Sinhalese and Muslim police officers, at least 630 of whom were executed.
By the 20th of June, fighting began in Jaffna. A small garrison of government troops was besieged in the old Fort. The Tamils, who did not have heavy weapons, made several unsuccessful attempts to capture the enemy's citadel, including a very exotic one: one night the Tigers tried to enter the Fort using a crane. However, the crane arrow could not stand it and collapsed with 40 soldiers on it.
On July 12, government forces launched Operation Thrivida Balaya to seize the islands of Vellanai and Mandativu opposite Jaffna, and, after stubborn fighting, captured them by mid-August. On September 13, an attempt was made to land an assault force from these islands to release Jaffna, but it failed with significant losses. As the supply of the besieged by sea faced increasing fire resistance from the shore on September 26, the Fort garrison was evacuated.
In June 1990, the Tamils \u200b\u200balso blocked the garrisons in Vanni along the Vavuniya-Elephant Pass road (Mankulam, Kokavil, Kilinochchi). During the fighting on July 10-12, the Tigers captured Kokavil, his small garrison of 70 soldiers was killed. The garrison commander, who refused to leave the wounded and evacuate, was posthumously awarded the highest order of the Sri Lankan army. Soon after, the government forces left Kilinochchi.
On November 22, the assault on Mankulam began. First, a truck with explosives driven by a kamikaze entered the base and exploded, then an attack from different directions followed. On November 24, the camp was evacuated, more than 100 soldiers were killed.
Despite the capture of a number of important points, the Tamils \u200b\u200bexperienced certain difficulties in supplying their formations in Jaffna, since government garrisons in Elephant Pass and Punerin blocked unhindered access to the peninsula. On July 10, 1991, the Tigers attacked the Elephant Pass. The government navy and army urgently organized a landing operation to rescue him, codenamed "Balavegaya". The landing in the Vettilaikerni area (east of Elephant Pass) began on July 15, but it was only 18 days later that a corridor to the besieged was broken through. During the siege of Elephant Pass, according to official data, the Sri Lankan army lost 202 soldiers killed, the Tamils \u200b\u200b- about 600 people.
The prolonged siege of Jaffna and the failure of the assault on Elephant Pass showed the Tamils \u200b\u200bthat without a serious reform of their troops and the acquisition of heavy weapons, one cannot count on a successful fight against the government army. And although the issue of the delivery of artillery to the Tigers for objective reasons has not yet been resolved, the Tamil infantry units soon turned into well-trained and combat-ready forces, including a large number of detachments of special forces.
Beginning August 28, 1991, for four weeks, government forces conducted operations "Ashakasena" and "Akunarahara" northeast of the Manal Aru region (colonized by Sinhalese settlers). The purpose of the operations was to finally cut off communications between the eastern and northern provinces. However, it was very difficult to achieve decisive success in the jungle, and after the completion of the operations the Tamils \u200b\u200bagain occupied the area.
On August 8, 1992, during a reconnaissance on Vellanai Island, the commander of government forces in the north of the country, General D. Kobbekaduva, and 9 officers accompanying him were killed by a mine explosion.
After the withdrawal of Indian troops, mutual terror against the civilian population weakened significantly. Now the Tamils \u200b\u200btried to attack mainly military targets, including the top leaders of the army and state. So, on November 10, 1992, the commander of the Navy, Admiral K. Fernando, was killed by a kamikaze, and on May 1, 1993, President of Sri Lanka R. Premadasa was killed during an election rally. On November 24, 1994, as a result of an assassination attempt, the main candidate for the post of President G. Dissanayake was killed.
In June-July 1992, the Sri Lankan army conducted Operation Balavegaya II, which expanded its zone of control north of Elephant Pass. The next operation in this direction was "Yal Devi", launched on September 28, 1993. The main goal was to capture Kilali - the main base of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon. On the second day, a convoy of government troops fell into a well-prepared ambush. With strong fire, the Tamils \u200b\u200bcut off the infantry from armored vehicles and destroyed 2 T-55 tanks of Czechoslovak production, about 70 soldiers were killed. By October 6, when the operation was terminated, the total loss was 110 troops.
The fact that the Tamils \u200b\u200bdid not sit idly by, but intensively train fighters and develop new tactics, became clear after a month. As a result of a surprise attack on Punerin, the Tigers managed to break through the outer perimeter of the defense and infiltrate the territory of the base. Thanks to reinforcements urgently deployed by sea, the garrison, after three days of fierce fighting, managed to repulse the assault. However, the losses were heavy - according to official data alone, 613 servicemen died. The Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured a large number of weapons, including two T-55 tanks.
At the end of 1994, the government of the new President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, signed a truce with the Tigers. However, the positions of the parties on the main issue - granting independence to the Tamils \u200b\u200b- remained diametrically opposed, and already in April of the following year, hostilities resumed.
In June 1995 the Tamils \u200b\u200battacked the garrison of Mandaitivu Island. The attack was repelled again, but at least 120 soldiers were killed. In response, the Sri Lankan army on July 9, 1995 launched an offensive from the Palali area called "Leap Forward". Not meeting serious resistance, government forces advanced 10 kilometers and expanded the security zone around the Palali airfield and the port of Kankesanturai - facilities critical to the supply of the entire group on the peninsula.
By this point, the Sri Lankan armed forces had finally received a large number of new weapons. The acquired tanks and artillery significantly increased the offensive capabilities. ground forces, and "Kfira" and Mi-24 - the striking power of aviation.
On October 17, 1995, the Sri Lankan army launched an offensive to capture Jaffna - Operation Riviresa. Artillery and aviation inflicted strong blows on the positions of the Tamils, who had neither the means of counter-battery warfare, nor any serious air defense. Despite the fierce resistance of the Tigers, the troops advanced slowly. On November 22, the last road connecting the defenders of Jaffna with the Tenmaracchi sector was cut. Heavy battles for the city continued for another 2 weeks, especially the attackers suffered heavy losses from mortar fire. However, on December 2, the Sri Lankan flag was hoisted over the Jaffna magistrate. The remnants of the defenders, like during the storming of the city by Indian troops, managed to evacuate to Vanni. According to official figures, 450 servicemen were killed in the month and a half of the operation, although there is reason to believe that in fact the losses were significantly higher. The loss of Tamils, according to the Sri Lankan military, exceeded 2,000 people - naturally, the Tigers, in turn, claim that this figure is significantly overestimated.
During this period, the Tigers carried out two well-known operations in the capital of the country. On October 20, 1995, the main oil storage facility in Colombo was destroyed, and about 20 security guards were killed. On January 31 of the following year, as a result of a car bomb explosion, the building of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was seriously damaged.
The concentration of the main forces of the army in the north of the country allowed the Tamils \u200b\u200bto significantly increase their activity in the east - around Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. In this area, clashes were in the nature of a classic guerrilla war: ambushes on the roads, shelling of police stations, garrisons and forward posts. The largest rebel operations were the defeat of a convoy in the Batticaloa area in March 1996 (54 killed) and an attack in the same area on the Vavunaitivu camp in March of the following year (75 killed). In the latter case, the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Small collisions numbered in the hundreds.
Meanwhile, the government army continued fighting to defeat the Tamils \u200b\u200bon the Jaffna Peninsula. At the end of March 1996, an operation was carried out to destroy small Tamil units that had infiltrated the previously occupied areas. On April 19, 1996, Operation Riviresa II began to capture the Tenmaracchi sector. By April 21, government forces captured Chavacacherri, and on April 26, occupied Kilali. The tigers offered little resistance and evacuated to the Vanni. Finally, in May, during Operation Riviresa III, the Vadamaracchi sector was occupied without resistance.
The undoubted successes in the fight against the Tigers gave the government reason to assert that the day of the final defeat of the rebels was approaching. However, it soon became clear that not everything is as good as the Sinhalese politicians would like. On the night of July 18, 1996, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a surprise assault on the Mullativu base - Operation "Unceasing Waves" ("Unstoppable Wave"). Despite its name, the operation did not at all mean a banal attack by large masses of infantry. On the contrary, in this case (as in subsequent offensives), the main stake was made on the actions of special forces that penetrated the enemy's front lines and attacked key defenses. The garrison of Mullativu, according to various sources, numbered from 1200 to 1600 troops, but was located isolated from the main forces of the Sri Lankan army, which played a deplorable role in its fate. After an eight-hour battle, the Tigers broke through the defensive perimeter and captured the base's arsenal. The arsenal's weapons and ammunition were immediately used against their former owners. By the end of the first day of the assault, the position of the defenders became critical.
The Sri Lankan army immediately made an attempt to help the garrison. Not far from Mullativu, a commando landing was landed from helicopters, but he immediately came under fire from the rebels and was forced to fight hard to hold the captured bridgehead. Over the next few days, the landed paratroopers continued to receive reinforcements by air and from the sea, however, due to strong opposition, they could not begin to perform their main task. Meanwhile, on July 20, the Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed the last centers of resistance of the Mullativu garrison. Having lost hope to save the remnants of the garrison, the Sri Lankan army evacuated the landing on July 25.
Operation "Unceasing Waves" resulted in a severe defeat for the government forces: the Mullativu garrison was completely destroyed, and about 100 soldiers were also killed trying to come to his aid. The Tigers captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition, including two 122mm guns.
The fall of the Mullativu led the command of the Sri Lankan armed forces to the idea of \u200b\u200bthe need to abandon the holding of isolated bases, which are very difficult to provide assistance in the event of an assault. Therefore, the Punerin garrison was soon evacuated, which greatly complicated the control of the movement of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon.
Despite the defeat suffered, the Sri Lankan army did not postpone the already prepared offensive in the north and on July 26 launched Operation Sath Jaya, the purpose of which was to capture Kilinochchi. The offensive was carried out from the Elephant Pass area. In the first stage, the Tamils, whose main forces were concentrated in the Mullaitivu area, offered practically no resistance. On the very first day, government troops occupied Parantan. However, the further southward movement resumed on 4 August met with serious difficulties. In two days of battles, government forces failed to break through the Tamil defenses, about 150 soldiers were killed, 3 tanks were destroyed and several more damaged. On September 22, the third phase of the operation began. This time, instead of a frontal attack, the Sri Lankan army made a roundabout maneuver and reached Kilinochchi from the east. Having thus extended the Tamil defense, the attackers again changed the direction of the main attack - on the night of September 24, an advance began to the west of Kilinochchi. On September 26, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful counterattack. During the many hours of battle, about 200 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed, and the Tigers suffered heavy losses. Already weakened by the previous battles, the defenders were unable to offer serious resistance in the future, and on September 30, government forces finally captured Kilinochchi. As in the attack on Jaffna, the overwhelming superiority of the Sri Lankan army in aviation and artillery played an important role. At the same time, it should be noted that in this conflict, the words "powerful air and artillery strikes" denote events that, in their intensity, are incomparable with the actual actions. strong armies: for example, during the described operation to capture Kilinochchi, 7-8 airstrikes were inflicted on the positions of the Tigers per day. According to official data, for September 22-30, the losses of the army amounted to 269 people killed, although in the Sri Lankan parliament a double figure was announced.
In January 1997, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful attack on Parantan. If this important point was captured, the Tigers would be able to cut off the troops in the Kilinochchi area from the Elephant Pass garrison. As a result of a surprise attack, the front line of defense was broken. The Tamil special forces managed to penetrate the artillery positions, where 11 guns were destroyed: some by female kamikaze from among the attackers, some by their own servants in order to prevent their capture by the enemy. However, with the help of the arriving reinforcements, Parantan's garrison still managed to repel the attack. At the same time, according to official data, more than 250 servicemen were killed.
The following month, government forces carried out Operation Edibala, which took control of the Vavuniya-Mannar road. The tigers showed little or no resistance.
On May 13, 1997, the Sri Lankan army launched a "decisive" offensive under the loud code name "Jaya Sikuruy" ("Guaranteed Victory"). The main objective of the operation was to regain control of the only land road leading to the Jaffna Peninsula, the section of which between Vavunia and Kilinochchi was under the control of the rebels. The goal of the first stage of the offensive was Puliyankulam, the attack on which was carried out in two converging directions: from the Vavuniya region to the north and from the Veli Oya region through Nedunkeni to the west. Government forces actively used artillery and armored vehicles. The Tigers, in turn, relied on mortar fire and sudden counterattacks. During the battles on May 13-18, the attackers captured the Omantai and Nedunkeni regions, losing about 120 troops. Having secured their positions, on May 24, the troops continued their advance and by June 3 occupied Panikkaniravi, a village just 3 kilometers from Puliyankulam. Already in these first battles, the army lost up to a dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers, knocked out and destroyed, as a result of the active use of RPGs by the Tigers.
On June 9, the Tamils \u200b\u200bentered the areas recently captured by the Sri Lankan army and attacked the village of Tandikulam, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich artillery depots were concentrated. During the fierce fighting that lasted all day, up to three hundred government soldiers were killed, the Tigers managed to knock out several armored vehicles and, more importantly, destroy large stocks of ammunition and ammunition.
On June 22, pulling up reinforcements and replenishing supplies, the army resumed its advance towards Puliyankulam. However, on the night of June 24-25, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful new counter-attack. This time, artillery positions in the Omantai region were attacked. The rebels managed to capture one gun and 4 artillery tractors, 3 more guns were destroyed. As a result of fierce fighting, at least 180 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
The Sri Lankan command was forced to take a one and a half month break in the operation, during which 130 servicemen were killed as a result of the next counter-attack by the Tigers in the Rambaykulam area. Finally, on August 19, as a result of a new offensive, the army managed to capture Puliyankulam. During the fierce fighting in the Tamil village itself, 6 tanks were knocked out, of which two could not be restored, and one BMP was captured.
Operation Jaya Sikuruy, originally planned for 3 months, was clearly stuck. Until the end of the year, the Sri Lankan army made no new attempts at a large-scale offensive. At the same time, the Tigers launched two more major counterattacks. During the first one, carried out in early October in the Kanakarayankulam area, Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured two Buffel armored personnel carriers and a large number of light weapons and ammunition, killing at least 200 soldiers. And in December, in the same area, a special forces brigade base was destroyed and more than 150 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
On February 1, 1998, the Tamils \u200b\u200battacked Kilinochchi, but this time the operation was unsuccessful. The tigers suffered heavy losses (up to 300 killed), while about 50 soldiers died from the Kilinochchi garrison. During this operation, Tamil saboteurs who penetrated the Jaffna peninsula attacked an artillery base in the Iyakacchi area, from which the heavy artillery of the Sri Lankan army was firing, supporting the garrisons of Kilinochchi and Parantana, and inflicted significant damage on it.
In the period from February to May of the same year, government troops undertook a number of operations, the main purpose of which was to capture Mankulam, the next major settlement on the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi road. The Sri Lankan army managed to get close to Mankulam, but an attempt to capture the city itself in early June failed.
On September 26, 1998, the Tigers launched a massive attack on Kilinochchi (Operation Unceasing Waves II). After fierce three days of fighting, Kilinochchi passed into the hands of the attackers. The losses of the Sri Lankan army alone exceeded 1000 people. 4 artillery pieces, 2 T-55 tanks and 8 Buffel armored personnel carriers, a large number of light weapons and ammunition were lost. Some of the lost weapons were captured by the Tamils \u200b\u200bas trophies (including 2 or 3 130-mm guns).
The capture of Mankulam was weak compensation for the defeat: taking advantage of the diversion of the main forces of the Tigers to the northern sector of the front, the Sri Lankan army finally took possession of this settlement, losing only 90 people killed.
With the fall of Kilinochchi, it became clear that Guaranteed Victory was unlikely to have any chance of success in the near future. The completion of Jaya Sikuruy was soon announced, and a number of private offensive operations were launched instead. Thus, as a result of Operation Rivibala, which began in December 1998, the Sri Lankan army captured Oddusuddan, located on the road from Mankulam to Mullativa (which housed the "headquarters" of the Tigers after its capture in 1996). And in March-September 1999, during Operation Ranagosa, a number of areas north of the Vavuniya-Mannar road were cleared of Tamil formations. At the same time, in June 1999, near Mannar, the Sri Lankan Air Force managed to destroy one of the 122-mm guns captured by the Tamils \u200b\u200bin Mullativu.
Despite the lack of rapid and impressive successes, the operations of the Sri Lankan army put the rebels in a difficult position. Already with the loss of the Jaffna Peninsula in 1995-1996, the Tamils \u200b\u200bbegan to feel difficulties in replenishing their troops: the small population of the Vanni and a number of areas of the east coast, which remained under the control of the Tigers, could not provide replenishment of considerable losses. And if there were no special problems with the recruitment of personnel for auxiliary units (often women or "children"), then the special forces and "conventional" infantry could not be content with the same fighters. The loss of many areas of the Vanni further exacerbated the situation.
In these conditions, the events of November 1999 were completely unexpected. By this time, the government forces were stretched out over a long distance in a rather difficult terrain. Numerous attacks by the Tigers on the rear units during Operation Jaya Sikuruy forced a large force to be diverted to protect previously occupied areas. Therefore, with a sufficiently large total number of troops on the front line, there was a very limited contingent.
On the night of November 2, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a large offensive in Vani, codenamed "Unceasing Waves III". The offensive was carried out from two directions: from the north across the Mankulam-Oddusudan road (here the strike hit the junction of army and marine units) and from the east between Oddusuddan and Nedunkeni. The attackers were helped by special forces units that had infiltrated into the rear. Within a few hours, the "tigers" managed to break through the defenses and capture Oddusuddan, and by the evening of the same day took Nedunkeni. Government forces, leaving behind large quantities of war material, retreated south to the Veli Oya area and west to the Vavuniya-Jaffna highway. Pursuing the retreating, the Tamils \u200b\u200bby the evening of November 5 started fighting on the approaches to Mankulam and Kanakarayankulam. Caught under the threat of encirclement, the Sri Lankan troops did not offer serious resistance and hastily retreated south. There were even cases of armed clashes between demoralized units and the military police, who tried to arrest the fleeing. Only by transferring significant reinforcements, the government army was able to stop the advance of the "tigers" in the Puliyankulam area. According to official figures, the losses of the Sri Lankan army amounted to only about 200 people killed and missing, but the scale of the defeat suggests much greater casualties. The Tamils \u200b\u200bseized a significant amount of light weapons, ammunition and ammunition, which took more than 60 road trips to remove.
Taking advantage of the favorable situation (the attention of the Sri Lankan command was focused primarily on strengthening new positions north of Vavuniya), the Tamils \u200b\u200bon December 11 began active operations on the northern front, seeking to break into the Jaffna Peninsula. The strike was struck along the coast to the Vettilaikerni-Kaddaikadu region (east of Elephant Pass). Already on December 12, these settlements came under the control of the Tamils, which threatened the eastern face of the Elephant Pass base. On December 17, as a result of a powerful attack, the "tigers" captured Parantan, which defended the southern face of the base. However, they failed to advance further, although heavy fighting continued in the area until the end of winter.
On the night of March 26-27, 2000, the "tigers" presented the Sri Lankan army with another surprise: instead of a frontal attack at Elephant Pass (whose garrison exceeded 10 thousand people), a naval assault force of more than 1,500 fighters was landed north of the base, in the Chempiyanpattu area. At the same time, special forces units infiltrated into the rear of the Sri Lankans attacked artillery positions in the Pallai area (according to the Tamils, 11 guns were destroyed). After three days of heavy fighting, the Chempiyanpattu area came under the full control of the "tigers". Even more important was the fact that on March 28, the landing units, in cooperation with special forces units, blocked the main road from Elephant Pass to Jaffna between the settlements of Pallai and Eluthumadduval. The supply of Elephant Pass was made possible only by a single low-capacity dirt road that ran south of the main road along the coast of Jaffna Lagoon. Government forces made numerous attempts to regain control of the main road. In the fierce fighting, the sides suffered heavy losses, including the Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed, captured and knocked out more than 10 armored vehicles. By April 10, the Sri Lankan army managed to clear the road directly from the enemy, but the Tamils \u200b\u200bheld their positions only 500 meters to the north, so it was not possible to restore transport links along the route.
Meanwhile, having transferred reinforcements to the landing, the "Tigers" on April 18 dealt another blow from the Chempiyanpattu area and strategically blocked important road in another place - between Pallai and Iyakacci. In the following days, fierce battles unfolded for the settlement of Iyakacchi, which fell on April 22. The Elefan Pass garrison, threatened with complete encirclement and destruction, hastily left the base, abandoning most of its weapons. The retreat took place under Tamil fire both along the coastal road and in the shallow waters of the Jaffna lagoon. The losses of the retreating were large - according to various sources, from several hundred to more than a thousand, while the commander of the garrison also died. According to the "Tigers" they received 3 152-mm and 2 122-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars and a large number of other weapons and ammunition.
On April 30, after a fierce battle, the Sri Lankan troops left Pallai, which was in a semi-encirclement, and withdrew to the Kilali-Elutkhumadduval-Nagar-Kovil region, where they equipped a new defense line.
Having suffered a heavy defeat and being under the threat of a further offensive by the Tamils \u200b\u200bin order to capture Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army hastily strengthened its forces on the Northern Front. By May 2000, two of the three divisions previously involved in operations in the Vavuniya region had been transferred to the Jaffna Peninsula - thus, five of the nine divisions of the government army - more than 40 thousand servicemen - were concentrated on the peninsula.
Considering that the rebels could hardly allocate more than 5 thousand fighters for the operation against Jaffna, the prospect of such an offensive seemed simply utopian. However, the "tigers" nevertheless started it, and the direction of the strike changed once again: this time the attack was directed from the Punerin area to Navatkuli through the Jaffna lagoon (the depths here are such that they allow to wade the lagoon in the dry season). The offensive began on May 10, and within 24 hours the Tamils \u200b\u200bmanaged to capture not only the positions of the Sri Lankan troops on the coastal beaches, but also the strategically important Navatkuli bridge, connecting the Valikamam and Tenmaracchi sectors. Subsequently, the offensive developed in two directions: to the west to the city of Jaffna and to the east to Chavakacherri. In fierce battles, both sides suffered heavy losses. The government forces actively used aviation, the rebels, as usual, relied on the destruction of the enemy by artillery and mortar fire. On May 17, the Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured the fortified point of Kaitadi (halfway between Navatkuli and Jaffna), and by May 20 they captured the second largest city of the Chavakacherri peninsula and the important village of Sarasalai. The situation for the Sri Lankan army was becoming more and more threatening, however, the forces of the advancing were at the end. In fact, with the occupation of Chavacacherri, the offensive of the "tigers" was exhausted. Despite the fighting continuing until the end of May, the positions of the parties in the area did not change. The attempt of the Tamils, following the capture of Elephant Pass, to completely master the Jaffna Peninsula, failed.
Having brought the troops, battered in previous battles, in order over the summer, the Sri Lankan army from the beginning of September moved to active operations against the Tamils. On September 3, an offensive began on the Navatkuli area under the code name "Rivikirana", the main blow was delivered from the direction of Jaffna. However, the very next day, having lost at least 170 soldiers killed, the Sri Lankan army stopped the operation. On September 17, the offensive, the target of which was Chavakacherri, resumed (Operation Kinihira I). During the day of fierce fighting, the Sri Lankans captured the city, repelling a number of counter-attacks by the "tigers".
Until the end of the year, government forces carried out a series of successive offensive operations, united under the common name "Kinihira". The Tamils, weakened by previous battles, could not hold their positions and gradually retreated: in October, the Sri Lankan army occupied Sarasalai, on December 21, Kaitadi, on December 30, Navatkuli. By the new 2001, the "tigers" evacuated their last units from the area.
Removing the direct threat to Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army attacked Tamil positions in the Eluthumadduval-Nagar-Kovil area on April 25, 2001 (Operation Agnie Khiela). The Tigers put up fierce resistance in well-equipped positions over the year, making extensive use of mortars and artillery. Heavy three-day fighting did not lead to any changes in the front line, the losses of the Sri Lankan army exceeded 300 killed. After that, until the end of the year, no serious hostilities took place, both sides were actively involved in training troops, accumulating weapons and ammunition. In January 2002, an armistice was signed, which continues to this day. However, the prospects for concluding a peace treaty remain extremely vague - since none of the parties, agreeing to various concessions, does not agree to concede on the main issue - the creation of an independent Tamil state.
Let us now turn to the losses of the sides during the entire period of the armed confrontation. According to official Sri Lankan data, the army and the police lost their lives: from 1983 to 1994 - 5,250 people, from April 1995 to January 1997 - 4,760 people, from February 1997 to the moment of the armistice - more than 8,000 troops, a total of about 18 thousand people. The losses of the rebels are estimated by the Sri Lankan army at 30 thousand, the "tigers" argue that this figure is actually half as much - in any case, the ratio of losses (given the quantitative and technical superiority of the government forces) looks very "flattering" for the rebels.
In conclusion, let's say a few words about the structure of the Sri Lankan army. It consists of 8 infantry divisions and one special forces division. By the time of the ceasefire, they were deployed as follows: 21st Division - Mannar, 22nd - Trincomalee, 23rd - Batticaloa, 51st, 52nd, 54th and 55th - Jaffna, 56th - Vanni. Each infantry division usually consists of 4 brigades, the numbers of which are formed by adding numbers from 1 to 4 to the division number (for example, 561st, 562nd, 563rd and 564th brigades of the 56th division). The 53rd Elite Special Forces Division, which took part in almost all major operations, consists of a commando brigade, a special forces brigade and an airmobile brigade. There are also several separate tank, artillery and engineer regiments, attached as necessary to divisions as part of the reinforcement.
The police units involved in operations against the insurgents are divided into brigades, each of which has its own area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. Two special police brigades are stationed in the Batticaloa and Ampara area.
The fleet also contributes to the struggle on the land front: about three thousand sailors are working with the army in Vanni.
Each Security Force Headquarters (SFHQ) and most divisions are run by generals with the rank of Major General. SFHQ includes several divisions, which in turn are divided into brigades. Each brigade is headed by a foreman. It consists of several infantry battalions, combat support troops (artillery troops, engineer troops and signal troops]]) and logistic support troops (ammunition corps, electrical engineers and mechanics, support corps, etc.), the exact composition of the brigade depends on her tasks. There are also several separate brigades (airmobile brigade, tank brigade, etc.)
In other parts of the country, there are regional and sub-regional headquarters. Tank, engineering, artillery and signal troops are represented at the headquarters in brigades. For example: artillery brigade, communications brigade and so on.
Below is a list of all combat units of the Sri Lanka army.
Security Forces Headquarters
Security Forces Headquarters - Jaffna (SFHQ-J) Security Forces Headquarters - Vanni (SFHQ-W)- 56th Division, active in Vavuniya County
- 61st Division, active in Vavuniya County
- Mannar Region Headquarters, Mannar
- 57th Division, active in Kilinochchi District
- 66th Division, active in Kilinochchi District
- 68th Division, active in Kilinochchi District
- Task Force 3, operating in Kilinochchi County
- Task Force 7, operating in Kilinochchi County
- 59th Division, active in Mullaitivu District
- 64th Division, active in Mullaitivu District
- 65th Division, based in Thunukai, in Mullaitivu District
- Task Force 2, operating in Mullaitivu District
- Operational Team Colombo, based in Colombo
- 11th Division, based at Cantonment Panagoda in the Western Province
- Hambantota Region Headquarters, Hambantota
- Galle Region Headquarters, Galle
- Diyatalava region headquarters, Diyatalava
- Ratnapura Subregion Headquarters, Ratnapura
- Kurunegala Subregion Headquarters, Kurunegala
Separate divisions
Separate divisions
Separate brigades
- Armored brigade
- Special Forces Brigade
- Commando brigade
- Artillery brigade
- Engineering brigade
- Communication team
Disbanded
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Notes
Excerpt Characterizing the Structure of the Army of Sri Lanka
The peasants came up and took him by the shoulders and legs, but he groaned pitifully, and the peasants, exchanging glances, let him go again.- Take it, put it in, it's all one! - shouted someone's voice. Another time they took him by the shoulders and put him on a stretcher.
- Oh my god! Oh my God! What is it? .. Belly! This is the end! Oh my god! - voices were heard between the officers. “She buzzed by a hair's breadth,” said the adjutant. The men, having adjusted the stretcher on their shoulders, hurriedly set off along the path they had trodden to the dressing station.
- Keep in step ... Eh! .. peasant! - shouted the officer, stopping by the shoulders the peasants who were walking unevenly and shaking the stretcher.
- Fix it up, Khvedor, and Khvedor, - said the front man.
- That's it, it's important, - the back one said happily, hitting the leg.
- Your Excellency? A? Prince? - Timokhin said running up in a trembling voice, peering into the stretcher.
Prince Andrew opened his eyes and looked from behind the stretcher, into which his head had sunk deeply, at the one who spoke, and again dropped his eyelids.
The militiamen brought Prince Andrey to the forest, where the trucks were parked and where there was a dressing station. The dressing station consisted of three outstretched tents with rolled-up floors on the edge of a birch grove. There were trucks and horses in the birch grove. The horses in the ridges ate oats, and the sparrows flew to them and picked up the spilled grains. The crows, smelling blood, croaking impatiently, flew over the birches. Around the tents, more than two tithes of space, lay, sat, stood bloody people in various clothes. Around the wounded, with gloomy and attentive faces, there were crowds of soldiers, porters, who were in vain driven away from this place by the officers in charge of order. Not listening to the officers, the soldiers stood, leaning on a stretcher, and intently, as if trying to understand the difficult meaning of the spectacle, looked at what was happening in front of them. From the tents one could hear loud, angry screams, then plaintive groans. Occasionally, paramedics ran out of there to fetch water and pointed out those that had to be brought in. The wounded, waiting for their turn at the tent, wheezed, moaned, cried, shouted, swore, asked for vodka. Some were delusional. Prince Andrey, as a regimental commander, walking through the unbound wounded, was carried closer to one of the tents and stopped, awaiting orders. Prince Andrew opened his eyes and for a long time could not understand what was happening around him. The meadow, wormwood, arable land, the black spinning ball and his passionate outburst of love for life were recalled to him. Two steps away from him, speaking loudly and drawing general attention to himself, stood, leaning on a branch and with his head tied, a tall, handsome, black-haired non-commissioned officer. He was wounded in the head and leg by bullets. Around him, eagerly listening to his speech, a crowd of wounded and porters gathered.
- We otteda as we blasted, so we abandoned everything, the king himself was taken! - shining black hot eyes and looking around him, shouted the soldier. - Come just that very time Leserva, his b, you my brother, the title is not left, therefore I tell you correctly ...
Prince Andrew, like everyone around the narrator, looked at him with a brilliant look and felt a comforting feeling. But isn't it all the same now, he thought. - And what will be there and what was there? Why was I so sorry to part with my life? There was something in this life that I did not understand and do not understand. "
One of the doctors, in a bloody apron and with bloody small hands, in one of which he held a cigar between his little finger and thumb (so as not to get it dirty), left the tent. This doctor raised his head and began to look around, but higher than the wounded. He obviously wanted to rest a little. Moving his head to the right and left for a while, he sighed and dropped his eyes.
“Well, now,” he said to the words of the paramedic, who pointed out to him Prince Andrey, and ordered him to be carried to the tent.
A murmur arose in the crowd of awaiting wounded.
- It can be seen, and in the next world to live alone, - said one.
Prince Andrew was brought in and placed on a table that had just been cleaned up, from which a paramedic was rinsing something. Prince Andrew could not make out separately what was in the tent. Complaining moans from all sides, excruciating pain in the hip, abdomen and back entertained him. Everything that he saw around him merged for him into one general impression of a naked, bloody human body, which seemed to fill the entire low tent, as a few weeks ago, on this hot, August day, the same body filled a dirty pond along the Smolensk road ... Yes, it was that very body, that same chair a canon [meat for cannons], the sight of which even then, as if predicting the present, aroused terror in him.
There were three tables in the tent. Two were occupied, on the third they put Prince Andrew. For some time he was left alone, and he involuntarily saw what was being done on the other two tables. On the near table sat a Tatar, probably a Cossack - in a uniform thrown beside him. Four soldiers were holding him. A doctor with glasses was cutting something in his brown, muscular back.
- Uh, uh, uh! .. - as if the Tatar was grunting, and suddenly, raising up his high-cheekbones, black snub-nosed face, showing his white teeth, he began to torn, twitch and squeal with a piercing ringing, drawn-out screech. On another table, around which a lot of people crowded, on his back lay a large, plump man with his head thrown back (curly hair, their color and head shape seemed strangely familiar to Prince Andrey). Several paramedics piled on the man's chest and held him. The white large, plump leg jerked rapidly and often, incessantly, with feverish tremors. This man was sobbing convulsively and choking. Two doctors in silence - one was pale and trembling - were doing something over the other, the red leg of this man. Having dealt with the Tatar, over whom they had thrown an overcoat, the doctor in glasses, wiping his hands, went up to Prince Andrey. He looked into the face of Prince Andrey and hastily turned away.
- Undress! What are you standing? He shouted angrily at the paramedics.
Part 1. War at sea
Since 1983, in Sri Lanka, an armed conflict between the Sinhalese-led government of the country and the Tamil minority, demanding independence, has been fading and flaring up. The main struggle is fought in the northern and eastern provinces, inhabited mainly by Tamils, although some military operations are carried out by the rebels in the country's capital. The geographical status of Sri Lanka as an island state has left its mark on the conflict, sharply distinguishing it from its peers: rarely does an insurgent war have such a pronounced maritime component.
One of the biggest challenges for any guerrilla movement is the procurement and delivery of weapons and military materials. Lacking legal means of acquiring and transporting weapons, insurgents often have to spend more manpower and resources on it than directly on military operations. This issue has become especially acute for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, not only deprived of any support from other countries, but also forced to provide supplies almost exclusively by sea. To carry out these tasks, the Sea Tigers Wing was created as part of the Tamil armed formations. The basis of their "fleet" is made up of small high-speed boats, both purchased in other countries and produced in clandestine artisanal "factories". Initially, the boats were assigned exclusively transport functions, but gradually the opposition of the Sri Lankan fleet forced the Tamils \u200b\u200bto start creating combat units. In the late 80s, some of the boats were equipped with small-caliber rapid-fire cannons and machine guns; in the early 90s, self-made exploding boats appeared, operated by suicide bombers from the Black Sea Tigers unit. In the mid-90s, a detachment of combat swimmers-saboteurs (Sea Leopards) was created.
By the beginning of the conflict, the Sri Lankan fleet consisted of two self-built patrol boats "Jayasagara" and "Sagarawardana", six large Chinese-made patrol boats of the "Shanghai-2" type, several dozen small patrol boats and support vessels. The escalation of the conflict forced the Sri Lankan government to start purchasing ship stock abroad. The most useful acquisitions were Israeli small patrol boats of the Dvora and Super Dvora types, which have been delivered in several batches since 1987. In addition, their licensed production is organized at the shipyard in Colombo. In total, more than two dozen boats of these types were purchased and built under license. The fleet was also replenished with several civilian ships, converted into auxiliary intelligence and command ships (hereinafter APU) or military transports.
The Tamil coast of Sri Lanka stretches for several hundred kilometers from the Mannar region on the northwest coast to the Pottuwila area in the southeast. In the initial period of the conflict, the Tamils \u200b\u200bestablished numerous bases in neighboring India, in the state of Tamil Nadu, inhabited by ethnic relatives. Delivery of goods and fighters was carried out through the narrow Polk Strait, dotted with numerous islands, which greatly impeded the actions of government forces. The almost complete absence of an aviation component of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the first few years of the confrontation also did not contribute to a successful fight against numerous border violators, who, moreover, preferred to carry out their operations at night.
During this period, the Sri Lankan fleet used the following tactics: patrol ships and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, possessing more or less good radars, were located at a distance of 5-10 miles from each other and combed the strait. In case of detection of an enemy (or just a suspected floating craft), they pointed high-speed patrol boats at the target. This tactic was successful in the fight against the slow-moving fishing vessels used by the Tamils \u200b\u200bat first, but proved ineffective against the fast fiberglass boats that soon appeared. Therefore, the acquisition of “Dvor”, capable of independently finding, pursuing and destroying targets, became so important.
In 1988 the situation changed qualitatively. India, which is home to tens of millions of Tamils, has expressed great concern over the terror carried out by the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil minority. However, India's intervention in the protection of the Tamils \u200b\u200bturned out to be very "non-standard": the troops sent to Sri Lanka were supposed to defeat the rebels, thus depriving the Sinhalese government of "grounds" for persecuting the Tamils. As part of the Indian operation, the Tigers' bases in Tamil Nadu were destroyed, which forced the rebels to relocate to Southeast Asia (in particular, to Burma) and organize the supply itself by sea through the Bay of Bengal.
At this stage, the Tamils \u200b\u200bbegan to acquire, albeit small, but still sea vessels, since boats obviously could not replace them in "deep" sea operations. A fleet of several merchant ships was gradually formed (for obvious reasons, their number is not known exactly, but in all likelihood does not exceed a dozen). Most of the time, such vessels carry out normal freight orders, and crews are recruited from among sailors from different countries the world. However, from time to time they carry out the delivery of military supplies to the coast of Sri Lanka, and the crew in such operations consists exclusively of Sea Tigers. The approximate scheme of the operation is as follows. The transport ship approaches the coast for about 50 miles, where it meets the boats to which it transfers its cargo. The boats that have accepted the cargo are divided into several groups and proceed to the points of unloading. They are covered by detachments of combat and exploding boats. In the event of a meeting with the ships of the government fleet, the covering detachments engage in a battle with them, regardless of the balance of forces, since the functioning of the entire Tigers organization depends on the delivery of the cargo. The operation is planned in such a way that its most important stage (the transfer of the cargo and its delivery to the shore) occurs at night. Due to the fact that the government of Sri Lanka has imposed a strict embargo on the supply of goods to regions controlled by Tamils, the cargo often includes not only weapons and ammunition, but also fuel, medicines, medical equipment and other materials. Such a delivery scheme excludes the transportation of large-sized weapons, so the most "heavy" weapons purchased by Tamils \u200b\u200bare mortars and small multiple launch rocket systems. All tanks and artillery pieces that the Tigers possess are captured as trophies from government forces.
Due to the inequality of forces between the fleets of the government and the rebels, the latter suffer significant losses in boats, both combat and transport. However, it is not possible to obtain any complete statistics on the losses of the Tamil “mosquito” fleet, so in the future we will focus on describing incidents with larger vessels. We only note that, despite the losses incurred, the Tamil "fleet" nevertheless, on the whole, copes with the main - transport - task, which is confirmed by the maintenance of the combat capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam at a sufficiently high level.
In 1991, after the withdrawal of Indian troops, the Sri Lankan fleet, in addition to the usual fight against the transport of insurgents, was involved in major operations to support the ground army. So, the boats of the Navy carried out the supply, and then the evacuation of the troops besieged in Fort Jaffna. The flights to Jaffna took place under heavy fire from the shore and were nicknamed the "Suicide Express" among Sri Lankan sailors. An even more important role was played by the fleet in the defense of Elephant Pass, a strategically important point that blocked access to the Jaffna Peninsula. To support the besieged garrison, a major amphibious operation was carried out, during which more than 7,000 troops were landed on the shore, who managed to "break through" the corridor to Elephant Pass and prevent its fall.
However, the Tamils \u200b\u200balso did not waste time and increased their combat capabilities. On July 10, 1990, the first attack of the "Tigers" using exploding boats was recorded, when it was damaged, but remained afloat, the APU "Edithara". And on May 4, 1991, the first completely successful attack by kamikaze boats took place, as a result of which the Abitha APU was destroyed.
The Lankan Navy suffered losses as a result of accidents. For example, in October 1992, as a result of a storm, a large landing craft "Kandula" (one of two Singapore-built ships acquired in 1985) sank. Although it was raised in December of the same year, the Kandula did not return to service.
In August 1993, in a battle with Tamil boats, the first “Dvora” was killed along with the entire crew of 13 people. In the same year, during an attack on the Punerin garrison (located on the southern shore of the Jaffna lagoon opposite the city of the same name), the Tigers captured 5 small 13-meter patrol boats of government forces.
On August 16, 1994, Tamil combat swimmers made their debut: in the harbor of Kankesanturai (the main port through which the supply of government troops on the Jaffna Peninsula) they sank the Armed Forces of Ukraine A516 and the tug "Dheera".
Just a month later, on September 20, the “Tigers” destroyed the largest warship they have sunk to date: the patrol ship “Sagarawardana” (hull number P600), attacked by a kamikaze, sank from for the most part crew, and its commander was captured.
Losses and the increasing volume of tasks forced the Sri Lankan government to constantly purchase new ships. Among the acquisitions, Chinese-built vessels prevailed: three large patrol boats of the Enhanced Shanghai-2 type (1991), the Parakramabahu patrol ship (former Haiqing-class anti-submarine ship, 1995), three large Haizhu-class patrol boats (1996) , as well as the "Shakthi" amphibious assault ship (Wuhu-A type, 1995) and 2 large landing boats of the "Yunnan" type (one in 1991 and the second in 1995). In Singapore, two more large landing boats were purchased, of the same type as those purchased in the 1980s (in 1991 and 1992), and in Israel, two small patrol boats of the “Shaldag” type (1996).
The Tigers also suffered losses in ships, and not only from the actions of the Sri Lankan army. Thus, in December 1990, the Malaysian authorities arrested the Tamil cargo ship “Golden Bird”. In January 1993, the Indian Navy intercepted the ship "Ahat", on board which the Tamils, led by the founder of the Sea Tigers wing, did not surrender and blew themselves up along with the ship. It should be noted that later the crews of the intercepted insurgent ships preferred to perish, but not be captured.
A short ceasefire in late 1994 ended the following spring. The beginning of a new stage of the conflict was marked by an attack by Tamil combat swimmers on ships in the harbor - the main base of the Sri Lankan Navy on the east coast of the island. The saboteurs who had infiltrated the harbor sank two large patrol boats: “Sooraya” (side number P310, type “Shanghai-2”) and “Ranasuru” (side number P320, type “Enhanced Shanghai-2”).
On July 16, 1995 in the harbor of Kankesanturai saboteurs sunk the APU “Edithara”. The vessel has repelled Tamil attacks several times in the past, and even survived the impact of an exploding boat. Now in the Sri Lankan fleet there is a patrol ship “Edithara”, named after its distinguished predecessor.
On 28 August 1995, off the coast of Jaffna, Tamils \u200b\u200bseized the passenger ferry "Irish Mona". Arrived at the scene of the incident, two patrol "Dvors" inadvertently approached the ferry and were sunk from anti-tank grenade launchers, the crews were missing. The ferry itself was subsequently abandoned by the Tigers off the coast of the peninsula.
In February 1996, the Sri Lankan Air Force Kfirs sank the Tamil transport ship Sea Bird, near Mullativu, loaded with weapons and ammunition.
In July 1996, the rebels launched a large-scale operation to capture Mullativu. The Sri Lankan Navy tried to help the dying garrison with both artillery fire and an amphibious assault. At the same time, a large patrol boat “Ranaviru” (board number Р321, type “Improved Shanghai-2”) was sunk by an exploding boat, a crew of 40 people died.
In 1997, the Tigers carried out a series of operations against freight traffic along the east coast of the island. In early July, the passenger ferry "Misen" was sunk. At the same time, the Tamils \u200b\u200bseized the North Korean ship "Mo Rang Bong", which was released after several weeks of negotiations. On September 9, in the Pulmoddai area (between Mullaitivu and Trincomalee), the Gordeliti vessel was attacked carrying a cargo of ilmenite ore (the enrichment plant in the Pulmoddai area does not work because Tamils \u200b\u200bcontrol the main sources of water supply, but the government is gradually developing this deposit, which provides valuable raw materials for titanium production). Having sunk several motor boats guarding the ship, the Tigers boarded the saboteurs, who let the "Gordeliti" sink to the bottom.
In mid-1997, an unusual, almost detective story happened, worthy of a Hollywood action movie. The Sri Lankan government ordered a batch of 30,000 mortar rounds. The order was placed in Zimbabwe, although Croatia and Bulgaria offered almost half the prices. It was the purchase at clearly inflated prices that attracted the attention of the parliamentary opposition, which organized an investigation into the deal. The investigation revealed much more interesting factthan a simple embezzlement of public funds: the ammunition was loaded onto the chartered ship Stillus Lymasul, but it did not arrive at the port of destination. And after a while, information appeared that the mines were unloaded ... on the coast occupied by the rebels. According to existing versions, the Tamils \u200b\u200beither simply “bought” information about the time and route of the cargo, or even “substituted” one of their vessels for freight. Indirect confirmation that the cargo fell into the hands of the Tigers was a barrage of mortar fire that fell in the next few months on government troops carrying out an operation with the loud code name "Guaranteed Victory" (at the time, the Sri Lankan military thought that victory was really close, although, as further events showed, it was an overly optimistic view).
A few months later, in November of the same year, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft found a ship standing off the coast in the Tamil-occupied area of \u200b\u200bMullaitivu. The "Kfira" sent by the Sri Lankan Air Force sank the ship, from which, according to government sources, they did not manage to unload most of the cargo. In turn, the Tigers said that the destroyed ship was in fact a previously captured Stillus Lymasul, set up as bait for the Sri Lankan Navy (modeled on the operation with the Irish Mona). Who was right will not be known soon (if it ever becomes clear). Perhaps it really turned out to be “Stillus Lymasul”, but who has already come to the Tamils \u200b\u200bwith a new batch of weapons.
On October 19, 1997, another Dvora was sunk in a battle with Tamil boats. And in February 1998, off the coast of Jaffna, the Tigers attacked a large government convoy. With the help of exploding boats, a large landing craft "Pabbatha" (Singapore-built) and a cargo ship "Valampuri" were sunk. More than 40 sailors and government soldiers were killed on board both ships.
In August 1998, the Tamils \u200b\u200bseized the general cargo ship Princess Kash. Delivered for unloading in the Mullaitivu harbor, it was sunk by the Kfirs on the same day.
Soon, the Sri Lankan Navy lost two more "Yards": on October 30, 1998 as a result of a kamikaze attack and on January 1, 1999, as a result of an internal explosion on board a boat stationed in the port of Talaymannar.
March 1999 also brought losses to the Tigers: in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Navy intercepted the ship "Mariamma". When the Indian ships approached, the Tamils \u200b\u200bleft it in a speedboat, having previously laid explosive charges that destroyed the ship. Interestingly, instead of gratitude, the Sri Lankan government demanded that the Indians transfer the ship and cargo to them, since it assumed that they could be captured by the ships of the neighboring naval forces.
In early 2000, the Tamils \u200b\u200bundertook a large-scale operation to capture Elephant Pass. In this case, the most important role was played by the landing in the amount of 1,500 people, landed by the Tigers on the flank of the defenders. Elephant Pass fell. During these battles on one of the April days, the Sri Lankan Navy lost two "Dvor" at once: one was sunk in a battle with Tamil boats, and the other - by the fire of a captured tank from the shore. A similar story repeated itself in June of the same year: one “Dvora” sank from the damage received in the battle with the Tigers' boats, the second was sunk by mistake by its own Mi-24 helicopter.
Meanwhile, the government fleet was constantly replenished with new ships and boats. On the basis of the Shaldag boats, at least 10 Colombo boats were built at the local shipyard. In 1997, 6 small patrol boats of the Trinity Marine type arrived from the USA, in 1998 - 3 boats of the Killer type from South Korea. In 2000, the Sri Lankan Navy was replenished with two large Chinese-built Lushun-class patrol boats (a further development of the Haizhu-class) and two former Israeli Saar 4.5-class missile boats. The latest acquisition drew particularly sharp criticism from the parliamentary opposition, since it was not clear against which enemy the missile armament of these boats could be used: the Tamil fiberglass boats were too small a target, and to shoot from afar at a large ship in the Bay of Bengal with its intensive shipping, without initially making sure that that this is really a ship of the Tigers, no one of course dares. Finally, the former Indian frigate "Saryu" was acquired, which became the largest ship of the Sri Lankan fleet to date and was renamed "Sayura".
On June 26, 2000, Tamils \u200b\u200battacked the tanker "Merces Uhana", which was hit by an exploding boat and sank after several hours of fire. It is believed that the real target of the operation was the vessel "Lanka Muditha", sailing seaward with 1,500 government soldiers on board.
In October of the same year, the Tigers attempted to attack the enemy right in the harbor of Trincomalee. Two exploding boats entered the port, but this time they failed to inflict significant damage on the government fleet. The result of the attack was only heavy damage to the fast transport “Lihiniya” (hull number A541) and damage to one of the large patrol boats.
But the "Dvors" continued to suffer losses during normal operations: one was killed in a battle with the Tamils \u200b\u200bin the same October 2000, another - in March of the following year.
On September 14, 2001, the Tigers' boats attacked the Pride of South, which was carrying more than 1,300 government soldiers. The vessel was directly escorted by two small French-built patrol boats, which managed to hold out until help arrived, although one of these boats was sunk by a Tamil kamikaze. In the ensuing battle, one of the "Dvor" was seriously damaged, 6 members of its crew were killed, the rest were wounded. However, with the support of combat helicopters, the attack on the main target - with the troops - was thwarted, and the damaged “Dvora” was able to be towed to the base.
In 2002, the warring parties signed a truce that continues to the present moment. However, clashes occur at sea from time to time as the Tamils \u200b\u200bcontinue their transport operations. Strengthening the government fleet allowed him to achieve a number of successes. Thus, on March 10, 2003, the Tamil tanker "Koimar" was intercepted and sunk.
On June 10 of the same year, the Sri Lankan Navy ship "Nandimithra" (a former Israeli Saar 4.5-class missile boat) discovered the suspicious vessel. However, during the rendezvous on "Nandimithra" the propulsion system failed and contact was lost. The Sri Lankan fleet launched a large-scale search operation and on 16 June sighted the same (or possibly different) vessel. This time the operation was successful and the tanker “Shoshin” was destroyed as a result.
However, according to information coming from Sri Lanka (which, of course, cannot be considered as completely reliable), the Tigers in the subsequent period managed to carry out a number of large deliveries. By the end of 2004, the situation was on the brink of a resumption of large-scale hostilities. However, nature unexpectedly intervened in the plans of the parties. The recent tsunami has severely damaged the entire east and south coast of Sri Lanka. The harbor was engulfed in war and the patrol ship "Parakramabahu" and the landing craft L820 (apparently raised soon by the Indian Navy) sank. In Trincomalee harbor, three-quarters of the Sri Lankan navy ships concentrated there were damaged, but none sank. According to government sources, the military has developed a plan for the urgent withdrawal of damaged ships from Trincomalee in the event of a rebel assault on the city. However, these preparations were clearly redundant. The Tamils \u200b\u200balso suffered heavy tsunami casualties, heavier than the Sri Lankan Navy, as their mosquito ships were far less likely to withstand the disaster.
At the moment, hardly any of the parties will dare to start hostilities after the devastating tsunami. However...
In accordance with the Tamil classification, the period of war from its beginning to the invasion of Indian troops is called Eelam War I (“eelam” in Tamil “state”), from the withdrawal of Indian troops to the armistice concluded at the end of 1994 - Eelam War II, since 1995 to 2002 - Eelam War III. Today the term Eelam War IV is increasingly used in the Sri Lankan press. There is no war yet, but it already has a name.
Part 2. Aviation
By the beginning of the conflict, the Sri Lankan Air Force was in a state of disrepair and in fact could only use 7 Bell 206 helicopters and several DC-3 transport aircraft. To carry out combat missions, these helicopters were urgently armed with 70-mm NURS installations and 12.7-mm machine guns. In addition, in 1984 they purchased 2 more helicopters of the same type and 2 Bell 212.
In order to assist the fleet in curbing Tamil traffic, the 3rd Marine Reconnaissance Squadron was formed, equipped with mobilized civilian aircraft (3 deHavilland Doves, 1 deHavilland Heron, 2 Riley Skyliner Heron), stationed in China Bay (near Trincomalee). These aircraft could patrol the airspace over the sea for a long time and direct combat boats to suspicious floating craft, but the lack of the necessary equipment did not allow them to operate at night, when the Tigers carried out the bulk of their transport operations. In the second half of the 80s, the squadron was replenished with six Cessna 337 Super Skymasters.
The escalation of the conflict forced the acquisition of aircraft capable of providing direct support to troops on the battlefield. The choice fell on the Siai Marchetti SF-260, a light training and combat trainer aircraft. The first 3 SF-260s arrived in 1985, and in the same year, two of them crashed. The following year, the Air Force was replenished with 5 aircraft of this type, and in 1988 - three more. In 1990-1991, 12 used SF-260s were purchased from Myanmar (Burma). Carrying up to 300 kg of bombs (with a maximum caliber of 114 kg), 70 mm NURS and machine guns on suspensions, the SF-260 was very popular in Sri Lanka and was the main strike aircraft until the mid-90s.
The helicopter component also increased significantly - in 1985, 9 Bell 212s were purchased, armed with 12.7-mm machine guns in the side openings and two NURS blocks or machine guns on suspensions, to perform combat and transport missions. These helicopters were often used by special forces. 4 Bell 412 (in 1985) and 3 Bell 212 (in 1986) were purchased for transportation of command personnel and cargo transportation.
Considering the importance of supplying the garrisons besieged by the rebels, the transport capabilities of the Air Force were enhanced with three Avro HS748s, two Y-8s and nine Y-12s. The latter turned out to be the most valuable acquisition and became the "workhorse" of the war, engaged not only in the transfer of troops and cargo, but also in reconnaissance over the sea. Moreover, Y-12s were actively used as improvised bombers.
From October 1987 to March 1990, Indian aircraft conducted combat operations against the Tamils. As a consequence of the almost complete lack of air defense systems among the rebels, the Indian Air Force, despite 70,000 sorties, did not lose a single aircraft.
Already since 1987, rarely any operation of government troops did without air support: planes and helicopters struck the enemy, landed troops, evacuated the wounded, delivered ammunition, fuel, food. The Tigers, in turn, made attempts to strengthen their air defense. On September 13, 1990, during a flight to support the besieged troops at Fort Jaffna, an SF-260 was shot down, the pilot of which became the first Sri Lankan pilot to die from enemy fire in this conflict.
In the summer of 1992, during Operation Balavegaya II, a Y-12 crashed, killing all 18 people on board. Presumably the reason for the death of the improvised "bomber" was the explosion of its own bomb.
In 1991, the Sri Lankan Air Force entered service with Chinese jet fighters: 4 single-seat F-7BS, and "twin" - 1 FT-7 and 2 FT-5. These machines turned out to be not the best choice for solving the existing range of tasks: they were too high-speed and did not have a good sighting system, they could neither effectively support ground troops, nor fight Tamil boats. Therefore, already in 1992, 4 IA 58 Pukara attack aircraft were purchased in Argentina. However, the “Argentines” did not live up to the expectations placed on them, mainly due to frequent breakdowns and problems with spare parts. By the end of 1997, the remaining "Pukars" became joked, and after a few years they were finally written off.
Finally, in 1995, the first 6 Kfirs purchased from Israel entered service with the government Air Force. This jet fighter-bomber showed itself very well in Sri Lanka when striking the formations of the Tigers on the line of contact, their rear bases and ships, thus becoming a worthy successor to the SF-260, now transferred from combat training to just training.
The helicopter wing was also strengthened: in 1992, 12 Mi-17s were purchased in Russia, 3 more machines of this type were supplied by Ukraine in 1996. The significantly higher carrying capacity of the Mi-17 compared to the Bell 212 made it possible to assign to it the bulk of the tasks of supplying troops on the front line, while Bell 212 began to be used mainly in the interests of special forces. However, the Mi-17 was sometimes involved in the landing, for example, during the battles for the Mullativu base in July 1996.
The next logical step in the direction of increasing the capabilities of the Air Force was the acquisition of the first truly combat helicopter - in 1995-1996 6 Mi-24s arrived from Ukraine, immediately joining the “work”. Among their targets were not only land, but also sea - thanks to its low speed and powerful weapons, the "crocodile" became a serious opponent of the Tigers' boats. In the same place and at the same time, they purchased 7 An-32s, which together with the Y-12 formed the basis of transport aviation.
The Tamils \u200b\u200bdid not sit idly by. On the black market they purchased Strela MANPADS (presumably from the stocks of the Cambodian army). On April 28, 1995, an HS748 was shot down by a missile near the Palali airbase (on the Jaffna peninsula), killing 54 passengers and a crew member. The next day, Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed another HS748 in the same place, killing 51 people.
On September 13, an An-32 fell into the sea in the area (75 dead). According to one version, the cause of the disaster was an explosive device planted on board. The same fate befell on November 28 An-32 in the Palali area (63 dead).
On November 18, when approaching Palali, Y-8 was shot down by ground fire, all 5 persons on board became victims of the incident.
On January 22, 1996, off the northeast coast, an Mi-17 with 39 servicemen on board disappeared without a trace. Another loss came at the end of the year: On December 7, Bell 212, carrying a number of senior commanders from the Jaffna Peninsula, for technical reasons, made an emergency landing in Tiger-controlled territory. As a result of an urgently organized rescue operation, people were removed, but the helicopter itself had to be blown up.
1997 brought a lot of trouble for the Sri Lankan Air Force. On January 20, Y-12, who was on patrol flight, disappeared in the Jaffna area. The next day, in the Negombo area, "Kfir" fell into the sea.
On February 21, during takeoff from the Ratmalan airfield, the An-32 crashed. The plane crashed in a nearby marshy area, killing 3 people out of 62 on board. And exactly two months later, on April 21, there was a flight accident with another An-32: in conditions of poor visibility, the plane made a hard landing, the landing gear broke, the screws and the fuselage were damaged. Although the damage was serious (experts estimated the cost of restoration at half the purchase price), no one on the plane died.
On March 6, during an attack on China Bay airbase, the Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed another Y-12 on the ground. On March 16, during a training flight, the Pukara exploded. On March 19, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Jaffna peninsula, an Mi-24 disappeared (along with 8 servicemen on board).
On November 10, the Mi-24 was shot down off the northeast coast and fell into the water, both pilots were killed, but the arrows managed to escape. Bell 212 crashed on 25 November. To top it all off, the SF-260 trainer was lost.
Beginning in 1997, the Sri Lankan army began to actively use the UAVs acquired in Israel. With their help, it was possible to locate a number of important targets, for example, a small test runway built by the Tamils \u200b\u200bor supply vessels. Of course, intensive use also entailed losses: in 1997-1999 at least 6 UAVs crashed.
On January 4, 1998, a Mi-17, which had just landed, was hit by an RPG in the Olumadu area, delivering supplies for the troops involved in Operation Jayasikuruy.
On June 26, an Mi-24 crashed in the area. Tamils \u200b\u200bclaimed their involvement in the incident, however, given that they are deep in the rear of government forces in the territory populated by the Sinhalese, an ordinary catastrophe seems more likely.
In September of the same year, there was a tragic incident with an An-24 civilian aircraft flying from Jaffna to Colombo. Apparently, he was mistaken for a transport worker of government forces and was shot down by a MANPADS missile near Mannar Island, the crew and passengers were killed.
In 1999, the Sri Lankan Air Force acquired 4 Bell 212 and 3 Mi-35s. Note that although the first "crocodiles" were purchased in Ukraine for a very small amount, but constant problems with their maintenance in a working condition contributed to the decision in favor of the supply of Mi-35 from Russia - albeit 3 \u200b\u200btimes more expensive, but with mandatory technical support " Rostvertol ”.
However, a real "boom" in the procurement of aircraft followed in 2000. On the one hand, it was caused by a series of heavy defeats suffered by government forces since November 1999. On the other hand, the successfully growing economy has finally allowed the Sri Lankan government to begin implementing extensive plans for the technical re-equipment of its aviation, army and navy. From Israel came 8 "Kfirov", from Ukraine 6 MiG-27 and 3 An-32, from Great Britain 2 C-130. From 2000 to 2004, Russia delivered at least 20 more Mi-35s, as a result of which the number of attack helicopters quadrupled.
The "oldies" SF-260W were replaced by the training RT-6 and K-8 purchased in China. Light transport aircraft were supplemented by several Beech King Air 200. One of the Beech 200 was delivered in reconnaissance version and is equipped with equipment for intercepting and direction finding of radio communications, as well as infrared scanners. At the same time, plans to resuscitate the 3rd naval reconnaissance squadron, which had remained without equipment by this time, were not implemented due to lack of funds.
Naturally, the Sri Lankan Air Force not only replenished, but also suffered losses. In December 1999, during fierce fighting in the Parantan area, he was hit and fell into the Jaffna lagoon Mi-24. Another Mi-24 was shot down near Chavacacherri on May 24, 2000, both gunners were killed, the pilots were wounded, but managed to make an emergency landing. In October of the same year, during an attack by Tamil "kamikazes" on Trincomalee harbor, a cover group shot down another Mi-24 with a missile. Half of the crew survived, and the helicopter itself with the bodies of the dead pilots was raised a few days later.
At the height of the fighting, there was not enough of its own forces for transportation, so the government leased several aircraft. One of them, An-26 with a Ukrainian crew, was shot down on March 30, 2000 near Vavuniya by a MANPADS missile. The crew and more than 30 wounded on board were killed.
They contributed to losses and flight accidents not directly related to hostilities. So, on July 24, an F-7 crashed near Colombo, and on September 15, an Mi-17, carrying several high-ranking government officials, crashed on the east coast. In August 2001, the MiG-27 crashed.
The Tamil attack on the Katanaike airbase in July 2001 became well known. The sabotage group, having penetrated the airfield, destroyed two Kfirs, one MiG-27, two Mi-17s and three K-8s. Since the Catanaike military airfield actually forms a single complex with the Colombo International Airport, the saboteurs did not limit themselves to military aircraft, "adding" to them 4 more burned airbuses (2 A-330, 1 A-320 and 1 A-340) of the Lion Air company ”Jointly owned by Sri Lanka and the UAE.
In early 2002, the government and the rebels signed a truce, but after that the air force was reduced by several aircraft due to aircraft accidents: in August 2002, a Y-8 crashed, in September of the same year, a Kfir, and on June 9, 2004, another Mig-27.
In conclusion, let's say a few words about the structure and basing of Sri Lankan aviation today. There are 5 main air bases: Katanaike, Ratmalana (south of Colombo), Vavuniya, Anuradhapura and Minneriya (east of Anuradhapura). The auxiliary air bases in Palali, China Bay, Amparai, etc. are also important. The 5th Fighter Squadron (MiG-27, F-7, FT-7, FT-5), the 10th Fighter Squadron ("Kfirs"), the 4th Helicopter Squadron, whose task is to transport VIPs (Bell 206 and Bell 412), as well as the 14th training squadron equipped with K-8. The 2nd heavy transport squadron (An-32, C-130) and the 8th light transport squadron (Y-12 and Beech 200) are located in Ratmalan. The 7th (Bell 206 and Bell 212) and 9th (Mi-24 and Mi-35) squadrons are based in Minneriya. The 6th helicopter squadron on the Mi-17 and the 11th aviation unit operating the UAV are in Vavuniya. Finally, the 1st training air wing is based in Anuradhapura on the RT-6, Cessna-150 and SF260TR.
Part 3. Wrestling on land
The population of Sri Lanka is ethnically heterogeneous: about 70% are Sinhalese who arrived on the island in the 5th century BC, 20% are Tamils, whose active penetration into the northern and eastern regions of the country is associated with the 5th century AD, up to 7 % are Muslims - descendants of Tamils \u200b\u200band Sinhalese professing Islam. The Tamil settlement area covers the districts (districts) of Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullativu, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. The most densely populated is the Jaffna Peninsula, on which the historical capital of the Tamils \u200b\u200bis located of the same name. The peninsula is separated from the main part of the island by the Jaffna lagoon, and in turn consists of three sectors, practically separated by small winding bays: Walikamam (in which the city of Jaffna is located), Tenmaracchi (the main city - Kodikamam) and Vadamaracchi (a narrow strip of land in the north east of the peninsula from Point Pedro to Caddaikadu). A vast area with an underdeveloped road network, often covered with jungle, south of the Jaffna Peninsula to the Vavuniya region is called Vani. The settlements mentioned later in the description of the hostilities are highlighted in bold on the attached maps of the Northern Front and the Vavuniya-Mankulam region.
Relations between the main ethnic groups have always been characterized by tension, often resulting in ethnic clashes. In the early 1980s, the Tamil militant organization “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, headed by V. Pirapaharan, began to operate in the northern regions of the country. The date of the beginning of the "hot" phase of the conflict is considered to be July 23, 1983, when 13 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed near Palali (not far from Jaffna) as a result of a Tamil attack. In response, Tamil pogroms broke out in the capital of the country, Colombo, and in a number of other regions, the victims of which were up to 3 thousand people. In these conditions, not only radical-minded, but also many “moderate” Tamils \u200b\u200bsupported the armed struggle. Within a few months, the uprising swept vast areas of the north and east of Sri Lanka.
By the start of the conflict, Sri Lanka's armed forces were in decline. The absence of external enemies and a weak economy did not contribute to the creation of a well-equipped and trained army. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government immediately began to acquire military equipment, mostly outdated and used, but quite suitable for fighting the rebels. Without going into a detailed chronological list, we will describe the main range of weapons purchased by Sri Lanka to date. China purchased T-59 tanks, T-86 BMP (a copy of the Soviet BMP-1) and wheeled BMP T-92, tracked armored personnel carriers T-63 and T-85, 122-mm and 130-mm artillery pieces, 152-mm howitzers. The Czech Republic supplied T-55 tanks and 122mm MLRS. In Russia, they purchased BMP-1, BMP-3 and BTR-80. Armored vehicles "Saladin" and armored personnel carriers "Saracen" arrived from Great Britain, and armored personnel carriers "Buffel" from South Africa. A shortage of qualified personnel forced the initial recruitment of military specialists from Britain, Pakistan and Israel.
It was not only the technical equipment of the army that improved - it also grew in number: in the several years since the start of the uprising, the armed forces increased from 15 to more than 100 thousand servicemen. Numerous police units have also joined the fight against the Tamils. At the same time, the number of formations of "tigers" (including various auxiliary units, including women and youth) usually did not exceed 10-15 thousand people, which is explained primarily by the difficulties in providing a larger number of soldiers with weapons and ammunition. Like the government, Tamils \u200b\u200bhad a long way to go to form truly combat-ready units. Note also that the rebels do not enjoy the support of any country in the world, and the financial base of the uprising is primarily provided by the numerous Tamil communities in developed countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Canada (for example, Tamils \u200b\u200bmake up about 30% of the population of Singapore).
At the first stage of the conflict, in addition to conducting actual hostilities, both sides widely practiced terror against civilians, which claimed the lives of thousands of Tamils \u200b\u200band Sinhalese. There were also cases of "cleansing" of some areas from the Tamil population by government troops, followed by their colonization by "trustworthy" citizens. Thus, as a result of such an action, the Tamil region of Manal Aru (to the north-east of Vavuniya) was inhabited by the Sinhalese and received the name Veli Oya. As a result, the Sri Lankan authorities “drove a wedge” between the northern and eastern Tamil regions.
In 1985, the Tigers took control of almost the entire Jaffna Peninsula, including their capital. Government forces were trapped in the garrisons of Palali and Point Pedro.
In May 1987, the greatly strengthened Sri Lankan army launched its first major offensive, code-named Liberation. During heavy fighting, the Tigers were driven out of most of the Vadamaracchi sector, thus establishing a landline between Palali and Point Pedro. In these battles, artillery and improvised Avro and Y-12 bombers were widely used, striking not so much at the enemy as at settlements controlled by the Tamils.
Worried about numerous civilian casualties and an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, neighboring India in July 1987 forced the Sri Lankan government to agree to a cessation of hostilities and the granting of limited autonomy to the Tamil regions. In exchange, the Indians pledged to disarm the Tamils, i.e. actually carry out a military operation to defeat them, since the Tigers categorically refused to lay down their arms.
The Indian attack on Jaffna began on October 11, 1987. On the night of October 12, 4 Mi-8s landed in the area of \u200b\u200bJaffna University to seize the leadership of the Tigers, but this special operation failed. Several helicopters were damaged by small arms fire, only 120 paratroopers were able to land (they were tasked with protecting the stadium where the helicopters were landing) and 30 Sikh commandos, who were supposed to capture the Tamil leaders. In the ensuing battle, 29 commandos and 6 paratroopers were killed. The rest of the landing was rescued the next day by three T-72s that made their way to the rescue.
The fierce battle for Jaffna, which claimed the lives of over 400 Indian soldiers, lasted 17 days. Strong air and artillery strikes were inflicted on the city, resulting in heavy casualties among the civilian population. Towards the end of the defense, the Tigers, whose losses were comparable to those of the Indian, managed to evacuate the main forces in the Vanni.
The capture of Jaffna, contrary to the hopes of the Indian command, did not lead to the defeat of the Tamil detachments, which went over to the guerrilla war. The Indian "peacekeeping" contingent was gradually increased to 100 thousand people, but this did not give the expected effect. The constant attacks of the guerrillas angered the “peacekeepers”, who began to act in the same way as the Sri Lankan army earlier. Indian involvement in the massacre, the high cost of the operation, and mounting casualties have caused discontent within India itself. As a result, by March 1990 the Indian army had left Sri Lanka, having lost by this time only about 1,150 soldiers killed. After the withdrawal of troops, in 1992, the Tamils \u200b\u200bexecuted the Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, who organized the invasion: during a pre-election rally, a kamikaze woman approached him and blew herself up along with those around her. Two and a half years of struggle against a strong enemy tempered the formations of the Tigers, whose forces were not only not undermined, but even strengthened.
The fragile peace that remained after the withdrawal of the "peacekeepers" collapsed on June 11, 1990. On that day, Tamils \u200b\u200battacked numerous police stations in the Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee districts and captured more than 1,000 Sinhalese and Muslim police officers, at least 630 of whom were executed.
By the 20th of June, fighting began in Jaffna. A small garrison of government troops was besieged in the old Fort. The Tamils, who did not have heavy weapons, made several unsuccessful attempts to capture the enemy's citadel, including a very exotic one: one night the Tigers tried to enter the Fort using a crane. However, the crane arrow could not stand it and collapsed with 40 soldiers on it.
On July 12, government forces launched Operation Thrivida Balaya to capture the islands of Vellanai and Mandativu located opposite Jaffna, and, after stubborn fighting, captured them by mid-August. On September 13, an attempt was made to land an assault force from these islands for the release of Jaffna, but it failed with significant losses. As the supply of the besieged by sea faced increasing fire resistance from the coast on September 26, the Fort garrison was evacuated.
In June 1990, the Tamils \u200b\u200balso blocked the garrisons in Vanni along the Vavuniya-Elephant Pass road (Mankulam, Kokavil, Kilinochchi). During the fighting on July 10-12, the Tigers captured Kokavil, his small garrison of 70 soldiers was killed. The garrison commander, who refused to leave the wounded and evacuate, was posthumously awarded the highest order of the Sri Lankan army. Soon after, the government forces left Kilinochchi.
On November 22, the assault on Mankulam began. First, a truck with explosives driven by a kamikaze entered the base and exploded, then an attack from different directions followed. On November 24, the camp was evacuated, more than 100 soldiers were killed.
Despite the capture of a number of important points, the Tamils \u200b\u200bexperienced certain difficulties with the supply of their formations in Jaffna, since government garrisons in Elephant Pass and Punerin blocked unhindered access to the peninsula. On July 10, 1991, the Tigers attacked the Elephant Pass. The government navy and army urgently organized a landing operation to rescue him, codenamed “Balavegaya”. The landing in the Vettilaikerni area (east of Elephant Pass) began on July 15, but it was not until 18 days later that the corridor to the besieged was broken through. During the siege of Elephant Pass, according to official data, the Sri Lankan army lost 202 soldiers killed, the Tamils \u200b\u200b- about 600 people.
The prolonged siege of Jaffna and the failure of the assault on Elephant Pass showed the Tamils \u200b\u200bthat without a serious reform of their units and the acquisition of heavy weapons, one cannot count on a successful fight against the government army. And although the issue of the delivery of artillery to the Tigers for objective reasons has not yet been resolved, the Tamil infantry units soon turned into perfectly trained and combat-ready forces, including a large number of special forces units.
Beginning August 28, 1991, for four weeks, government forces conducted operations Ashakasena and Akunarahara northeast of the Manal Aru area (colonized by Sinhalese settlers). The purpose of the operations was to finally cut off communications between the eastern and northern provinces. However, it was very difficult to achieve decisive success in the jungle, and after the completion of the operations the Tamils \u200b\u200bagain occupied the area.
On August 8, 1992, during a reconnaissance on Vellanai Island, the commander of government forces in the north of the country, General D. Kobbekaduva, and 9 officers accompanying him were killed by a mine explosion.
After the withdrawal of Indian troops, mutual terror against the civilian population weakened significantly. Now the Tamils \u200b\u200btried to attack mainly military targets, including the top leaders of the army and state. So, on November 10, 1992, the commander of the Navy, Admiral K. Fernando, was killed by a kamikaze, and on May 1, 1993, President of Sri Lanka R. Premadasa was killed during an election rally. On November 24, 1994, as a result of an assassination attempt, the main candidate for the post of President G. Dissanayake was killed.
In June-July 1992, the Sri Lankan army conducted Operation Balavegaya II, which expanded its zone of control north of Elephant Pass. The next operation in this direction was "Yal Devi", launched on 28 September 1993. The main goal was to capture Kilali - the main base of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon. On the second day, a convoy of government troops fell into a well-prepared ambush. With strong fire the Tamils \u200b\u200bcut off the infantry from armored vehicles and destroyed 2 T-55 tanks of Czechoslovak production, about 70 soldiers were killed. By October 6, when the operation was terminated, the total loss was 110 troops.
The fact that the Tamils \u200b\u200bdid not sit idly by, but intensively train fighters and develop new tactics, became clear after a month. As a result of a surprise attack on Punerin, the Tigers managed to break through the outer perimeter of the defense and infiltrate the territory of the base. Thanks to reinforcements urgently deployed by sea, the garrison, after three days of fierce fighting, managed to repulse the assault. However, the losses were heavy - according to official data alone, 613 servicemen died. The Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured a large number of weapons, including two T-55 tanks.
At the end of 1994, the government of the new President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, signed a truce with the Tigers. However, the positions of the parties on the main issue - granting independence to the Tamils \u200b\u200b- remained diametrically opposed, and already in April of the following year, hostilities resumed.
In June 1995 the Tamils \u200b\u200battacked the garrison of Mandaitivu Island. The attack was repelled again, but at least 120 soldiers were killed. In response, the Sri Lankan army on July 9, 1995 launched an offensive from the Palali area called "Leap Forward". Not encountering serious resistance, government forces advanced 10 kilometers and expanded the security zone around the Palali airfield and the port of Kankesanturai, facilities critical to the supply of the entire group on the peninsula.
By this time, the Sri Lankan armed forces had finally received a large number of new weapons. The acquired tanks and artillery significantly increased the offensive capabilities of the ground forces, and the Kfira and Mi-24 increased the striking power of the aviation.
On October 17, 1995, the Sri Lankan army launched an offensive to capture Jaffna - Operation Riviresa. Artillery and aviation inflicted strong blows on the positions of the Tamils, who had neither the means of counter-battery warfare, nor any serious air defense. Despite the fierce resistance of the Tigers, the troops slowly advanced forward. On November 22, the last road linking the defenders of Jaffna with the Tenmaracchi sector was cut. Heavy battles for the city continued for 2 more weeks, especially heavy losses were suffered by the advancing from mortar fire. However, on December 2, the Sri Lankan flag was hoisted over the Jaffna magistrate. The remnants of the defenders, like during the storming of the city by Indian troops, managed to evacuate to Vanni. According to official figures, 450 servicemen were killed during the month and a half of the operation, although there is reason to believe that in fact the losses were significantly higher. The loss of Tamils, according to the Sri Lankan military, exceeded 2,000 people - naturally, the Tigers, in turn, claim that this figure is significantly overestimated.
During this period, the Tigers carried out two well-known operations in the capital of the country. On October 20, 1995, the main oil storage facility in Colombo was destroyed, and about 20 security guards were killed. On January 31 of the following year, as a result of a car bomb explosion, the building of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was seriously damaged.
The concentration of the main forces of the army in the north of the country allowed the Tamils \u200b\u200bto significantly increase their activity in the east - around Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. In this area, clashes were in the nature of a classic guerrilla war: ambushes on the roads, shelling of police stations, garrisons and forward posts. The largest rebel operations were the defeat of a convoy in the Batticaloa area in March 1996 (54 killed) and an attack in the same area on the Vavunaitivu camp in March of the following year (75 killed). In the latter case, the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Small collisions numbered in the hundreds.
Meanwhile, the government army continued fighting to defeat the Tamils \u200b\u200bon the Jaffna Peninsula. At the end of March 1996, an operation was carried out to destroy small Tamil units that had infiltrated the previously occupied areas. On April 19, 1996, Operation Riviresa II began to capture the Tenmaracchi sector. By April 21, government forces captured Chavakacherri, and on April 26, occupied Kilali. The tigers offered little resistance and evacuated to the Vanni. Finally, in May, during Operation Riviresa III, the Vadamaracchi sector was occupied without resistance.
The undoubted successes in the fight against the Tigers gave the government reason to assert that the day of the final defeat of the rebels was approaching. However, it soon became clear that not everything is as good as the Sinhalese politicians would like. On the night of July 18, 1996, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a surprise assault on the Mullativu base - Operation Unceasing Waves ("Unstoppable Wave"). Despite its name, the operation did not at all mean a banal attack by large masses of infantry. On the contrary, in this case (as in subsequent offensives), the main focus was on the actions of special forces that penetrated the enemy's front lines and attacked key defensive targets. The Mullativu garrison, according to various sources, numbered from 1200 to 1600 troops, but was located isolated from the main forces of the Sri Lankan army, which played a deplorable role in its fate. After an eight-hour battle, the Tigers broke through the defensive perimeter and captured the base's arsenal. The arsenal's weapons and ammunition were immediately used against their former owners. By the end of the first day of the assault, the position of the defenders became critical.
The Sri Lankan army immediately made an attempt to help the garrison. Not far from Mullativu, a commando landing was landed from helicopters, but he immediately came under fire from the rebels and was forced to fight hard to hold the captured bridgehead. Over the next few days, the landed paratroopers continued to receive reinforcements by air and from the sea, however, due to strong opposition, they could not begin to perform their main task. Meanwhile, on July 20, the Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed the last centers of resistance of the Mullativu garrison. Having lost hope to save the remnants of the garrison, the Sri Lankan army evacuated the landing on July 25.
Operation "Unceasing Waves" resulted in a severe defeat for the government forces: the Mullativu garrison was completely destroyed, and about 100 servicemen were also killed trying to come to his aid. The Tigers captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition, including two 122mm guns.
The fall of the Mullativu led the command of the Sri Lankan armed forces to the idea of \u200b\u200bthe need to abandon the holding of isolated bases, which are very difficult to provide assistance in the event of an assault. Therefore, the Punerin garrison was soon evacuated, which greatly complicated the control of the movement of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon.
Despite the defeat suffered, the Sri Lankan army did not postpone the already prepared offensive in the north and on July 26 launched Operation Sath Jaya, the purpose of which was to capture Kilinochchi. The offensive was carried out from the Elephant Pass area. At the first stage, the Tamils, whose main forces were concentrated in the Mullaitivu area, offered little resistance. Already on the first day, government forces occupied Parantan. However, the further southward movement resumed on 4 August met with serious difficulties. In two days of battles, government forces failed to break through the Tamil defenses, about 150 soldiers were killed, 3 tanks were destroyed and several more damaged. On September 22, the third phase of the operation began. This time, instead of a frontal attack, the Sri Lankan army made a roundabout maneuver and reached Kilinochchi from the east. Having thus stretched the Tamil defenses, the attackers again changed the direction of the main attack - on the night of September 24, an advance began to the west of Kilinochchi. On September 26, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful counterattack. During the many hours of battle, about 200 Sri Lankan soldiers died, and the Tigers suffered heavy losses. Already weakened by the previous battles, the defenders were unable to offer serious resistance in the future, and on September 30, government forces finally captured Kilinochchi. As in the attack on Jaffna, the overwhelming superiority of the Sri Lankan army in aviation and artillery played an important role. At the same time, it should be noted that in this conflict the words “powerful air and artillery strikes” denote events that are incomparable in their intensity with the actions of really strong armies: for example, during the described operation to capture Kilinochchi, 7-8 air strikes were carried out per day on positions Tigers. According to official data, for September 22-30, the losses of the army amounted to 269 people killed, although in the Sri Lankan parliament a double figure was also announced.
In January 1997, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful attack on Parantan. If this important point was captured, the Tigers would be able to cut off the troops in the Kilinochchi area from the Elephant Pass garrison. As a result of a surprise attack, the front line of defense was broken. The Tamil special forces managed to penetrate the artillery positions, where 11 guns were destroyed: some by female kamikaze from among the attackers, some by their own servants in order to prevent their capture by the enemy. However, with the help of the arriving reinforcements, Parantan's garrison still managed to repel the attack. At the same time, according to official data, more than 250 servicemen were killed.
The following month, government forces carried out Operation Edibala, which took control of the Vavuniya-Mannar road. The tigers showed little or no resistance.
On May 13, 1997, the Sri Lankan army launched a “decisive” offensive under the loud code name “Jaya Sikuruy” (“Guaranteed Victory”). The main objective of the operation was to regain control of the only land road leading to the Jaffna Peninsula, the section of which between Vavunia and Kilinochchi was under the control of the rebels. The goal of the first stage of the offensive was Puliyankulam, the attack on which was carried out in two converging directions: from the Vavuniya region to the north and from the Veli Oya region through Nedunkeni to the west. Government forces actively used artillery and armored vehicles. The Tigers, in turn, relied on mortar fire and sudden counterattacks. During the fighting on May 13-18, the attackers captured the areas of Omantai and Nedunkeni, while losing about 120 troops. Having secured their positions, on May 24 the troops continued their advance and by June 3 occupied Panikkaniravi, a village just 3 kilometers from Puliyankulam. Already in these first battles, the army lost up to a dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers, knocked out and destroyed, as a result of the active use of RPGs by the Tigers.
On June 9, the Tamils \u200b\u200bentered the areas recently captured by the Sri Lankan army and attacked the village of Tandikulam, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich artillery depots were concentrated. During the fierce fighting that lasted all day, up to three hundred government soldiers were killed, the Tigers managed to knock out several armored vehicles and, more importantly, destroy large stocks of ammunition and ammunition.
On June 22, pulling up reinforcements and replenishing supplies, the army resumed its advance towards Puliyankulam. However, on the night of June 24-25, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a powerful new counter-attack. This time, artillery positions in the Omantai region were attacked. The rebels managed to capture one gun and 4 artillery tractors, 3 more guns were destroyed. As a result of fierce fighting, at least 180 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
The Sri Lankan command was forced to take a one and a half month break in the operation, during which 130 servicemen were killed as a result of the next counter-attack by the Tigers in the Rambaykulam area. Finally, on August 19, as a result of a new offensive, the army managed to capture Puliyankulam. During the fierce fighting in the Tamil village itself, 6 tanks were knocked out, of which two could not be restored, and one BMP was captured.
Operation Jaya Sikuruy, originally planned for 3 months, was clearly stuck. Until the end of the year, the Sri Lankan army made no new attempts at a large-scale offensive. At the same time, the Tigers launched two more major counterattacks. During the first of these, carried out in early October in the Kanakarayankulam area, Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured two Buffel armored personnel carriers and a large number of light weapons and ammunition, killing at least 200 soldiers. And in December, in the same area, a special forces brigade base was destroyed and more than 150 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
On February 1, 1998, the Tamils \u200b\u200battacked Kilinochchi, but this time the operation was unsuccessful. The tigers suffered heavy losses (up to 300 killed), while about 50 soldiers died from the Kilinochchi garrison. During this operation, Tamil saboteurs who penetrated the Jaffna peninsula attacked an artillery base in the Iyakacchi area, from which the heavy artillery of the Sri Lankan army was firing, supporting the garrisons of Kilinochchi and Parantana, and inflicted significant damage on it.
In the period from February to May of the same year, government troops undertook a number of operations, the main purpose of which was to capture Mankulam, the next major settlement on the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi road. The Sri Lankan army managed to get close to Mankulam, but an attempt to capture the city itself in early June failed.
On September 26, 1998, the Tigers launched a large-scale attack on Kilinochchi (Operation Unceasing Waves II). After fierce three days of fighting, Kilinochchi passed into the hands of the attackers. The losses of the Sri Lankan army alone exceeded 1000 people. 4 artillery pieces, 2 T-55 tanks and 8 “Buffel” armored personnel carriers, a large number of light weapons and ammunition were lost. Some of the lost weapons were captured by the Tamils \u200b\u200bas trophies (including 2 or 3 130-mm guns).
The capture of Mankulam was weak compensation for the defeat: taking advantage of the diversion of the main forces of the Tigers to the northern sector of the front, the Sri Lankan army finally took possession of this settlement, losing only 90 people killed.
With the fall of Kilinochchi, it became clear that Guaranteed Victory was unlikely to have any chance of success in the near future. The completion of the Jaya Sikuruy was soon announced, and a series of private offensive operations were launched instead. Thus, as a result of Operation Rivibala, which began in December 1998, the Sri Lankan army captured Oddusuddan, located on the road from Mankulam to Mullativa (which housed the "headquarters" of the Tigers after its capture in 1996). And in March-September 1999, during Operation Ranagosa, a number of areas north of the Vavuniya-Mannar road were cleared of Tamil formations. At the same time, in June 1999, near Mannar, the Sri Lankan Air Force managed to destroy one of the 122-mm guns captured by the Tamils \u200b\u200bin Mullativu.
Despite the lack of rapid and impressive successes, the operations of the Sri Lankan army put the rebels in a difficult position. Already with the loss of the Jaffna Peninsula in 1995-1996, the Tamils \u200b\u200bbegan to feel difficulties in replenishing their troops: the small population of the Vanni and a number of areas of the east coast, which remained under the control of the Tigers, could not provide replenishment of considerable losses. And if there were no special problems with the recruitment of personnel into auxiliary units (often women or "children"), then the special forces and "conventional" infantry could not be content with the same fighters. The loss of many areas of the Vanni further exacerbated the situation.
In these conditions, the events of November 1999 were completely unexpected. By this time, the government forces were stretched out over a long distance in a rather difficult terrain. Numerous attacks by the Tigers on the rear units during Operation Jaya Sikuruy forced a large force to be diverted to protect previously occupied areas. Therefore, with a sufficiently large total number of troops on the front line, there was a very limited contingent.
On the night of November 2, the Tamils \u200b\u200blaunched a large offensive in Vani, codenamed “Unceasing Waves III”. The offensive was carried out from two directions: from the north across the Mankulam-Oddusudan road (here the strike hit the junction of army and marine units) and from the east between Oddusuddan and Nedunkeni. The attackers were helped by special forces units that had infiltrated into the rear. Within a few hours, the "tigers" managed to break through the defenses and capture Oddusuddan, and by the evening of the same day to occupy Nedunkeni. Government forces, leaving behind large quantities of war material, retreated south to the Veli Oya area and west to the Vavuniya-Jaffna highway. Pursuing the retreating, the Tamils \u200b\u200bby the evening of November 5 started fighting on the approaches to Mankulam and Kanakarayankulam. Caught under the threat of encirclement, the Sri Lankan troops did not offer serious resistance and hastily retreated south. There were even cases of armed clashes between demoralized units and the military police, who tried to arrest the fleeing. Only by transferring significant reinforcements, the government army was able to stop the advance of the "tigers" in the Puliyankulam area. According to official figures, the losses of the Sri Lankan army amounted to only about 200 people killed and missing, but the scale of the defeat suggests much greater casualties. The Tamils \u200b\u200bseized a significant amount of light weapons, ammunition and ammunition, which took more than 60 road trips to remove.
Taking advantage of the favorable situation (the attention of the Sri Lankan command was focused primarily on strengthening new positions north of Vavuniya), the Tamils \u200b\u200bon December 11 began active operations on the northern front, seeking to break into the Jaffna Peninsula. The strike was struck along the coast to the Vettilaikerni-Kaddaikadu region (east of Elephant Pass). Already on December 12, these settlements came under the control of the Tamils, which threatened the eastern face of the Elephant Pass base. On December 17, as a result of a powerful attack, the "Tigers" took possession of Parantan, which defended the southern face of the base. However, they failed to advance further, although heavy fighting continued in the area until the end of winter.
On the night of March 26-27, 2000, the "tigers" presented the Sri Lankan army with another surprise: instead of a frontal attack at Elephant Pass (whose garrison exceeded 10 thousand people), a naval assault force of more than 1,500 fighters was landed north of the base, in the Chempiyanpattu area. At the same time, special forces units infiltrated into the rear of the Sri Lankans attacked artillery positions in the Pallai area (according to the Tamils, 11 guns were destroyed). After three days of heavy fighting, the Chempiyanpattu area came under the full control of the “tigers”. Even more important was the fact that on March 28, the landing units, in cooperation with special forces units, blocked the main road from Elephant Pass to Jaffna between the settlements of Pallai and Eluthumadduval. The supply of Elephant Pass was made possible only by a single low-capacity dirt road that ran south of the main road along the coast of Jaffna Lagoon. Government forces made numerous attempts to regain control of the main road. In the fierce fighting, the sides suffered heavy losses, including the Tamils \u200b\u200bdestroyed, captured and knocked out more than 10 armored vehicles. By April 10, the Sri Lankan army managed to clear the road directly from the enemy, but the Tamils \u200b\u200bheld their positions only 500 meters to the north, so it was not possible to restore transport links along the route.
Meanwhile, having transferred reinforcements to the landing, the "tigers" on April 18 dealt another blow from the Chempianpattu area and blocked a strategically important road in another place - between Pallai and Iyakacci. In the following days, fierce battles unfolded for the settlement of Iyakacchi, which fell on April 22. The Elefan Pass garrison, threatened with complete encirclement and destruction, hastily left the base, abandoning most of its weapons. The retreat took place under Tamil fire both along the coastal road and in the shallow waters of the Jaffna lagoon. The losses of the retreating were large - according to various sources, from several hundred to more than a thousand, while the commander of the garrison also died. According to the Tigers, they got 3 152-mm and 2 122-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars and a large number of other weapons and ammunition.
On April 30, after a fierce battle, the Sri Lankan troops left Pallai, which was in a semi-encirclement, and withdrew to the Kilali-Elutkhumadduval-Nagar-Kovil region, where they equipped a new defense line.
Having suffered a heavy defeat and being under the threat of a further offensive by the Tamils \u200b\u200bin order to capture Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army hastily strengthened its forces on the Northern Front. By May 2000, two of the three divisions previously involved in operations in the Vavuniya region had been transferred to the Jaffna Peninsula - thus, five of the nine divisions of the government army - more than 40 thousand servicemen - were concentrated on the peninsula.
Considering that the rebels could hardly allocate more than 5 thousand fighters for the operation against Jaffna, the prospect of such an offensive seemed simply utopian. However, the “tigers” nevertheless started it, and the direction of the strike changed once again: this time the attack was directed from the Punerin area to Navatkuli through the Jaffna lagoon (the depths here are such that they allow ford the lagoon in the dry season). The offensive began on May 10, and within 24 hours the Tamils \u200b\u200bmanaged to capture not only the positions of the Sri Lankan troops on the coastal beaches, but also the strategically important Navatkuli bridge, connecting the Valikamam and Tenmaracchi sectors. Subsequently, the offensive developed in two directions: to the west to the city of Jaffna and to the east to Chavakacherri. In fierce battles, both sides suffered heavy losses. The government forces actively used aviation, the rebels, as usual, relied on the destruction of the enemy by artillery and mortar fire. On May 17, the Tamils \u200b\u200bcaptured the fortified point of Kaitadi (halfway between Navatkuli and Jaffna), and by May 20 they captured the second largest city of the Chavakacherri peninsula and the important village of Sarasalai. The situation for the Sri Lankan army was becoming more and more threatening, however, the forces of the advancing were at the end. In fact, with the occupation of Chavacacherri, the offensive of the “tigers” was exhausted. Despite the fighting continuing until the end of May, the positions of the parties in the area did not change. The attempt of the Tamils, following the capture of Elephant Pass, to completely master the Jaffna Peninsula, failed.
Having brought the troops, battered in previous battles, in order over the summer, the Sri Lankan army from the beginning of September moved to active operations against the Tamils. On September 3, an offensive began on the Navatkuli area, code-named "Rivikirana", the main attack being delivered from the direction of Jaffna. However, the very next day, having lost at least 170 soldiers killed, the Sri Lankan army stopped the operation. On September 17, the offensive, the target of which was Chavakacherri, resumed (Operation Kinihira I). During the day of fierce fighting, the Sri Lankans captured the city, repulsing a number of counter-attacks by the "tigers".
Until the end of the year, government forces carried out a series of successive offensive operations, united under the common name "Kinihira". The Tamils, weakened by previous battles, could not hold their positions and gradually retreated: in October, the Sri Lankan army occupied Sarasalai, on December 21, Kaitadi, on December 30, Navatkuli. By the new 2001, the "tigers" evacuated their last units from the area.
After removing the direct threat to Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army attacked Tamil positions in the Eluthumadduval-Nagar-Kovil area on April 25, 2001 (Operation Agnie Khiela). The "Tigers" put up fierce resistance in well-equipped positions for the year, making extensive use of mortars and artillery. Heavy three-day fighting did not lead to any changes in the front line, the losses of the Sri Lankan army exceeded 300 killed. After that, until the end of the year, no serious hostilities took place, both sides were actively involved in training troops, accumulating weapons and ammunition. In January 2002, an armistice was signed, which continues to this day. However, the prospects for concluding a peace treaty remain extremely vague - since none of the parties, agreeing to various concessions, does not agree to concede on the main issue - the creation of an independent Tamil state.
Let us now turn to the losses of the sides during the entire period of the armed confrontation. According to official Sri Lankan data, the army and the police lost their lives: from 1983 to 1994 - 5,250 people, from April 1995 to January 1997 - 4,760 people, from February 1997 to the moment of the armistice - more than 8,000 troops, a total of about 18 thousand people. The losses of the rebels are estimated by the Sri Lankan army at 30 thousand, the "tigers" argue that this figure is actually half as much - in any case, the ratio of losses (given the quantitative and technical superiority of government forces) looks very "flattering" for the rebels.
In conclusion, let's say a few words about the structure of the Sri Lankan army. It consists of 8 infantry divisions and one special forces division. By the time of the ceasefire, they were deployed as follows: 21st Division - Mannar, 22nd - Trincomalee, 23rd - Batticaloa, 51st, 52nd, 54th and 55th - Jaffna, 56th - Vanni. Each infantry division usually consists of 4 brigades, the numbers of which are formed by adding numbers from 1 to 4 to the division number (for example, 561st, 562nd, 563rd and 564th brigades of the 56th division). The 53rd Elite Special Forces Division, which took part in almost all major operations, consists of a commando brigade, a special forces brigade and an airmobile brigade. There are also several separate tank, artillery and engineer regiments, attached as necessary to divisions as part of the reinforcement.
The police units involved in operations against the insurgents are divided into brigades, each of which has its own area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. Two special police brigades are stationed in the Batticaloa and Ampara area.
In a massive and well-prepared offensive launched in 2008, the Sri Lankan army was able to almost completely break the resistance of the Tamil rebels from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who have been fighting for almost a quarter century to create an independent Tamil state in the north-east of the island. The "Tigers" lost all their fortified points, strongholds and were forced to retreat into the jungle. Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa has announced that the rebels will be finished in 2009. However, winning does not mean ensuring a stable peace. The contradictions remain the same as they were at the very beginning of the conflict.
The armed confrontation between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan authorities has been going on for so long that sometimes it seems that it has always been so. It is hard to believe that the civil war that began in 1983 with the Sinhalese massacre of Tamils \u200b\u200bcould ever end. And, nevertheless, recent events speak for themselves. The Sri Lankan army, which purchased modern weapons from India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation, apparently managed to turn the tide of history. In 2008, she consistently moved to the north of Sri Lanka, recapturing more and more territories from the separatists. The cities of Kokavil and Mankulam fell. In September, one of the most important strongholds of the "tigers", Parantan, was taken, a former fort that was the key to the capital of the informal Tamil state - the city of Kilinochchi.
After that, the offensive stalled a little. Probably, stubborn battles for the capital of the "tigers" took place throughout the fall and early winter. It is still impossible to say how the hostilities unfolded and what were the losses on both sides: the Sri Lankan authorities completely closed the war zone from journalists and observers, claiming that they were acting in the interests of their own safety. One way or another, but on January 2, the capital of the "Tamil Tigers" Killinochchi was taken. After that, government forces moved further north and captured the fort city of Elephant Pass, or Elephant Pass, which is located on a narrow isthmus that connects the Jaffna Peninsula lying in the north with Sri Lanka. On January 15, the army announced that the entire peninsula was under its control.
Finally, on January 25, the last stronghold of the Tamil separatists was taken - the city of Mullaittivu, located on the northwest coast. It was the main sea gate of the self-proclaimed Tamil state. The Sri Lankan Navy blocked it from the sea in order not only to cut off the main supply channel for the Tamil Tigers, but also to prevent them from breaking out of the ring and leaving the island. As a result, the rebels were driven back into the jungle and trapped in a small area of \u200b\u200babout 300 square kilometers. The situation is complicated by the fact that about 250 thousand civilians live in this territory, who are caught between two fires. The Sri Lankan government issued an ultimatum to the Tigers, demanding the release of the civilian population through the security corridor. However, this was done, rather, to calm international public opinion: the entire history of the conflict shows that both warring parties, without much hesitation, let civilians into the expense, if circumstances required it.
However, the question that worries observers no less, and maybe even more, is how durable the victory of the Sri Lankan government over the "Tamil Tigers" is. Is the current leader of the "tigers" Velupillai Prabhakaran ready to continue the fight or is he busy looking for an opportunity to leave the island as soon as possible? He previously stated that he would not give up. By the way, successful offensives of the Sri Lankan army on the "tigers", like the one that happened in 2008, happened before, and every time Tamil separatists found the opportunity and strength to deliver a counterstrike, which brought all the government's efforts to naught.
This was the case, for example, in 1995-96, when the Sri Lankan armies, as a result of military operations under the code names Riviresa I, II and III, also managed to take control of the Jaffna Peninsula. As it is today, the Sri Lankan government argued that the defeat of the rebels was near. However, on 18 July 1996, the Tamils \u200b\u200bunexpectedly launched an operation called "Unstoppable Waves" and took over the city of Mullativu. At the same time, the superiority of government forces in numbers and weapons did not help. The constant shortage of heavy weapons forced the "tigers" to develop special tactics of warfare: their main force is made up of small but well-trained commandos, as well as kamikaze, who seize key positions in the rear and break into the defense from the inside. In the attack on Mullativa, the strike teams broke forward and captured a weapons depot, which was immediately directed against the defenders. The garrison of about 1,600 people was completely destroyed.
"Tamil Tigers". Photo (c) AFP
Of course, the Sri Lankan army took into account the mistakes of the past. In addition, now the "tigers" are seriously damaged. In addition to the defeat in Sri Lanka, over the past few years, law enforcement agencies of a number of foreign countries suppressed the activities of several international networks involved in collecting and sending funds for the Tamil rebels. The arrests took place in the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are considered a terrorist organization. But even if the "tigers" no longer have the strength and means to carry out a large-scale operation, they can go on to guerrilla warfare, that is, return to what, in fact, they started with in the 70s and early 80s. And in order to fight the guerrillas and keep under control the areas covered by the jungle recaptured from the "tigers", the Sri Lankan army will need much more human and material resources than to conduct open hostilities.
It is also clear that in the event that Tamil insurgents move to guerrilla warfare in Sri Lanka, the number of terrorist attacks will increase manifold, especially with the use of suicide bombers. In recent years, when the attention of the world community was riveted on the countries of the Near and Middle East, the words "suicide bomber" were mainly associated with the so-called "martyrs." In fact, the Tamil Tigers account for most of the terrorist attacks involving kamikaze terrorists. This is their kind of visiting card. The group created a special suicide squad, which was named "Black Tigers". The loudest terrorist attack of the Black Tigers was the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who paid for India's intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war in 1987-1990. The premiere was blown up by a Tamil suicide bomber, who handed him a bouquet of flowers in which a bomb was hidden.
Other successful terrorist attacks by the Tamil Tigers include the bombing of an oil storage facility in the capital of Colombo in 1995, the assassination of Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993, Navy Commander Admiral Fernando in 1992, not to mention the numerous bloody attacks against ordinary Sri residents. Lankans being blown up on buses and in markets. The danger of a repetition of these terrorist acts cannot be ruled out also because, despite the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers, none of the reasons underlying the armed conflict has been eliminated. Meanwhile, these contradictions are so deeply rooted in the history of the Sri Lankan society and state that, most likely, one cannot do without a political solution.
Sri Lanka is home to many nationalities. Four fifths of the population is Sinhalese, who live mainly in the south of the country. Tamils \u200b\u200bliving in the north and east, according to some estimates, make up one tenth of the population. The rest is accounted for by smaller ethnic groups, including the so-called Indian Tamils, who were brought in by British colonialists from India to work on tea plantations. They live in the central regions and do not take part in the war. The contradictions between Tamils \u200b\u200band Sinhalese date back to the colonial era. Before colonization, there were three states in Sri Lanka - two Sinhalese and one Tamil. Having established control over the island in the 19th century, the British united them into one. At the same time, guided by the principle of "divide and rule", the colonialists relied precisely on the Tamil minority, whose representatives were entrusted with many important administrative functions.
Leader of the Tamil Tigers Veluppilai Prabhakaran. Photo (c) AFP
Despite this, after the island gained independence in 1948, ethnic clashes among its inhabitants for a long time did not have. The United National Party (UNP) came to power, uniting representatives of various groups belonging to the stratum of the European educated elite. Ethnic and confessional contradictions - between Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus - escalated later when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (PSLP) entered the political scene, using patriotic and sometimes nationalist Sinhalese rhetoric, intending to take revenge for colonial times and restore "justice" in relations between Sinhalese and Tamils. The Sinhalese language became the only state language, Buddhism was actively promoted, and quotas for national and regional affiliation were introduced in universities. This provoked the discontent of the Tamil minority, which in turn led to the formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which demanded the creation of an independent Tamil state - Tamil Eelam.
Further escalation of political confrontation led to inter-ethnic clashes and war. In 1987, India intervened in the conflict, through which the parties managed to reach a compromise. The Sri Lankan authorities agreed to recognize the official status of the Tamil language, to provide the northern and eastern regions inhabited by Tamils \u200b\u200bwith broad autonomy. In the end, however, nothing came of it. Several truces that were concluded during civil war, also failed to give rise to a political settlement.
But in any case, the 25-year-long armed conflict, which killed about 70 thousand people, indicates that the conflict will not be resolved by military means. It is possible to defeat the "tigers", drive them into the jungle, but the question of the political rights of the Tamil minority will remain open, which means that the possibility of a new confrontation is not ruled out. It is noteworthy that the current President Rajapaksa is also a representative of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he is not inclined to compromise with the Tamils, which means that he risks stepping on the same rake.
Perhaps, in terms of the number of various special forces and their percentage of the total number of the army, Sri Lanka occupies one of the first places in the world. The reason for this lies in the fact that over the past decades, the main (and in fact the only one - apart from UN peacekeeping operations) conflict in which the Sri Lankan army was involved, remained the war with the Tamil rebels of the LTTE.
In total, during the civil war that ended in 2009, 685 Sri Lankan special forces were killed. 10 of them were posthumously awarded the highest award of Sri Lanka - Parama Vira Vibhushana.
At present, the Sri Lankan special forces have about 5 thousand servicemen.
The first was the commando regiment of the Sri Lankan army. The decision on its formation was made in 1977 by the then commander of the army, Lieutenant General Janaka Pereira. About a dozen officers and sergeants were trained by Indian para-commandos.
And on March 15, 1980, the first commando squadron was formed, after 6 years deployed into a full-fledged regiment, and in April 1988 - into a separate brigade.
In total, during the years of the civil war, 4 commando regiments were formed. During the war, they played the role of airborne assault units, specializing in combat operations in urban conditions, air and sea landings, assaults of fortified LTTE bases in the jungle, as well as counter-terrorism operations and the protection of top officials of the state.
Since 1993, the main base and commando school have been located in Velioi in the Northern Province, which had the status of a "border village" on the border of the territories controlled by the LTTE.
In June-July 2007, it was 1200 commandos who stormed the main LTTE base in the Eastern Province on Mount Toppigala, nicknamed the "Sri Lankan Tora Bora", the capture of which led to the establishment of full government control over the Eastern Province.
After the end of the war, the regiments were reduced to the size of battalions. Today the commando regiment consists of 4 battalions, as well as separate groups for the protection of the country's leaders, counterterrorism and service dog breeding.
Each battalion has 140 operatives, divided into teams of 20 people.
The second special unit of the Sri Lankan army - the special forces regiment - began its history in 1985, with a squadron trained by advisers from the Pakistani special forces of the SSG. It was deployed to the regiment in December 1988, and in March 1997 - to a separate brigade.
During the civil years, it consisted of up to five regiments. The first commander of the 1st Special Forces Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Fazli Lafir, died in battle in July 1996, commanding an operation to unblock the besieged LTTE garrison of government forces in Mullaitivu, and was posthumously awarded Parama Vira Vibhushana.
Unlike commandos, special forces regiments specialized in raids behind enemy lines with deep reconnaissance, sabotage and acts of sabotage.
Now the special forces regiment has 3 battalions, trained on operations in the jungle by patrols of 4-8 fighters.
Also in the regiment there is a team of combat divers and one of the most famous units of the Sri Lankan army - a squadron of combat raiders, which regularly entertains spectators at army events with shooting from AK-47 and grenade launchers from the saddle of motorcycles at full speed.
The third special unit of the army was created in 1996, but the authorities officially recognized its existence only in 2013. The deep reconnaissance detachment, now numbering about 200 fighters, is the elite of the Sri Lankan special forces.
In addition to commandos and special forces regiments, it also includes former LTTE militants who have sided with the government. During the war years, they specialized in operations in small groups deep in enemy territory, organized sabotage and attempted assassination of high-ranking LTTE officials.
Fighters of the deep reconnaissance detachment killed at least 8 separatist commanders ranging from major to colonel, and several times unsuccessfully attempted the life of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. They were also accused of killing a number of human rights defenders and lawyers who defended the captured militants.
The training of the squad members takes place in the Maduro Oya National Park. Final exam - 100 km march on national park with 18 control points in 72 hours, with full load, no food, no water, with one compass.
The park is known for the largest population of wild elephants in the country, which you have to wade past. Of course, for the sake of saving lives, you can shoot at elephants, but that means failing the exam.
This special unit does not have any special uniform or insignia.
The Air Force also has a separate special forces regiment, it was created in July 2003.
He was entrusted with the task of protecting air bases, as well as rescuing the crews of downed helicopters and aircraft on enemy territory.
As part of the fleet in January 1993, with the help of instructors from the British SBS, its Special Boat Squadron (SBS) was created under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ravindra Vijigunaratne. Already in November 1993, he carried out the first operation to repulse the fleet camp in Punerin captured by the LTTE.
During the war years, SBS operatives intercepted ships delivering weapons to LTTE, conducted coastal reconnaissance for amphibious assault landing, confronted Sea Tigers that attacked Sri Lankan ships in their motor boats, often in kamikaze attacks.
Specially for the SBS, high-speed boats "Arrow" were designed and built, armed with a 23-mm automatic cannon and a PKM machine gun.
By the way, after the end of the civil one, the Australians became interested in this development of the Sri Lankans - to fight illegal migrants.